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This thesis ia an attempt to discover and to Rive an account 
o i the origins o f the (Romantic) idea o f imagination which dominates 
Xiiglish art educational theory. Though I hbve written what is  
essentially  the history o f an idea, I have endeavoured throughout 
to relate the d ifferent aspects o f "imagination” to concurrent 
philosophical, psychological, and aesthetic theories. iiy method 
has been to read in the original ( i . e .  translated) sources every­
thing I could find on "imagination" and closely associated concepts 
and, with the occasional support o f  expert commentaries and coim>- 
entators, to establish the relationships and differences between 
these findings. No work of this type or scope has hitherto been 
undertaken though, inevitably, vork has already been done or* a few 
aspects o f the subject, (notably by M.W. Bundy and M. Wemocli), so 
that though I cannot claim that a ll this thesis is  entirely original, 
a ll  o f  i t s  seven parts contain men original work, and Parts 3* 4, 
and 5 arc largely orig ina l.
I have sought to demonstrate that "imagination" is an ancient 
and very broadly used concept which enjoys a prominent place in 
often-contradictory theoretical systems and that i t s  contradictions, 
s teeming largely from Platonic metaphysics Aristotelian philosophy 
o f  mind, and even elemental cosmology, compounded and unresolved 
throughout subsequent history, have entered English art educational 
theory. The separate parts o f this thesis are chronologically based 
this being to my mind the simplest and most direct way o f dealing 
with the subject matter. Thus ihe study starts with Plato, includin
- . . 1.   . j l.t ....... m  _ . .. »  • .  j » .  .. J. . . . - » -» - —  r  .
1CJ.V1VU \*\i VW «* VJi V U IJ VUO f tkUU AiJLO WMt!| l/X UV/C &  W1C U>;
theory o f imagination through Antiquity and the Middle Ages, with 
particular reference to (hristinu theology; moves to an examination 
o f  "imagination" in lienaicsnnce magic, comparing and relating thir.
to the theory o f  art from Alberti onwards; considers the philosophers 
o f the 17th century with sp ecific  concentration on place o f "imagin­
ation" in their theories, and examines the Romantic and pre-Romantic, 
philosophical, psychological, and aesthetic theories o f imagination. 
Finally there is  an account o f  some o f the subsequent 19th century 
developments in Existentialism and Phenomenology. liy conclusion is 
that because o f the great breadth o f interpretation that "imagination" 
bears, i t s  undefined use at the heart o f  art educational theory can 
only perpetuate the obfuscation that exists there.

1Chapter 1 : PLATO
Introduction.
A.N. Whitehead remarked that the history o f western philosophy 
consists o f footnotes to Plato. With respect to the theory of 
imagination this in  very largely true, for though there is  no word in 
his Dialogues which corresponds to our broad modern concept o f 
imagination, there are central themes in his works which have come to 
be regarded as aspects o f this concept. These themes are threefold, 
and to varying degrees they dominate subsequent theories o f 
imagination: so we have P lato's idea o f "madness", a mystic or visionary 
state which is  very like the la ter notion o f divine revelation; a 
psychology o f cognition developing from the material o f sense to the 
fom al ideas o f reason; and an epistemology whose apogee are the Forms, 
ideals which are close relatives o f Kant's Ideas o f reason. The second 
o f these themes is  more fu lly  worked out by Aristotle and his De Anima. 
with it s  theory o f imagination as intermediary (and to some extent 
interregnum) between sense and understanding, has heavily influenced 
subsequent psychology. Mediaeval Christian theology came to regard 
the imagination as a sine qua non o f divine vision, following the 
Platonic ( l )  and Neoplatonic models, and in Kant's Critique of 
Judgment imagination is  seen to be a cognitive faculty which 
■ )presents aesthetical ideas:. To my knowledge, there is  no theory 
of imagination before Plato ( 2) but, as I have attempted to show,
Plato took much from his forebears, especially Pythagoreanism end 
mythology, a fact which is  very important in the light o f the survival 
o f his Timaens during the Middle Ages -  probably the only one o f his 
works which was known in it s  entire*y during that period. Dow far
il ) See fi.P.Koffol . "The ITi «+,nrv o f Ph<lflcftnhv".tfol . Or n.oo . •*. . . PI *+.0 
and his philosophy bad the greatest share in obtaining for Christianity 
it s  rational organisation, and in bringing i t  into the kingdom o f the 
supernatural, for i t  was Plato who made the f ir s t  advance in this direction
(2) See J .1 .P.cnre, "Greek Theories o f Elementary Cognition Prom Alcmaeon 
to A ristotle", p .251 : "Defore Plato . . .  we find no record o f any serious 
treatment o f memory or imagination."
2P lato 's theories as such were influential during the centuries between 
the closing o f the Athenian, and the opening o f the Florentine Academies 
is  unknown ( l ) ,  but the Pythagorean Timaeus was an authoritative text 
for  alchemists and pre-Newtonian natural philosophers, who had their 
own ideas abput the magical powers o f imagination.( 2)
The following chapter on Plato is  divided into two sections which 
are both concerned with what 1 have called, following P. FriecLlsender, 
the Platonic eidos* o f "highest state", and the two ways o f achieving 
i t .  These are the manic and the d ia lectic routes. The former pertains 
to the "madness" which I have already mentioned, the la tter to the 
cognitive psychology upon which Aristotle founded much o f his De Anima.
In the f i r s t  section I deal with this manic route to the eidos. relating 
i t  to some ancient beliefs which Plato adopted and concentrating 
sp e c ifica lly  on the mythology o f  the Phaedrus. which yields a paradigm 
o f the idea i f  inspiration and which, in the Renaissance, was o f particular 
interest to Karsilio Ficino and Giordano Bruno. In the second section 
I deal with the d ia lectic  route to the eidos concentrating here on 
P lato 's concept o f eikasia and i t s  function in cognition. Finally I 
suggest that there may be grounds for interrelating these two "routes".
(1) The extent o f P lato 's  influence is  probably greater than has hitherto 
been suspected; see e .g . R. Klibanskv. "The Continuity o f The Platonic 
Tradition", p. 35 ! "•••the prevailing theory o f a definite break between 
Mediaeval and Renaissance Platonism which has dominated the history o f 
philosophy cannot he maintained on closer inspection o f the fa cts ."
(2 ) See Klihansky. op. c i t . . p.23 : The Timacus with it s  attempted
synthesis o f the religious te leolog ica l ju stifica tion  o f the world and 
the rational exposition o f creation was, throughout the earlier Middle 
Ages, the starting point and guide for the f ir s t  groping e fforts  towards 
a s c ie n t ific  cosmology." See also G.Ü.G. Mure. "A ristotle", P.241.
* 1 have rendered a ll Greek words into their Ehglish equivalents 
. throughout in order to avoid complications wixn typing.
t
3CHAPTER 1. PLATO
SECTION I .
The man Timacus was a Pythagorean philosopher, ( l )  and the Timaene. as 
Guthrie says, is  the "most Pythagorean" ( 2) o f  P lato's dialogues* Indeed, 
Pythagoreanism was a "major formative influence" on P lato .(op. c i t . .  p.147) 
although the fu ll  extent o f that influence is  inestimable since the 
precise nature o f  lythagorean b e lie f is  unknown. Vie do know, however, 
that P lato 's most fundamental be lie fs  are, in e ll  likelihood, Pythagorean 
in origin . I t  is  Aristotle, the source o f much that is  known o f the pre- 
Socratic philosophers, who f ir s t  ascribes to Pythagoras the doctrine that 
"the principles o f numbers are the principles o f a ll things." ( 3 )» and 
Pythagoras is  also credited with the discovery o f the dependency o f 
musical intervals upon mathematical ratios. Pythagoras and his followers 
receive l i t t l e  mention in the Dialogues, but Socrates agrees with them that 
harmonics(4) and astronomy are "sister sciences1^ ? ) , end stresses the value 
o f  astronomy as preparation for  a study o f the laws and principles o f  
mathematics. The importance o f  mathematics for  Plato is  well-known, and 
any schoolboy w ill associate Pythagoras with maths., more fundamental, is  
the doctrine o f metempsychosis which Pinto took from Pythagoreenism, and 
whose inception is  wrongly credited to Pythagoras h im self.(6) 123
(1) See Klibanslcy. op. c i t . . p.27
( 2) W.K.C.Guthrie. "A History o f Greek Philosophy", Vol.l.«p»282. C .f. also 
Guthrie, op. c i t . . p.211. "A.E. Taylor hold that throughout this dialogue 
Plato was doing no more than reproduce a fifth-century Pythagorean account 
o f the world. Pew would go a ll the way with him in th is, but we have seen 
enough to give assent.. . . "  ( . . t o  the great influence o f  Pythagoras on P la to .)
( 3 ) Republic. 530d. By 'harmonics' we would nowadays mean "tuning, or 
accoustic theory". (Hew Oxford D ictionary o f Music).
ik ) Metaphysics. A985b 21). See also Guthrie, op. c i t . .  P.168.5) Republic. 530d. In Republic 600b occurs the sole mention o f Pythagoras in the dialogues, he is  favourably compared with Homer and other "poetical 
individuals" who arc "only imitators", and incapable o f  knowledge. ( 600c—e )• 
Guthrie comments, (op. c i t . . p.160). : "this single reference is  o f  great 
**•
(¿5 See Ha cyclopaedia Dri tannic a. "Metempsychosis“ . This doctrine is  ancient 
and universal, and i3 found in Buddhism} Pythagoras probably found i t  in 
Egypt, where he is  said to have travelled, Soe also Guthrie, op. c i t . .p .1 65.
*
4A b e lie f in metempsychosis and in the kinship o f a ll nature is  shared 
by Hnpedoclcs, (see Appendix A), Heraclitus, and the ancient Greek mystery 
religions including Orphism and Dionysianism, though the individuating 
aspects o f each o f these philosophies are d iff ic u lt  to pinpoint. Fried- 
laender's assessment o f  Pythagoras as an "intellectual force e ffective 
through the ages" ( l )  is  absolutely correct, and is  a view shared by 
Hegol(8); sim ilarly Bertrand Bussell's description o f him as 'h a lf Einstein 
half Mary Baker Eddy' is  indicative o f the vide sweep o f  Pythagorean ism.
The influence o f  Pythagoras on Plato is  manifest in the cosmology o f 
Timaeus and in the visionary, acstatic content o f some o f the Socratic 
dialogues, but i t  also has a significant e ffe ct on the mainstream o f 
European philosophical b e lie f through the Neoplatonism which Plotinus 
founded in the 3rd century A.D.. Many o f  Plotinus' followers wrote bio­
graphies o f  Pythagoras, and the widespread b e lie f in the 'princip le o f 
plenitude' or ' chain o f  being' which was held by a rtists, scientists and 
philosophers during the 17th and 18th centuries, is  in large part a develop­
ment o f Pythagorean doctrines o f universal harmony. And whilst Neoplatonism 
contributed enormously to Catholic theology, Pythagorean number theory had 
a great practical influm ece on Italian Benaissance painting(3). Neo­
platonism also did much to shape early Romantic theory through Novalis (who 
probably coined the term "Romautiker") a t  the end o f the 18th century and 
who was a passionate admirer o f Plotinus. The vision o f  a universal harmony
f l )  P.Priedlaender. "Plato s An Introduction", p.27.
(2) Hegel ( on. c i t . .  0.194-3) is  less than approbatory on the breadth and 
influence o f  Pythagorean!am : "All the ideas o f magio, that medley o f 
unnatural and natural, the mysteries which pervade a clouded miserable 
imagination, and the wild ideas o f distorted brains, have attached them­
selves co him. However corrupt the h istory  o f his l i f e ,  h is philosophy 
is  as much so. Everything engendered by Christian melancholy and love of 
allegory has been identified  with i t . "
It .  QT k .  f w w . P  Wi n\ s t—- — *■- - —« -------- J — f r  — — -1—  ------ --T -,r —
"Architectural Principles in the Age o f  Humanism". " . .  . .Wittkower has 
exhaustively shown how 'Renaissance a rtis ts  firmly adhered to the Pythagorean 
conception 'A ll  is  Number' end, guided by Plato and the Neo-Platonists and 
supported by a long chain o f theologians from Augustine onwards, they were 
convinced o f  the mathematical and harmonic structure o f  the universe and 
a ll crcationl "
5is  what lin ks these developments, a vision which is  sometimes seen as 
the revard o f protracted e ffo r t  and devotion and sometimes o f immediate 
intuition , and in both cases what we now co ll "imagination" has a crucial 
and indispensable part to play* As wo shall see, th is "vision" occurs in 
several guises throughout the history o f human thought, i t  is ,  as 1 hope 
to demonstrate, a permanent and precious quality o f the bumen mind and 
generally associated with imagination*
Hollowing Friedlsender, I  have called th is "vision" the eidos in 
relation to  Plato, identifying the d ia lectic  and the manic routes to 
the eidos — the former being the reward o f e ffo r t , the la tter  o f something 
like in tu ition . One or other o f  these routes is  the theme o f most o f 
the lKnlt»pi«Bf but in th is section we are concerned with the manic route, 
particu larly as i t  is  formulated in Phaedrus; as Jowett says in the intro­
duction to  his translation o f th is work : " . . .h e  appears to intimate here, 
as in the Ion. Apology.Meno. and elsewhere, that there is  a faculty in man, 
whether to  be termed in modern language genius, or inspiration, or 
imagination, or idealism, or communion with. God, which cannot be reduced 
to rule o r  measure."(l)
Attitudes to the ancient myths were changing during P lato 's time ( 2) 
but i t  i s  evident from the opening remarks in Phaedrus that Socrates has /
a good knowledge o f them and, as becomes forcib ly  demonstrated in this 
work, a great respect for  the truths which they embody. P lato 's own views 
o f  the o ld  nyths is  ambiguous(3 ) as the themes o f the different dialogues 
show, but i t  is  not unreasonable to assume that he may have shared Socrates' 
obvious *. aspect for  them. They certainly inform P lato 's own mythology in 
their cocnon quest for  an anthropomorphic framework fo r  the ineffable 
mystery o f  the ”viaion"(4) o f which we have spoKen, a quest which appears
(1) The necessary connection between soul and eidoo " is  the focal point in 
P lato 's philosophy" as i t  is  in the myths} see Friedlsender, on. c i t . . n.197.
(2) See lfrigdlaendor. op. c i t . . p.172.
(3 ) See e .n . Phaedrus 229c and Lows 907b.
(4) See Guthrie, on. c i t . . n .270-1.
6,
to be comuon to a ll myths and which also characterises the late Romantic 
aesthetic o f myth and symbol as means o f intimating 'Ideas' in the sense 
o f  Kant (and Schopenhauer) and 'sp irit*  in the Hegelian (mid Berkeleyan) 
sense. Whereas for the Romantics imagination is  seen as both the maker 
and interpreter o f myth and symbol, fo r  Plato these functions are aspects 
o f  "divine madness". The Platonic myth is  something more than en attempt 
to fam iliarise the unknown through a lle g o ry ,(l) for i t  has an eschatological 
significance which transcends interpretation, and contains an injunction 
to strive towards the very highest state, the eidos. as exemplified by 
by philosophy. Several o f  the Dialogues illustrate th is point, but none 
more so than the Phaedrus. but i t  is  possible that the fu ll import o f 
P lato 's myths may escape those who are in the habit o f  making a rig id  
distinction between the in te lle ct and the m otions, as Jowett warns :
•iio one can duly appreciate the dialogues o f Plato, especially  the Phaedrus. 
Symposium, and parts o f the Republic, who has not a sympathy with mysticism." 
And he adds t
"By mysticism we mean, not the extravagance o f an erring fancy, but 
the concentration o f  reason in feeling, the enthusiastic love o f the good, 
the true, the one, the sense o f the in fin ity  o f  lmovledge end the marvel 
o f  the human fa cu lt ie s ." ( 2) (See Appendix B).
Phaedrus is  unique in Plato for  i t s  id y llic  pastoral setting, in "a 
spot sacred to Achelous and the Nymphs. "(3)* Its  theme is  madness; not 
the "humca infirm ity" (Phaedrus 265a) which we normally understand by that 
word, but "divine madness" which is  "a divine release o f  the soul from the 
yoke end custom o f convention." (o p .c it . .  p.244-5)
(1 ) Plato was adverse to allegorical interpretation o f  the myths, see 
Republic T78d.. & Phaodrus 2291>-e. N.B. also J.A. Stewart. "The Myths o f 
P lato .I, 23p .l5 ,3: "Eschatological Myths demand genuine b e l ie f ."
(2) Quoted from Jowett's introduction to h is translation to Phaedrus. 'The 
sentiments expressed here are not dissimilar from the Rapedoclcan views o f
B. Russell (sec appendix A), and despite the cautionary word "mysticism",
I con only reiterate tboir importance in educational theory.
(3 ) Phaedrus S’TOb. For a discussion o f the importance o f the setting o f 
th is dialogue, see Friedlsender. op. c i t . . p.172.
j
7Socrates l is t s  four types o f this madness: "prophetic, in itiatory , 
poetic, erotieJ "(l) each o f  which is  identified with a god: "the 
f ir s t  was the inspiration o f Apollo, the second that o f  Dionysus, 
the third that o f the Muses, the fourth that o f Aphrodite and Eros."
(Phaedrus 265b). The o ld  myths were undoubtedly the religion o f 
P lato 's day, and their influence on him is  strik ingly apparent from 
these passages, but an examination o f the individual importance o f  these 
gods and their attributes shows how the belie fs which they carry s t i l l  
survive to this day, retaining much o f  their original force. Apollo 
is  the most important o f  these gods for Plato, as he is  in Greek mythology, 
and is  second only to Zeus; ( 2) he is  the sun-god, and the sun is  else­
where a symbol fo r  knowledge.( 3 ) he is  Socrates' patron god, and both 
Pythagoras(4) and Flato(5) were said after their deaths to be sons o f 
Apollo. According to Otto,
"Apollo is  the most Greek o f  a ll gods . . . .  Although Dionysiae 
enthusiasm was once an important force there can nevertheless be no 
doubt that the Greek temper was inclined to subdue th is and a ll  other 
fonts o f intemperence, and that i t s  great representatives unhesitatingly 
embraced the Apollonian sp ir it  end nature. Dionysiac nature desiderates 
intoxication, and hence proximity; Apollonian desiderates c la rity  and 
form, and hence distance. The f ir s t  impression th is  word gives is  o f  t
something negative, but implied in i t  is  the most positive thing o f  a ll -  
the attitude o f cogn ition ." (6)
,1 ,
2
,3,
4
,5,
6
Hackforth's translation has "mystic" for " in itia tory ". 
See W.F.Ctto. "The Ilomeric Gods," p.6l 
See Republic 7. 5 1 4 ff .. the simile o f the cave. 
Guthrie. "The Greeks and Their Gods", p.197.
Zeller, n.118 
Otto, on. c i t . .  n.98.
8This rather austere, distant quality o f Apollo accords v e il with the 
contemplative temper o f his philosopher followers, and is  characteristic 
o f the Apollonian tendency in art, which Nietzsche and Burckhardt(l) 
contrasted with the Dionysian.( 2)
The poetic madness associated with the Muses is  more fam iliar, being 
a part o f  the a r t is t ic  myth which has retained it s  original form, and i t  
hardly needs amplification here, as with the other myths o f  human creative­
ness, i t  largely owes it s  perpetuity to the authority o f Plato. The divine 
inspiration o f "poets, prophets and soothsayers" is  dependent upon their 
lacking "every p a rtic le  o f  reason and understanding"; ( l o c .c i t )  The sense 
o f  awe communicated by these words seems at odds with P lato 's condemnation 
o f  poets and a rtis ts  in the Republic, and a similar inconsistency is  the 
assertion, both in Phaedrus ( 265b) and Symposium that erotic madness is  
superior to the others. Socrates is  undoubtedly the prototype for  Diotima's 
Eros, (Symposium 201 d .f f  ) the sp ir it  ( daimon) who i s  the guide to philosophy 
(Phaedrus 277a) and who, "like a ll sp ir its " , mediates between the mortal 
and irsnortal. As Friedlaender says, Plato was deeply attached to the 
demonic world(4) to which Socrates is  guide, giving, as i t  does, "protection 
against philistin ism " and "the impetus for  an ascent to the World o f Forms"(5) 
In Platonic terms the daimon1 a remarkable powers are only explicable by 
the transmigration o f  the soul, end it s  innate (Qnpe do clean) tendency 
towards that to which i t  truly belongs; but that the route i s  d if f ic u lt  and 
even painful is  illu strated  by the e fforts  o f  the neophyte to depart from 
the cave, and, in Phaedrus, the sou l's  pain in growing it s  wings and the
(1) See appendix C.
( 2) Guthrie, op. c i t . .  p.200-1. suggests that the prophetic mania which 
Socratos associates with Apollo may have been borrowed from worshippers o f  
Dionysus.
( 3 ) "Like Bacchic maidens . . .  when they are under the influence o f  Dionysus." 
{lon.774).
V4; K.n. also Guthrie. "A History o f Greek Philosophy", V o l.l. p.231 » 
"Pythagoras himself quickly achieved the status o f a daimon intermediate 
between man and god, or even an incarnation o f the Hyperborean A pollo."
(5) See Friodisender. "Plato", (Vol.3. "The Dialogues, Second and Third 
Periods" ) p.229.
9charioteer's struggle with his s teed s(l). In the mythical and emotive realm 
o f poetic madness, i t  is  Dionysus who is  the archetypal daimon.
As the "Dacchae" o f  Euripides shows, the arrival o f the cult o f 
Dionysus into Greece was a remarkable h istorica l event,( 2) and the drunkenness, 
revelling, end lasciviousness which cure associated with his name and that o f 
Bacchus are a mould from which the mythical notion o f  the dissolute artists 
has been cast. The almost total identification  o f Dionysus with Bacchus, 
illustrated  in the paintings o f Bnbens and Titian, is  erroneous, but is  
understandable in terms o f  the superficial antics o f their followers; excess 
and intoxicant may substitute for inspiration, and may even protect against 
philistinism , but they are also the elements o f  a rt is t ic  charlatanism. (4) 
Drunkenness was a prominent feature o f  Dionysian orgies(3 ), but the original 
ortria were not the simple physical events implied by the Ihglish word; and 
were acts o f  religious devotion.: "..and •• Baccheuein is  not simply to 
'r e v e l' but to have a particular kind o f  religious experience the communion 1234
(1) The growth o f  the wing o f the soul is  an important occurrence, since i t  
pertains to the sou l's  awareness o f i t s  immortal destiny. In Greek art, wings 
indicate self-motion, the essential quality an immortal being; hence both Eros 
and Hermes are represented as winged*(See also Fhaedms 245e. & Friedlsender. 
PP.193.ff) The charioteer simile is  extraordinary; in i t s  complexities can
be found the embryonic, tripartite  division o f  psychology and psychoanalysis, 
but i t  also has a remarkable parallel in the Katha Upanishad. As Friedlsender 
notes, this curious sim ilarity is  f i r s t  referred to in "The Religion and 
Philosophy o f  the Veda and Upanishads" (A.B.Keith. in Harvard Oriental Series 
XXX11. Cambridge Mass.,1925) Friedlaender, o p .c i t . . p.771. note 20. says 
Keith (pp.609 & b n )  is  o f  the opinion that the two similes are independent 
o f each other as "the details are perfectly  d istin ct", but Friedlsender asks 
(P.19'3) : "Could this figure have found it s  way out o f  the Far East to Plato?"
(2) See M.P.Nilsaon. "Cults, Myths, Oracles, and P o lit ics  in Ancient Greece", 
pp.26-7. : "The advent o f this god to Athens was momentous, for  in his cult 
tragedy arose, the theatre is  bu ilt in h is precinct, and his priest presided 
at the Great DLonysia."
(3 ) See Crstylus 406b. there the etymology o f "Dionysus" is  said to refer to 
wine as making those who have no mind think they have. See also Laws 637b.
a r e f .  to drunkenness at Dionysiac festiva ls ; and Laws 672b. where i t  is  said 
that according to tradition, Dionysius was driven mad by his stepmother Hera,
and in OT*d<»r -fco fro bimpol f  Via i n P s c c h i c  n i i c c c .
(4) l . e . since such excesses are popularly regarded as peculiar to the 
'a r t is t ic  temperament'.
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with God which transformed a human being into a Dacchos or a Bacchao . . . r?( l ) .  
Tho imbibing o f wine was a means o f becoming entheos. or " fu ll o f the god"(2), 
in a state o f  complete self-abnegation -  a state o f being, lite ra lly , 
possessed« In th is condition the enthusiast or Bacchante is  inspired, the 
god is  in him and acting through him, whilst he, the individual is  ekstatikoa. 
'outside him self #(3 ) The Dionysian cult is  credited with introducing tragedy 
and drama (4) into Greece, and drama was in it ia lly  a religious ritu&l(f>), 
and the function o f the actors was rather different from that o f our 
contemporaries* As Guthrie points out : "Mimesis meant acting as much as 
imitation, mi metes was often, and mimos always an actor. The relation 
between an actor and his part is  not exactly imitation. He gets inside i t ,  
or rather, in the Greek view, i t  gets inside him, and shows forth through 
his words end gestures. There is  more to i t  than that. Drama began, as 
i t  remained, as relig ious ritual, and we cannot hope to understand Pythagorean 
thought i f  we allow ourselves to forget that i t ,  too, was primarily re lig iou s . 
In the earliest and simplest dramatic representations man impersonated gods 
and sp irits  for relig ious ends, and what they supposed to be happening can 
be best illustrated  by contemporary worship lik e  that o f  Dionysus." (Guthrie. 
o p .  c i t . . pp.230-1).
So the actor does not simply play a part, or portray a character, but 
i t  comes to l i f e  through him, ju st as the god is  revived through the thiasos. 
or follow er. Similarly, no man can be a poet, visionary, lover, or philosopher 
unless the god speaks through him, and he is  in a state o f madness. (6 ).
!l)See E.It,Dodds. Introduction to h is edition o f  "The Bacchae" o f Euripides.n.X.2) Liddell Cc Scott.
3) Guthrie, o p .c i t . . p.231 : "Pythagoras and his school . . .  were in the fu ll  
stream o f  these relig ious ideas. "
(4) See Ihcvc.B rit.. "Drama", & "Dionysus". Aristotle makes no such ascription 
in the "Poetics",but Plato, Symposium 177” . speaks o f "Aristophanes, whose sole 
concern is  with Dionysus and Aphrodite".
i  f p \  f  . .  n .  JLV . ____ .W f mco vita uua j. vi i-/» «uj. i»» |
(6) See Symposium,20<)a: "..creative  souls..conceive that which is  proper fo r  the 
soul to conceive or retain. And what are these conceptions?—wisdom and virtue in 
general. And ouch creators aro poets and other artists who may be said to  have 
invention."etc. c . f .  Lysis 214a : poets are " . . in  a manner the fathers and authors 
o f  wisdom." Laws 682a : " . . . f o r  poets are a divine race,and often in th eir 
strains,by tho aid o f the Muses and the Graces,they attain truth. The ambivalent 
attitude Plato has towards artists is  show hy the ubove in compnricon with his 
notorious views in Uopublic. and, c .g . in Anoloirv : " ..n o t by wiodom do poets 
write p o e try ..."  etc. (Apol. 22).
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The h istorica l origin o f these b e lie fs  would be impossible to 
identify  exactly« ju st as the ancient and universal b e lie f  in metempsychosis 
cannot be said to have a beginning in any particular time or place. P lato 's 
sources cure« as we have seen, recognisable from the allusions made in his 
writings; given the stamp o f his authority, they have been enormously 
in flu en tia l. The notion o f  the artist as a bystander in the creation o f 
'his* works, as the possessed or inspired whom the gods — The Muses,
Dionysus, or Apollo have chosen, is  equally old even though it s  formulations 
vary. The distinctness o f  the soul from 'the body is  an inseparable part 
o f th is notion, and for Plato the soul must re ject and ascend from the 
body and i t s  preoccupations in order to achieve the eidos. This ascension 
has two means in the dialogues, the manic and the d ia lectic ; and Plato is  
inconsistent in h is  attitude to the former, and whereas his attitude to the 
la tter  i s  steadfast it s  root is  the same, and when i t  is  uppermost in the 
mind o f  Plato the rational, p o lit ica l philosopher he i s  led  to advocate 
the banishment o f  artists  from his ideal state. I f  in the f i r s t  place 
we regard mimesis as imitation, which is  i t s  only meaning in modern T hglish (l), 
then within the lo g ic  o f h is rational philosophy we must grant Plato the 
virtue o f  consistency in his attitude to the copiers o f  the unworthy 
physical world; others with a rational approach to education are less con­
sistent. But, in  the second place i f  we see the Platonic myth o f  inspired 
madness as a statement about human passions and emotions, end about on 
enduring psychological need satisfied  by a rt, then mimesis is  something more 
than simple imitation, and our interpretation o f P lato 's philosophical 
position is  somewhat different, and the moral grounds for  abolishing artists 
lose their former security. And the myth o f the daemonic a rtist persists, 
as innumerable a rtists  and divines have sought to forge a link between the 
individual and the eidos. the fin ite  and the in fin ite , endeavouring to step 
from the lim itations o f the one to the boundlessness o f  the other, and in 
the majority o f  such cases the connocting step has been "imagination".
( l )  Oxford Ehglinh Dictionary. 1933 ndn.
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In concluding this f i r s t  section i t  can be said that vhil3t the fu ll 
implications o f P lato 's mystical and mythical views are by no means clear, 
his general position is  deducible and the deduction already contains a 
blueprint fo r  some later and very important aesthetic theory. Even the 
form o f  the four kinds o f "madness" is  reproduced during the Renaissance in 
Giordano Bruno's eroici furori. in poems which he dedicated to Sir Philip 
Sydney. Of more direct relevance to the theory o f imagination is  the 
sim ilarity v/hich exists between Plato and Kant. The impulse to c la rity , form 
and cognition which characterises the 'Appollonine' (end thus the 
Platonic) inspiration presages the analysis o f cognition in Kant's Critiirue 
o f Pure Reason, though this i s  rather more fu lly  worked out in the d ia lectic  
route to the eido3 as we shall see in the next section. This kind o f  
inspiration seems also to be related to that sense o f awe or wonder which 
A ristotle saw as the origin o f man's philosophic impulse and ’Aich Kant 
also regarded as important to a ll philosophy, hut the prophetic aspect of 
this inspiration also invites comparison with the productive kind o f 
imagination o f Kant's f i r s t  Critique. I t  is  with greater confidence that 
we can suggest a link between P lato 's "poetic madness" and the aesthetic 
imagination o f the Critique o f  Judgment : for  Kant the aesthetic imagina­
tion is  a property o f a r t is t ic  genius and yields the sublime which, unlike 
mere beauty (the Appollonine?), is  not simply pleasurable (eudaemonic) but 
awesome. P lato's "poetic madness" is  a property o f the daemon (or sp ir it) 
who mediates between the mortal and the immortal as the imagination o f 
Kant's genius furnishes Ideas o f reason out o f the intuitions of sense.
But Plato i s  waxy o f  poetic madness as he is  o f the Dionysian and i t s  mimetic 
licence where acting usurps being as the god usurps the se lf  or soul; thu3 
the soul a t best is  reduced to the role o f  spectator rather than participator 
in the quest for the eidos. a situation which does not obtain in the d ialectic 
route to the eidoo but vbich sets the seal on centuries o f  distrust o f  that 
part o f  man that dreams and which diverts him from the paths o f  righteous­
ness and reason
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SECTION II .
Although translations from Greek use the word "imagination", there is  no 
word in Greek which corresponds to i t s  broad modern Ebglish usage. I t  
certainly' has no direct counterpart in the Dialogues o f Plato, even though 
they are a major source o f many o f the inflexions which nowadays are to be 
found in "imagination". The emotive account o f mania as the sine mia non 
o f  a rtis tic  creation, now absorbed into contemporary mythology, looks at 
f i r s t  to be quite divorced from P lato's epistemology, but he did not make 
the rig id  categorical distinctions to which we are accustomed.
Just as for  Plato, the soul, as the most divine part o f  the individual(l) 
i s  imprisoned in the body, so are h is ideas inescapably a part o f  their means 
o f  expression; i t  cannot be assumed that the myths and similes are merely 
illu stration , for they are the embodiment o f those ideas, vulnerable to 
interpretation but only fu lly  meaningful in their to ta lity . We can either 
say that these embodiments are the inevitable product o f p re -scien tific  
ignorance, the devices employed by a superior in te lle ct  attempting to over­
come th is ignorance, or that, in toto. they are en attempt to communicate 
ea awareness o f something which is  at once so refined and so diffuse that 
i t  is  not verbalisable. In short, ve either believe that we know more, or 
that ve perhaps know only as much as what Plato knew o f the great eschato­
log ica l mysteries. I f  we equate P lato's 'poetic madness' with "imagination", t 
as succeeding writers have, then imagination may be explained in texms o f 
inspiration as in Plato; otherwise, i f  we 'in terpret' Plato, we must 
explain i t  in terms o f personality as in much modern psychology; the f ir s t  
reading is  nrina facie  exclusive and e l i t i s t  -  an aberration fo r  which Plato 
has la te ly  been brought to task, -  the second is  proceedurally exclusive, 
fo r , to borrow Vygotsky's analogy, wo could not hope to discover the f ir e ­
fighting property ox water by analysing oxygen nnu hydrogen. We should be 
mindful o f  these deficiences when considering the 'ra tion al' psychology o f 
imagination such as is  found in A ristotle 's  De Anina. but which has its
f ir s t  sorious(2) treatment in P lato 's Dinloroies.
(1) Sec Phaodrus S'tPd.2) Soo"y.l.Dcaro. o p .c it .
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Th« sou l's progression from blank ignorance to the realm o f the Forms 
is  given a diagrammatic framework in the Divided Line s im ile .(Republic sea*)
The lower subsection o f the lin e  corresponds to eikasia. e .g . » "images", 
"shadows", and "reflections in water and in solid , smooth and polished 
bodies and the lik e "; ( o p .  c i t , ,  510a) these "images", a s  appearances or 
phenomena(l) are "the f ir s t  ingenuous and intuitive v ision  o f  the real"
(Paton p .76). "Eikasia" has no Ehglish equivalent,(2) but as Faton says, "we 
may ca ll i t  imagination or the cognition o f images, or again Intuition or 
the mere looking at o b je cts ,” ( l o c .c i t )  and i t  is  essentially  a confused 
state wherein images and solid  objects are intermingled.( 3 ) Mure describes 
i t  thus : ” . . .  in eikasia. we shall find a stage o f consciousness prior to 
proper, in which distinction o f subject and object, and o f  fancy form fact 
are only beginning to emerge."(4 )
P lato 's choice o f a line as a simile supports a developmental inter­
pretation o f the sou l's  progress(5), an interpretation which is  supported 
in parts o f Theaetetus. Sophist, and Philebus. and the elementary cognitive 
role o f eikasia. illustrated  in the Divided Line simile, has its  moral and 
emotive equivalents in the charioteer and cave similes o f  Phaedrus and 
Republic, where i t s  analogues are the unruly black steed and the prisoners 
who s i t  gazing at shadows.
(1) See H.J. Paton. "P lato's Theory o f Eikasia". p«76.
( 2) Liddell & Scott give : "likeness, image, representation", and "conjecture, 
guessing." There are reservations against "representation.”
( 3 ) See G.R.G.Mure. "A ristotle", p.40.
(ft) Mure, op. c i t . . p.45. Mure adds in a footnote, p.45. s "Or we might include 
in Eikasia a ll individual dogmatic judgments o f value, and regard them as 
shadows o f comparatively real originals in the sphere o f p is t is  o f the best 
public opinion as embodied, e .g . in the established legal system. We might, 
again, even relate Eikasia to P lato 's  theory o f art, and discover in i t  the
f arm o f Croce's view o f the nature o f aesthetic experience."5) Sec D.B08S : "There is  ju stifica tion  for  the view that Plato tnought o f 
the four states o f mind as forming a series, gaining in c la r ity  as i t  proceeds? 
But noesis is  F lato 's main concern, and "we are not bound to hold that Plato
J »  i t s  " • . • • •  i t  * -u iv u j'xxv v i  c x h a o i a  a o  au  xu p u j. v a u v  y u a o e  x ii v u x  BppXttiieuBXVU uX vxits w v u u t
The looking at shadows and reflection s is  only a rather occasional attitude 
in the l i f e  o f the ordinary nan, whose habitual state is  that o f p is t is  . . . . ?
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According to the E leatic Stranger o f the Sophist, there are distinctions 
to be made between divine creation, o f  the natural objects constituting 
p is t ia .( l )  (which is  the second subdivision o f the divided lin e ) and 
divine imitation, which i s  (referring to the objects o f p ie tis ) s "images o f 
them which are not them, but which correspond to them," ( Sophist 266b) i . e . .  
which is  eikasia. These la tte r , the objects o f  eikasia. he ca lls  :
"The appearances which spring up o f themselves in sleep or by day, 
such as shadow when darkness arises in a fir e , or the reflection  which is  
produced when the light i s  bright and smooth objects meet on their surface 
with an external light, and creates a perception the opposite o f our 
ordinary sight." ( o p .  c i t . . 266b-o)
Human creation, we are told, may be either o f  manufactured a rtic los , 
for example a house ( Sophist 266c ) . or i t  may be imitation or likeness­
making ( o p .  c i t . . 235d) i . e . .  "which is  a sort o f  dream created by man for  
those who are awake " ( o p .  c i t . , 266c ) . This imitation may either be "a 
copy which is  created according to the proportions o f the orig in a l,"
( o p .  c i t . . 255d) or. "phantastic or the art o f  making appearances",
( o p .  c i t . . 256c). which "give up the truth in their images and make only 
the proportions which appear to be beautiful, disregarding the real ones.
( o p .  c i t . . 256a). This phantastic imitation is  effected by means o f an 
instrument ( o p .  c i t . . 267a).(probably in reference to the p lastic  arts), 
or by the individual him self who is  the instrument(l o c . c i t ) , which is  "the 
art o f mimicry," that i s ,  acting and poetry,(see pp«10-11 on mimesis).
P a in ters  (2) are without doubt the archetypal phantastic imitators ( So phi st. 
254b). who, by making th e ir  imitations seem rea l, "can deceive the less 
in telligent sort o f children, "(l o c .o i t ) . In the way that sophistry can 
deceive by making fic t io n  seem like fact (op. c i t . . 234c). The illu sion
U* wuicu uiu Itumtui uiiuu it> ¿u-vue, (Ho public w2u) ¿uuuvuluijf iu ut«
(1) Pnton. op. c i t . . p.8*5. says o f p is tis  : " I t  includes a ll empirical 
science and a ll history as well as the ordinary judgments o f the ordinary 
m an...” ( c . f . Ho bs , previous footnote.)
(2) And, therefore, poets| see ivopublio 600d-e.
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"Heraclitan flux"(Pnton. op, c l t . , p .8 l) o f eikasia where "doubt about the 
rea lity  o f  senee is  easily  raised, since there nay even be a doubt whether 
ve are awake or in a dream,"(l) is  a weakness which is  exploited by the 
eikones(2) o f the painter, and i t  is  because o f such exploitation that the 
painter and poet must be excluded from the ideal state* This banishment 
is  a log ica l extension o f  P lato's fundamental tenet that the soul must, be 
allowed to pursue it s  goal, the eidos. and i t  must do so unimpeded: not 
even Homer is  exempted from the ban*
I t  is  P lato's intention that eiknsia be seen as the lowest o f four 
stages o f  in tellectual development which correspond to the four divisions 
o f the Divided Line, but both Patón and Beare are o f the opinion that he 
understates its  importance.(5 )Patón a llie s  himself with those sceptical 
philosophers, "agnostics of a ll ages from Protagoras to Hume", for  whom 
eikasia is  "the only way o f knowing" and whose objects "have been identified 
with the whole o f rea lity " (op* c it* . p .82). On this view, "Memory, sense, 
imagination, and a ll that we ca ll Thinking or knowledge are on one dead level 
which is  described by Plato under the heading o f  eikasia? (op* c i t . . p .82-3).
In consequence, Patón finds in eikasia the source o f  a ll art : "The artist 
has a ll the marks o f the stage o f  eikasia". ( p . 93). For, "Imagination qua 
imagination takes no account o f the difference between the apparent and the 
actual and is  therefore properly included in eikasia. •
I f  wo admit th is in regard to imagination, we have admitted i t  already 
in regard to the a r t is t ic  activ ity  as a whole. For the function o f the 
a rtist is  nothing more and nothing less  than imagination, i . e .  the making 
images clear and express to h im self."( o p .  c i t . .  p«92).
Íl )  Theaetctus 158d: see also Appendix D.2) See Mure, op. c i t . . p.39. footnote : "Plato plays deliberately on the 
conneetion ox encasta wiun eikon. ' image••"
(3 ) Although i t  was relatively  unimportant for Plato.
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The " f ir s t ,  broad, general, cognitive experience"(Pnton p .8 l) called
eikasia is  identified in Theaetctns with "the f i r s t  ingenuous and intuitive
vision o f  the soul whether in sense, memory, or imagination,"(l o c .c i t ) .
which is  aesthesis.(Patón p.76) and aesthesis i s  also identified with
phantasia. ( l ) In the fundamental Socratic b e lie f  in knowledge as
recollection (2) this " f ir s t  general experience" has a definite function in
the cognitive development o f the soul, and is  not entirely discarded. No
rules are given for  choosing between the valuable and valueless, and these
are only identifiable retrospectively, although Plato believes in the
innate Enpedoclean disposition ( 3 ) o f  the soul, an impulse to the higher
realm which ia  it s  proper home. The existence or otherwise o f  this impulse,
.the
or o f a means o f recognising the actual and/illusory in eikasia. is  crucia lly  
important, but i t  is  not established; some sensations are "preserved" to 
form memory (Hiilebus. 39a). for recollection  i s  the "recovery" o f "some 
sensation or knowledge" (op. c i t . . 34b). Not only are former sensations 
stored in th is way, fo r  there is  also a "scribe", who seems "almost to write 123
(1) Paton. op. c i t . .  p.82 -  a reference to Theaetetus 132c. C .f. Be tire, op. 
c i t . .  p . 263. sec.11 s "phantasia and aesthesis are of essentially the same 
nature." Beare adds, lo c .  c i t . .  ftn t . 1 .. : "Here phantasia is  clearly a 
different thine from the facility o f reproductive imagination as defined by 
A r is to t le . . ."  ( i . e .  in Be Anima. 429a 1 .)  Be are is  also referring to Theae— 
tetus 132b-c.
(2 ) See, e .g . .  Meno 31c.. Phaedo 7 3 .. 73 .. & 92«. Philebus 34. .  & Laws 723.
(3 ) For the apparent d ifficu lty  o f  realising th is  disposition, see also 
Appendix A. The empirical rather than dispositional account o f education
is  foremost in Theaetetus.  ( e .g . 186b-c : "The simple sensations which reach 
the soul through the body are given at birth to men and animals by nature, 
but their reflection  on the being and use o f  them are slowly and hardly gained, 
i f  they are ever gained, by education and long experience." c . f .  Laws 667b-c : 
"Learning has a certain accompanying charm which is  the p leasu re ..."etc ). N.B. 
also A ristotle . Be Anima 404b 11-19.: On the soul : "Thus Hspedocles declared 
that i t  is  formed out o f  his elements each o f them also being soul; his words 
are:
1 fbr ' t ie  by Earth we see Earth, by Water Water,
By Ether Ether divine, by Fire destructive fire .
By Love Love, and Hate by cruel Hate.'
In the same way Plato in the Timaeus fashions the soul out o f his elements; 
foT v»#» nrifiof w  1 end thin jc i c js c i  sut z i  the
principles o f elements, so that soul must be so to o ."  On this passage,
Poore, op. c i t . . p.47 se c .27. comments : "P lato's 'elements', however, were 
not material, and were far other than those o f Empedocles." This may be 
so, hut as w ill be seen, generations o f alchemists believed in the actuality 
o f  the Platonic elements, and one i s  s t i l l  l e f t  with the problem of moving 
from the actual to the formal.
/down words in the soul" when "memory and perception m eet".(op .cit,,59a ) 
as well as "another a rt is t" , who is  "the pointer, who, a fter the scribe
N
has done his work, draws images in the soul o f  the things he has described" 
(on. c i t . . 59b). Thus i t  is  that we acquire the verbal memory and the 
Images" which together make our conceptual knowledge. The influental 
wax-tablet simile o f  the Theaetetus(l91o-d). together with the similes o f 
the scribe and painter, Trojan horse.(l84d) and aviary.(l<?7d-e). indicate 
how much Aristotle learned from Plato, and are strongly reminiscent o f 
Locke's 1 empty chamber* .When we are children, the mind is  einpty(l97e) like 
the unoccupied aviary; the doves in the aviary represent "kinds o f  knowledge" 
( l o c .c i t )  in the mind, "one kind is  prior to possession and for the sake o f 
possession, and the other for the sake o f  taking and holding in the hands 
that which is  possessed already. And then, when a man has learned and 
known something long ago, he may resume and get hold o f the knowledge 
which he has long possessed, but not at hand in  the mind."(l98d) A man 
might possibly give a wrong opinion, for , "...w ish ing  to capture a certain 
sort o f  knowledge out o f  the general store, he may take the wrong one by 
mistake. Tims i t  i s  that he may think eleven to be twelve, getting hold, 
as i t  were, o f  the ring-dove which he had in h is  mind, when he wanted 
the pigeon."(l99a) The p ossib ility  o f such an error is  inconsistent with 
the Enpe do clean formula fo r  the sou l's  impulse to the eidos. ju st as is  
the irrational function o f memory as admitted in  Phaedo t "recollection  
may be derived from things either like  or unlikel'(74a) fo r  "what is  this 
feeling o f  lovers when they recognise a ly re , or a garment, or anything 
else which the beloved has been in the habit o f  using? Do not they, from 
knowing the lyre, form in the mind's eye an image o f  the youth to idiom 
the lyre belongs? And this is  reco lle ction .. . .such recollection  can be 
effected  by a ll manner o f thiage."(73e) Semi in this lig h t , the 
palingenetic account o f  the education o f the so u l(l)  looks less credible,
( l )  e .g . Meno. 81c.. t " . .a l l  enquiry and learning is  but recoilaction . .
18.
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end Socrates' demonstration o f i t  with Meno's slave boy (Meno 8 2 ff) even 
more spurious, ju s t  as Leibniz's admiration o f i t ( l )  seems more a product 
o f Christian dogma then o f a close reading o f the Dialogues.
In concluding and summarising these two sections o f my f ir s t  chapter 
X would like to indicate as clearly as possible those elements o f  P lato 's 
philosophy which shape and anticipate subsequent contributions to the theory 
o f imagination. F irstly , as I have already consented, our modern word 
"imagination" is  fa r  too broad in it s  connotations to be used accurately 
as a translation o f  anything in Plato, though there are those who have 
conmitted this inaccuracy. With the wisdom (or the prejudice) o f hindsight 
i t  is  possible to separate out o f  Plato formulations or intimations o f  most 
aspects o f that wide range o f  notions which is  coamonly subsumed under our 
modem concept o f  "imagination? The eidos has been iden tified , following 
Friedlaender, with that exalted state in Plato which in subsequent notions 
may be identified  with e .g .,  the Neoplatonic and cy stic  b lis s  o f  the vision 
o f the "One" or God and, less  restrainedly, the Idoas o f reason found in 
Kant. In the f i r s t  section I dealt with the "manic" route to the Platonic 
eidos and it s  four parts t the prophetic, the mystic, the poetic and the 
erotic ; a ll o f these, 1 believe, have a necessary connection with P lato 's 
eikaaia. I t  i s  important to note what these four kinds o f  "madness" or 
inspiration have in  comnon, which is  an intense emotive value whose content. 
as e .g . the poem, the beloved, or the god, has no p r io r ity . So i t  may be 
that the inspiration finds i t s  content rather than vice versa, though Plato 
d e a r ly  indicates that this content most fa l l  within four areas which, on 
his model, we may now ca ll knowledge, re lig ion , art, and love . Tuning 
to eikasia. discussed in the second Faction, th is notion i s  strikingly 
similar to what la te r  philosophers, e .g . Descartes and Kant, ca ll "in tu ition"- 
that which is  immediate to sense -  and what Brentano was to ca ll "presentation". 
P lato 's account o f  eikasia in the divided line simile o f the Remiblic
( l )  Hew Essays. IBc.l. CU.l. aec.«i.
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undoubtedly favours the Apollonine route to eidos which therefore has both 
inspirational and d ia lectic  elements and may be regarded as an enthusiasm 
for. knowledge, which was shared by Pythagoras, Socrates, and Plato, whose 
patron god wao Apollo and who were a l l ,  l ite ra lly , philosophers. Thus 
fo r  Plato the importance o f eikasia is  essentially in i t s  precognitive 
rather than it s  ontological function, ju st as with the Kantian "intuition" 
in the Critique o f  Pure Iteason. But the p rior ity  o f eikasia to the higher 
cognitive functions o f  judgment and understanding gives to eikasia what 
Sartre ca lls  the "naive ontology" o f  images, for  there can be l i t t l e  
doubt o f  a connection between eikasia and eikones (images). This connection 
and this naive ontology inform P lato 's  account o f memory in Theaetetus.
Philebus. and Phaedo. which are akin to the empiricism o f Locke and home 
and the Kantian "reproductive imagination"; the dependency o f eikasia on 
p is tis  also anticipates other distinctions between 'image' and 'o b je ct ' 
such os are found e .g . in the Cartesian (and Spinozan) "figure" as distinct 
from "image" and Kant's "th in g -in -itse lf"• This problem o f distinguishing
between image and ob ject, between imagination and rea lity , persists through­
out the entire h istory o f  philosophy and, following the Platonic preference 
fo r  objective knowledge, the distinction  generally hinges on a description 
o f  the content o f  the presentation or intu ition , and charting the progress 
o f  this distinction i s  one o f  the themes o f th is present thesis. Although 
the theoretical basis o f  Sartre's rejection  o f the "naive ontology" o f 
the image has it s  immediate foundation in the phenomenology o f  Husserl 
and Brentano, and in the la tte r 's  detailed study o f  A ristotle , already in 
Plato the beginnings o f this theoretical basis can be found. The suggestion 
o f  an actual connection between eikasia. aesthesis. and phantasia im plicitly  
challenges the suggestion o f  an ontology o f  images in the way that Brentano 
asserted that a ll  consciousness is  consciousness o f  something -  as w ill be 
seen in the chapter on phenomenology. Finally, a comment on P lato 's  theory 
o f  art. In the body o f  P lato 's works is  a dichotomy between the objective
(knowledge) and the subjective (meaning), a dichotomy which I have characterised
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as the d ia lectic  and the manic routes to the eidos. Overall, i t  i s  the 
former which has held sway over Western European c iv ilisa tion . In the 
Republic Plato dismisses art as copy o f copy, i . e .  p is tis  is  a copy o f 
an ideal and eikasia (and so eikones) a copy o f p is t is : Eikones. (as the 
writings o f  the Fhilostrati show), can be paintings. Thus, to put i t  broadly, 
art may have great meaning and emotional significance but has neg lig ib le  
cognitive value and so must be censored or banned from P lato's ideal state.
t
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APPENDIX A.
According to  Aristotle, Bnpodocles held that "knowledge is  o f the like by 
the lik e" (Metaphysics. E 1000b 5 ). As Guthrie says, (o p .c it . 
this view was shared by Fythegoras, Socrates, and Plato, and, (o p .c it . .  
p.203) s-
"The idea o f the kinship o f a ll nature has been su ffic ien tly  shown 
to be Pythagorean and to underlie the doctrine o f transmigration and the 
prohibition o f enimal flesh . I t  recurs in these connections in Hnpedoclea".
He also adds that "the religious ideas o f  Mnpedocles are demonstrably 
almost identical with those o f Pythagoras." (o p .c it .p .208.footnote 2 ). The 
notion that the soul grovs like  what i t  contemplates, (see A.E.Tavlor. "P lato.. 
The Man and His Work".p.133). so that e .g . "The philosopher who contemplates 
the kosaos becomes the kosmos in his own soul", ( Guthrie. o p .c it ..p .2 1 l) . is  
o f  prof own d and lasting educational importance, and one which is  shared by 
one o f  the "progressive" educators o f our own times, Bertrand Bussell
"Thus, to sum up our discussion o f the value o f philosophy i Philosophy 
is  to be studied, not for the sake o f any defin ite answers to it s  questions, 
since no defin ite answers can, as a rule, be known to be true, twt rather 
for  the sake o f  the questions themselves; because enlarge our conception 
o f what is  possible, enrich our intellectual imagination and diminish the 
dofpnatic assurance which closes the mind against speculation; but above a ll 
because, through the greatness o f the universe philosophy contemplates, the 
mind is  rendered great, and becomes capable o f  that union with the universe 
which constitutes it s  highest good."("Cic Problems o f  Fhilosophr»nn2fr9-250). 
Seo also Friedlsender, o p .c it . v o l . l . . p .196  ; for Socrates, " . . . . t r u e  love 
is  love that educates. The connection between love end education, however, 
can only be fu lly  grasped from the point o f view o f the beyond. Education 
means shaping the beloved after the image o f the god, those followers had 
been both lover and beloved; hence, this orientation also imposes upon the 
educator the obligation to look up to the god and to resemble the la tter
more and more." See also ltepublic 500d. "And the philosopher, holding converse
with the divine order, becomes orderly and divine as far as the nature 
o f men a llow s;".
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APPENDIX B.
There is  a variety o f attitudes to myths in general, and to P lato 's  myths. 
Hegel regards myths as property belonging to a time -when c iv ilisa tion  was 
in an immature state :
"The myth is  always a mode o f representation which, as belonging to 
an earlier stage, introduces sensuous images, which are directed to 
imagination, not to thought; in th is , however, the activ ity  o f  thought is  
suspended, i t  cannot yet establish it s e l f  by it s  own power, and so is  not 
yet free. The myth belongs to , the pedagogic stage o f the human race, since 
i t  entices and allures men to occupy themselves with the content; but as i t  
takes away from the purity o f thought through sensuous forms, i t  cannot 
express the meaning o f  Thought. When the Notion attains i t s  fu ll development, 
i t  has no more need o f  myth? (le c tu re s  on The History o f Philosophy," Vol.2. 
PP.19-20).
Prom a certain philosophical standpoint, the need fo r  myth may indeed 
be considered to have been outgrown when the capacity for  abstract thought 
is  realised. Guthrie is  less dogmatic, and he wisely perceives that 
myth, wherever we may say i t  is  directed, exerts a continuous influence 
on our b e lie fs , a lbeit less obviously than in the distant past t
"Its  stories and images may be, at an early stage o f c iv ilisa tion , 
the only available means (and an e ffective  one) o f  expressing profound 
and universal truths. Later, a mature religious thinker lik e  Plate may 
choose i t  deliberately, and as the culmination o f reasonod argument, to 
communicate experiences and b e lie fs , the rea lity  and cogency o f  which is  
a matter o f  conviction outrunning log ica l proof. This i s  genuine myth, 
and it s  va lid ity  and importance are undoubted. The danger begins when 
men believe they have l e f t  a ll that behind and are relying on a sc ien tific  
method based so le ly  on a combination o f observation and log ica l inference.
The unconscious retention o f inherited .and irrational inodes o f  thought, 
cloaked in the vocabulary o f reason, then becomes an obstacle rather than 
an aid to the pursuit o f  truth” .("A  History o f Greek Philosophy; V o l.l.p .2 .
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Guthrie i s  surely -wrong to suggest that Plato deliberately chose myth 
as a vehicle, at least not as a culmination o f reasoned argument; generally 
speaking reason and myth as we understand them are kept apart in the 
Dialogues, they hardly belong together. I t  is  perhaps more accurate to 
say that myth was 'chosen' fo r  him by the accident o f  the time and place 
o f his b irth . J.A. Stewart i s  for once near to the point here: "...llyth  
distinguished once for  a ll by weight and ring from Allegory i s  an essential 
element o f P lato 's philosophical style; and his philosophy cannot be under­
stood apart from i t . "  ("The Myths o f Platogp .5 .)
This is  certainly a sounder assessment o f the place o f  myth in Plato 
than that o f E. Wallace, who considers that the mystical and mythical 
elements detract from the value o f  P lato's philosophy, (see h is Introduction 
to A ristotle 's  "Psychology".p.XV.) . Like Hegel, Wallace judges the myths 
from a prejudicial viewpoint; i f  log ica l thought i s  one's idea l, myth can 
at best be regarded as allegory, and at worst as manifest ignorance. This, 
as w ill be seen la ter, echoes the ascribed role o f  imagination in rational 
psychology.
APPENDIX C.
The influence o f Pythagorean!sm, and o f the mysteries i t  embraced, on Plato, 
end thereby on the whole o f  Western philosophy, i s  one o f the points to have t 
been established throughout th is chapter. The influence o f Dionysianiem 
and the Greek mystery relig ions which i t  ty p ifie s , i s  important in relation 
to the development o f  the b e lie fs  which have nourished western art, 
particularly from the end o f  the 18th century.
P ilike Pythagoras, Dionysus was not a  man who actually lived among 
men; nor was he, like  Apollo, a  god, fo r  ho has no Olympian ancestry. Ho 
was possibly Phrygian, but prooaoiy T h ra c ia n  in orig in , (aee m c y c lo p a e d ia  
Britannica). and was a f e r t i l i t y  god whose followers w ere mostly women.
Graves. (The Greek Myths), says his mother was Semele, the moon-goddess,
(lV b .c .) . whereas Ehcvc.Brit. Raya she was Zemelo, a Phrygian earth-goddess; 
Petrarch. (See Graves. op . c i t . . p.27b) says his mother was L etho('forgetfu lness') ,
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a probable reference to  Dionysus' association with wine. Dionysus' 
identification  with Bacchus, a feature o f h is absorption into Greek 
mythology, becomes complete in Roman times. His cult superficia lly  
thrived on drunkenness, sexuality, and eonism, but inspired a profound 
mysticism which has influenced Christian theology,(See e .g . Russell's 
Tlistory o f  Western Hiilosophy", pp.3^-5*)
Nietzsche ca lls  himself "the last d isciple o f  the philosopher Dionysus", 
(Things I Owe to The Ancients, s e c .? ) , he even signed some o f h is le tters  
"Dionysus” . He also ca lls  Goethe a Dionysian, for  this is  "the highest o f 
a ll faiths" (Twilight o f the Idols, sec.49), a faith which he praises above 
a ll for  i t s  'Yea-saying", and fo r  it s  sexuality. "The Birth o f Tragedy" 
is  a study o f the Apollonian and the Dionysian aspects o f art, and it s  
tenor may be illustrated  by the following quotation from "Twilight o f  the 
Idols", sec. 67.
"What is  the meaning o f the antithetical concepts Apollonian and 
Dionysian which I have introduced into the vocabulary o f Aesthetic, as 
representing the d istin ct modes o f  ecstasy? — Apollonian ecstasy acts above 
a ll as a force stimulating the eye, so that i t  acquires the power o f  vision . 
The painter, the sculptor, the epic poet are essentially visionaries. In 
the Dionysian state, on the other hand, the whole system o f passions is  
stimulated and intensified , so that i t  discharges i t s e l f  by a ll the means o f 
expression at once, and vests a ll  it s  power o f  representation, o f imitation, 
o f  transfiguration, o f  transformation, together with every kind o f  mimicry 
and h istrion ic display at the same time. The essential feature remains the 
fa c i l ity  in transforming the in ab ility  to refrain from reaction (-a  similar 
state to that o f certain hysterical patients, who at the slightest hint assume 
any ro le ). I t  is  impossible fo r  the Dionysian a rtist not to understand any 
suggestion; no outward sign o f emotion escapes him, he possesses the instinct 
o f  comprehension and o f  divination in the highest degreo, ju st as he is  
capable o f  the most perfect art o f  coctaunication. He enters into every 
skin, into every passion t he i s  continually changing himself.
Music as we understand i t  today is  likewise a general excitation
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and discharge o f the emotions; hut, notwithstanding th is, i t  is  only 
the remnant o f a much richer world o f emotional expression, a mere 
residuum of Dionysian histrionicism . For music to be made possible as 
a special art, quite a number o f senses, and paritularly the muscular 
sense, had to be paralysed (a t least re la tive ly ): for a ll rhythm s t i l l  
appeals to our muscles to a certain extent) : and thus man no longer 
imitates and represents physically everything he fee ls , as soon as he 
feels it*  Nevertheless that is  the normal Dionysian state, and in any 
case i t s  primitive state* Music is  the slowly attained specialisation 
o f the state at the cost o f kindred capacities." M.Praz,("The Romantic 
Agony',1 p ,8 ). quotes Alfred Bauraler. who has called Dionysianism o f the 
6th. century B.C. the "Romanticism o f antiquity".
APPENDIX D.
Plato never gives any guidance on how to recognise true perceptions as 
against false ones, he only indicates how painful the process is  o f 
renouncing the false* The near inq>ossibility o f  'distinguishing dream 
from actuality is  also noted in Timaeus :
"Of these and o f other things o f  the same kind, relating to the 
true and waking rea lity  o f nature, we have only th is dreamlike sense, and 
ve are unable to cast o f f  sleep and determine the truth about them. For 
cn image, since the rea lity  after which i t  is  modelled does not belong to 
i t  (o r , 'since i t s  very intention is  not se lf-ex is ta n t ') and i t  exists ever 
as the fleeting shadow o f some other, must be inferred to be in another 
(that i s  in space), grasping existence in some way or other, or i t  could 
not be at all* Dut true and exact reason, vindicating the nature o f true 
being, maintains that while two things (that is ,  the image and space) ore 
different they cannot exist one o f them in the other and so bo one and also 
two at the same time*" ( 52b. .  the brackets are Jew ett's).
Chapter 2 : ARISTOTLE
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I shall discuss Ariototle at some length, bat with good reason.
R>r although the visionary aspects o f  P lato 's philosophy are virtually 
absent from A ristotle 's  theories, the cognitive psychology -which A ristotle 
inherited from his great forerunner and which he expanded and reformulated 
has been written into such subsequent theory -  either wholesale or pa rtia lly .
I include in this Stoicism, Neoplatonism, Empiricism, Kantianism and Pheno­
menology* That the psychological elements o f these philosophical traditions 
are not the same serves to underline the fact that, except fo r  a few obvious 
examples such as the mediaeval Arab "faculty" psychologists, St. Thomas 
Aquinas, and Franz Brentano, A ristotle 's  De Anima seems not to have been read 
in the original (or in translation). Above a ll i t  i s  the Platonic element 
o f A risto tle 's  psychology which has dominated what followed t «hat is  
essentially a dynamic theory in the De Anima becomes a theory o f cognitive 
development—from the materials o f  sense, through imagination to understanding 
and reason—which is  seen as a series o f ontological moments or "fa cu lties". 
This, caricatured, is  Kant's account in the second edition o f  his Critique 
o f  Pure Reason. This pseudo-Aristotelian, or PIatoni©-Aristotelian psychology 
embraces what J-P. Sartre ca lls  the "naive ontology" o f images, the b e lie f  
that mental images are copies o f  things existing as things, which modern 
thinkers have so consistently attacked from the position o f  noo-Aristotellan 
phenomenology.
The following chapter is  divided into five  sections. The f ir s t  i s  
introductory and deals in a general way with the differences between A ristotle  
and Plato, with emphasis on the fundamental doctrine o f  motion which underpins 
the De Anima. The second section is  on A r is to tle 's  conception o f the soul, 
i t s  differences from P lato 's , and the motive form-matter, potential-actual 
framewozk on which i t  rests. In section throe 1 outline and discuss the 
account o f  sense and o f  «diet in Latin is  called the sen sue commnnis. a 
function o f  coalition  which is  not unlike perception and which in some 
respects resembles Kant's synthetic faculty o f  imagination, bat which is
In trod u ction .
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different from P lato 's "synthetic faculty". In a long fourth soction 
I deal with A r isto tle 's  theory o f imagination, attempting to  separate 
the various, sometime« confused, strands. Thus we learn that imagination 
(phentaaia) derives from sense, explained as in Plato by a wax-seal, 
impression analogy; i t  is  a form o f  movement (rather than s ta tic ) , and 
usually false (according to the extent to which i t  is  autonomous, presumably); 
i t  is  different from opinion, this la tter demanding commitment to action; 
i t  is  the basis o f memory wherein the image is  seen as related or mnemonic 
(to  and o f  i t s  o b je ct). Imagination is  also regarded as a fora o f  thinking 
as there is  no thought without imagination, though conceptual thought is  
mors universal than, being abstracted from, images. A ristotle also assorts 
that imagination is  inseparable from appetition which he regards as the 
basis o f  motion; th is  assertion, together with the view that appetites 
need the moral restraint o f reason, is  the coping-stone o f  Stoic, Neoplatonic, 
and Christ!on psychology. In terminating this section I note some anomalies
o f  A ristotle 's  theory o f  imagination, and consider his account o f dreaming, 
in which he attacks the alleged prophetic and revelatory powers which later 
came to be an integral part o f mediaeval theology. In the f i f th  and final 
section I b rie fly  consider A ristotle 's  aesthetic theory, end the possible 
links between his phantasia and mimesis. *
*
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Sine« Plato and A ristotle «ere for  20 years contemporaries at the 
Academy, i t  would be surprising to find no problems common to their work, 
though th eir methods are quite different : "To leave P lato 's dialogues 
for the treatises o f A ristotle is  to exchange a gallery o f  bright land­
scape paintings fo r  a map, and a map that Aristotle sometimes seems to be 
constructing with special intent to convict h is master o f  errors in pers­
pective. But i t  is  s t i l l  P lato 's  country that he charts." (Mare, o p .c i t . . 
p .67) . A ristotle rarely c ites  the dialogues as an authority fo r  P lato 's 
ideas, but i t  is  clear that the speculative psychology found in Theaetetus. 
Sophist, and Philebus. is  at least a stimulus fo r  A ristotle 's  out specula­
tions. A r is to tle 's  psychology o f  imagination, an amplification and re­
development o f Plato's* forms the basis o f  mediaeval theory:
"Plato, applying the standards o f  metaphysical idealism, seemed, on the 
-whole, to depreciate these powers*, especially aa they were fo r  him 
connected with the doctrine o f imitation. He did, however, lay  the 
basis fo r  a theory o f  phantasy in psychology and ethics, and he made a 
most sign ificant contribution to enunciating the concept e f the dream- 
phantasy. A ristotle, on the other hand, broke the connection between 
phantasy and imitation, rid icu led  the Platonic notion o f  divinely implanted 
phantasies, and assuming the rea lity  o f  sensible experience, la id  the 
basis fo r  the subsequent description o f the phantasy in psychology. Ve 
have, then, from the very beginning what may be called an id e a lis t ic  and 
aysticol tradition founded by Plato, and an equally well defined empirical 
tradition deriving from A ristotle . To the concepts o f  phantasy and 
imagination in these two systems a ll subsequent views in classica l and 
mediaeval thought may ultimately be traced; and, seen in one lig h t , this 
¡lielurjr la  ilia laáviú w2 u w u lliv t , loouiug iv*- aaaujr u a it u is . ,  w « .« bu *
* i . e .  phantasy and imagination.
SECTION I
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theories emanating from these two great thinkers, " ( l )
The range o f  Bundy's stadias does not extend much beyond the la te  
mediaeval ism o f Dante, bat despite the post-Newtonian demise o f *
A ristotleian science A ristotle 's  psychological and aesthetic theories 
fa r  outlived the influence o f h is ideas on physical science.( 2) .  Ikmdy 
i s  quite correct to point out that A ristotle is  antipathetie to the obscure 
Platonic notions o f  daeaonism, metempsychosis, and knowledge as reminiscence. 
And whereas for A ristotle sense does not have quite the omnipotence which 
Locke was to give i t ,  he certainly recognises it s  great importance in 
cognition. Plato based his theory o f  knowledge on what he considered to 
be worth knowing; A ristotle based his on what he sow as generally knowable,
a radical sh ift  from the old  Soeratic model t ” ........ when Socrates
isolated  himself from every external relationship by making an appeal 
to  h is daemon, and assumed, as 1 suppose, that everyone must do the same, 
such a view o f  l i f e  is  essentially a secret, or constitutes an essential 
secret, because i t  cannot be communicated d irectly . The most that 
Socrates could do was to help another negatively, by a maieutic artistry , 
to  achieve the same view. Everything subjective, which through i t s  
d ia lectica l inwardness eludes a d irect form o f  expression, is  an 
essential secre t." ( 3 )
(1 ) M.W.Bnndv. "Hie Theory o f  Imagination in Classical end Mediaeval Thought",' 
pp .259-260. Although Bundy's book has been useful to 117 own analysis o f  the 
theory o f  imagination, h is  treatment o f  the relationship between imitation 
(mimesis) and imagination is  inadequate and, I believe, inaccurate; c f .  my 
remarkslin fra) on A ristotle 's  theory o f  art.
( 2) A.W.Lew.("The Two Imaginations", in Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research. Vol. XXV.up. 188-200). is  quite certain o f th is influences "Hie 
whole o f  the Western tradition l ie s  under the spell o f the Be Animas o f  a 
knowledge process dominated by the epistemological triad perception, 
imagination, thought, where the hierarchy o f epistemic moments is  dominated 
by the act o f  abstraction, and where sensation is  bat a reaping o f the 
flowers o f  experience, synthesised and fixed in the vat o f  imagination and 
ultimately processed into those essences or concepts which are but the 
elements o f judgment", (pp. 188-9). On imagination. Levy adds s "Kant's 
account in the Critique o f Pure Reason s t i l l  l ie s  under the unacknowledged 
spell o f  the De Anima." (p .190).
(3 ) S.Kierkegaard. "Concluding Unscientific P ostscrip t".(C h .II.S ee .I .)
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Finally, in contrasting the outlook end approach o f these two philosophers, 
«ho both, in different ways, set the pattern for  most subsequent speculation 
(including the theory o f imagination) ,  a quotation from the respected 
scholar Eduard Zeller I
" . . .th e  Athenian a bom poet and tax imaginative and speculative mind, 
with a tendency to mysticism enforced by the influence o f  Pythagorean ism; 
the Stagirite a man o f sober disposition relying on the facts o f  experience 
and a powerful s c ie n tific  organiser." And t "Plato would allow  the world 
o f  sensual perception no real being, fbr A ristotle, however, th is  is  the 
subject o f  investigation."("Outlines o f  the History o f Greek Philosophy", 
p .167 )
Fundamental to A ristotle 's  philosophy is  his b e lie f in the permanence 
o f motion, upon which are founded his distinctions between actuality end 
potentia lity , and between form and matter. As he asserts in the Fhvsica :
" . . . . . there never was a time when there was not motion, and never w ill be 
a time when there w ill not be m otion ."(l) Within this conviction o f  the 
perpetuity o f motion or change, as exercised in He Anima. he makes many 
distinctions o f a conceptual nature; but i t  is  motion which i s  o f  primary 
importance. E. Wallace finds a similar conviction in H egel's attitude to 
psychology t
"Aristotle would seem then to take the seme view o f  the study o f the ,
mind as Hegel has done in a passage o f  the Bi cyclopaedia. ' I f  we propose to 
think the mind,' we may suppose A ristotle to be saying with the la tter ,
'we must not be quite so shy o f  i t s  special phenomena. Hind i s  essentially 
active. But i f  the mind la active, i t  must, as i t  were, u tte r  i t e e l f .  I t  
i s  wrong therefore to take the mind fo r  a prooessless ens as did the old 
metaphysio which divided the processless inward l i f e  o f  the mind from its  
rnitwaril l i f e .  No good w ill be done nnl»«« +Jw» wind he in i t s  t is s rc t :
( 1 ) feysigp, 232b 5 fft  this statement is ,  however, toutologous, since 
Aristotle also asserts that time is  " . . . i t s e l f  a kind o f m otion.” (o p .c i t . .
251b 12). On the sternal nature o f motion, eoe also Physics 250b ll-252b 6 in c ..
♦
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rea lity , in i t s  action t and in each a way that i t s  manifestations are 
seen to he determined by i t s  inward force , ' " ( l )
The Aristotelian soul i s  not a separate entity lik e  the Platonic, bat 
an imminent, active force which manifests i t s e l f  in  many different ways 
and which is  united to the body in the way that a ll matter has form. Thus, 
fo r  him, that which is  subject to change or motion, the developing thing,
( i . e .  the individual person in De Aniraa). is  what G.B.G.Mure refers to  as a 
'concrete* o f  matter (h v le ). and form ( eidoa): matter and form, though 
conceptually distinguishable, were actually inseparable.(2 ) Development 
( energeia) is  expressed in terms o f  matter becoming form, o f that which 
i s  potential becoming actualised : " ..th e  actuality o f whatever is  potential 
is  identical with it s  fozmulable essence,” A ristotle te l ls  us; ( De An.41 ‘7b 
!£•) or as St. Hiomas Aquinas puts i t  in his commentary on De Anima : " . .  
the actuality o f  anything i s  the inmanent idea and form o f the thing as 
in potency. "(3 ) This motion or change, understood as development, o r  as 
becoming, is  known as entelechv. so that matter completely actual ised  is  
entelechy and in the successive stages o f  the process from potentiality  
to actuality, each higher stage is  energeia compared to the lower, and 
dunamia compared to those above i t . (4) Unformed matter is  impossible, 
though i t  is  described as steres ia .(T) " . .a  cause o f  both being and not 
being. " (De Caelo 28Tb 5) So form is  to  be understood as the beginning
(1 ) E.Wallace. "The Psychology o f  A ristotle " . Introduction. p.XXXI. The 
quotation from Hegel comes from "Logic" sec.T4(Wallace's translation).
(2 ) " I f  we now .....analyse the developing thing s ta tica lly  in terms o f  i t s  
composition, we shall find that i t  i s  a con cre te ...o f matter(hvle) end form 
( e id os). Matter and form are in fa ct the respective equivalents o f potentiality 
and actuality. They are consequently like  the la tte r , a pair o f  terms purely 
relative to one another." ( G.B.G.Mnre. ot> .cit.. p .lO ). Matter, Mure explains,
is  not ' s t u f f ,  but the materials o f which a thing i s  composed; form is  
structure or the structural princip le. I t  is  important to bear in mind, as 
J.I,Bears remarks. (o p .c i t . . p.219 sec.14). the difference between an object 
and i t s  shape ( scheme or morphe) and an ob ject and i t s  form. 
w)Trum "Arisio t ie 's  De annua in me version o f  W illi«» o f  Moerbeke and The 
Commentary o f  St.Thomas Aquinas", (trous.K.Foster & S.Humphries,with Intro, 
by Ivo Thomas), p_,2l6,sec. 120. "immanent idea" is  hare a translation o f  
ratio (logos).
(4 ) See J.I,Be are. p p .c it . . p_,_270 sec.16.. whom I have closely followed hero.
(5) G.H.G.Mure. p p .c it . . p_,l2 .dofines stsresls as t"the absence o f  character 
forma subject which is  by nature such as to possess i t "
and tiie aid o f a ll motion, so far aa the development o f any individual
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thing or person is  concerned, though A ristotle gives no priority  to 
oither form or motion. A grasp o f  the characteristic fornalation o f  
A ristotle 's  philosophical belie fs  is  cruoial to a proper understanding 
o f their application in the psychological theory o f  De Anima. and G.B.G. 
More also affirms that this teleolog ica l formula "dominates the «hole 
course o f  A ristotle 's  speculation", adding :
"Follow him as ho applies i t  in every sphere which he investigates; 
watch i t  grow from th is in itia l abstract formula into a concrete universe 
o f  thought; and you may hope to grasp the essential meaning o f his 
philosophy. " (Q p .c it ..p .7 ).
Mure,(pp. 15-15), gives what he ca lls  a "fourfold causal analysis o f  
A ristotle 's  a it ia (l ) .  describing i t  as " ..th e  permanent centre o f  his 
philosophy and the crucial test to which he brings the metaphysic o f 
his predecessors.” (Q p .c it ..p .l6 ). But Aristotle does owe much to his 
predecessors. The problems to which he addresses himself come to him
from Plato and h is b e lie f in the primacy o f motion is  perhaps Heraclitan, 
and h is psychology is  one o f  action, committed to the idea o f  soul,
thought and imagination as kinds o f  movement. Bis influence o f this 
teleological formula is  far-reaching and profound(2) and may be seen to
(1) n tis a itia  is  inadequately rendered as "cause", a word whose modem 
empirical associations make i t  too sp ec ific  to convey the broader Aristotelian 
accretions. Mure (o p .c i t . . p .lO ). also introduces an appropriately organic 
element to h is explonation o f  Aristotelian motion, describing this la tter
as "anabolic" and "catabolic".
( 2) See E. Zeller, o p .  c i t . . p .176  s " I t  i s . . . . a  merit o f  A ristotle 's  
interpretation o f  the world that through the distinction between potential 
end actual being, one o f which is  converted into the other by motion, and 
especially through the important concept o f  entelechy . . .  the ground was
cl oared for the idea o f evolution and the mathematical type o f ontology and 
concept which Plato represents was replaced by a b iological type." See also 
Kali ace, op .cit . .  r.Ii. The notion o f  a transcendent rea lity  has considerably 
less importance for  Aristotle than have the "Forms" fo r  Plato. In so for
4«. 4v*4 -AeJ-1 AV4 ~ •* 4 V — -*■ a
a property o f the fu lly—developed mind, which achieves a measure o f  autonomy, 
" ..in  the history o f  the individual »knowledge comes before it s  employment 
or exercise ." ( Be Anima. *J.gw 16). On this question o f immanence end trans­
cendence in A ristotle 's  philosophy, see "A ristotle" by tf..P.Boso.p.l55ff.
("A representation o f  God in the l>e Anima as imaauent in the individual 
would not necessarily be inconsistent with the representation o f Him iu 
the Metaphysics as transcendent."etc.) .
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shape the Neoplatonic principle o f plenitude, the Leitniziaa monad and, 
aa the language o f  hvle and eidos partly indicates, the phenomenology 
o f  Brentano -  who was an Aristotelian scholar -  and Husserl. As both 
this present chapter and th is present work conclude with a consideration 
o f  Sartre, whose studies o f  imagination are based on Busserlian principles, 
the psychology and aesthetic o f  imagination is  given a certain symmetry 
which te s t if ie s  to the lasting power o f A ristotle 's  theories.
/
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SECTION II 
Part 'A*
The De Anima is ,  as Aristotle te lls  us, a 'h i s t o r y  o f the sou l'.
Dot A ristotle 's  conception o f the sonl is  quite different from that o f 
Plato; as already suggested, Aristotle is  highly cr itica l o f  the doctrine 
o f  metempsychosis which is  fundamental to the Pythagorean and Sap e do cl eon 
bases o f  P lato 's theory. The epistemological be lie fs  underlying the 
psychology o f  De Anima are inevitably quite d ifferent from the idealism, and 
the b e lie f in knowledge as reminiscence, which are dominant in P lato 's  voiles. 
Owing to the influence o f  Neo-Platonism and Christianity, the word "soul" 
f i t s  more happily into discussion o f Plato than o f A ristotle; modern Baglish 
has no word as E. Wallace says, which "con fu lly  represent what Aristotle 
■leant by psyche.
"And when we ask what English term would best translate the word used 
by A ristotle i t  is  d if f ic u lt  to arrive at any precise decision. 'Mind* might 
well be said to  occupy the some place in the psychology o f our day" which 
usvche did in A r is to tle 's  times t i t  might be plausibly regarded as the 
true equivalent o f  A r is to tle 's  word. But on the other hand i t  is  to be 
remembered that the 'mind' means less than A r isto tle 's  expression meant 
in Greece." (Wallace, o p .c i t . . p.XLVIIl).
Bane's empirical notion o f  the s e lf  is  inadequate as i t  gives no credit to 
the mind as a possible formative power in i t s  own right, and the "sp irit" 
o f  both Berkeley end Hegel is  in each case too autonomous and transcendental 
a conception accurately to convey the immanent and teleological qualities 
o f  the Aristotelian psyche, which probably has i t s  closest relative in 
Brentano's idea o f  "consciousness" and the assertion that a ll consciousness 
has an active content, i . e . .  can only be spoken o f as "consciousness o f" .
For Brentano as fo r  A ristotle there is  no thought without a "presentation".
Based on the developmental formula which is  contained in h is distinction«
o f  form and matter, and o f  actuality and poten tia lity , A ristotle gives an
account o f the individual's dynamic progression from the near-materiality
o f  perception to the near-formal state which is  the quality o f  mental
autonomy. He speaks o f  the animate body as owsia (essence or being)
* Written in 1882.
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o f  -which the soma, the body per se. is  the hvle: the psyche per se is  
eidos. Pbr the soma to have l i f e  is  to have realised in i t  certain 
antecedent p oten tia lities  which belonged to the hvle from which the 
liv ing  body has sprang; psyche i s  the realisation o f each p oten tia lities . 
Hie Aristotelian soul is  as inseparable from body as form is  from matter, 
bat this soul is  not materially explicable t i t  has no material body.
Body i t s e l f  is  always o f  the nature o f a sabiectum. but is  the subject 
o f  no attributes or  predicates, nor is  i t s e l f  an attribute or p red ica te .(l) 
Even to speak in terms o f  a "unity" o f  soul end body would be misleading 
since i t  implies the p oss ib ility  o f  disunity, o f  Platonic dualism, which 
Aristotle is  intent on refuting t
"...w e can wholly dismiss as unnecessary the question whether the soul 
and body are one : i t  is  as meaningless as to ask whether the vax and the 
shape given to i t  by the stamp are one, or generally the matter o f  a thing 
and that o f  which i t  is  the matter.” ( De An. 412b 6 ff )
This 'sou l' " . . i s  precisely  the actuality whereby the body has l i f e , "  ( 2) 
end, given what ifnre ca lls  the 'fou rfo ld  causal analysis' o f  A risto tle 's  
philosophical b e lie fs  (o p .c it . .  pp 15-17). " I t  is  (a) the source o f  origin 
o f  movement, i t  i s  (h) the end, i t  i s  (c )  the essence o f the whole liv in g  
bodv."(De An 415b 8 f f ) . The im possibility o f  any non^-conceptual separation
( l )  This paragraph closely  follows J .I.B ears 's  exegesis (o p .c i t . . pp .220-1.
sec.17.
(2 ) St.lThomas Aquinas. o p .c i t . . p .l69 . se c .222. I t  mast be observed at this 
point that though he gives much valuable elucidation o f  A r is to tle 's  often 
d iff ic u lt  ideas, St. Thomas sees A ristotle through the eyes o f  h is Neo— 
Platonic, Hebrew god; and that the hulk o f what subsequently passed for , 
and was reviled as, the work o f  "The Philosopher" was the emasculated version 
which St. Thomas made acceptable to the church. Hence fo r  example when 
A ristotle says the seal " . . . i s  a substance in the sense which corresponds 
to the defin itive formula o f  a thing 's essence. That moans that i t  is  'the 
essential whatness* o f  a body o f  the Varactor ju st assigned..." (v is . 
organised, possessed o f potentiality  o f  l i f e ) ,  ( De Anima. frjgb lO ff ) . St. 
Thomas consents : "In a r t ific ia l things, made by human sk ill , the forms 
Imposed on the material are accidental format and since these ere eesier 
fo r  us to perceive than is  substantial form, as being more accessible to the 
sense, i t  i s  obviously reasonable to approach the soul, which is  a substantial 
form (my underlinings), through a comparison with occidental forms." (on.citY ."
£■•¿25« gffc.235)«
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o f  body from soul, and o f the dualism im plicit in Platonic metempsychosis, 
i s  interdependent on the actual singularity o f the body-soul :
" I t  is  not with every causal body that a given font o f  soul w ill unite 
i t s e l f .  To suppose otherwise is  as erroneous as to suppose that a 
carpenter could do h is work with a flute as well as with a hameer and 
saw." (Bears, op.ci t . .  p.270. s e o .l6 ).
The Bnpedoclean notion o f  knowledge as being o f  like by like , a con­
comitant o f P lato 's  b e lie f in the transmigration o f soulo, is  also 
attacked by A ristotle , fo r  on h is  account there con be no innate knowledge 
in a soul which i s  coeval with i t s  body; the in diva dual, before knowing, 
i s  in a state o f  'un like ' in relation to that which he does not yet 
know.(l) But, as has already been emphasised, although the roots o f 
empiricism are perhaps to be found in Aristotelian ism, Aristotle is  
himself far from being an em piricist. Bnpirieal man is  e part o f  nature; 
in A ristotle 's  conception man is ,  by his actual in te lle c t , superior to 
naturo.(2)Not superior in the moral sense which is  for  Plate synonymous 
with knowledge, but in the sense that man is  able to subject nature to 
the synoptic power o f  h is a b ility  to abstract. I t  is  in  this b e lie f  o f 
the importance o f  -that a b ility , which Socrates valued so highly, to 'see 
the ono in the many', that A ristotle ressembles Plato; but this is  one o f  
the very few points at which their philosophies seem to touch.
(1 ) So, o f  the potentiality-actuality  change, in relation to the 
individual's development, A ristotle says t " ..p r io r  to and daring the 
change the two factors are unlike, after i t  l ik e ."  ( De Minn. 417a 20) .  
i . e . .  "At f ir s t ,  and while the transforming process is  going on, there
is  dissim ilarity; bat at the end, \i\cn the thing is  transformed r.d changed, 
there i s  sim ilarity. And so i t  i s  between the sense-faculty and its  
ob ject. And the early philosophers were wrong because they missed this 
d istin ction ." (Aqcjnas, op._cit., P.,.237, 800.357).
(2 ) i . e .  A ristotle does not emphasise the receptive function o f oui 
experience at the expense o f the mind's active, organisational response 
to the natural world. I t  is  this response which raises man above the 
natural and animal world.
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Port »B*
No Recount o f  A ristotle ’ e conception o f the soul and i t s  attributes would 
be- complete without some reference to h is conjectures about physical 
science* The actual inseparability o f  soul and body demands such a 
reference* as does tho far-reaching influence o f Aristotelian science* 
though i t  is  b iological science which is  o f  particular interest at present.
The basic b iological inactions o f the liv in g  person, i«e* which are 
commensurate with the body being insouled* so to speak, are breathing, 
heartbeat, and nutrition. Aristotle considers the p oss ib ility  that soul 
resides in the a ir we breathe (De Spiritu. 481a. IQ ff) . and concludes that : 
" . . . i f  the soul resides in this a ir, the a ir is  at any rate a neutral 
substance. Sorely, i f  i t  becomes animate or becomes soul, i t  snffors some 
change or alteration, and so naturally moves towards that is  akin to i t ,  
and lik e  grows by the addition o f lik e . Or is  i t  otherwise? fo r  i t  may 
be contended that the a ir i s  not lik e  the whole o f soul bat i s  something 
which contributes to th is potentiality  or in this sense makes i t ,  and -that 
which has made i t  is  i t s  principle and foundation." (L o c .c it ) .
Although he dismisses pre-Socratic and Platonic psychology and 
epistemology, the influence o f the old  elemental science s t i l l  persists, 
and the apparently close relationship between soul and respiration is  
maintained.(l) Bat respiration i s  elsewhere described as "the means o f  t
affecting refrigeration" ( De Bespiratione. 478a 10). as a necessary function 
in holding a life-preserving balance between the excesses o f  hot and cold, 
the heart being the source o f heat (O n .cit .. 478a. 21).
The heart i s  also considered to be the organ o f  digestion, whereby the 
row material o f  food is  changed into a form useful to the individual :
" . . . l i f e  and the presence o f soul involve a certain heat. Not even the 
uxgosliiig pxvcttsts to which is  uue the nuiriiion  ox animals occurs apart 
from soul and warmth, fo r  i t  is  to f ir e  that in a ll oases elaboration is  
due. I t  is  for  this reason, precisely, that the primary nutritive soul
( l )  Cf. I.oibniz.wfao ca lls  psychology' "pneumatology".
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m st also be located in that part o f  the body and in that division o f 
th is region which is  the inmediate vehicle o f  th is princip le. She 
region in question is  intermediate between that where food enters and 
that where excrement is  discharged. In bloodless animals i t  has no 
name, but in the s an gain eons class this organ is  ca lled  the heart." 
(0 p .c lt . . 474a. 2*5ff).
To modern anatomical science, which regards i t  as a pumping muscle, 
A ristotle 's  notions about the heart would be laughable; but these 
notions have not been restricted  to anatomy. The heart has it s  
chemical and it s  psychological correlates i 'Nov the other psychical 
facu lties cannot exist apart from the power o f nutrition . . . . . . . . .  and
th is  depends on the natural f i r e ,  by the union with which Nature has 
set i t  aglow." ( De Bespirationa. 474b.lOff) . I t  is  th is cardiac f ir e  
which transforms the nutriment and makes i t  available to the blood fo r  
distribution to the muscles: 'There i s  a sim ilarity between this 
phenomenon end that o f boiling; fo r  boiling is  due to the vo la tiliza tion  
o f  flu id  by beat and the expansion consequent on increase o f  bulk." 
(Q p .c it .. 479b. T D t t ) .
The old  elemental science maintains i t s  grip on A ristotle as i t  
did on Plato and, owing to the survival and prestige o f  Timaeus.became 
tho basis fo r  mediaeval and Benetissance alchemy and magic. Air and 
f ir e  are used to explain the continuation o f  l i f e  in  the individual 
and the elements aa a whole are vae foundation o f  A r is to tle 's  cosmology.(l)
The implications fo r  the theory o f  imagination are perhaps not imiediately 
apparent. But the ancient and traditional account o f  the function o f  the 
synthesising and transforming "facu lty" which passes from Plato and
A ristotle and eventually to Kant gives to th is "faculty" a crucial
fv \ c . .  n. u — j . w r . i 4# -  VD, .A 1ojl v u o v e u JLJlL OJ^ UQA OD XU
five  regions, the less being in each case surrounded by the greeted -  namely, 
earth surrounded by water, water by a ir, a ir  by f ir e ,  and f ir e  by aether -  
make up tho whole Universe. All the hpper portion represents the dwelling 
o f  the gods, tho lover abode o f mental creatures." On a b iological plane, 
the exhaustive, upwardly—reaching fire s  are cooled by tho refrigerative 
qualities o f  respiration : the passionate heart needs the restraint o f 
more mundane considerations.
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place which i s  midway between the materials o f  sense and the forms o f  
reason. The biological analogy te l ls  o f  the heat which, by a process 
lik e  boiling, refines nutriment into a vaporous state which is  amenable 
to the blood and which, la ter understood as "sp irits", were believed 
to ascend to the head. Food is  made spiritous, as water is  made 
vaporous, when exposed to f ir e . The intoxication caused by wine was 
believed to have operated in the same way; and so, in a mythology which 
even today has a tenuous existence, the heart is  regarded as the 
biological counterpart and actual home o f  imagination.
The elemental and cosmological foundations o f a theory which is
able to embrace p h ilo s o p h ie s  o f biology, psychology, and chemistry,
engender links which to modern ways o f thinking are trans-categorical
and therefore erroneous. Bat centuries o f  natural philosophy vere
based upon such links. In this way, the heart, the body's combustion
chamber, is  an elemental substrate o f  f i r e ,  and fire  becomes associated
with imagination. Fire is  the essential transforming agent o f  the
alchemist, the chemist, and the magician, playing a major part in
transforming dross (the physical or material) into a pore form (rational
or sp iritu a l), as for example in changing bass metal into gold. The
theory and practice o f physical science before Newton's time (he too
was an alchemist)owed much topra-Socratic philosophy, and i t  was not
until the 18th century that the b e lie f in a fire-prin cip le , phlogiston,
was fin a lly  dispelled by Lavoisier and Priestley. Even today imagination
i s  seriously given fundamental connections with the four elements in the
works o f Gaston Bach el or d who himself was a professor o f  physios, and
long-standing myths about imagination and creative a b ility  grew from
th is ancient cosmology t a ir  the tempering agent associated with
respiration and in sp ira tion :(l) the heart as b iological furnace producing
( l )  Soo G.ft.G.Mnre, o p .c it . . p.99 : "In e ll  organisms there must, i t  seems, 
be e matter more divine than the four elements, in which the soul is  
primarily embodied, and v ita l heat is  occasionally promoted by Aristotle 
to  the dignity o f being an analogue o f the aether, and termed spiritne 
(naenma). " See Be Gen.Animalium 7^6b 29
vapours and sp ir its , -with it s  associations vith the emotions(l); and fire , 
catalyst and maker o f fusions, associated vith passion and fervour. ( 2) 
Through the magic and alchemy o f  Giordano Bruno and Paracel sub and the 
la tte r 's  great influence on the inystical writings o f  Jacob Boefame, these 
ancient notions also f i l t e r  into modern philosophy and psychology o f 
imagination.
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(1) See De Mima. 40^a 29ff : " . .a  physicist would define an affection o f 
soul . d ifferently  from a d ia lectica l; the la tte r  would define e .g . anger 
as the appetite for returning pain for  pain, or something like that, while 
the former would define i t  as a boiling o f  the blood or warm substance 
surrounding the heart".
(2) De Alima. 406a 28f f  : " . . i f  the natural movement o f the soul be upward, 
the soul must be fir e ; i f  downward, i t  must be earth."
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SECTION IIJ.
A ristotle 's  fundamental motive formal» o f  form-matter end actuality- 
potentiality is  applied micro cosmic a lly  and macrocoamically, and is  brought 
to bear on bis analysis o f  the soul as a whole, end on the qualities which 
cure the sou l's  components. The soul is  to the body what sight is  to the 
eye :
"Suppose the eye were an animal -  sight would have been i t s  soul, for  
sight is  the substance or essence o f  the eye which corresponds to the 
formal a, the eye being merely the matter o f seeing; when seeing is  removed 
the eye i s  no longer an eye, except in name -  i t  i s  no more a real eye than 
the eye o f  a statue or o f  a painted fign re ."(DeAn.412b 19ff)
Sense is  related to  it s  orgau as soul is  related to the body, the one 
is  the sine oua non o f  the other; sense is  related to it s  objects in 
precisely  the same ways
"By a 'sense' i s  meant what has the power o f  receiving into i t s e l f  the 
sensible forms o f things without the matter* This must be conceived o f  
as taking place in the way in which a piece o f wax takes on the impress o f 
a signet-ring without the iron or gold ." ( l )
Borrowing P lato 's  popular metaphor, A ristotle endeavours to convey 
the utter reliance o f  sense on it s  objects, whilst retaining a degree o f  
autonomy for  those ob jects; but as far as the actual organs are concerned, 
seeing end sight are the same thing, or we fa ll  into an in fin ite  regress t 
otherwise we must " . ..assume a sense which is  aware o f  i t s e l f . ” ( De An.425b 16) 
And as A ristotle observes :
"This presents a d ifficu lty  t i f  to perceive by aigjht is  just to see, and 
what is  seen is  colour (or the coloured), then i f  we a n  to see -that which 
sees, -«hat which sees orig inally  imst bo coloured. I t  is  d e a r  therefore 
that 'to  perceive by sight' has mors than one meaning; fo r  oven when we are
( l ) Op. c i t . . 424a 1 7 ff . Or, as J.I.Dgare describes i t  : "Tho sensory faculty 
is  nothing but a faculty until confronted by it s  subjeot. The percipient 
undergoes a change when confronted with the ob ject; the object is  capable 
o f  independent existence; the object has it s  own actual qualities -  i t s  form, 
which sense finds in i t  at the noant o f perception. Thus, for  A ristotle, 
the object is  what Kant would ca ll a Ding on s ich ."
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not seeing. i t  is  by sight that ve discriminate darkness from ligh t, 
though hot in the same way as ve distinguish one colour from another, 
iferther, in a sense even that which sees is. coloured; for in each case 
the sense-organ is  capable o f  receiving the sensible object without it s  
matter. That is  why even when the sensible object are gone the sensings 
and imaginings continue to exist in the sense-organs.
The activ ity  o f  the sensible ob ject and that o f the percipient sense 
is  one end the same activ ity , end yet the distinction between their being 
remains, " ( l )
Here then are the beginnings o f  the theory o f imagination, for when 
the object o f  sense has departed i t s  dematerialiaed impression( 2) remains; 
the identification  o f  this residual impression with the object maintained 
at this pre-pcrceptnal level o f  sensation, for  Aristotle insists that 
sensations are always true. (3 ) But sensations vary, so that in a 
perception o f snow, sensations answering to 'co ld 1 and 'white* are involved: 
to account for  the synthesis o f  perception Aristotle describes «hat he ca lls  
the koine aisthesis. and which is  rendered in Latin as the sensns coinnunin. 
This sensns communis i s  both discriminative and autonomous, fo r  as Aristotle 
argues i "..discrim ination between white and sweet cannot be effected  by 
two agencies which remain separate; both the qualities discriminated must
(1 ) O p .cit.. 425b 1 8 ff . Or, as he says earlier. (424a 25) : "The sense rad 
it s  organ are the same in fa ct, hut their essence is  not the seme.1' — i .e .  
"Sensation is  thus usually described by Aristotle as a process iu which wc 
are 'moved' or 'a ffe c te d ' ( l ite r a lly , 's u f fe r ')  by an external ob ject. I t  
involves therefore immediately an 'a lteration ' or a qualitative transform­
ation t the a ffection , which i s  the vehicle o f alteration, produces a change 
in the nature or quality o f  the organ which perceives."(B.Wallace. op. c i i . . 
p.LVIl).
(2) The deliberate use herein o f  terms associated with British empirical 
-philosophy both anticipates a la ter chapter rad implies the unacknowledged
debt which empiricism owes to Aristotlo;(although, o f  course, there i s  nothing
mechanical about A r is to t le 's  account). . -----
13) Sen bu s cocmunia i s  the Mediaeval Latin tronslation o f  A ristotle 's  phrs.it; 
G.R.G.htire ca lls  i t  the 'synthetic function'« •T.T.Bcare tha-Jsynthetic function
A# CCTISC ® r F.VilliiCC f e>n«ies«l wn A W 7r\1 1 r*«** +V« V SArwnw pene^ wsi I
The inadequacy o f these substitutes re flects  the problems o f rendering 
Aristotle into Ehgliah.
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be present to  something that is  one and single ." ( De An.426b 17ff) ibid 
th is discriminative act is  unbroken : " ..th e  discriminating power and the 
time o f  i t s  exercise must be one and undivided.” (o p .c i t . . 426b 29ft )  He 
attempts to dispel the apparent paradox with an illu stra tive  metaphor 
( 427a lO ff) . which is  again reminiscent o f  Plato. He likens the senens 
connmnis to a point on a lin e , which may be regarded as se lf-su ffic ien t, 
or as a junction between the two sections on each side o f the point; he thus 
endeavours to  answer Platonic dualism by identifying an epistemological 
postulate with it s  psychological ro le . Sense, in E. Wallace's phrase, is  
already a "going beyond the immediate fa c t ” , so that :
"the ob ject which i t  apprehends i s  perceived not in i t s  individual charac­
ter  but in relation to i t s  general idea. And thus the object o f sense- 
perception as perceived is  im plicity an universal : i t  i s ,  to use A r is to tle 's  
example, not Callias, but Callias the man that we perceive, " ( l )
Bearing in mind the fundamental formula which guides A r is t lt ie 's  psychology, 
and anticipating the direction in which h is account o f  cognition is  moving, 
h is statement that "Actual sense corresponds to the stage o f the exercise 
o f  knowledge" ( De An. £17a 19). asserts the equal certainty with which we 
regard the sensed and the known. The ob ject o f sense is  external and 
individual whereas knowledge apprehends universals, and i t  is  an essential 
function o f  the sensue communis and o f  phantasia to mediate between 
sense and the understanding. The "synthetic faculty" o f P lato's Theaetotun (l)
( l )  E.Wallace, on. c i t . . u.LXII. The reference is  to the Posterior 
Analytics 100a 16.
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is  very similar to A ristotle 's  sensus commmis(l) ,  and both conceptions 
bear a marked resemblance to Kant's synthetic power o f imagination; bat 
there are d iff ic u lt ie s . P lato 's conception, which is  a function o f  the 
mind, i s  very like  the transcendental schemata o f the second edition o f 
Kant's Critique o f Pure Reason; A r is to tle 's  sensus communis, with it s  
degree o f  autonomy, is  more a function o f  sense and is  closer to Kant's 
productive imagination o f the f ir s t  edition o f  the Critique. As we 
shall see in the discussion o f  A r is to tle 's  theory o f  imagination he is  
as reluctant as Kant to allow imagination any significant autonomy, and 
there i s  in both philosophers an ongoing unresolved dichotomy between a 
conceptual or analytic and a psychological autonomy. In maintaining 
what looks lik e  an ontological d istinction  between object and iopreesion 
which i s  not unlike the Kantian th in k -in -itse lf doctrine. But in main­
taining that 'that which sees mast be coloured' and that i t  is  not 
Cal lia s  but 'Callias the man' that we (a ctive ly ) perceive, A ristotle  is  
also in anticipation o f  the phenomenological idea o f  intentionality.
His fundamental emphasis on action and motion informs his aesthetic 
theory, but the 'em pirical' end 'ra tion a l' imaginations, so important 
fo r  more recent theories o f art, give him l i t t l e  cause for concern. (l)
( l )  See J.I.Beare. (o p .c it . .  p .276 se c .21) who considers that Plato 
" . . .la y s  what may have been the foundation o f A ristotle 's  theory o f  
i t *  os the faculty which distinguishes and composes the data o f  sense, 
and o f  the theory o f imagination, memory, and reminiscence. Indeed, 
the terns in which he expressed himself respecting these, and the 
similes he employed for  elucidating them, have remained part o f ,  and 
have deeply influenced the language o f ,  psychology, to the present 
day. In fullness o f detail on such points A ristotle surpasses him; 
but a ll the main or cardinal psychological ideas respecting the 
functions o f synthesis are already, at lea st in outline, to he found 
in Plato. The difference between him and A ristotle on this point was 
mainly a difference o f  method. He chose to c la ssify  a ll functions o f 
synthesis as parts o f the activ ity  o f the understanding. This, indeed, 
as an epistemologist or metaphysician, he was wise in doing; but fo r  the 
purpose o f empirical psychology, A r is to tle 's  contribution o f synthesis 
to the faculty o f  sense is  unquestionably sound." G.R.G.Mare's views 
are similar; he finds the roots o f  A risto tle 's  aenana cm-iunis in 
Theaetetua. "though Plato ascribes the synthetic function to thought 
and not to sense." (O n.cit. .  n.109. footnoto).
* i . e . the ' synthetic faculty'
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Part »A '.
Directly and indirectly, A ristotle 's  De Anima is  a major source o f 
a ll philosophy o f  mind up to — and in some cases beyond -  the end o f  the 
19th century. This includes Stoicism, Neoplatonism, Kant, Phenomenology, 
and even Associationism. Most o f what A ristotle  has to saychout"imagination" 
(phantasia) occurs in the third book o f De Anima. where he tr ie s  to say 
f ir s t  what phantasia is  not, and then what i t  i s .  As ve shall see, there 
are d iff ic u lt ie s  in his account which are caused by h is fundamental distinc­
tion between activ ity  and passivity as well as anomalies between his account 
o f phantasia and that o f memory, and i t  i s  owing to these d iff ic u lt ie s  and 
anomalies that subsequent theories o f imagination are incompatible with 
each other and yet have a common ancestry in Aristotelian psychology. He 
begins book three with a brie f description o f  the soul :
"There are two distinctive pecolarities by reference to which ve 
characterise the soul -  1. local movement and 2. thinking, discriminating 
and perceiving. Thinking both speculative and practical is  regarded as 
akin to a form o f  perceiving; for  in the one as well as in the other discrim­
inates and i s  cognizant o f something which i s . ” ( De An.427a 1 5 ff)
(He la ter  describes phentasis as a form o f  movement and also says there 
is  no t-hinlcing without "an image" (De An.4‘iHa 1 4 ff) . He reproves Empedocles 
and other "ancients" who identified thinking writh perceiving and who "a ll 
look upon thinking as a bodily process l ik e  perceiving, and hold that lik e  
is  known as well as uerceivied by lik e " , ( 427a 26). saying that they cannot 
avoid the dilemma that "whatever seems i s  true" and that "error is  contact 
writh unlike; fo r  that is  the opposite o f  the knowing o f  the lik e  by l ik e ."  
(427b 4 ). In broad terms Aristotle is  saying that i t  is  very important
¿21 "ti.CH tC  fh «  on H ih »  A p n ^ rM li.
"imagination" can deceive; he is  also saying that perceiving is  bodily, 
with the implication that thinking is  not and that there is  something 
like  an inner/outer distinction betveen them. Distinguishing between 
thinking and perceiving he says >
SECTION IV .
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"...im agination ie  different from either perceiving or discursive 
thinking, though i t  is  not found without sensation, or judgment without 
i t .  That th is  activ ity  is  not the same kind o f thinking as judgment 
is  obvious. F  or imagining l ie s  within our own power whenever we wish 
(e .g . we can ca ll up a picture, as in the practice o f nnemonics* by the 
use o f mental images), but in forming opinions we are not free : we 
cannot escape the alternative o f  falsehood or truth. Further, when we 
think something to be fearful o r  threatening, emotion is  irmediately 
produced, and so too with what, i s  encouraging; but when we merely imagine 
we remain as unaffected as persons who arc looking at a painting o f some 
dreadful or encouraging scene." (0r>.cit..427b l 6 f f ) .
As he has already (427b 6 f f )  made a distinction between practical
and discursive thinking, we can now say that "imagination" depends on
sensation, that judgment depends on "imagination", and that to imagine,
or to see a real or a mental image, does not a ffect us. He adds a l i t t le
la ter that thinking "is  held to  be in part imagination, in part judgment"
(427b 29). and goes on to describe "imagination" as "that in virtue o f
which an image arises for  u s . . . "  (428a l ) . asking whether i t  may be a
"single facu lty  or disposition relative to images, in  virtue o f which
we discriminate and are in error or not" (428 a 2 ). These 'discriminative
fa cu lties ' he says are sense, opinion, science, and intelligence, and
he proceeds to  show that imagination is  not the seme as sense or opinion;
practical thinking however, as we have seen, is  in part "imagination".
Thus he describes "imagination" as "for the most part fa lse" (428a 11) i
i t  takes place in the absence o f  sense as for  example in the case o f
dream-*-ig (428a 8 ) . He maintains that seise and knowledge are "never in
error" ( 428a 17 ) bo that imagination, which can bo fa lse , is  nsiiher o f
these* A ristotle is  evidently making a distinction hero between the
appearance o f  images and the appearance o f objects to sense and between
imaging, as dreaming, and thinking; given his act-potentiality formula
and his insistence on the sou l's  motive quality i t  is  dangerous to
* This is  almost certainly a reference to the ancient 'a r t  o f  memory* o f 
which K.A.Yates has eo iHumiliatingly written.
interpret Aristotle ua having a "naive ontology" o f images or as having 
a continuity view o f imagining, hut this ambiguity exists in his account 
o f  "imagination". In speaking o f "when we merely imagine" and making 
th is act analogous with "looking at a painting" Aristotle seems at once 
to be admitting the "naive ontology" o f  the mental image and also to be 
denying i t  any potency in relation to the (motive) soul. iBearing in
mind his idea o f the soul and it s  difference from P lato 's idea, we might 
construe A ristotle 's  remarks to be an attempt to restr ict or deny that 
the image, mental or p icto r ia l, has any autonomous meaning for the se lf 
or consciousness; h is remarks may equally well be seen as an attack on 
the Imenic" power o f  P lato 's  eikasia and, by inference, the oikon.
In saying what "imagination” is  not, Aristotle makes distinctions 
between i t  and "opinion", and i t  is  clear that he has in mind certain 
passages o f  Plato lAere sense, imagination and opinion are confused, 
i . e .  in Tiinaeus (52a). Sophist ( 264ar-b) . and Hiilebus ( 39b). He agrees 
that lik e  imagination opinion may be false but adds that "opinion involves 
b e lie f"  and "every opinion is  accompanied by b e lio f , b e lie f by conviction, 
and conviction by discourse o f reason" (De An.428a 17). Although "opinion" 
may be interpreted as o .g . "supposition" or "judgment" with the former 
lacking the strength o f  the la tter , we must pay heed to A ristotlo 's  motive 
or inmanent conception o f  the soul and realise that for him there is  a 
necessary connection between sense, b e lie f , conviction, reason, and 
commitment to action. The point being made here, and i t  is  one which is  
la te r  to be resurrected by Leibniz, i s  that the individual liv es , acts 
according to , what appears to him as sense and which he therein believes, 
e t c . ,  but that in relation to what wo have ealled "imagination" he suspends 
b e lie f , action, e tc ..  So in broad terms distinctions between the "real" and 
the "imaginary" function in terms o f  action, and disposition rather then 
content.
49.
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Passing on to A risto tle 's  comments on vliat imagination is .  ire 
find :
" . . .  imagination is  held to be a movement and to be impossible 
•without sensation, i . e .  to occur in things that are percipient and to 
have fo r  i t s  content -what can be perceived, and since movement may be 
produced by actual sensation and that movement is  necessarily similar 
in character to the sensation i t s e l f ,  this movement must be 1. necessarily 
(a) capable o f existing apart from sensation, (b) incapable o f existing 
except -when we perceive, 2. such that in virtue o f i t s  possession that in 
which i t  is  found may be present various phenomena both active and passive, 
and 3. such that i t  may be either true or fa ls e ."  (De An. 42Sb l l f f ) . 
Beginning with the la st  o f  h is three points, he explains that though sense 
is  always right with respect to i t s  proper objects, the combination o f 
the objects in perceptions may be wrong; so fo r  example, "..w hile the 
perception that there is  white before us cannot be fa lse , the perception 
that what is  white i s  this or that may be fa ls e .” (428b 2 I f f ) . The 
cognitive process from sense to practical thinking allows the p ossib ility  
o f  error to increase, and in what appears to be a moment o f doubt he even 
admits the p oss ib ility  o f  error in the perception o f  the special objects 
o f  sense, though at this in it ia l level there is  "the lea st possible amount 
o f  falsehood." (428b 18) But "the greatest amount o f  sense-illusion" comes 
in "the perception o f  the universal attributes which accompany the con­
comitant objects to which the special sensibles attach (I  mean e .g . o f  
movement and magnitude);" (428b 22) These three 'modes'- sense, and the 
two aspects or perception -  are phases In that motion which " is  due to the 
a ctiv ity  o f  sense", and the nearer i t s  source that th is motion is  arrested, 
as presumably in both epistemological and psychological analysis (though 
Aristotle does not himself say so) the lesser the likelihood that error 
could occur. I t  is  th is motion which is  imagination t 
" I f  then imagination presents no othor features than those enumerated
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and is  what we have described, then imagination mast be a movement 
resulting from an actual exercise o f  a power o f sense." ( 428b TO)
Bat he in sists  that this motion which i s  imagination is  different 
from the a ctiv ity  o f  sense, ( Do An. 428b 26) which is  consistent with 
what we have already found, bat here we are concerned with Imagination 
as the residuum o f sense, rather lik e  P lato 's  "wax-seal" and Locke's 
"tabula rasa" formalations, which becomes the content o f  thought.
The more complex (in  Locke's sense) th is  content becomes, that is ,  
the more 'universal' (conceptual) the more lia b le  to error: this 
tendency i s  also stated by Spinoza, as we shall see, and the dangers 
o f  abstraction are more forcib ly  argued by Berkeley and Hume. For 
A ristotle as for  Plato and fo r  countless philosophers who followed, 
imagination is  what remains to the mind as a result o f the body's contact 
with the objects o f  sense : "...im aginations remain in the organs o f
sense and resemble sensations..." and so, "..animals in their actions 
are largely guided by them, some ( i . o .  the brutes) because o f  the non­
existence in them o f  mind, others ( i . e .  men) because o f the temporary- 
eclipse in them o f  mind by feeling or disease or sleep, " ( l )
In referring here to the possible "eclipse" o f  the mind by "imaginations" 
he makes no distinction  between possible autonomous images and active 
imafHn'tnp-«. though to be consistent with what he has formerly said we 
should interpret him as intending the la tte r  in relation to dreaming, 
the illu sion s o f illn ess  — presumably feverishness but perhaps those o f 
mental illn ess  -  and feelings. According to what we have already found 
th is means behaving towards the imaginary as one would towards the real, 
but whereas hitherto the b e lie f  and conviction which begot action, end
thus the action i t s e l f ,  were seen as the distinguishing features o f the
( l ) Pe Anima.429a 4 f f . Both J . I.Be are and E. Vail ace comment on the close 
resemblances between the accounts o f  A ristotle and Hobbes. Wallace, for  
example says : "Hobbes indeed was l i t t l e  else than translating Aristotle 
when ho wroto: 'A ll fancies are motions within us, reliques o f those made in 
the sense.' The pictures o f imagination in fact ore simply a result o f  the 
general law o f nature that the movement o f  one substance prolongs i t s e l f  and 
gets communicated to another. And hence i t  is  that in the Rhetoric, Imagination 
i s  described as weak sensation or, in the language o f Hobbes, 'decaying sen se '."
52
"rea l", the need for further, ob jective distinctions becomes apparent i f  
pure thought i s  not to be regarded as a species o f  imagination. I t  is  
surprising that he should include feeling amongst h is mind-eclipsing 
states without further c la rifica tion  and in contradiction o f  h is affirma­
tion  o f  the in a b ility  o f  imagination to a ffect us; both o f these aspects 
o f  A ristotle ’ s theory o f  imagination have implications for  theories o f 
art which are based on imagination -  i f  A ristotle  is  right, that i s .
But his fa ilure to make e x p lic it  any relation between imagination and 
art in the De Anima or between art and imagination in the Poetica seems 
a clear enough indication that he saw no such relation .
Although he barely ventures into the a r t is t ic  uses o f  imagination 
he does refer to  imagination in  his work on memory, and as we have already 
seen he makes reference to the use o f  "images1' in  "the practice o f  Mnemonics".
He says memory i s  " ...n e ith er  Perception nor Conception but a state or 
a ffection  o f  one o f  these, conditioned by lapse o f  time" ( Be Memoria et 
Beminiscentia. 449a 24). ( l )  His account o f  memory end o f the d iffic u lt ie s  
experienced sometimes in trying to remember, a task which involves "searching 
fo r  an image in  a corporeal substrate" (op. c i t . . 455a 15). looks like m 
unequivocal statement o f  the epistemological use o f  autonomous images, but 
we find Be are translating Phantasma as "presentation", a word which precludes
t
a phenomenal distinction  between "real" and "imaginary" :
( l )  J.I.Beare says in a footnote to 450a 25 o f  h is  translation o f 
De Memoria et Reminiscent!.a : "The defin ition  o f  memory implies that in 
i t s  genesis on aisthesis (or upolepsia) has undergone something (pathos) 
owing to lapse o f  time since the enevgeia. The residue o f  the aiothesis 
(o r  upolepsis) so affected has become a phantasma (or set o f  kinesis 
capable o f yielding a phantasma) related to the original a isthesis as it s
us o f the heavily Aristotelian nature o f Brentono * a "Psychology from an 
Bnpirical Standpoint", a source book fo r  modem Phenomenology, which also 
regards the "presentation" as the basic essential fo r  consciousness.
"Without a presentation intellectual activity is  impossible. For there
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i s  in  such activ ity  an incidental affection identical with one also 
incidental in geometrical demonstrations. For in the la tter  case, 
though we do not for  the purpose o f  the proof make any use o f the fact 
that the quantity o f  the triangle . . i s  determinate, we nevertheless draw 
i t  determinate in quantity. So likewise when one exerts the in te lle ct 
. . . »  although the ob ject may not be quantitative, one envisages i t  has 
quantitative, though he thinks i t  in  abstraction from quantity; while, 
on the other hand, i f  the object o f  the in te lle ct  i s  essentially o f the 
class o f  things that are quantitative, but indeterminative, one envisages 
i t  as i f  i t  had determinate quantity, though subsequently, in thinking i t ,  
he abstracts from i t s  detexminateness." ( De Mem.449b 3 0 ff).
Although he says that there is  no intellectual a ctiv ity  without a present­
ation, the rest o f  the foregoing quotation clearly indicates that the 
presentation i s  a condition o f the in te lle ct, rather than vice-versa, in 
th is  special case o f  a geometrical demonstration. Y'e should not dednce 
that th is is  always the case. In te llect and sense are interdependent; 
in te lle c t  looks to sense (or i t s  residua) for  i t s  content and sense is  
informed by in te lle c t : the presentation (phantasma) has a two-way cognitive 
function as well as the mind-eclipsing a b ility  already mentioned. So 
within his form-matter, potential—actual formula A ristotle i s  now ablo to 
provide an account o f  mind as dependent on sense and imagination for  that 
which is  present to i t  as content hut which the mind at once shapes or 
conceptualises as i t  abstracts from imagination. Ho thus postulates an 
actual in te lle ct  (Aquinas ca lls  i t  intellectus agens). and a potential 
in te lle c t  ( in tellectus p o ss ib ilis ): the former ’ universalisea' the 
individuals given in imagination, transforming them into the formal 
content o f the la tter  which is  then able to employ them in it s  specul ative 
autonomy. Seen from am empirical standpoint, the process is  one o f 
formal refinement from the materiality o f senaa to tho immateriality o f  
mind; from an id ea lis t ic  standpoint, the process may with equal va lid ity
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be turned on it s  head; bat in the l i f e  o f the individual this process is  
above a ll a continuous interaction, more or less  randomly interspersed 
vith sojourns, o f  unpredictable duration, in the realms o f in te llection  
or o f  imagination.
The interchangeability o f  material and mental i s  fa c ilita ted  by 
what Aquinas ca lls  A r is to t le 's  "deliberative" imagination and it s  close 
relationship with the actual in te lle c t . So, keeping the vestiges o f  
the origin in sense o f imagination, we are to ld  : " ..th ere  w ill always 
be in the mind o f  a man who remembers or expects something on imago or 
picture o f  what he remembers or expects." (Be Rhetorics 1770a 23ff) For, 
"To the thinking soul images serve as i f  they were contents o f  perception.. 
That is  why the soul never thinks without an image." (Be An 451a 1 4 ff) 
and imagination is  regarded as a "kind o f thinking'1. ( 4T5a 10) Mind is  
related to what is  thinkable as sense is  to what i s  sensible, so that 
"..phantasms are to the in tellectual part o f  the soul as sense-objects 
to the senses; as -these la s t  are affected by th eir ob jects, so i s  the 
in te lle ct  by phentanas. n ( l ) ,  and "Pure sensuous apprehension and 
discernment resemble in tellectua l understanding and discernment." (p.fr46. 
sec.767). Hence, " . . i f  in te lle c t  is  related to phantasms as the senses
to their ob ject, then ju s t  as the senses cannot sense without an ob ject, 
so the soul cannot understand without phantasms."(p . 448. sec.773). But
he has already called imagination movement, and though he has had occasion 
to borrow P lato 's  "impression” metaphor for  explaining retention o f  images, 
the emphasis is  on qualitative change, "a kind o f  moving image" as Mure 
describes i t  : "This i s  a v ita l part o f  A r is to t le 's  doctrine. We 
cannot too often remind ourselves that he regards the sense—content 
(perceived, imagined, or remembered) always as dynamic, never as s ta tic  — 
not as a cross-section o f  the psychical stream, bat as that which persists 
through in a ll change." (Hhro. p. 116.footnote).
( l )  Aquinas, op. c i t . .  p . . sec.770. Aquinas' "phantasms” correspond 
to "images” here; "presentations" is  probably too broad to cover both 
these words and would in any ease mask what is  confused in A ristotle .
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Imagination also responds to the "fourfold causal analysis}' as 
Mare has described the structural basis o f  A ristotle 's  philosophy o f 
mind, and two o f the moments o f th is analysis are o f particular 
importance to in te lle ction , as a ll imagination is  either 1. calculative 
or 2. sensitive." ( De An. 433b 29). Animals and men both possess 
imagination, but :
"Sensitive imagination » . . i s  found in a ll the animals'", deliberative 
imagination only in those that are calculative : for  whether this or that shall 
be enacted is  already a task requiring calculation; and there mast be a single 
standard to measure by, for that is  pursued which is  greater. I t  follows 
that what acts in th is  way must be able to make a unity out o f  several 
images." (Pa An.434a 5 f f ) « This a b ility  to make a unity out o f several 
images, surely identical with the a b ility  to see the one in the many, which 
Socrates valued so highly, poses "the d iffic u lty  about interaction involving 
a common elementn( 429b 30 ) which A ristotle thinks he has solved in describing 
the mind as "in a sense potentially whatever is  thinkable."(429b 31). But 
again he offers  a s ta tic  explanation, and resorts to a Platonic simile i 
"What i t  thinks mast be in i t  ju st as characters may bs said to be on a 
writing-tablet on which as yet nothing actually stands written t this is  
exactly what happens with m ind."(l)
Developmentally and conceptually, the common ground wherein the in ter­
changeability o f the bodily and the mental orders becomes e ffective , is  
equally well described as calculative or  deliberative imagination, or as 
actual in te llect ( in tellectus agena). Only in more general terns may a 
distinction be allowed between th is imagination in i t s  material origin , 
and this in te lle ct  in  it s  mental orig in ; but here, as in other areas of 
transcription between the accepted substantives o f  mental philosophy, tho
( l )  £e ♦Anima. 430a I f f . ; this passage i s  surely the source o f Locke's 
celebrated "tabula rasa", a metaphor(which only appears in the f ir s t  
edition o f tho Essay). *
*  Including man
intervening area synthesises features from both sides and achieves an 
identity, much as on individual manifesto qualities o f each o f its  
parents. A similar interaction mast occur in the mind too, since 
i t  has i t s  practical (actual) and speculative (potential) moments <
"And in fa ct mind . . . .  is  vhat is  by way o f becoming all things, i& ile 
there is  another which is  vhat is  by virtue o f making all things : this 
is  a sort o f positive state like  ligh t; for in a sense ligh t mekes potential 
colours into actual colours.
Mind in this sense o f i t  is  separable, impassible, nnmized, since 
i t  is  in it s  essential nature activ ity  (fo r  alvays the active is  superior 
to the passive factor, the originating force to the matter which i t  fo n ts ) .” 
(Pe An.430a 1 4 ff) The influence o f Plato is  again apparent in this 
passage; the actual in te lle ct  is  the mind as "becoming a ll things” , but 
mind as "making all things", the potential in te lle c t , likened to ligh t, 
immediately brings to mind P lato 's  likening o f knowledge to the sun. The 
probability o f  this influence in emphasised by the ascription to this 
function o f mind o f  metaphysical qualities i "separable, impassible, umoixed." 
This platonic overtone is  carried into the ensuing paragraph :
"Actual knowledge is  identical with it s  ob ject : in the individual, potential 
knowledge is  in time prior to actual knowledge, but in the universe as a 
whole i t  is  not prior even in time. Mind is  at one time knowing and at 
another not. When mind is  set free from its  present conditions i t  appears 
as ju st what i t  is  and nothing more t this alone is  immortal and eternal 
(we do not, however, remember it s  former a ctiv ity  because, whole mind in this 
sense is  impassible, mind as passive is  destructib le), and without i t  nothing 
th in k s."(l)
Aristotle prevents the conclusion that he is  arguing for knowledge as 
reminiscence, and potential in te lle c t  becomes, lik e  soul, innate property
( l) Pe Anima, 431 a I f f . ; see aleo op .c it « . 434a 15 t "The faculty o f  knowing 
is  never moved but remains at re s t ."
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o f  the living person; i t s  immortality is  a concomitant o f the inevitable 
truth (fo r  A ristotle) o f  the principles with which i t  structures experience. 
Mathematics are a product o f this aspect c f  mind, fo r  t 
" . . .t h e  mind when i t  i s  thinking the objects o f Mathematics thinks as 
separate elements which do not ex ist separately. In every case the mind 
which is  actively thinking is  the objects which i t  thinks.” ( De An.451b.15ff).
The potential in te lle c t  is  thus "the form o f  forms" ju st as sense is  "the 
form o f sensible things” » (452a.) for» as Aquinas observes, "objects only 
become actually in te llig ib le  when abstracted from phantasms" (p.429 Sec.75?)
The mind thinks as abstract that which is  not separate in the physical world»
" fo r  mind as speculative never thinks what i s  practicable»" (De An.452b 27)- 
and i s  only in te llig ib le  "through a concept" t "Therefore the concept o f  
the actually understood thing is  also a concept o f  the understanding, through 
which the la tter  can understand i t s e l f . "  (Aquinas, p.425 sec.724). Concepts 
necessarily involve images, but are d ifferent from then by their universality, 
"they are abstracted from individuating conditions, whereas phantasms are 
always o f  particulars. Phantasms in fact are not actually, but only potentially , 
in d iv is ib le ." ( l )
The progressive d istilla tion  o f  the materials o f  sense into the concepts 
o f  the mind does not follow  the d irect, undeviating course described above.
As we have already seen the mind may be eclipsed by imagination, under certain 
conditions, and the dictates o f reason have only a limited control over the 
actions o f men, especially  when action is  influenced by the 'ap p etites '.
I t  i s  "appetite and practical thought" which are the two "sources o f 
movement".(De An.455a 17) Ve have already observed the close link between 
Imagination and practical thought, but imagination is  also inseparable from 
appetite, and "when imagination originates movement, i t  necessarily Involves
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which is  able to impel movement; only appetite can rouse man or animal into
( l )  Q p .cit .. p.457. soc.794; see also p.250. secs.577/8 : "..ind ividuals 
are known by the senses, and universals (which are o f  the sciences) by 
the in te lle c t ."e tc .
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action s "That which m oves.... is  a single faculty and the faculty of 
appetite; " (455a 22)and the object o f the appetite, the in it ia to r  o f the 
action towards or from which the movement occurs, may have it s  origin in 
thought or in imagination. (457b 12) As he has told  us much earlier,
"..appetite is  the genus o f which desire, passion, and wish are the 
species;" (414b 2) and the object o f appetite, we now' learn, "may be 
either the real or the apparent good." ( 455a 27) As "mind is  always 
right, but appetite and imagination may be either right or wrong"(455s Pn) 
morally good actions are the result o f  the influence o f reason on the 
appetites; as Aquinas comments :
"All in te lle ct" , he says, ’ is  r ig h t ', by which he means that we never err 
about the f i r s t  principles o f action, about such truths as ' i t  i s  wrong 
to do harm to anyone', or 'in ju stice  i s  never r ig h t ', and so on. Those 
principles correspond to the equally in fa ll ib le  f i r s t  principles o f the 
speculative reason." (Op.cit. p.475 s e c .826). .
But Aristotle does not proceed to draw the Socratic conclusion which
Aquinas appends, that " i f  we act amiss i t  is ,  in the la st analysis,
because we fa l l  short o f  what ve in te llectu a lly  know; " ( l ) though this
i s  clearly implied. Since their ob jects  may originate in imagination
or reason, the appetites are frequently at odds with each other, though
i t  is  only in man that this struggle takes place, that i s ,  "only in beings
with a sense o f  time". ( Do An.455b 6) I t  is  time, too, which conditions •
the images o f  memory; so man, with b is  actually related a b ilit ie s  o f
reason, calculative imagination, and memory, is  able to re f le c t  end predict
( De An.455b 6 ff)  and thus to choose to act rationally . Ultimately, however,
i t  is  imagination that the objects,which provide the appetite with its
stimulus to action,make their appearance t from in te lle ct  they appear in
the calculative imagination, and from passion, desire, illu s io n , and
dreams, they appear to the sensitive imagination. The crucial guide to
morally good, rational behaviour, i . e .  to behaviour governed by the
( l )  Aouinas. l o c . c i t . . this short statement, a remarkable combination o f 
Socrntic ethic and Aristotelian psychology,neatly encapsulates a major tenet 
o f  Stoicism which,absorbed into Plotinus' Neoplatonism, became central to 
Christianity arid contributed greatly to  the distrust o f imagination only begon 
to be dispelled by Addison's Spectator c*ssay3 from 1711.
"in fa llib le  f i r s t  principles o f the speculative reason", rests on being 
able to distinguish between these two kinds o f imagination.
The ambivalence o f  the 'tanemonic impression" is  b r ie fly  discussed in 
the De Memoria (450b 1 2 ff) . where the problem o f the possible autonomy of 
the memory-image is  raised :
"Granted that there is  in us something lik e  on impression or picture, why 
should the perception o f  the mere impression be memory o f something else, 
instead o f  being related to th is impression alone ? For when one actually 
remembers, th is  impression is  what he contemplates, and th is  is  what he 
perceives. How then does he remember what is  not present? One might as 
well suppose i t  possible also to see or hear that which i s  not present. In 
reply, we suggest that th is very thing i s  quite conceivable, nay, actually 
occurs in experience. A picture painted on a panel is  a t once a picture 
and a likeness : that i s ,  while one and the same, i t  is  both o f these, 
although the 'being' o f  both i s  not the same, and one may contemplate i t  
either as a picture or as a likeness." ( O p .c it .. 450b l 6 f f )
Like the picture, he goes on to say, the "mnemonic presentation" may 
be regarded as autonomous or as "relative to something e lse " ; i t  is  the soul 
which sees i t  "qua related", he te l ls  us, but quite how the distinction is  
made is  not explained. But he is  not unaware o f  the importance o f this 
distinction , fo r  he speaks o f  the "mental derangement" o f  those who "do not 
recognize th eir phantasms as memonic" : "for they were accustomed to speak 
o f  their mere phantasms as facts o f  their past experience, and as i f  
remembering them. This takes place whenever one contemplates what is  not 
a likeness as i f  i t  were a likeness," ( o p .c i t . .  451a lO ff)
A r is to t le 's  use o f  a painting as an analogy fo r  the mental image once 
again serves to roiterate b is recognition o f  the image as an ontological
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seen as related -  the former to the original ob ject o f  sense the la tter  to 
the portrayed -  then their author is  mentally sick . This, with his earlier 
analyses o f  "calculative" or "deliberative" imagination and their close 
association with intellactus agens. very closely  para lle ls  Kant's account
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o f imagination in his Critique o f Pure Reason, where imagination as residual 
sense impression in Aristotle becomes "reproductive imagination", calcnlative 
or deliberative imagination becomes "productive" imagination; significantly 
Aristotle has no aesthetic imagination which corresponds to Kant's o f  the 
Critique o f Judgment, this la tter  owing much to P lato 's fonr kinds o f  "madness" 
or inspiration in Phaedrus. Although proof is  unobtainable, i t  i s  highly 
lik e ly  that A ristotle , in referring (above) to the deranged, is  attacking 
the Platonic notion o f madness/inspiration; on this point 1 agree with M.W. 
Bundy's view that these "ecsta tics"..."ta k e  their phantasms, i .e »  their 
imagined b e lie fs , such as that o f  having seen certain supernatural beings, as 
actual happenings, true objects o f  the memory” , adding that "this view 
precludes any doctrine o f  inspiration in terms o f phantasy." (Bundy, op. c it» . 
EaZgl- This denial o f  the Platonic inspiration, and A ristotle 's  mention o f 
the painting, can be considered in relation to the artist as maker, the 
object as product (the painting) and the spectator, and in a ll three cases 
A ristotle 's  acid test is  art as mnemonic : as imitation or representation 
in the way that an icon may be e_.g. a representation o f the Virgin Mary.
There is  no hint in Plato or in A ristotle o f  the pednted image as being an 
imitation o f an ideal, such as was developed during the Renaissance.
For A ristotle , as for  Plato in certain o f h is dialogues, the "imagination" 
functions as memory in synthesising sense and concept, but this synthetic 
function o f imagination in cognition, which Kant attempts to explain fu lly , 
is  allowed no autonomy by A ristotle except as dreaming or the illu sion  o f  a 
sick mind. But dreams, as A ristotle knew, have always been given mystical 
and prophetic value.
Part B.
Gaston Bachelard co lls  dreaming the "oneiric imagination", and he gives i t  
considerable importance in his numerous writings on imagination; Bandelaire, 
who wrote a panegyric on imagination, asserted that to dream well is  a g ift  
granted to few men. The church fathers, following Synesius and finding many 
examples in the Bible o f  divine revelation in dreams, accorded great roligous
o f imagination in b is Critique o f Pare Reason, where imagination as residual 
sense impression in A ristotle becomes "reproductive imagination", calcnlative 
or deliberative imagination becomes "productive" imagination; sign ificantly  
A ristotle has no apathetic imagination which corresponds to Kant's o f the 
Critique o f Judgment, th is latter owing touch to P lato's four kinds o f "madness 
or inspiration in Phaedms. Although proof is  unobtainable, i t  i s  highly 
lik e ly  that Aristotle, in referring (above) to the deranged, is  attacking 
the Platonic notion o f madness/inspiration; on this point I agree with M.W. 
Bundy's view that these "e csta tics " .. ."take their phantasms, i . e . their 
imagined b e lie fs , such as that o f  having seen certain supernatural beings, as 
actual happenings, true objects o f  the memory", adding that "th is  view 
precludes any doctrine o f  inspiration in terms o f  phantasy." ( Bundy, o p .c i t . .  
p«75). This denial o f  the Platonic inspiration, and A ristotle 's  mention o f 
the painting, can be considered in relation  to the artist as maker, the 
•bjeot as product (the painting) and the spectator, and in a ll three cases 
A risto tle 's  acid test i s  art as mnemonic : as imitation or representation 
in the way that an icon may be e .g . a representation o f the Virgin Mary.
There is  no hint in Plato or in A ristotle  o f  the painted image as being an 
imitation o f an ideal, such as was developed during the Renaissance.
For A ristotle, as for  Plato in certain o f h is dialogues, the "imagination 
functions as memory in synthesising sense and concept, but th is synthetic 
function o f  imagination in cognition, which Kant attempts to explain fu lly , 
is  allowed no autonomy by Aristotle except as dreaming or the illu sion  o f a 
sick mind. But dreams, as Aristotle knew, have always been given mystical 
and prophetic valne.
Part B.
Gaston Bachelard ca lls  dreaming the "oneiric imagination” , and he gives i t  
considerable importance in bis numerous writings on imagination; Baudelaire, 
who wrote a panegyric on imagination, asserted that to dream v e il  is  a g i f t  
granted to few men. The church fathers, following Synesius and finding many 
examples in the Bible o f  diviue revelation in drooms, accorded great rcligous
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significance to dreaming. Dot A ristotle in h is essay on dreams v i l l  have 
none o f  th is . As we have already seen this "oneiric" imagination takes 
place in  the absence o f sense, hut i t  is  "not an affection  o f the faculty 
o f  perception in the simple sense" (De Somniis. 459a 10) and "since 
presentation is  the movement set up by a sensory faculty when actually 
discharging it s  function, while a dream appears to be a presentation" he 
concludes that " i t  manifestly follow s that dreaming is  an a ctiv ity  o f 
the faculty o f  sense-perception, but belongs to th is faculty qua 
presentative." (0 p .c it . . 459a 22) This activ ity , elsewhere called an 
* impression', is  the residual movement in the organ o f  sense l e f t  "when 
the external ob ject o f  perception has departed", ( 460b l )  and he likens 
th is movement to that o f  a p ro je ctile  which continues i t s  motion after 
having lo s t  contact with whatever set i t  in motion. (459a 28ff) Oil or gin 2 
on what he has already said in De Anima about the mind eclipsing a b ilit ies  
o f  imagination in states o f passion, sickness, and dreams, he t e l ls  us in 
the De Somniis that "we are easily  deceived respecting the operations of 
sense-perception when we are excited by emotions", so i t  is  with : " ..th e  
coward when excited by fear, the amorous person by amorous desire; so that, 
with but l i t t l e  resemblance to go upon, the former thinks he sees his foes 
approaching, the la tter  that he sees the ob ject o f  h is  desire; and the 
more deeply one i s  under the influence o f  the emotion, the less sim ilarity 
is  required to give rise  to these illu sory  impressions. Thus too , both 
in f i t s  o f  anger, and also in a ll  states o f appetite, a ll men become easily 
deceived, and more so the more th eir emotions are excited. This is  the 
reason too why persons in the delirium o f  fever sometimes think they see 
animals on their chamber walls, an illu sion  arising from the fa in t 
resemblance to animals o f the markings thereon when put together in
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sufferers, in such a way that, i f  the la tter  be not very i l l ,  they know
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v e il  enough that i t  i s  an illu sion ; hut i f  the illn ess is  more severe they 
actually move according to the appearances."(l)
I t  is  only vhen the links which imagination normally forges between 
perception and conception are broken, as in the sorts o f  coses he has 
given, that the oneiric imagination operates t
"For by day, ldiile the senses and the in te lle ct  are working together, 
they ( i . e .  such movements) are extruded from consciousness or obscured, 
ju s t  as a smaller i s  beside a larger f i r e ,  or as small beside great pains 
or  pleasures, though, as soon as the la tte r  have ceased, even those which 
are t r if l in g  emerge into n otice ."  ( O p .c it .. 460b T iff)  There are times 
when these 't r i f l in g  movements' produce "sights" which are "confused and 
weird", "..and the dreams (which then appear) are unhealthy, like those o f  
persons who are atrabilious, or feverish, or intoxicated with wine. For 
a l l  such a ffection s, being spiritous, cause much emotion and disturbance." 
(O p .c it .. 461a 2 0 ff)
A ristotle is  aware, as he says in a remark which reminds us o f Hume,
that i t  is  only " ..b y  the e ffe c t  o f custom the mnemonic movements tend
to succeed one another in a certain order" ( De Mem.et Rem. 451b 29). though
he also in sists  upon the a b ility  o f  in te lle c t  to "make a unity out o f  several
images" (De An. 454a 5 ): in relation to  dreaming, however, as G.R.G. Mure
comments, "..imagination is  illu strated  only in i t s  negative function .."
(Mare, o p .c i t . . p.117). So far as the alleged prophetic function o f dreams
i s  concerned, he is  sceptica l, saying that dreams "..must be regarded either
as causes, or as tokens, o f the events, or else as coincidences" ( De Divinatione
Per Sonnum. 462b 26). Following a physiological account o f  dreams (o p .c it . .
46lb l l f f ) .  he concludes that "Most (so -ca lled  prophetic) dreams are . . .  to
be classed as mere coincidences."(De Div.Per Som.456b l ) . And so s "Oh the
wlivle, fvx’ttouiucii ua ujrttuu o f the lower animals also dream, i t  may be
( l ) O p .cit .. 460b 5 f f . Cf. Leonardo's celebrated passage where he recommends 
a rtis ts  to look at stained and spotted walls as a means o f stimulating their 
inventiveness;(in "A Way to Stimulate And Arouse The Hind to Various Inventions", 
The Notebooks o f Leonardo da Vinci. V o l.II . p .2 5 l).
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concluded that dreams are not sent by God, nor are they designed for  
this purpose (to reveal the future). They have a divine aspect, hovever, 
for  Nature (th eir cause) is  divinely planned, though not i t s e l f  divine.
A special proof (o f  their not being sent by God) is  this : the power 
o f foreseeing the future and o f having vivid dreams is  fonnd in persons 
o f in fer ior  type, which implies that God does not send their dreams; tc.t 
merely that a ll those whose physical temperament is ,  as i t  were, garrulous 
and excitable, see sights o f  a ll descriptions; fo r , inasmuch as they 
experience movements o f every kind, they ju st chance to have visions 
reambling objective facts , their luck in these matters being merely like 
that o f persons who play at even and odd. For the principle which is  
expressed in the gambler's maxim s ' I f  you make many throws your luck 
must change', holds good in their case a lso ."  ( De Piv.Per Son. 463b lO ff) 
F inally, Aristotle t e l ls  us that vivid dreamers are "conmonplace 
persons and not the most in te lligen t" for  "the mind o f such persons is  
not given to thinking, bat, as i t  were, d ere lict, or to ta lly  vacant, 
and, when once set moving, i s  borne passively on in the direction token 
by that which moves i t . "  ( Pe Div. Per Soa.. 464a 22). The oneiric 
imagination, so highly prized by others, is  fo r  him on a par with the 
unrelated, autonomous images to which the deranged succumb, end so is  
m poor tr iv ia l thing somewhat similar to what we would ca ll "day-dreaming" 
or "phantasiaing"; certainly he allovs i t  no place in Aesthetic theory 
aa the following discussion o f  Poetjca shows.
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SECTION V.
In considering A ristotle 's  theory o f  imagination I have already 
deduced, very b rie fly , a theory o f  art as imitation which is  consistent 
with h is  view o f the image as mnemonic. I t  is  veil known that h is 
Poetica. a work which enormously influenced 17th and 18th century neo- 
classicism in Europe, is  largely about art as mimesis which ve usually 
render as "imitation"; but Aristotle is  not entirely consistent in  this 
doctrine and the Poetica does contain a single, noteworthy reference to 
something like  the Platonic inspiration t
"..poetry  demands a man with a special g i f t  for i t ,  o r  else one with a 
touch o f  madness in him; the former can easily assume the required mood, 
and the la tter  may actually be beside himself with «n otion ."(l455a 30).
Despite what we have found elsewhere, th is touch o f madness, lik e  i t s  manic, 
Platonic forerunner, he w ill allow a creative function, but this single 
mention i s  not o f  the greatest consequence in A r is to t le 's  theory o f  art. 
Similarly, a b rie f comment in the Metauhvsica reveals a view o f  art as a 
kind o f conceptual activ ity  which up to a point presages the idealising form 
o f  imitation which is  an important aspect o f Renaissance art theory : "Art 
comes into being when many observations o f  experience give rise  to a single 
universal conviction about a class o f similar c a s e s ." ( l ) .  This view o f 
art, which is  even today enjoying something o f a reviva l, also has echoes 
in  the Poetica. as wrill soon be shown; i t  is  also applicable to the visual 
arts, which are not mentioned in the Poetica.
Describing the (non-visual) arts, Aristotle says : "Epic poetry and 
Tragedy, as also Comedy, Dithyrambio poetry, and most flute-playing and 
lyre-playing, are a l l ,  'viewed as a whole, modes o f im itation ." (2 ). The 
idea o f  art as mimesis is  also found in Plato (Republic. Ek.x), and this 
Greek idea is  rather more complex than our Ehglish "im itation" wrould 
suggest, and A ristotle 's  psychology o f  imagination can help to shed ligh t 
on our interpretation o f mimesis. As we have found, the mental image has
neglig ible value as an autonomous entity and is  spoken o f metaphorically
(1 ) Metaphysics 981a. quoted in M.W.Bundv. o p .c it . .p .6 l .
(2 ) De Poetica , 1447a 14; this is  taken from JJywater's translation. T.S.Dorsch 
has " . .  forma o f imitation or representation" for th is last phrase. *
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as when he likens the mnemonic impression to a painted panel; th is  static 
image as painting or as (metaphorically) the content o f imagination, has 
no power to a ffect us except in extreme cases such as the delusions o f the 
feverish. Autonomous and "oneiric" imagination are a product o f  such 
states as passion, il ln e s s , inebriation and Platonic inspiration, they 
rupture the sense-thought link, whereas art should reinforce th is link.
This is  the importance o f  the pleasure principle for  A ristotle, fo r  the 
most accurate representations, even o f unpleasant things such as corpses, 
delight us in our recognition o f their likeness: (Poetica Ch.4) so we see 
the art work as related, as we do the imagings o f  memory. This is  why the 
poet mast "simplify and reduce to a universal form" (o p .c i t . . 1455a 55) his story 
and why poetry is  superior to history, fo r  "poetry is  something more philosophic 
end o f  graver import than history, since it s  statements are o f  the nature rather 
o f  universale, whereas those o f history are o f  singulars."(O p .c it .. 1451b I f f ) . 
This idealising tendency o f  art was, as I have observed, central to the 
easthetic o f the Renaissance and iron ica lly  the subsequent 'academic' 
tradition in European a rt , for , as Bandy points out n-It is  the thought of 
A ristotle , rather, which results in the perpetuation o f that interesting 
commonplace o f  aesthetic that Phidias to create an Aphrodite had in mind a 
form o f perfect beauty, the result o f  many particular observations. The 
theory o f  imagination which coincides with such a view grows out o f  
Aristotelian psychology rather than the D ialogues."(l)
‘ v - There are etymological grounds for  making an association between (l)
( l )  M.W.Dundy. o p .c it . . p p .62- 5 .A well known example o f this theory is  
Raphael's le tte r  to Castiglione, where he refers to the idealised origin 
o f  his conception in "ana certa idea" o f  the nymph Galatea. To modern 
eyes Raphael's nymph clearly  shows how ideals in material form quickly 
become the victims o f fashion.
"imitation" and "giving an image o f"  ( l ) ,  which do not obtain in the
Greek mimesis where the emphasis is  an accurate representation and
universalisation, which indicates that Aristotle, given h is theory o f
imagination, came very near to Kant's "productive imagination" with it s
rationality and it s  function in the creation and appreciation o f the
objects o f  taste and beanty. The counterpart o f  P lato 's divine madness
(inspiration) and Kant's sublime aesthetic imagination i s  absent from serious
consideration by A ristotle . But he has said that the soul is  characterised
by motion and that imagination is  a form o f thinking and is  also "a movement
resulting from an actual exercise o f  a power o f  sense" (De An.. 429a l ) . He
also says that "A picture painted on a panel is  at once a picture and a
likeness" ( De Mem, et Rem.. 450b 21). In The Psychology o f Imagination.
Sartre argues that in looking at a portra it o f  someone we posit the
portrayed person as absent (or perhaps as non-existent) and the image is
seen as the person portrayed, i . e . ,  the picture i s  seen as a likeness; the
person i s  only reachable through the image but such is  the power o f
imagination that we are affected as though the person were present. Sartre
ca lls  th is , -  "the relationship that consciousness posits in the imaginative
attitude between the portrait and i t s  original" -  'toothing short o f magical”
( o p . c i t . .  p .15 ). I t  seems to me that Aristotle i s  saying something very
similar to Sartre, except that he (A ristotle ) resists magical, irrational,
mid (to some extent) symbolical explanations and makes no direct ascription
o f  this power to imagination. Both A ristotle and Sartre denigrate what
the la tte r  ca lls  the "naive ontology" o f  images so that the synthetic or
( l )  Skeat's "Concise Etymological Dictionary o f  The Ehglish Language" shows that 
our word Image.(a likeness^ statue) comes from the French image, out o f the Latin 
imaginer, accusative o f  imago, a likeness, which is  formed, with the su ffix  —ago, 
from the base im-in iro-itari. to im itate. Lewis & Short's "Latin Dictionary" 
suggests a relationship o f imago ("im itation ,copy,representation ,likeness,"etc.) 
with imitor. which they give as : I .  "To represent, to express, copy, portray", 
or, I I . "To imitate, to act lik e , copy after, seek to resemble, counterfeit 
something." (ib r  niraesia,Liddell and Scott have 1. "im itation", and 2. "rep 
resentation by means o f Iron an art'1, c itin g  Plato ( Sophist. 265n. Republic 594b) 
and A risto tle 's  P oetics: giving minotes. "an im itator.copyist", or an "Actor or 
Poet" as in the Poetics. Skeat's "mimic" originates from the Greek rairaos. 
"imitator,actor,mime." However, the Oxford English Dictionary says the Latin 
imago only apparently is  "containing the same root as im -itari. to IMITATE."
The O.E.D. 's  5rd definition o f imitate, "To be, become,or make oneself l ik o . . "  
i s  best.
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transformative power o f imagination is  an actual power and consequently 
the "image" is  seen as "related t o . . . " ,  and consciousness as "consciousness 
o f . . . " .  In considering drama Aristotle says that tragedy is  not a mimesis 
o f men, "..h u t o f action and l i f e ,  o f  happiness and unhappiness -  and 
happiness and unhappiness are hound up with action . The purpose o f liv in g  
is  an end which is  a kind o f  activ ity , not a quality; i t  is  their characters, 
indeed, that make men what they are, hut i t  i s  hy reason o f their actions 
that they are happy or the reverse."  ( De Poetica. 1450a 1 5 ff). The 
fundamental Heraclitan emphasis on motion informs the theory o f art. Art 
is  not, so to speak, a p iece o f l i f e ;  hut out o f  the tension, between art 
as autonomous and as likeness, imagination i s  given space to move and l i f e  is  
epitomised or exemplified, and in seeing the relation (or likeness) ve are 
able to experience the pleasure o f r e l ie f  o f  tension which is  the Aristote­
lian catharsis. Similarly ve should say that the actor does not portray a 
character hut rather that the character comes to l i f e  through him as the 
person in the portrait comes to l i f e  through the "image" in a "magical" 
transformation effected in imagination. In th is  way too, albeit more 
frenziedly, the Dionysian enthusiast is  possessed hy the god : he acts as 
though he were the god, believing that he i s .
In concluding this second chapter and th is  f i r s t  part on Plato and 
A ristotle I would like  to make a few general points in relation to the 
differences between these two philosophers, and also with respect to la te r  
theories. P lato's interest in ^aadness" and the daemonic, and his use o f  
myth as a vehicle for  the ineffable, come to play an important part in 
Semantic notions o f the nature o f genius and the creative artist, and in 
the symbolic function o f  art, when imagination is  regarded as the essential 
creative 'fa cu lty ' o f  the a rtis t . In A ristotle  daemonia is  underemphasised 
almost to the point o f exclusion -  hut not quite, as I have hoped to 
indicate. P lato's wish to censor the mimetic nature o f  art and to give 
i t  a didactic function is  largely granted in post-Renaissance neo-classicism .
and is  not so very far removed from the cathartic function which Aristotle 
ascribes to mimesis. Here, the absent is  offered  as present, so that we 
react to the art ob ject -  the drama or poen for  Aristotle -  as though i t  
were real; this demands a suppositional a b ility , a w illing suspension o f  
d isbelie f, which la ter  thinkers, e .g . Sartre, have identified  with 
imagination.
In h is descriptive psychology -  "psychognosy" as Brentnno called his 
own, similar approach -  Aristotle to some extent follows Plato in seeing 
imagination as a derivative o f  sense and as having a cognitive function 
qua mnemonic, i . e . ,  as related to it s  ob ject as the impression in wax is  
related to the seal which made i t ;  this i s  what Brent an o ca lls  the reference 
by the image to something as object. These mnemonic images are the content 
to which abstract thought refers when necessary. But A ristotle has emphasised 
the essentially motive quality o f  imagination, thinking, and the soul, and 
has asserted a necessary link between imagination and appetite:
"He said clearly , both in his treatise On the Soul and in h is Metaphysics 
that thought and desire have the same ob je ct . I t  is  f i r s t  present in the 
faculty o f thought and there the desire s t i r s ."  (F.Brentano. "Psychology 
From An Bnpirical Standpoint? p.181) .
Brentano's book i s  heavily influenced by A ristotle  as his great emphasis 
on action shows, though he later came to re je c t  this ’Necessary" link 
between the "presentation", as he ca lls  i t ,  and desire. Whereas Brent an o 
was to o ffe r  a tr iad ic  division o f mental phenomena which was based on 
his study o f A ristotle , the established tradition  had followed a Platonic 
triad, amplified by Aristotle and culminating in Kant's three critiques, o f 
the true (cognition), the good (appetition) and the beautiful (fee lin g ); 
the recognition and pursuit o f  this triad is  fu lly  advocated in the 
Neoplatonism of Plotinus. From this la tte r  source i t  is  taken over by 
Christian theology end later by Shaftesbury and Leibniz, amougs others, 
and, truly a mainstay o f the philosophia p e r e n n i i t  also comes to 
inform the aesthetics o f Semantic! sei partly from Kant and also from 
the f ir s t  Komant.ikor. Generally speaking the theory o f  imagination np
to and including Kant is  on uneasy alliance o f Platonic metaphysics end 
Aristotelian psychology, accepting the necessary cognitive function o f 
imagination hut strongly distrusting it s  connection with the needs and 
pleasures o f  the flesh . As a consequence o f this alliance philosophers 
have been obliged to address themselves to the problem o f how to distinguish 
between the 'higher* cognitive and the 'low er' appetitive imaginations, 
usually with a conspicuous lack o f success even when, with Locke, Platonic 
metaphysics begins to suffer i t s  demise.
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Introduction:
In the chapters which constitute this second part I shall attempt to 
indicate and examine the significant contributions to the theory o f 
imagination -which is  written into Dante's Divine Comedy, and which is  
very similar to the la ter Romantic theory which draws on the same Neoplatonic, 
Platonic and Aristotelian sources. I begin with some general background 
notes on the forces which shaped mediaeval theory o f imagination, followed 
by some remarks on the theory o f imagination in Stoicism and in the authors 
Plutarch, Quintilian and Philostratus, for although I accept P .O .K risteller's 
view that "a single mediaeval tradition does not exist, rather, there are 
many different mediaeval traditions, some o f  them quite opposed to others" 
("Renaissance Philosophy and the Mediaeval Tradition” , p.7 ) . the Middle 
Ages, as E riste ller la ter  says, "were bu ilt upon a Roman and Latin and not 
d irectly  upon a Greek foundation” . ( 0 p .c it . .p . l7 ) . S it ju s t  as i t  would be 
hard to overestimate the influence o f  Rome on the c iv ilisa tion  of Europe, 
i t  i s  easy to underestimate the legacy o f North Africa, and so I have also 
considered Plotinus' Sineads. St. Augustine's theory o f imagination and (in 
Part 5) the Corpus ITcrmetica.
Except for the Aristotelian "faculty" psychology o f the mediaeval Arabs, 
philosophical and theological specualtion during the Middle Ages is  basically  
a synthesis o f  Platonic and Aristotelian elements. This i s  also true o f
t
the psychology o f  Stoicism which i s  Platonic in form but Aristotelian in 
content, without the le t te r 's  emphasis on action. The association o f  sense 
and imagination with the appetites, to which Aristotle had drawn attention, 
is  the basis o f  the lasting Stoic, Neoplatonic and Christian injunctions 
against the moral ev ils  o f  these lower reaches o f  the cognitive process -  
'low er' in the Platonic sense o f the divided line simile. The Stoic 
distrust o f  the fick le  imagination comes to be very widely held end is  
ultimately the view against which the praise o f this "facu lty", by post- 
Renaissance magicians, Addison's "Spectator" essays, end many Romantic 
w riters, must be measured. But the Stoic view is  true only to the Platonic 
aspects o f A ristotle 's  psychology, as M.W.Dundy also asserts :
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"The Academy, the Peripatetic school, and the Epicureans seem to have 
done l i t t l e  to develop the P latonic and Aristotelian theories o f phantasia.
I t  is  to Stoicism that one turns for a theory which takes advantage o f the 
rich heritage o f the thought o f  the two great thinkers. I t  is ,  in 
consequence, the view which, next to these, is  the most important influence 
upon subsequent conceptions in classica l and mediaeval thought. Although 
this Stoic view has Aristotelian psychology as i t s  basis, and is ,  on the 
whole, constructive, i t s  influence was detrimental to a fu ll  recognition o f 
certain v ita l aspects o f the theory o f De Anima." (O p.cit. , p.87).
Greek learning was generally held  in high regard in Borne, but with the fa ll  
o f  the Bnpire knowledge o f  Greek seems virtua lly  to disappear from Europe, 
and first-hand acquaintance was not renewed until the 12th and 13th centuries 
in the case o f A ristotle, and the 13th century in the case o f  Plato ( l ) .  With 
the (probably sole) exception o f  Timaeus. translations o f Plato into Latin 
did not ex ist prior to the 15th century when Marsilio Ficino translated the 
Dialogues for  Cosimo de' Medici. ( 2) .  Apart from the Pythagorean Timaeus. 
the preservation o f Platonic thought, interlarded with Gnostic mysticism, 
is  largely owed to Neoplatonism. A risto tle 's  works seem to have fared 
slightly  better, owing in part to  translations made by Boethius. (3 )•
(1) See K risteller. o p .c i t . . p«22 s "Hie knowledge o f  Greek was not completely 
absent from the Middle Ages, as recent studies have convincingly shown, but i t  
was never as common or extensive as i t  was in Boman antiquity or during the 
Renaissance."
( 2) See J.T.Mucklo. "Greek Works Translated Directly into Latin Before 1350", 
in Mediaeval Studies. Vols 4 & 5 . (1942 and 1943) 5 Both Cicero and Chalcidius 
translated part o f Timaeus; Cicero translated Protagors a lso. Apuleins translated 
Phaedo and Republic, but theavailability  o f  these is  guesswork.
(3) See .Muckle. o p .c it . .  p .54. As K riste ller emphasises, during the Middle 
Ages, " ..th e  influence o f A ristotle  was not a unified phenomenon.."; certainly 
i t  seems apparent that the De Anima was not known before i t s  translation "a 
l i t t l e  a fter 1150" (Muckle). And, as K riste ller adds s " I t  is  interesting
to point out that A ristotle 's  Poetics and Rhetoric, the former practically  
unknown during the Middle Ages, the la tter  largely treated as a work on moral 
philosophy, became prominent as textbooks o f literary  theory only during the 
sixteenth ceninry." (O p.cit.» pp.68-9,). According to Mnckle. a version o f tho 
Poetics was made in 1248.
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Except fo r  the obvious Platonic and Aristotelian elements, the 
nature and extent o f the various doctrines which filte re d  into European 
philosophy from Alexandria and the near East are hard to specify. Worthy 
o f  mention here, in view o f the magical practices o f the Renaissance, are 
Gnostic ism (1 ) , the works o f R iilo  o f Alexandria. ( 2) .  and number symbolism. 
This la tter in part serves to underline the continuing influence o f 
Fythagoreaniam, but i t  also shows the influx o f eastern astrology into 
Europe(3); an understanding o f  mediaeval number symbolism — mathesis as i t  is  
sometimes called -  is  essential to a proper interpretation o f Dante's theory 
o f  imagination and is  indeed a key to the structure o f the Divine Comedy. 
in  this great work Renaissance Romanism was to find a forerunner o f  its  
aesthetic b e lie fs . Ihe final chapter o f th is second part o f  the thesis 
w ill consist o f  an analysis o f  Dante’ s theory o f imagination.
I have already mentioned Epicureanism in passing, and refer to i t  
b r ie fly  here to indicate that so far as we are able to judge from the 
De He rum Nature o f Lucretius i t s  philosophical leanings aro closer to 
A ristotle than Plato. Lucretius attacks metempsychosis and also asserts 
that 'subtle images are emitted from the surfaces o f  things" (Bc.4. 11.
11 3 5 ff .) ,  apparently suggesting an order o f  entities midway between 
objects and the contents o f mind -  ghostly things which anticipate some 
aspects o f  post-Renaissance fo lk lo re . O ffic ia l theory looks more 
favourably on the virtues o f restraint than the dubious pleasures o f
(1 ) See R.T.Wallis. "Gnosticism", pp ,12ff. In a wide sense the tern 
"Gnosticism" means "School o f  Alexandria". Wallis also warns against 
making too much o f the "Orientalism" o f Neoplatonism.
( 2) See V.F. Hopper. "Mediaeval Number Symbolism" p,60 : "The Jewish 
acceptance o f  Gnosticism, prefigures in R iilo  and the apocalypses, resulted 
in the speculations o f  the Cabala." An interest in the Cabala is  a 
prominent feature o f Renaissance magic.
V3) See V.g.Ilopper. o p .c i t . . p .ix : according to Hopper, Babylonian astrology 
i s  the most p r o li f ic  source o f  number symbolism : "The Middle Ages inherited 
th is theory by virtue o i the stud do ni v ita lity  01 astrology itse ix , out 
the sanctity and incorruptib ility  o f  the astrological numbers was made by 
their presence in page after page o f the Holy Writ, there to be pondered 
over and expounded by generations o f  Churchmen."
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the flesh, and i t  is  perhaps fo r  this reason that Stoicism has been more 
resilien t than Epicureanism. The simple moral prograame o f the Stoics, 
which dominates the Middle Ages, is  to control passion and imagination, 
giving reason supremacy. Stoicism is  rather le ss  impressive and credible 
out o f  the mouth o f an aristocrat and emperor lik e  Marcus Aurelius than 
from a poor slave like  Epictetus (as Kierkegaard somewhere remarks) but 
even so, in the foimer's "Meditations", arguably the la st  purely Stoic vork, 
the message remains clear : "Erase fancy; curb impulse; quench desire; le t  
sovereign reason have mastery." (Bk. 9. 7 . ) .  In th is way may contemplation 
o f  the eternal be achieved t
"Many o f the anxieties that harass you are superfluous : being but creatures 
o f  your own fancy, you can rid  yourself o f  them and expand into an ampler 
region, le ttin g  your thought sweep over the entire universe, contemplating 
the illim itable  tracts o f  eternity, marking the swiftness o f change in each 
created thing, and contrasting the brie f span between birth and dissolution 
with the endless aeons that precede the one and the in fin ity  that follows the 
other." (Bk. 9. 3 2 .). Hie rewards o f  the Stoic l i f e  look very like those o f 
the d ia lectic  route to the eidos in Plato, a fa ct  which looks forward in time 
to some mediaeval Christian ideas about the need to curb imagination in order 
to reach a state o f grace. The persistent note o f  censure against the 
amoral imagination is  maintained by a ll Stoics including the Chrysippus of 
Plutarch's essay "Against the S toics", fo r  whom :
"The imaginable is  the e ff ic ie n t  cause o f imagination; as any thing that 
i s  white, or any thing that i s  cold, or every thing that may make an 
ing>ression on the imagination. Fancy is  a vain impulse upon the mind o f 
man, proceeding from nothing which is  rea lly  imaginable; this is  experienced 
in those that whirl about th eir idle hands and fig h t with shadows; for the 
imagination there is  always some real imaginable thing presented, which is  
the e ff ic ie n t  cause o f  i t ;  but to the fancy nothing. A phantom is  that to 
which we are led by such a fancifu l and vain attraction ; this is  to be seen
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in melancholy and distracted persons." ( l )
This "fancy" i s  very lik e  A ristotle 's  autonomous imagination which be 
dismisses as a delusion o f the sick , rather in the way o f (hxysippas.
Plutarch himself prefers to accentuate the more constructive side o f 
what we have found in A ristotle, stating that "..conception is  a certain 
imagination, and imagination an impression on the soul" ("Against the Stoics"
Sec.47). The Stoics take a rather negative view o f  imagination, on -the 
whole, though M.V.Bundy points to the "substantial contribution” to the 
theory o f imagination made by the Stoics in defining the Greek to mis as 
e .g . in their
" ..d e fin ition  o f  phantaaia kataleptike. *a criterion  o f facts produced 
by a real ob ject and conformable to that o b je c t . ' The ' acataleptic' 
phantasy was called a phantasm, and upon th is opposition o f  phantasia end 
phantasma was b u ilt  a tetralogy o f  terms, including phantaston to denote 
the source o f the real image, the phantasy, and phantastikon to correspond 
to the phantasm. These four terms had an interesting history in mediaeval 
thought.
Upon this d istinction  between the genuine and the illu sory  phantasy the 
Stoics erected their theory o f conduct; for  than the great ethical problem 
was 'the right use o f  phantasies*." (Op. c i t . .  P .2 6 0 ) .
Whether, as a learned Greek and a literary  man,Plutarch concurred with t
the mimetic theory o f  Plato or A ristotle, i s  not clear; but he o ffe rs  no 
aesthetic function to  any aspect o f  imagination. His Roman contemporary 
Quintilian is  heir to a different tradition and h is  theory o f imagination 
i s  even further removed from Stoicism than that o f  Plutarch. In Quintilian 
vo find the f i r s t  real link between art, emotion, and imagination; *or him 
the vividness o f images is  an everyday rea lity  rather than a delusion o f 
the sick t (l)
( l )  Plutarch. "Morals" Vol. I II . Ik.IV. Ch.XII. A short glossary is  helpful 
hero s Imagination^pl)onto ala: imaginable =nhrmtnston: fancy -jhantastikon: 
and phantom sphantaaaw.
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"There are certain experiences which the Greeks call phantasiai. and the 
Romans visions, whereby things absent are presented to the imagination 
with such extreme vividness that they seem actually to be before our 
very eyes. I t  is  the man who is  really sensitive to such impressions who 
w ill have the greatest power over the emotions." ("The Institu tio  Oratorio", 
Ht. VI. 50.)
fbr the rhetorician and orator, this power o f imagination is  a useful 
quality which can be manipulated to sway the emotions o f  an audience; 
Quintilian argues that anyone can acquire this power and thus influence 
people. He is  quite favourably disposed towards the daydreaming aspect o f 
imagination, the "fancy" o f Plutarch, which seems to afford pleasures 
like  those which Addison vas to reassert at the beginning o f  the 18th 
century:
"When the mind is  unoccupied or is  absorbed by fantastic hopes o f daydreams, 
we are haunted by these visions o f which I am speaking to such an extent 
that we imagine that we are travelling abroad, crossing the sea, fighting, 
addressing the people, or enjoying the use o f wealth that we do not actually 
possess, and seem to  ourselves not to be daydreaming but acting." (O p .cit.. 
lit. VI.. 30).
Host significant o f  a l l ,  however, is  that this visionary a b ility , which 
he later ca lls "phantasia. or imagination, which assists us to form 
mental pictures o f  things", (O p.cit. .  He.VIII. I I I .  88). i s  the ab ility  
which Virgil employed when describing some o f  the scenes -  o f  which Quin­
tilia n  gives examples -  in the "Aeneid". (O p .cit.. Bk.VI. ’53). Despite 
the subsequent dominance o f Stoicism, the possible creative function o f 
imagination, as such, was recognised by the Romans; nor was Quintilian 
alone in this recognition.
Hiilostratus' biographical work "In Honour o f Apollonius o f TyanA" 
expresses the Platonic view o f  visual art as imitation. On painting, 
Apollonius says " ..su re ly  those appearances are prodneed at random without
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any divine significance", and Damis, vith idiom he is  conversing, says 
painting is  make-believe as "exact likeness" and "fa ilin g  that function, 
i t  becomes an absurdity -  mere s i l ly  daubing." (See Ilk.II. Ch. 22 & Hk. VI.
i
Ch. 19). But in a la ter passage o f Bk.VI Ch. 19 this rather dismissive 
opinion on art is  exchanged for  something more substantial, when Apollonius 
i s  defending Greek art against a rather sarcastic Egyptian called Thespesian, 
who wants to know how i t  is  the Greeks are able to make images o f the gods; 
Apollonius replies : "With such craftsmanship as ideal beauty end devotion 
prescribe fo r  divine e f f ig ie s ."  Thespesian asks whether Phidias and Praxiteles 
went up to heaven and represented the gods from the l i f e ,  "or had they some­
thing else to  guide their p la stic  s k ill? " . Apollonius t "Something e lse , and 
something fu ll  o f ingenuity." Asks Thespesian : "What can that have been?
You w ill not find any other principle besides mimicry." And Apollonius gives 
the memorable reply :
"Imagination produced these e ffe cts , and imagination is  a more cunning 
craftsman than mimicry. Imitation can portray in art what i t  has seen, 
imagination, even what i t  has not seen, for  i t  w ill suppose the unseen to 
be an analogy o f the real. Mimicry is  often disconcerted by wonder and 
awe, but nothing disconcerts imagination, which moves with imperturbablc 
advance towards i t s  ideal goal. The man who meditates a design fo r  Zeus 
must see him with heavens and seasons and stars, as Pheidias did in that 
eager sa lly  o f  ambition;".
3his seems to be the f ir s t  occasion in the literature o f  Western Europe 
that imagination replaces imitation as the idealising function o f art, 
and as such alone i t  is  worthy o f note. The dialogue form is  Socratic, and 
the "eager sa lly  o f  ambition" looks lik e  a milder form o f  Platonic madness 
or inspiration, but nothing can b e lit t le  the impact o f  the contrast between 
cry" and "imagination". Bosanquet, in h is  'History o f Aesthetic", is  
cautious about this passage, saying that "Inward or mental imitation doos 
not for Philostratus amount to imagination." But for us, "in view o f h is 
instances, i t  is  not easy to distinguish them." (p .llO ) .
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There can he no doubt that Neoplatonism is  by far the most influential 
body o f  b e lie f to come to us from Antiquity. Its  doctrines are clearly  
evident in Christian theology and in the aesthetic theory o f the Renaissance 
and Romanticism, having been absorbed by saints Augustine and Thomas Aquinas 
and reasserted through the Latin translation o f  Plotinus' "Sineads" by 
F ic in o .(l)  The association o f certain mental states vith intimations o f 
deity largely becomes acceptable through the Plotinian notion o f  "emanations" 
whereby the "One" is  a potency, to varying degress, in a ll things. So, in 
a conception which Plotinus probably found in  A ristotle*3 "Metaphysics", 
the universe is  regarded as a chain o f being ( 2) which both emanates from 
the "One" and proceeds hack to Rim, who is  thus the beginning and end o f  
a ll things and relations. The paradox o f  a deity that is  both above and
a part o f  nature re fle cts  the Stoic ethic, written into Neoplatonism, which 
was a synthesis o f Platonic metaphysics and Aristotelian psychology, incorpor­
ates an ambivalent theory o f  imagination :
(1 ) Hackle, o p .c it . .  p.41. knows o f no translation o f Plotinus' work before 
1350, into Latin, /in incomplete translation o f the "Ehneods" was done by 
Thomas Taylor, into English, at the beginning o f the 19th century.
( 2) Porphyry, a pupil o f  Plotinus, particularly mentions the influence o f  the 
Metaphysics on Plotinus. See also A. 0.Love jo y . "The Great Chain o f Being",
P.59 : "This vague notion o f an ontological scale was to be combined with
the more in te llig ib le  conception o f zoological psychological hierarchies which 
Aristotle had suggested....
The result was the conception o f the plan and structure o f the world, through 
the Middle Ages and down to the late eighteenth century, many philosophers,
.most men o f science, end, indeed, most educated men, were to accept without 
question -  the conception o f  the universe as a 'Great Chain of Being', composed 
o f an immense, or -  by the s tr ic t  but seldom rigorously applied log ic  o f  the 
principle o f continuity -  o f  an in fin ite  number of links ranging in hierarchical 
order from the meagre3t kind o f existents, which barely escape non-existence, 
through 'every possible ' grade up to the ens perfectissinuia -  or, in a somewhat 
more orthodox version, to the highest possible kind o f creature, between which 
end the Absolute Being the disparity was assumed to ho in fin ite  -  every one 
o f  them differing from that immediately above and that immediately below i t  
by the least possible degree o f d ifferen ce.”
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This paradoxical nature o f  Neoplatonic thought concerning phantasia and 
related powers can hardly be overemphasised > it s  idealism taught i t  to 
despise phantasies, it s  dualism found a place for them, i t s  psychology, 
largely A ristotelian, taught i t  to study them, and it s  passion fo r  the 
Tiiaaeus led i t  to recognise them as God-given." (M.W.Bundy. op. c i t . . p.l*t6). 
In referring to the Tiiaaeus Bundy reminds us also o f  the immense significance 
o f  Pythagoreanism for the Neoplatonists. The idea o f  a chain o f  being in 
which everything exists both for and in_ God denotes a fundamental unity o f  
a ll things, a universal haxmony such os Pythagoras believed was based on 
numerical relations. This aspect o f  Neoplatonism party explains the 
subsequent b e lie f  in number symbolism and the growing importance o f  mathe­
matics, and the idea o f  universal harmony la ter came to be affirmed by the 
rise  o f  Biology and microscopy in the 17th century, as I shall again have 
cause to note.
t
Chapter 1 : NEOPLATONISM
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Neoplaton.isc; is  virtually  synonymous with the name o f Plotinus, who 
sow himself as an interpreter o f Plato. Ilis "amends" is  an eclectic  
mixture o f Platonic and Aristotelian elements, as well as Stoicism and 
probably other occidental b e lie fs  : "The cradle o f  Neoplatonism vas not 
Athens but Alexandria, the meeting place o f East and West, hospitable to 
a ll id eas ." (W.R.Inrce. "The Philosophy o f Plotinus", Vol. 1. p .x i i ) .
Neoplatonism is  a rather mystical, synthetic philosophy which, as Inge 
also remarks, "sums up the results o f  700 years o f untrammelled thinking."
(Op. c i t . . p . ix ) . and which has become a vital part o f  Christian theology. 
Although Plotinus has been called "the la st great philosopher o f antiqu ity"(l) 
with whom "the creative impulse o f Hellenic philosophy ended" (B. Bosoncruet, 
op. c i t . .  p.118). he must be thought o f  as a great in itia tor  rather then as 
the fin a l resting place o f a great tradition . For as well as forming the 
mainstay o f Christian theology, Neoplatonism has had an influence on 
mediaeval, Renaissance, and modern thought such as "can hardly be exaggerated!^2) 
Bosanquet's assertion that Neoplatonism foreshadows Romanticism is  not hard 
to substantiate, and the "beloved Plotinus" o f Novalis, one o f  the founder 
Roman tike r , is  extremely close in sp ir it  to both the "manic" Plato and 
the visionary Romantics. The Neoplatonic "principle o f plenitude", the
(1) P.Henry. "The Place o f Plotinus in the History o f  Thought", (introduction 
to Mackenna's translation o f Bineads). p .rxxv.
(2) K,Gilbert & H. Ruhn. "A History o f  Esthetics", p.117. See also Henry, 
o p .c i t . . Tip.xxxv-xxxvi : "Ten centuries o f the Middle Ages, though knowing 
nothing o f the Iihnejds o f  Plotinus, remained paradoxically enough, i f  only 
through the mediation o f  St. Augustine and the pseudo-Dionysius, closely 
dependent upon his thought. Of St. Thomas Aquinas, Dean Inge could write, 
not without exaggeration but with some p lau sib ility , that he was nearer to 
Plotinus than to the real A ristotle . The Renaissance, in the person of 
Marsilio Ficino, rediscovered b is works and was enthralled by his .eaching. 
Later, such religious thinkers as the Cambridge Platonists, such philosophers 
as Berkeley and Hegel, such poets as Novalis and Goethe interested themselves 
in him and contributed by this interest towards an atmosphere in which his 
works, having been edited, translated, end explained, are no more obscure 
than those o f the many-sided A ristotle or their common master, the 'd iv ine ' 
P lato".
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b elie f that a ll things form a chain o f being stretching from and back 
to the "One" (la ter "God"), became a commonplace o f early biology and 
17th and early 18th century aesthetic b e lie f , and this and other aspects 
o f Neoplatonism are a significant part o f  the doctrines o f several phil­
osophers who contributed to pre-Romantic theory o f art, either d irectly  
or ind irectly , including Leibniz, Shaftesbury and Hutcheson. Plotinus' 
view o f art is  closest to that o f  Apollonius amongst his forerunners, and 
he attacks the Platonic notion o f  imitation, stating that art improves 
upon nature. But before saying more about the theory o f  art in the 
"Ehneads", 1 w ill give an outline o f Neoplatonic b e lie fs .
B riefly , Plotinus believes that a ll being is  an emanation from the 
Okie, the Primal Fountain o f  a ll Being, the Perfectly Good; this emanation 
descends by degrees to individuality and to the inert, formless, resistent 
matter which is  non-Being. Within this emanation, Plotinus has two 
triads : that o f  the Divine Principles into the Absolute, Spirit, and 
Soul; and that o f man into Spirit, Soul, and Body t
"In their objective aspects, Body, Soul, and Spirit are respectively the 
world as perceived by senses; the world as interpreted by the mind as a 
spiritual and temporal order; and the spiritual world. The la st (done 
is  fu lly  rea l. Reality is  constituted by the unity in duality o f  the 
spiritual faculty and the spiritual world which i t  contemplates in exer- 1
cising i t s  self-consciousness. The reality o f  Soul and it s  world is  
derivative and dependent; the phenomenal world does not possess re a lity ."
( Inge, o p .c i t . . p .x i i )
The human individual is  separated from the One, to which he truly belongs, 
and is  debased by his contact with alien, physical elements; thus the Scul 
longs restlessly  to return home, retracing his steps in what Gilbert and Kuhn 
call a "mexapnysi cai pi ig n ore  progress." (u p .c it .. n . i ia i . ao, “vnen we 
long for beauty ve also long for  home -  fo r  goodness, for God, and for 
truth." (L oc.c it ) .  Within th is scheme, the human Soul belongs partly to
the physical world and partly to the spiritual -  "It  stands midway between
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the phenomenal vorld, o f  which i t  is  the principle, and the world o f 
the Sp irit, which is  i t s  princip le. But the Soul is  not only an 
intermediary between appearance and rea lity . I t  is  the point where 
a ll converging lines meet; ' i t  binds extremes together', and i t  is  the 
v ital correspondence with every region to which these lin es  lead."
(Inge, o p .c i t . . pp.^a-*?).
The Soul then has two orders, and as a consequence, two orders o f 
imagination and o f memory, (though Plotinus attempts to overcome the 
dualism o f  his position ). To the lower order belong sensation and 
perception. Against the psychology o f both Plato and A ristotle ,
Plotinus emphatically rejects the' 'impression' or 'im print' account o f 
perception. "Perceptions are no imprints", he says, and they "are not 
to be thought o f  as seal-impressions on soul or mind."(°£hneads" IV .6.1)
With the rejection o f this theory must also go the notion o f  memory as 
"lingering impressions", i . e .  that "the sensible object striking upon 
soul or mind makes a mark upon i t ,  and that the retention o f  this mark 
is  memory." (L oc.cit) Plotinus, in some respects sim ilarly to A ristotle , 
is  attacking the b e lie f  that the mind (or soul) is  passive, though unlike 
A ristotle, he also re jects  the wax-seal metaphor o f  Plato. In any visual 
perception, Plotinus says,
" ..th e  object is  grasped there where i t  l ie s  in the d irect lin e  o f  vision ; •
i t  is  there that we attack i t ;  there, then, the perception is  foxmed : the 
mind looks outward; th is is  ample proof that i t  has taken and takes no 
inner imprint, and does not see in virtue o f some mark made upon i t  lik e  
that o f the ring on the wax; i t  need not look outward at a l l  i f ,  even as 
i t  looked, i t  already held the imag' o f  the ob ject, seeing by virtue o f 
an impression made upon i t s e l f . "  ("Bineads" IV .6 .1 ).
I f  the perception were an imprint, he asks, bow could we perceive great 
magnitudes?
"And, most convincing o f a l l ,  i f  to see is  to accept imprints o f the 
objects o f  our vision , we can never see theso objects themselves; we
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see only vestiges they leave vithiu us, shadows : the things themselves 
would he very different from our vision o f them." (O p.cit.. IV. f>. 1. ) .
The mind, then, is  an outgoing, affirmative power; "there must be no 
impressions, nothing to which the mind is  passive; there can only he 
acts o f that in which the objects become known." (IV. 6. 2 . ) . In this 
act o f perception, this actual bridging o f  the gap between i t s e l f  and 
objects, the soul acts as "the Reason-Principle o f the entire realm of 
sense" :
"Thus i t  has dealings with both orders -  benefitted and quickened 
by the one, hut by the other beguiled, fa llin g  before resemblances, and 
so led downwards as under sp e ll. Poised midway, i t  is  aware o f both 
spheres." (IV. 6. 1 . )
This Aristotelian emphasis on mind as an active principle with its  
sp ecific  denial o f  images as impressions, or as in any way passive, implies 
that imagination is  an act o f  the mind in which i t  comes to know i t s e l f .
Images as impressions also prevent our knowing things or objects themsolvc?~. ' 
Plotinus' clearly accepting that things or objects exist and images do not.
This apparent rejection  o f  the intermediary imago leads him to propose 
a dual is  t i c  account o f  memory and imagination which again brings to mind 
Aristotle and the la t te r 's  "sensitive" and "calculative" imagination.
So for  Plotinus there is  what Inge ca lls  the "sensible imagination" (Op. c i t . . /
p .211) which is  " ..th e  stroke o f something unreasonable outside the S o u l;" ( l) .
At this level the imagination is  the seat o f  memory, which "deals with 
images" ("Ehneads" IV. 3. 29. )  hut which "implies at once an object to 
which i t  corresponds, and i t  is  attended by a consciousness o f  some time 
past at which the remembered event actually happened." ( inee. p.2P0). This 
i s  like the account o f memory as "related" images which A ristotle gave;
( l )  See also "fhneads", IV. 8. 3« » "Taking i t  that the presentment o f 
fancy is  not a matter o f our w ill and choice, how can we think o f  those 
acting at i t s  dictation to he free agents? Fancy s tr ic t ly , in our use, 
tidtes i t s  rise from conditions in the body; lack o f food and drink sets 
up presentments and so does the meeting o f  these needs . . . . "
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for  Plotinus: "..where there is  to he memory o f a sense-perception, this 
perception becomes a mere presentment, end that to this image-grasping power, 
a distinct thing, belongs the memory, the retention o f the object : for  in 
this imaging faculty the perception culminates; the impression passes away 
but the vision remains present to the imagination." ("Eoneads", IV. 3. 29).
The present ob ject as perceived becomes the "presentment" as present to the 
imagination, and the impression becomes the v ision . Plotinus i3 uneasy 
about the discrepancies between the memory— image as related and also as 
an individuated, autonomous, and therefore unrelated "presentment", and 
he suggests that:
"Perhaps memory would be the reception, into the image-making faculty, o f 
the verbal formula which accompanies the mental conception : this mental 
conception -  an invisib le  thing, and one that never rises to the exterior 
o f the consciousness — lie s  unknown below; the verbal formula — the 
revealer, the bridge between the concept and the image-taking faculty -  
exhibits the concept as in a mirror; the apprehension by the image-taking 
faculty would thus constitute the enduring presence o f the concept, would 
be our memory o f  i t .  " ("fimeads" IV. 3. 30).
So imagination, the ' image-making faculty ' and 1 image-taking faculty1, 
also receives, in the guise o f memory, the verbal form which mirrors the
/
invisib le  concept; in imagination the image is  conceptualised as the 
concept is  made concrete. As "the recipient in us" imagination thus 
"receives from both sides, absorbing not merely in tellections but also 
sense-perceptions. " (L o c .c it .) I t  is  by this shaping,creative action 
o f in te lle c t , acting through imagination, that Nature is  revealed and 
seen in i t s  rea lity , yielding that Wisdom, ultimately pertaining to the 
A ll-Sou l,of which i t  is  a faint reflection  :
"This Wisdom is  a f ir s t  (within the All-Soul) while Nature is  a la st : for 
Nature is  an image o f that Wisdom, and, as a la st  in the Soul, possesses 
only the la st reflection  o f  the Reason-Principle : we may imagine a thick 
waxen sea]., in which the imprint has penetrated to the very uttermost
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film  so as to show on both sides, sharp-cut on the upper surface, faint 
on the under. Nature, thus, does not know i t  merely produces : what i t  
holds i t  passes, automatically to its  next; and th is transmission to the 
corporeal and material constitutes it s  making power : i t  acts as a thing 
vanned communicating to what l ie s  in next contact to i t  the principle o f  
which i t  is  the vehicle so as to make that also warm in some lees degree.
Nature, being thus a mere communicator, does not posses even the 
imaging act. There is  (within the Soul) in te lle ction , superior to imagination; 
and there is  imagination standing midway between that in tellection  and the 
impression o f which Nature alone is  capable. For Nature has no 
perception or consciousness o f  anything; imagination (the imaging faculty) 
has consciousness o f  the external, for i t  enables that which entertains the 
image to have knowledge o f the experience encountered, while intellection  
also engenders — o f i t s e l f  and by an act derived from it s  own active 
p rin c ip le ."  (O p .cit .. IV. 4» 1 ? ). Imagination, like the soul, occupies 
a midpoint between two separate orders : the imagination between 
impression and in te lle c t , the soul appearance and reality . The problem 
fo r  imagination (as for  the soul) is  to which o f  these orders i t  can be 
said to belong, and whatever the answer, how does i t  e ffe c t  it s  links 
with the other order ? Plotinus implies that imagination is  autonomous
t
in saying that i t  stands midway between impression and in te lle ct  and that 
i t  i s  also a part o f  the soul. His concept o f  the soul suggests at once 
an immanent and a transcendental entity : a mixed Aristotelian and 
Platonic conception, which also anticipates some aspects o f Kant's theory 
o f  imagination. In view o f  his emphasis on the shaping power o f the 
soul and hie attack on the empirical notion o f  impressions, imagination 
seems more o f an image-making than an image-taking "faculty" and more 
in obeyance to the s e lf  ( in it ia lly )  and the "All—Soul" or "The One" 
fin a lly . These two espocts o f  imagination are seen as two aspects o f 
the soul, so to the problem o f their relationship Plotinus says t "The 
«newer is  that, when the two souls chime with each other, the two iiangiug
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faculties no longer stand apart; the union i s  dominated by the imaging 
faculty o f  the higher s o u l . . ."  ("Ehneads" IV. 5. 51.) The (Platonic) 
impulse behind th is union, as behind a ll the soul's a ctiv ity , is  the 
desire to return to the One, the All-Soul; and so, paradoxically,' the 
aim o f  the related image (memory) is  "forgetfulness", "a happy forget­
fulness o f  a ll that has reached i t  through the lower", the realm o f  
ob jects. And, "the more urgent the intention towards the Supreme, the 
more extensive w ill be the Soul's forgetfulness", for  "the good Soul is  
the forgetfu l."  ( IV. 5. 52). The image-taking faculty (memory) surrenders 
it s  physical vestiges to the image-making, intimating that for Plotinus 
(as for the Kantian schemata) imagination i s  more o f  an intellectual 
"faculty" than a physical or empirical one. In existential terms this 
means the world is  more a product o f  the mind than a shaper o f the mind.
The process o f "forgetfulness" suggests a kind o f abstraction or Socratic 
reminiscence such as the boy Meno was believed, like a ll mortals, to 
possess; as Inge says, we "do not remember noeta because we contemplate 
them as permanent a ctiv ities  o f  the higher s e l f ."  (O p.cit. . p.227).
This is  much as Plotinus has to say about memory and imagination, but 
in relation to what has gone before, especially  in Plato and A ristotle, a 
significant synthesis is  effected in Plotinus between the cognitive impulse
/
o f the "higher soul" and ethical and aesthetic impulses, and these impulses 
share a quality o f  joy . Like the soul and imagination, beauty a l60 
functions in the gap between the material and the spiritual orders, so that 
material ob jects may be beautiful through contact with a higher quality,
(and some 'th ings' such as virtue are inherently beautiful - ( "Ihneads"»
I .  6. 2 . ) . The material ob ject "becomes beautiful by conmrani eating with 
tho Beason-Principle that flovs from the Divine", fo r  : "Our interpretation 
is  that the Soul -  by the very truth o f i t s  nature, by it s  a ffilia t io n  to 
the noblest Eristents in the hierarchy o f Being -  when i t  sees anything o f 
that kin, any trace o f that kinship, th r i l ls  with an iscnediate delight, takes 
it s  own to i t s e l f ,  and thus s tirs  anew to the sense o f  its  naturo and o f all
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i t s  a f f i n i t y . ” (O p .c it . . I .  6. 2 « ) . He continues : " a l l  the love lin ess 
o f  th is  world comes by communion in Ideal—Form.” Whereas we see in h is  
account o f  the two aspects o f  imagination a para lle l with the A ristotelian  
am plification  o f  the "d ia le t ic "  route to the eidos in P lato, the visual 
t h r i l l  o f  the beau tifu l, with i t s  immediate delight in communion with 
"Ideal—Form” , now r e ca lls  the "manic" route. Most s ig n ifica n t o f  a l l ,  
Plotinus sta tes  that the Soul "includes a facu lty  p ecu lia rly  addressed to 
beauty" ( i .  6 . 5 . ) .  though he does n ot give th is  "fa cu lty " a name; none 
the le ss  the soul acts to  bring about a unity o f  Idea and matter such as 
imagination a lso  e f fe c t s , and fo r  a l l  i t s  splendours th is  fusion o f  Idea 
and matter i s  the lowest kind o f  beauty whose fin est function i s  to lead 
to "e a r lie r  and l o f t ie r  beauties", which "in  the sense-bound l i f e  we are 
no longer granted to  know . .  but the Soul, taking no help from the organs, 
sees and proclaim s them. To the v is ion  o f  these we must mount, leaving 
sense to l i e  in  i t s  own p la c e ."  ( I .  6. 4 . ) . And in a follow ing passage 
he eulogises the second type o f  beauty which i s  b ere ft , l ik e  the forget­
fulness to which memory s tr iv e s , o f  physical attribu tes :
"Such v is ion  i s  fo r  those only who see with the Sou l's sight -  and at the 
v is ion , they w ill  r e jo ic e ,  and awe w ill  f a l l  upon them and a trouble 
deeper than a l l  the rest could ever s t i r ,  fo r  now they are moving in 
the realm o f  Truth." ( l ) .
This v ision  i s  a "Dionysiac exu ltation " ( i .  6. 4 . )  which leads the soul 
s t i l l  further towards "the God" ( I .  6, 7 . )  and o f  which he says "Anyone 
who has seen This, knows what I intend when I say i t  i s  beautifu l" adding
( l )  "Sineads", I .  6. 4 . : the v ision  is . truth rather than being o f  truth . 
The id en tity  recurs in Keats' "Ode On A Grecian Um" s "Beauty is  truth, 
truth b e a u ty .."  e t c . ;  from the same poem the lin e s  "heard melodies are 
sweet, but those unheard /  Are sweeter . . "  are very l ik e  P lotinus' "And
>1a w >a u 4 a n  v m l i a A w J  4«« ^  a « , .  . A .  A V .  V  1 _  . . .  1.............  ** *
—T -----------— -  ~  »» “ “ -  w*v**w«. v*«w u u s H i w a A t o  s c  u c u a  c u t u  n a m e  u u e  m u u a
to the consciousness o f  beanty ." ("Sineads", I .  6. *3.). The lin e  "Beauty 
i s  t ru th .."  e t c . ,  also i s  to be found in Shaftesbury.
t
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that the path to th is m ystic -vision roust fo llow  a re jection  o f  the lower 
earthly beauty as Odysseus resistG Circe and Calypso in order to " . . f l e e  
to the beloved Fatherland", fo r  "the Fatherland i s  There whence we have 
come, and There is  the Father." ( I .  G. 8 . ) . I t  i s  no coincidence that 
to the modern ear the "Fatherland" means the German idea o f  Germany, fo r  
Romanticism is  both German and Neoplatonic in i t s  physical and sp ir itu a l 
o r ig in s , and m ilitant nationalism i s  a product o f  Romanticism. The 
notion o f  the in d iv id u a l's  sp iritual journey, 'always home, to my fa th er 's  
house ', was revived hy Novalis -  whom I have already mentioned as one o f  
the f i r s t  Romant-iker -  probably from th is  passage in P lotinus. Other 
Neoplatonic orig in s  o f  Romanticism are to be found in the re itera tion  o f 
th is  mystic kinship o f  the Good and the Beautiful which occurs in  the 
Cambridge P latonists generally  end in Shaftesbury's "C haracteristics" 
p articu larly  -  a work that was more respected in Germany than in  Ihgland.
I t  i s  not d i f f i c u l t ,  re ca llin g  the P latonic daemon, to find in th is  "v is ion " 
and i t s  being reserved fo r  those who "Bee with the Sou l's  s ig h t", a blue­
prin t fo r  the Romantic idea  o f  genius, except that fo r  Plotinus the v ision  
i s  "the b irthright o f  a l l ,  which few turn to use” and once attained i t  
immediately bestows p erfection  and inner unity upon him who i s  now "the 
authentic man", ("ihneads" I .  6. 9 . )  The precise function o f  imagination 
here i s  not stated by P lotinus, but being, lik e  the soul i t s e l f ,  in ter­
mediary between tbc material and the sp ir itu a l, and being prim arily visual., 
the imagination might e a s ily  be considered to have an important visionary 
function . Ib is  function i s  written in to Dante's "Divine Comedy", as 1 
shall show la te r  in th is  second part o f  my th esis . Plotinus t e l l s  the 
"Authentic man" : "you are now become very v ision  t now ca ll up your 
confidence, strike forward yet a step -  you need a guide no longer -  
strain and s e e ."  f l .  ft. 0 . ) . So Dante. ( Pur^ntorio. 353T. 4 9 f f . )  reaches 
a point in h is  ascendent journey when he no longer needs h is guide (V ir g i l ) ,
who person ifies reason, and i s  reunited with Beatrice, who i s  love
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The daemon, the authentic man, the Semantic genius : these a ll seem 
to me to he configurations o f  the same type, o f  which there are few as 
Plotinus says, and only those who have known th is "v is ion " can understand 
what he means in speaking o f  i t s  beauty. The idea that the a r t is t  might 
be a guide to  th is  v is ion  i s  not articu lated  by Plotinus, though Dante 
seems la te r  to have seen h is great poem as fu l f i l l in g  such a task. Certainly, 
unlike P lato , Plotinus recognises that art can have considerable importance 
in man* 8 sp ir itu a l l i f e ,  fo r  "the arts are not to be s ligh ted  on the ground 
that they create by im itation o f  natural ob je c ts " , the arts do not give 
"a bare reproduction o f  the thing seen but go back to  the Reason-Principle 
from which Nature i t s e l f  derives", they are "holders o f  beauty" and "add 
where nature i s  lacking" ("Ehneads" V. 8. 1 . ) .  What nature la ck s , according 
to what we have already found in P lotinus, i s  imagination, and though the 
beauty they have may not be o f  the very highest i t  i s  a necessary in te r - 
mediary, a lin k  between the material and the id ea l, a u n ify  o f  form and 
matter. So the beauty o f  a p iece  o f  sculpture does not co n s is t  in i t s  
beauty as stone "but in v irtue o f  the Form or Idea introduced by the a r t" , 
which ibrm i s  :
" . . i n  the designer before ever i t  enters the stone; and the a r t i f ic e r  holds 
i t  not by h is  equipment o f  eyes and hands but by h is pa rtic ip a tion  in h is  
a rt. The beauty, therefore, ex is ts  in a fa r  higher state in  the art; fo r  
i t  does n ot come over in tegra lly  in to the work; that o r ig in a l beauty i s  not 
transferred; what comes over i s  a derivative and a minor i and even that 
shows i t s e l f  upon the statue not in tegra lly  and with en tire  rea lisa tion  o f  
intention but only in so fa r  as i t  has subdued the resistan ce  o f  the 
m ateria l." ( ingc, on, c i t . . p .23 2 ).
Beauty in an art work consists in  the communication o f  the Idea through 
the material form; the a r t is t  has needed to struggle with tho material 
in order to  a ctive ly  make i t  beautifu l through "the creating p r in c ip le " , 
so the success or fa ilu re  o f  h is  struggle i s  measured by the degree to 
which h is  work partakes o f  the idea l form o f  beauty. As Inge puts i t  :
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"The true a r t is t  fixes  h is  eyes on the archetypal Logoi, and tr ie s  to 
draw inspriation  from the sp ir itu a l power which created the forms o f 
bod ily  beauty. Art, th erefore , i s  a mode o f  contemplation, which 
creates because i t  must. This is  a real advance upon Plato and A r is to t le ."  
(Op. c i t . . p . 21 *>). This "advance", i f  i t  i s  useful to talk  o f  art in such 
terms, i s  a synthesis. The t h r i l l  o f  the Neoplatonic "v is ion " clearly  has 
i t s  antecedents in P lato, as does the idea that such delight accompany the 
attainment o f  the heights o f  m orality, truth, and cognition, as well as 
lov e  and beauty. I t  is  important, I think, to  underline the Neoplatonic 
view that there is  a " fa cu lty "  in man to which beauty is  s p e c ifica lly  
addressed and that beauty must be prim arily, i f  not so le ly , v isu a l. What 
could th is  "facu lty" o f  the soul be, which i s  visual and yet not material ? 
What e lse , we may deduce, but imagination. But th is must, i f  imagination, 
be the higher, image-making part which belongs, lik e  Kant's schemata, to 
reason; i t  i s  not free but restrained, or i f  unrestrained, in fe r io r . 
Plotinus does not himself make such a deduction however, and though h is 
opinion o f  art is  as high as H tiilostratus' he docs not give so high an 
Aesthetic function to imagination; such a function we w ill find  in Dante, 
though even there the imagination does not have quite the same symbolic 
power as Kant's "aesthetic im agination". As forerunners o f  the Renaissance 
in I ta ly  both Plotinus and Dante ( l )  influenced the aesthetic notion o f  
im itation as idea lisation  ( 2 ) ,  but the imagination remained "d ia le c t ic "
(1 ) On Plotinus in th is context see e .g . P. Honrv. op. c i t . .  pp. xxxv-xxxyi 
"The Renaissance, in the person o f  M arsilio i ic in o ,  rediscovered h is works 
and was enthralled by h is teaching. Later, such re lig iou s thinkers ns the 
Cambridge P laton ists, such philosophers as Berkeley and Hegel, such poets 
as Goethe and Novalis in terested  themselves in  him . . ” On Dante, see
N.A.Robb. "Neoplatonism o f  The Ita lian  Renaissance" p .1*5*5 : "Florentine 
humanism, generally speaking, held Dante in honour as one o f  i t s  greatest 
forerunners . . . "
( 2 ) On th is  notion see E. Pnnofsky. "Idea"; ( e . g . . P.49) " ..th e  Renaissance 
at f i r s t  seeing no conirm licLion therein, demanded 01 i t s  works 01 arc 
truth to nature and beauty a t the same time, ju s t  as antiquity had done 
(the idea o f  iraitatio i s ,  a fte r  a l l .  ju s t  as much an inheritance from 
antiquity as is  the idea o f  e le c t io ) . "
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and A ristotelian  as Pico d e lla  H irandola's work on the subject c lea rly  
demonstrates, though beauty was a major aesthetic goal :
"The Renaissance was destined to drive the a r t is t  mad and make him the 
most miserable o f  men -  at the very moment when the world was to become 
le s s  habitable fo r  him -  by revealing to him h is own grandeur and le ttin g  
loose  on him the w ild  beast Beauty which Faith had led  a fter i t  obedient, 
with a gossamer thread fo r  leash ." ( j.M aritain . "Art and Scholasticism ", 
p .2 2 ). This "d ia le c t ic " , A ristote lian  notion o f  imagination has an 
im p lic it  association  with beauty in Plotinus, an association  which in 
the 18th century was to become e x p lic it  and even commonplace, t ie d  as i t  
then became to  the doctrine o f  ta ste .
The possib le  lin k s between imagination and the "manic" route to 
eidos. or  the Neoplatonic ‘ v isionary t h r i l l ' ,  are le s s  evident in , and 
a fte r , P lotinus. To accred it the image-taking fa cu lty  with transcendental 
or symbolic potency would perhaps have been too much against the Stoic ethi 
and psychology to have had any credence fo r  the Neoplatonies, but the 
suggestion o f  such a potency does occur among the "lesser" and "less  
o r ig in a l"  N eoplatonists, as Bundy c a lls  them, who followed Plotinus ( l ) .  
Neoplatonism was developed in more than one d irection  by i t s  adherents 
such as Proclus, Porphyry and Iamblichus, and 1 would lik e  now to  consider 
b r ie f ly  the more mystical work "On the Mysteries" o f  Iamblichus, which 
suggests that imagination has th is "manic" potency to which I  have referred 
There i s  in Plotinus the clear indication  that the soul should str ive  to 
unite with the One but also that th is  unity i s  a return, a kind o f  home- 
coming, to where the soul tru ly  belongs. For Iamblichus the Plotinian 
"Father", the D ivin ity, i s  somewhat more p a tern a listic , and i t  i s  only by 
courtesy o f  His beneficence that we receive intim ations o f  a higher re a lity  
sc ‘tills Divi— "by z
( 1 ) See Bundy, op. c i t . . Ch.V'il fo r  a fu lle r  discussion o f  these 'le s s e r  
Neoplatoni s ts " .
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" ..r e v e a ls  through things which are deprived o f knowledge, conceptions which 
precede a ll knowledge ....Through them also he inserts in us wisdom, and 
through everything which is  in the world excites our in te l le c t  to the truth 
o f  real beings, o f  things which are in generation, and o f  future events."
("On The M ysteries", Sec. I I .  Ch, X V II.). The imagination seems to be the 
recip ien t o f  these insertions o f  wisdom and truth :
T o r  we do not see that any one o f  the things which arc sewn through generation 
possess any thing more than what i s  imparted to i t  by it3  f i r s t  generating 
cause. But, in the present instance, the imagination w ill receive a certain  
more exce llen t addition from that which has no ex is ten ce ."  ( O p .cit. , Eh.XXII.) .  
He also says that i t  i s  possib le to invoke the "Gods" by operations which seem 
to e f fe c t  likenesses, repeating an Ebipedoclean and Pythagorean notion , fo r  
" . . . i t  i s  not p ossib le  to speak r ig h tly  about the Gods without the Gods"
( Op, c i t . . Ch. X V Ill) . as when " ..in v oca tion , and the tilings performed by a 
s c ie n t i f ic  operation , accede and arc conjoined to more excellen t natures through 
sim ilitude and a l l ia n c e ." ( l ) For P lotinus, as we have found, sim ilar con­
junctions are made in  the imagination, and perhaps Iamblichus hod a sim ilar 
idea in  mind, fo r  h is  "operations" certa in ly  anticipate the magical operators 
o f  the Renaissance, such as Giordano Bruno, fo r  whom imagination was a very 
real and necessary instrument.
I t  i s  c lear  that fo r  Iomblichus the "imaginations procured by enchant- 
ments" are a rather in fe r io r  kind fo r , in common with Plotinus he speaks o f  
two kinds o f  imagination but, unlike h is  great predecessor, he also makes a 
c lear association  between imagination (in  h is  two senses) and "ecstasy".
He says there are two kinds o f  ecstasy, one o f  which i s  (lik e  the Plutarchan 
"fancy") d isorderly , confused, m aterial, and " f i l l s  us with stupidity
and f o l l y , "  i t  i s  incapable o f  knov.'ledge and "wanders from wisdom".
( l )  "On The M ysteries", Ch.XVIII: in a footnote ( p .l6 3 ) to h is  translation  o f  
th is  passage i .Taylor says that according to Xumuiicuuti we uuty uj.ipx’uuci, d iv in ity  
"through sacred operations" bat d iv in ity  does not approach us. The nature o f  
these operations i s  not clear, they i-.ay bo magical, alchemical, or r i t u a l is t ic  
in  a re lig iou s  way, perhaps a ll o f  these at once, but certa in ly  not " s c ie n t i f ic "  
in  any modern sense.
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The other kind "imparts goods which are more honourable than human 
temperance", i t  "gives i t s e l f  to the cause which rules over the orderly 
d istribu tion  o f  things in  the world", and "con joins with natures that 
transcend a ll  our wisdom." Making the d istin ction s  between these two 
kinds o f  ecstasy, he i s  a lso  characterising two kinds o f  imagination t 
"The one, likew ise, i s  unstable, but the other i s  above nature. The one 
draws down the sou l, the other elevates i t .  And the one en tire ly  separates 
us from a divine allotment, but the other connects us with i t " .  Again, the 
one i s  "depraved enthusiasm", which i s  "sim ilar to  melancholy, or in tox ica tion , 
o r  any other delirium exerted by the body", i& i ls t  the other i s  "the 
enthusiasm more exellen t through a plenitude o f  power". So, in  iden tify in g  
these two, we must " . .  by no means compare the diseases o f  the body, such 
as su ffusions, and the imaginations excited  by diseases, with divine 
im aginations", and . .
" ..n e ith e r  must you compare the most manifest surveys o f  the Gods with 
the imaginations a r t i f i c ia l ly  procured by enchantment. For the la tte r  
have neither the energy, nor the essence, nor the truth o f  the things 
that are seen, but extend mere phantasms, as fa r  as to appearances o n ly ." ( l )
( l )  This, and the foregoing quotations, are a ll  from Iambiichus. o p .c i t . .
Qi.XXV. Tertullian associates ecstasy with sleep, as sleep renders the body 
inactive, giving freedom to the soul: "This power we call ecstasy, in which 
the sensuous soul stands out o f i t s e l f ,  in a way which even resembles madness. t 
Thus in the very beginning sleep was inaugurated by ecstasy : 'And God sent 
an ecstasy to Adam, and he s lep t." So sleep is  "ordinarily . .  combined with 
ecstasy" and memory is  "..an  especial g i f t  o f  the ecstatic con d ition ..."
(from De Anima. in The W ritings. Vol I I ) . T ertu llian  considers that bad dreams 
"are in f l i c t e d  on us mainly by demons", whereas good dreams come from God. 
( O p .c it .. Ch.XLYII. sec also Ch. XLIX fo r  a sim ilar view ). I  have already 
c ited  Keats' restatement o f  Neoplatonic ideas, and he again comes to mind 
in  re la tion  to the foregoing remarks from T ertu llian . In a le t te r  (22 Nov 
1817) to Benjamin Bailey, Keats says "What the imagination seizes as Beauty 
must be t r u th .."  and : "The Imagination may be compared to  Adam's dream -  
ho awoke and found i t  t r u t h . . . "  With respect to  T ertu llia n 's  comments on 
sleep, dreams and ecstasy, these associations are seen as divine q u a lities  
o f  the imagination by Svnesius o f  Gyrene in h is  De Insonniis -  e .g . ,  
u.*j4C. 1. ~~j : “ . .  wo liuvu in ¡he promise o i  our dreams a pledge from the 
d iv in ity ."
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I t  i s  important to emphasise that both kinds o f  imagination are here 
connected with extremes o f  pleasure — ecstasy or enthusiasm — and that 
these two kinds o f  imagination are ea s ily  confused, or Iamblichus would 
not have to warn against confusing them. Despite the clear and undefended 
bifurcation  o f  imagination, he i s  so strongly in the grip  o f  Platonic 
metaphysics that he w ill not entertain the p o s s ib il i ty  o f  one imagination, 
having perhaps several aspects, whose te s t  fo r  authenticity might be in 
action or  existance, as A risto tle  had said. So, l ik e  P lato, Iamblichus 
i s  dismissive o f  "human a r t " , lie considers that "image-makers" are 
a r t i f i c ia l ,  without divine elements, fo r  "Nothing . . .  which i s  fashioned 
by human art i s  genuine and pure. He equates art with the lower imagination 
which deals in  phantasms and appearances : "This delusive formation . . o f  
phantasms, w ill  be conversant with shadows, which are very remote from 
the tru th ."  ( O p .c i t . . Chs. XXVII-XXX). This rea lly  i s  a re itera tion  o f  
the P latonic view as contained in  Be.10 o f the Itepublic. i t  i s  the view 
against which Leonardo was to fig h t  in h is  attempt to  ra ise  the status 
o f  art, a f ig h t  in  which he was successful party because the visual arts 
had come to  have a re lig io u s  function ; a lso , though th is  may not be a 
d irect reason fo r  the elevation  o f  the visual arts to  " l ib e r a l” status, 
imagination as dreaming came to be recognised by the church fathers as 
the main means o f  divine revela tion .
Ch or.tcr 2 ; THE CHE!ttM FATHERS
SECTION I
As I have alreacfy said, Christian theology took an enormous amount 
from Neoplatonism. In this chapter I shall consider the theories o f  
imagination o f  St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas and also o f  the mystic, 
Richard o f St. V ictor, whom Dante regards highly and in -«hose w ritings the 
function o f  imagination in meditation and contemplation is  ou tlined . I 
also mention in passing the theories o f  other w riters who helped to con­
solidate the synthesis o f  P laton ic, A ristotelian  and B iblica l thought into 
orthodoxy. The incongruities o f  th is synthesis, or attempted synthesis, 
produce a dual is  t i c  theory o f  imagination as the amoral power which d istracts  
men's mind3 from higher things and imagination qua dreaming as an instrument 
o f  divine revelation . Both these views are sanctioned by Augustine and 
Aquinas, who are by far the most important o f  the early theologians. >1.H.
Bundy asserts that Augustine says nothing new about imagination ( l ) ,  but 
nonetheless i t  must he said that Augustine's theory o f  imagination was 
destined to become the " o f f i c ia l "  view, and that h is theory i s  further 
to be valued fo r  i t s  c la r ity  and for  h is  unambivalent assertion that "aerial 
and ethereal essences" influence ns and con "bear thoughts end dreams into 
our minds".
I t  i s  in h is  le tte rs  to Nebridius that we fin d  Augustine's (e ssen tia lly  , 
Neoplatonic) views on imagination; Nebridius has written to l»im that " ..th ere  
con be no exercise o f  memory without images, o r  the apprehension o f  some 
ob jects  presented by the im agination." ( 2 ) .  Augustine disagrees, taking 
a more Socratic then A ristotelian  line i " ..th e  things which we remember 
are not always things which are passing away, but are fo r  the most part things 
which are permanent." (L etters" VII, Ch. I I . T , ) . He believes that to f ix
■RVw v» n  iW  n A n e o i  i » n  n f  - f l i n  + ) > o r t W '  ■? » n « < " * * » ■ * r*  A v  om  a  « 1  «»a  <» *»«5\ f • • * — • — — * * ~»r —  * o '  - -- * —— «» - —• - r —  ~ • v
end Boethius, see M.W.Bundy, o p .c i t . , Cl), VIII; see also J.Morgan, "The 
Psychological Tcoching o f  St. Augustine", csp. p.212 f f .
(2 ) "Letters to St. Augustine", Vo>. 1. Letter VII. Ch.I. 1 . Augustine is  c learl; 
uneasy about rendering the Greek phantosine in to Latin, and re foro  to " . .th e  
apprehension o f  none ob jects presented by the imagination, which you have been 
pleased to c o ll  'phantasiae '. "
otir thoughts on etern ity  does not. require the presence o f  on image in 
imagination, fo r  "an no man can doubt-, the mind received more re lia b le  and 
correct impressions betore i t  was involved in the illu s ion s  which the senses 
produce." (hoc, c i t . ) .  Eternity "does not require any image fashioned by 
the imagination as the vehicle by which i t  nay bo introduced into the mind;" 
( 'L e t te r s " , VII. Ch.I. 2 . ) , fo r  i t  i s  only by th is Socratic reminiscence 
to which Augustine seems to re fer  "that, in  regard to some things at le a s t , 
there can be no exorcise o f memory without any image o f  tho thing romembored 
being presented to  the im agination." (hoc. c i t . ) I t  looks aa though Augustine 
i s  favouring the "image—making" aspect o f  the Pletiniar. imagination over the 
"image—taking" one which i s  o ffered  by Nebridius and at the seme times denying 
imagination a symbolic function ouch as la te r  theorists have given to the 
image as aesthetic o b je c t .
Augustine divides "images", which Nebridius "as well as many others” ca lls  
”phantasiae"(l) in to three, now fam iliar, types, "according as they originate 
with the senses, or the imagination, or the facu lty  o f  reason." ( O p .c it , .
C h .Il. k . ) .  The f i r s t  are tho images o f  ob jects  o r  persons we have once seen, 
l ik e  the "impressions" o f  Locke and ZIumo; the second are suppositions, " . . .  
when, fo r  the soke o f  discourse, we ourselves suppose th in gs .. "(L o c .c i t . ) .  
and the th ird  are "ch ie fly  . .  numbers and measure." (L o c .c i t . ) . Of those, 
the second seems to mo to be by the fur most immediately importer.! since hors, 
pace Dundy, Augustine not only recognises the autonomy o f  imagination but 
also givos i t  what we today would regard as a very important function . This 
sense o f  "supposition", we may surmise, l ik e  J. Dewey's la te r  "rehearsal." 
sense o f  "imagination" , suggests that a c t iv it ie s  lik e  theorising, hypothesis, 
planning ahead, are a ll done in imagination. But he minimises i t s  value :
"Who can doubt that those images ere much more unreal than those with which 
the senses acquaint us? For the things which we suppose, or b e lieve , o r  picture 
to ourselves, are in everv point whoJ.lv unreal; and the things which wo
( l )  Again Augustine here shows b io  reluctance to ca ll "images" by the Greek 
"phontasiAe", seeming to vant. to retain th is  term for  the higher sense o f  
"image" and the Latin "im eginatio" fo r  Nebridius" (lover) cense.
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perceive by sight niid the other senses, are, as you see, far more near to 
the truth than these products o f  im agination." ( O u .c it .. Ch. I I .  9 . ) .  Nor 
does he think h is th ird  sense very important, fo r  though i t  may appear that 
thought produces an image, Augustine considers that in te lle c t  is  hampered 
by images, a view which l-eminds us o f  P lotinus ' " forg etfu ln ess". The 
problem o f  bow we are able to imagine things which we have never actually 
seen i s  solved by "a certain facu lty  o f  diminution and addition which is  
innate" and which enables the mind to recombine and a lter  the images which 
are o f  h is  f i r s t  "impression" type. But he makes l i t t l e  o f  these embryonic, 
pre-Kantian "reproductive" and "productive" kinds o f  imagination and con­
cludes h is  anelysis o f  imagination with the S toic assertion that i t  is  "oar 
most sacred duty" to practice  "resistance to the sway o f  bod ily  sen ses .."  
and t e l l s  Nebridius "I would warn you never to  lin k  you rself in friendship 
with those shadows o f  the realm o f  darkness."(Ch. I l l ,  7 ) .
As we have already seen, Bundy i s  not to ta lly  ju s t i f ie d  in saying there 
i s  nothing new in Augustine's theory o f  imagination and a l i t t l e  la te r , 
thanks to  Nehridius' doggedness and Anguotine's sa in tly  patience, the la tte r  
is  obliged to explain the means whereby the heavenly powers (daemons) 
communicate with us m ortals. Augustine is  "not a l i t t l e  stunned" by th is 
query from Nehridius, which he c a lls  "a  great one" ("L etters", IX. 2 . ) . and 
i t  i s  evident that he does not question the p o s s ib il ity  o f  such communication 
and h is  rep ly , taken in conjunction with Aquinas' views on the subject o f  
divine messengers -  angels and demons — im p lic it ly  condoned many aspects 
o f  magic, w itchcraft end demonology which thrived daring the Middle Ages 
and the Renaissance. Imagination, as we shall see in Port 3. has a central 
ro le  in these o ccu lt practices which seemed to be sanctioned by the church
"f #rfch <*t»« .  q tn tA q  nvi ov>r»-f/i r o i l y  +>»*+. n . . a w w  mrtvemftni o f  +.ho minH
a ffe cts  in some degree the body" :
"Whence ve may conjecture that, in l ik e  manner» vhen thought is  busy* 
although no bodily  e f fe c t  o f  the mental act i 3 d iscern ib le  by us» there
way 1)9 some sucli e f fe c t  d iscern ib le  "by beings o f  aerial or ethereal essence 
whose perceptive facu lty  i s  in the highest degree acute, -  so much so, that, 
in comparison with i t ,  our fa cu ltie s  are scarcely  worthy to "be called perceptive. 
Therefore these footprin ts o f  i t s  motion, so to speak, which the miiul 
impresses on the body, may perchance net only remain, hut remain as i t  were 
with the fo rce  o f  habit; and i t  may be that, when these are secretly  stirred  
and played upon, they hear thoughts and dreams into our minds, according to 
the pleasure o f  the person moving or touching them : and th is  is  done with 
marvel 1 on;s fa c i l i t y .  For i f ,  as is  m anifest, the attainments o f  our earth- 
horn pnd sluggish "bodies in  the department o f  exercise , e .g . in the playing 
o f  musical instruments, dancing on the tigh t-rop e, e t c . ,  tire almost in cred ib le , 
i t  i s  by no means unreasonable to suppose that beings which act with the 
powers o f  on aerial or ethereal body upon our bodies, and are by the con­
stitu tion  o f  th eir  natures able to pass unhindered through these bodies, 
should be capable o f  much greater quickness in moving whatever they wish, 
while we, though not perceiv ing what they do, are nevertheless a ffected  by 
the re su lts  o f  th eir  a c t iv ity . We have a somewhat para lle l instance in the 
fa c t  that we do not perceive how i t  i s  that supcrflxiity o f  b i le  impels us to 
more frequent outbursts o f  passionate fee lin g ; and yet i t  does produce th is  
e f fe c t ,  while th is su perflu ity  o f  b i le  i s  i t s e l f  an e f fe c t  o f  oui y ie ld ing  
to such passionate fe e l in g s ."  ("L etters", IX. T .) .
These ' aerial or ethereal essences’ , whose influence on our bodies 
Augustine likens to that o f  b i le ,  immediately re la te  to contemporary b e lie fs  
o f  physical science, vdiicli vr.a b asica lly  Pythagorean, and which rested la rge ly  
on the authority cl’ P la to 's  Tinecus. (See Appendix A ). As wo have already 
seen, not even A risto tle  could r e s is t  the force  o f  doctrine o f  the four 
elements, and th is basic tenet, expounded by the Pythagorean philosopher 
Tinseus — to whom even Socrates lis ten s  a t t e n t i v e l y i s  tho key to under­
standing most o f  the s c ie n t i f i c ,  cosm ological, and magical b e l ie fs  o f the 
Middle Ages and o f  the Renaissance According ta Timacus, the cosmos is  
constructed out o f  the four elements s earth, water, «sir, end f i r e ,  (in
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ascending order). The human body i s  made o f  the four elements •which become 
progressively  more refined  from earth, the most base, to f i r e ;  so f i r e  is  
the element in the body -which is  most akin to the soul, for  the "divine 
form" to which the soul belongs i s  "made mostly o f  f i r e  so that i t  should 
be as bright and beautifu l to look at as p o s s ib le ."  ( l )  The gods, then 
are associated with f i r e ,  ju s t  the birds inhabit the a ir , and other animal 3 
the water and the earth. Fire i s  also responsible fo r  dreams, mirror 
r e fle c t io n s , and fo r  vis io n ; since sight, the g i f t  o f  the gods, i s  the 
greatest o f  man's g i f t s :  we owe to v ision  our fin est achievements such as 
philosophy and mathematics.
Though they are in  equal proportions, the four elements are in ter­
changeable, undergoing a const a it  cy c lica l transformation here in the 
physical world, so that "anything in process o f  change" should be spoken 
o f  not "as being a thing but as having a Ciuality". (Tinmens, S ec.49) Tho
four elements belong in -the three d is tin ct r e a lit ie s  which existed  before 
the world caine into existence : these are being, space, and becoming. "The 
nurse o f  becoming was characterised by the qu a lities  o f  water and f i r e ,  o f  
earth and a i r . "  (2 ) So the elements are in a state o f  disequilibrium , o f 
eternal motion, o f  becoming, which apprehended by "opinion with the a id  o f 
sensation", the phrase used in th is  instance to describe phantasia. and 
attacked by A r is to t le .(3 ) The lowest r e a lity , space, "eternal and 
in d estru ctib le ", i s  "apprehended without the senses by a sort o f  spurious 
reasoning and so i s  hard to  believe  in -  we look at i t  indeed in  a sort 
o f  dream . . . " {  (Timneus Sec. 32) th is  "dreamstate" c learly  corresponds to 
the lowest d iv ision  o f  the divided lin e  in Beuttblic. Book VI. When the 
elements o f  the human body arc in  proportion and at rest the body i s  in a 
state o f  health; imbalance o f  the bodily  elements causes disease, such as
(1 ) See Tiraac-us, secs . 40 A. 42—>•3: sensation, fo r  example, i s  explained as 
irregu lar motion caused by welding together the soul and the elements o f  
the body.
(2 ) Op. c i t . .  sec, =52. See also sec. 29 : " ..b e in g  has to becoming the same 
relation  as truth to b e l ie f . "  e t c . .
(3 ) See Do Anita a 428a f!4 f f . . a lso Part 1. Ch. I I .  p. (supra).
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when "there is  b i le  in the b lood . (O p .c it . . Secs. Augustine’ s
likening, o f  the e ffe c ts  o f  aeria l and etherial essences on cur bodies, 
to the e ffe c ts  o f  b i le , is  now seen to be most appropriate, since both 
show an imbalance o f  elements; the one i s  not a mere metaphor fo r  the 
other, but they are both interdependent parts o f  the same cosmology.
So we arrive at an appreciation o f the extent to which the ancient 
elemental science found acceptance in the work o f  one o f  the two most 
important o f  Christian theologians during the Middle Ages. For Timaeus, 
the aether -  the natural element o f  the "beings o f  aeria l and etherial 
essence" o f  which Augustine w rites to Nebridius -  i s  the "brightest 
variety" o f  a ir , that i s ,  that part o f  th is  element which i s  most refined  
and c losest to the divine element- o f  f i r e .  As " f ir e  has achieved the 
maximum interpenetration o f  the re st; a ir  the secon d ... " ( l )  there i s  a 
rationale fo r  the influence o f  beings or daemons on our bodies, and 
B ib lica l and Pythagorean b e l ie fs  find support in each other and fuse a 
body o f  dogma against, which the early empirical s c ie n t is ts  would come 
to struggle. ( 2 ) 12
(1) Pjn, c i t . , s e c .58. Compare A r is to tle , Dc Mundo 395a I f f . , where aether 
is  said to be superior to f i r e .  A risto tle  regards aether to be more divine 
than any o f the four elements, and the body 's v ita l heat ( su iritus or pneuma) 
is  an analogue o f  the aether in  which the soul i s  prim arily  embodied.
(2 ) The Stoic side o f  Augustine's theory o f  imagination i s  also shared by 
Focthius. "the la s t  o f  the Romans and the f i r s t  o f  the S ch olastics", whose 
"ConsoJ ation o f  Philosophy" was fo r  the Middle Ages a compendium o f  
c la ss ica l thought. Boethius introduced A risto tle  to the West and preserved 
many o f  the works o f  antiquity, and h is "Consolation" was indeed a 
consolation to Dante on the death o f  Beatrice and the form o f  h is work is  
imitated in the alternating prose and verse sty le  o f  Dante's "Vita Kuova"; 
both works are accounts o f  psychological recovery. On imagination Boethius 
says ( e .g . ) :  " ..sen se  and imagination cannot aspire to  the knowledge o f  
the universal, since th eir  cognizance cannot go beyond bodily f ig u r e s . . . " .  
Boethius is  rewarded in  the "Di.vine Comedy" by being placed in heaven in 
the c ir c le  ol’ twelve l ig h ts , also containing Albertus Magnus. Aquinas, 
Dionysius the Areopogite and Richard o f  St. V ictor, which surrounds Dante 
and Beatrice; ( "Paradiso" . Canto X. Bines 121* f f . ) .
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SECTION I I
In th is short section I shell expound the theory o f imagination o f Bichard 
o f  St. V ictor. There are other important cr .r lj Christian myotic a, such as 
ftLoysius the A reopagito(l) end Richard's fe llow  monk Hugo o f  St. V ictor, 
the "A lter Augustinus" as he was known, hut in Richard ve find a reasonably 
complete and accessib le  statement on imagination. For Richard, as fo r  the 
S to ics , imagination is  generally  to be regarded as the servant o f  reason 
but as having i t s  drawbacks in  d istracting  the mind from prayer by i t s  
"clamouring" a fte r  physical d e s ire s .(2 ) But with a ll  i t s  e v ils ,  imagination 
can help the novice in h is  early  m editation. His analysis o f  imagination 
fo llow s Angustiue and P lotinus in i t s  subdivision into the "earth ly" imagin­
ation which " ..o ccu rs  when without deliberation , our mind runs vaguely th is  
way and that on anything which we have seen, heard or done” ( "Benjavdn Minor", 
Ch. XVI) , and the "reasonable kind" -  "..when we create some imaginary 
thing from what we have know« through the bod ily  senses. For example we 
see gold , end we eee a horse, but we have never seen a golden horse. Now 
th is  cannot he done by an animal but i s  on ly possib le  by a rational creatu re ." 
(L o w .c lt .) .
He further divides th is  "reasonable" imagination -  which i s  c le a r ly  a 
descendant o f  A r is to t le 's  "d e libera tive" imagination -  "..a ccord in g  to whether 
i t  i s  se t forth  by the reason, or combined with in te llig e n ce "  : "The f i r s t  
takes place when the mind uses some known form o f  v is ib le  things to produce
f
some other v is ib le  thing in  the mind yet without re la tin g  i t  to anything 
unseen. The second occurs when through, the image o f  v is ib le  things we 
try  to r ise  to the knowledge o f  unseen th ings. In the f i r s t  we have the 
imagination combined with the reason, in the la t te r  the in te lligen ce  combined
(1 )  See Dionysius The Areopog ita . "Tho M ystics! Theology", Ch. I I  pp.19f>-6 : 
"..many attain unto v is ion  through tho lo s s  o f  sight and knowledge, and that 
in  ceasing thus to see or to know we may learn to  knew that which i s  beyond «11 
perception and understanding . . .  lik e  e.s men who, carving a statue out o f
w»»WK1 is. vomatrA »11 +>w% iwTiAflinit.n+.fl IWmlftv» iho *1 on #vf thfi
la ten t image end by th is  mere removal display the hidden statue i t s e l f  in i t s  
hidden beauty".
(2 ) Richard o f  St. Vic tor ."S e lected  Writings on Contemplation".Beniaain Miner, 
Bk. I ,  Chs. V & YrI . Speaking o f  imagination ia the service o f  reason, Richard 
c ite s  Romans I . ?ib: ( i . a .  : "For the in v is ib le  o f  him from tbs creation o f  the 
world are c learly  seen, being understood by the things that are m a d e ..."e tc ).
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with the im agination." ( O p .c it . .  Cb. XVIII) . This second kind o f  rational 
imagination, attempting to  r ise  to knowledge o f  the unseen, is  given a 
degree o f  resp ecta b ility  in i t s  being recognised ae a mode o f  contemplation 
(though a re la tiv e ly  in fe r io r  one); but in  Richard ’ s  m ystical theology i t  
remains, a counterpart o f  Platonic and Neoplatonic configurations, a d u a lis t 's  
means o f  circumventing a lo g ic a lly  insoluble problem. Richard tr ie s  to f i t  
imagination into an ascending sca le  o f  contemplation, hut he ultim ately is  
ob liged  to admit the inadequacy o f  imagination once the "v is ib le  things" have 
been l e f t  behind on the mystical ascent, ( ju s t  as Dante was to do in the 
"Divine Comedy") :
"Thinking roams about, meditation investigates, contemplation wonders.
Thinking arises from imagination, meditation from the reason, contemplation 
from the in te llig en ce . In telligen ce  takes the highest p lace , imagination 
the low est, reason l i e s  between them. Everything which comes under the 
view o f  the lower sense, comes n ecessa rily  under the view o f  the higher 
sense. lienee i t  fo llow s that everything which is  grasped by the imagination* 
i s  a lso , together with much that i s  above i t ,  grasped by the reason. So 
a lso , a l l  that the imagination and reason include, together with those 
things which they cannot include, fa l l  under the view o f  in te llig e n ce ."  
("Benjamin Major", BK. I . Gb. I I I . ) .  This double tr iad  o f  imagination/ 
thinking, reason/meditation, and intelligence/contem plation , is  described 
la te r  as s ix  moments o f  an ontologica l sca le  :
"The f i r s t  l ie s  in the imagination and i s  according to the imagination 
on ly. The second i s  in the imagination hut according to  reason. The 
th ird  i s  in the reason according to the imagination. The fourth is  
in the reason end according to the reason. The f i f t h  is  above the reason 
and not contrary to i t .  So two are concerned with the imagination, two 
with the reason, two with in te llig e n ce ."  ( 0 ;> .cit. . Bk. I . Ch. V I . ) . 
inevi tably i t  i s  the »aid-point on the sca le , between the third and fourth 
moments, which is  c ru c ia l, for  i t  i s  here that the "image" relinquishes 
the la s t  traces o f  i t s  physical orig ins and becomes a rational en tity .
1
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In the th ird  moment "we arc l i l t e d  up by the likeness o f  v is ib le  things 
to the consideration o f  in v is ib le  things” , reaching the fourth moment 
where "..phantasy is  wont to cloud rather than to help" :
"Let the imagination therefore give way fo r  a time, give way and almost 
vanish : there is  nothing in i t  which i s  able to help th is  work. What 
con the imagination do i f  reason fa i ls ?  What place has the imagination 
where there i s  'no variableness nor shadow o f  tu r n in g '. . .? "  ( hk. >i, Ch. IV). 
Richard i s  simply repeating the well established Neoplatonic formula derived 
from noth 1*1a to and A risto tle  in which the ascent o f  the soul to a state 
o f  grace is  homologous with the mind's pursuit o f  knowledge. Jlis scale o f  
s is  moments looks c lear enough but as v/e see from the quotations imagination 
is  f i r s t  sa id  to have a d irect  lin k  with intel ligoncc/contem plation and 
then i s  said  to  3ever these lin k s at the middle o f  the double triad  
mentioned above. Imagination, in the case o f  the golden horse seemed also 
to have been credited with a productive or creative a b il ity , suggesting 
a p os itiv e  autonomous power in conjunction, with reason, but th is  i s  not 
pursued -  r.o doubt in  deference to -the mystic state with which he is  more 
concerned. The lin k  between imagination and the heights o f  contemplation 
are reasserted when Richard w rites about dreams, where the Angastinian 
rather than the A ristotelian  view predominates, paving the way — as Lundy 
remarks, ( op. c i t . .  p.266) -  fo r  Dante's understanding o f  the powers o f  
dream and imagination :
"To see a dream io  to pass over by the mind into the secret place o f  
divine contemplation. He who ascends by ecstasy in to contemplation o f 
sublime tilings sleeps and sees a dream," ("Benjamin Major", "Of Dreams"). 
This r . /s t ic a l ,  visionary power o f  (imagination qua) dreams i s  repeated 
a l i t t l e  la te r  :
"What i s  the seeing o f dreams end the fo re te llin g  o f  things to come and 
the foreseeing o f  the mysteries o f  hidden tilings but to receive the grace o f  
contemplation from heaven and by ecstasy to perceive knowledge o f  bidden 
judgments by a divine shewing?" (O p .o it .. "Of Dr cm  and Prophecy")
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lie seems to be unaware o f  the anomalies o f  an imagination which in 
waking is  powerless without reason hut in sleep  attains the mystery 
and the ecstasy o f  contemplating heaven, hut nevertheless th is la tte r  
power o f  imagination, also unequivocally affirmed in the "De Insomniis" 
o f  Synesius, was taken fo r  granted hy Dante in both the "Vita Nuova" and 
the “Divine Comedy". The precedents fo r  an exalted, but creative. 
function o f  imagination are thus to be found where, u ltim ately , the 
Romantics found them -  in P lato, A risto tle , Neoplatonism, and in 
Christian mysticism -  and they seem to be no le s s  va lid  and true fo r  
Dante than fo r  the poets o f  the 19th century.
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■SECTION II I
Having considered, the theory o f  inagination o f  Augustine nnd Richard 
o f  St. V ictor I  w ill terminate th is  diopter with a b r ie f  examination
o f  St. Thomas Aquinas' view3 on imagination. He is  the most important 
o f  these three figures as he became the foremost authority fo r  the 
theology o f the (C atholic) church, and also fo r  h is  e ffo r ts  in 
assim ilating the philosophy o f  A risto tle  into that th e o lo g y .(l)  Much 
o f  the cred it, o r  resp on sib ility , fo r  th is  la t te r  task must be given to 
the patron saint o f  natural science, Aquinas' sometime teacher, Albertus 
Magnus. I t  was Albertus who almost single-handedly revived esteem for  
A risto tle  and whose stated intention  o f  "adapting A risto tle  to the
use o f  the Latin races" vas fu l f i l l e d  despite o f  on intense suspicion o f 
"the Philosopher" evidenced hy the repeated condemnation o f  h is  works o f  
natural science and metaphysics in  Paris in the years 1210, 1215, 1231, 
and 1245. Aquinas too, as we have already seen, was an avid student 
o f  A r is to t le , nnd in h is  "Siunraa Theologica" he endeavoured to put down 
the sum o f  a ll  lenown learning, and in th is encyclopaedia o f  mediaeval 
knowledge and b e l ie f  gives an account o f  imagination nnd dreams which is
in keeping with h is  forerunners hut which was to sanction o ccu lt  and 
magical p ractices  which were fa r  removed from Christian devotion .(2 ) 
Like Augustine and Richard, he believes that divine agencies influence 
men through dreams (and imagination) and as a consequence the o f f i c ia l
theologica l l in e  established imagination as the recip ien t o f  God's message.
(1 ) In 1897 Pope Leo XIII d irected  that tho works o f  St.Thomas he the basis 
o f  theology.
(2 ) See C.E.ITonkin. "The Share o f  Thomas Aquinas in The Growth o f  The V/itchcraf 
Delusion", In t r o .,  p . l . Jlopkin holds Aquinas at lea st partly  responsible fo r  
numerous superstitions and horrors,including devil worship, lye.cn th ropy ,be lie f 
in irtcubi and succubi,and a ll  the turgescences o f  demonology and w itchcraft,
as well as sanctioning the establishment o f  the In qu isition . As Iiopkiu says :
A U V/JL C UA KllUV AAIVUUO^ UA A C v i l l j  XJ X  JLU UJL U UA %>* y  (U A U i'U C U  UU U l UApAcUlUC.lU.Il
and support fo r  the w itchcraft delusion in most o f  i t s  important features, 
and that h is theories were extended to give credence to o th e rs ." (O p .c it ., 
p.179. And {"Generally speaking,thirteenth century scholasticism  helped 
preserve the authoritative standing o f ancient demonology nnd wove i t  into the 
ordered system o f  mediaeval pb ilosophy."( o p .c i t . . n .135). Hie pursuit o f  magic 
nnd alchemy continued well in to tho l6th .century aud beyond, to nu extent which 
modem scholarship has only recently  began to rea lise ) Renaissance magicians 
often, c ite  Aquinas as the authority fo r  the v a lid ity  o f  th eir  p ra ctices .
A ccord in g  fcc A quinas, God communicates wi th man through a n ge ls  aad i t
i s  on angel that "enlightens the human in te lle c t  by means o f  phantasms" 
("Summa Theologies", I .  0. (Till. Art. I . ) , and "the imagination which 
serves the in te lle c t  can be changed by an tog e l"  ( l o c . f i t . ) . He finds 
examples in  the B ible o f  the use o f  imagination in dreams as a medium 
between d iv in ity  and humanity ?
"Those tilings which are seen in dream3 are seen by imaginative v is ion .
Bat the angels reveal things in dreams, as appears from Matthew i  20; i i  13, 
,19 in regard to the angel who appeared to Joseph in dreams. Therefore 
an angel con move the imagination. " (1 )  He rea lises  that the angel may 
be good oi* bad ( l .  0. C1CI. Art. I l l )  and also that "imaginative apparitions 
are sometimes caused in  us by the lo ca l movement o f  animal sp ir its  end 
humours" ( l o c . c i t . ) ,  but ho neither attempts to explain the physiology o f 
th is  a ffection  nor doe3 he explain how the individual i s  to discriminate 
between the v is ion s caused by good angels, bad angels, or  good or bad 
d igestion . He is  aware that the recogn ition  o f  imaginations as good or 
bad can poso avkward problems, and that the symbolic mystery o f  some irnuges 
requires explanation :
"An angel causing an imaginative v is ion , sometimes enlightens the in te lle c t  
a t the same time, so that, i t  knows what these images s ign ify ; and then there 
i s  no deception. But sometimes by the angelic operation the sim ilitudes o f  
things only appear* in the imagination; but neither then i s  deception caused 
by the angel, but by the defect in the in te l le c t  o f  him to whom such tilings 
appear. Tims n eith er va* Christ a cause o f deception when He spoke many 
tilings to tiie people in  parables, which lie did not explain them." (hoc, c i t . ) 
Failure adequately to explain images or imaginative v ision  i s  caused not. 
by th eir  having ary inherent malevolence but by defects in  the recip ient o f
(1 ) Anginas, on. c i t . .  I , 0, CXT Art. I I I .  ITe also days, c it in g  Augustine 
and A ris to tle , that through imagination a imovledge o f  the future may be 
revealed : " . .th e  in fluence o f  the heavenly bodies caur.es the imagination 
to bn a ffected , and so , as the heavenly bodies cause many future events, 
the imagination receives certain images o f some such events. These images . 
are i>erceived more at night arid while we sleep then in the daytime and while 
w  are awake«" (o n . c i t . . I . i ; . IXiNVI. Art h ) .
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tho images; the fau lt is  presumably in interpretation  or actual response, 
fo r  in the absence o f  in te llectu a l enlightenment the imaginative v is io n  
may be taken as angelic or devilish  :
" . .th e  operation o f  the devil seems to be confined to the imagination 
and sensitive appetite, by moving either o f  ■which he can induce man to  sin.
Por h is  operation may resu lt in presenting certain forms to the im ag in ation ..." 
( 0t>. c i t . ,  I I .  0. IJCCX, I I ) . He also adds that imagination may be swayed
by passion ( l l .  0. LXXVTI. 2 ). and may also adversely influence the judgment 
o f  a man who is  out o f  the habit o f  using h is  in te lle c t ,  ( i l .  0. L I I I .  5 ) . 
Although he has obviously learned from h is reading o f  A ris to tle , ( l )  Aquinn3 
reiterates the now orthodox Christian view, found in Augustine and Richard, 
that the "imaginative v is ion " is  not simply a re la tiv e ly  low -level cogn itive 
event but may also be sp iritual in  i t s  import; I  regard th is  as a variation  
on the P latonic (d ia le c t ic  and manic) routes to  the eidos. but th is  oidos has 
become something divine in  tire Christian sense. There can be no doubt that 
for Aquinas the cognitive function o f  imagination i s  the central one (2 ) -  
imagination fo r  him, as fo r  the S to ics , must be subservient to reason -  but 
i t s  possib le  sp iritual function, as in parables, also suggests fo r  ns a 
potential aesthetic use o f  imagination.
(1 ) See op. c i t . .  2a 2ae. 180. 5 ..  : "In the present l i f e  human contemplation 
i s  impossible without phantasms, because i t  i s  connatural to man to  see the 
in te l l ig ib le  species in phantasms, as A risto tle  says, nowever in te lle ctu a l 
knowledge does not stop at the phantasms themselves, but in them i t  
contemplates the purity o f  in te ll ig ib le  truth, and th is holds not on ly  fo r  
natural knowledge but also fo r  the truths known through rev e la tion ."
(2 ) See Dundy, op, c i t . . p .225: also "Surama Theologica", I .  a. 57. 4 . :
"What i s  present in our understanding is  more l ik e  an angel than are the 
images in our imagination; the former being actually  understood, w hile the 
la tte r  are only so p oten tia lly . But an angel can know what is  in on e 's  
imagination in so far ns he can know bodies, since imagination is  a bodily  
fa cu lty ."
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C h apter 3 : Tire AIlAB PSYCililLOGTSTS
Although A r is to t le 's  Pe Anima vaa not amongst the works vhioh Boethius 
translated, the A ristotelian  tra d ition  o f  psychological theory passes from 
Neoplatonism into Christian theology hut in a somewhat d istorted , S toic form.
As I have already noted in mentioning Aquinas' commentary on the De Anina.
(Part I . Ch, g ) . h is interpretations o f  A r is to t le 's  philosophy o f mind are 
coloured by h is acceptance o f  C hristian ity  and h is wish to accommodate 
A ristotle  to that fa ith . The th ird  and the most fa ith fu l source o f  A r io to te l- 
ianism, known also to Albertus and Aquinas, was the Arab "facu lty  psycholog ists" 
and in th is chapter I shall give a descrip tive analysis o f  the theories o f  
Avicenna and Avenues' in terpretation  o f  Al-Ghazali. What we are concerned 
with here i s  a synthesis o f  A r is to t le 's  descriptive psychology and Galen's 
theories o f  the brain, y ield ing a psychological theory which a llo tted  mental 
a b il it ie s  to  sp e c ific  location s or chambers in the brain . To have chosen 
the brain is  i t s e l f  something o f  an advance, fo r  in the case o f  imagination, 
fo r  example, various bodily lo ca tion s  had been suggested, including the 
heart, and in Timaeus ( sec. 71) both imagination and the capacity fo r  
inspired prophecy had been placed in  the l i v e r . ( l ) .
The trad ition  o f  describing "a ll  mental functions under the assumptions 
o f  the re a lity  o f  matter" is  considered by Bandy to be at the fo re fron t o f  
popular b e l ie f  in the Middle Ages t ’
"This tra d ition , which fo r  want o f  b etter  term, we may co ll  em pirical, i s  
interested in the orderly  process o f  knowledge from percept to concept, and 
i t  i s  e lse  interested in the psychological conditions underlying thought.
I t  is  th is  view, rather than that o f  the mystics, which was to become tho 
popul'.r mediaeval trad ition , presumably because o f  i t s  appeal to the love 
o f  system, o f  careful analysis, o f  subtle d istin ction s , and precise sub­
ordination. I ts  persistence is  another indication  o f  the popular preference 
o f  A risto tlo  to P lato, with tho resu lting  fa ilu re  to appreciate the subtle 
Platonic theory o f  imagination." Q-?.V. Bandy. op, c i t . .  n .176).
( l )  I have already observed a mythical connection between the element o f  .fire 
and imagination; th-^re is  a further connection hero wi th the nyxh o f  Fromethona, 
who sto le  f ir e  i'rora the gods und whose reward o f eternal torment was to have 
h is ever-regenerative l iv e r  torn out.
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The influence o f  A r is to t le 's  De Animn on Avicenna is  almost to ta l, 
though, as Bundy seems not to have seen, Avicenna's psychology takes 
almost no account o f  the attempt o f  A risto tle  to give an ex isten tia l 
descrip tion  o f  mental l i f e .  Avicenna id e n tifie d  fiv e  main mental a b il it ie s  
which he located in three v en tr ic les  o f  the brain s the fron t, the middle, 
and the rear; these fiv e  a b i l it ie s  are the internal fa cu lt ie s , whilst the 
the senses are the fiv e  external fa cu lt ie s . He c a lls  the f i r s t  o f the 
internal fa cu lties  the senous conaiunis, the "facu lty  o f  phantasy", which 
is " lo ca te d  in the forepart o f  the front v en tric le  o f  the brain. I t  receives 
a ll  the forms which are imprinted on the fiv e  senses." (Avicenna, "Psychology", 
C h .III. p .T l ) . The second fa cu lty , "representation", i s  in the rear o f  the 
fron t ven tr ic le , and as the sensus communis, lik e  the image-taking facu lty  
o f  P lotinus, simply rece ives, so the representative faculty  retains, i . e .  
"preserves what the sensus communis has received from the individual, fiv e  senses 
even in  the absence o f  the sensed o b je c t s ."  (L o c .c i t . ) .  In the middle ven tricle  
o f  the brain Avicenna places imagination, which "in  relation  to the animal 
sou l" is  ca lled  "rational imagination", (L o c . c i t . ) . These correspond to 
A r is t o t le 's  "sen sitive" and "deliberative" imagination. For Avicenna the 
function  o f  th is  fa cu lty  i s  to "combine certain  things with others in the 
fa cu lty  o f  representation, and to separate some things from oth ers ."  (L o c .c i t ) . 
So fo r  him imagination both synthesises and discrim inates, though the la t te r  , 
a b i l i t y  is  generally regarded as a function o f  judgment; but Avicenna's 
"estim ative fa cu lty " i s  loca ted  at the fa r  end o f  th is  middle ventricle  and 
"perceives the non-sensible intentions that ex is t in the individual sensible 
o b je c ts , lik e  the fa cu lty  which judges that the w olf i s  to be avoided and 
the ch ild  is  to be lo v e d ."  (L o c . c i t . ) . Before saying something ebout th is 
idea  o f  "non-sensible in tentions" we should make quite clear what Avicenna 
i s  saying about the various aspects o i imagination. The account looks to 
be both developmental and on to log ica l, so the f i r s t  internal facu lty , image- 
taking, where (we might say) 'im pressions' are registered, i s  the lowest 
stage; th is is  phantasy aid sensus communis. The contents o f  phantasy are
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retained in the fa cu lty  o f  "representation" to be used by imagination for  
combining or distinguishing, there being l i t t l e  doubt that th is  la tte r  
a c t iv ity  is  cog n itiv e ly  superior to the formers the anim al/sensitive 
imagination invokes an in stin ctive  intention , the human/rational imagination 
an intention which i s  re fle ct iv e  and may be learned. The intention is  
defined by Avicenna as :
" . . a  thing which the soul perceives from the sensed ob ject without i t s  
previously having been perceived by i t s  external sense; but the external 
sense perceives i t  f i r s t  and then transmits i t  to the sou l, as, fo r  example, 
when the sheep perceives the form o f  the w olf, i . e .  i t s  shape, form, and 
co lou r ."  (Op. c i t . .  Ch. I l l ,  p. 50 ) .
So, as our tran sla tor, F. Rahman, says :
" ..a n  image qua image is  neither painful nor pleasant and therefore the 
discernment o f  pleasure, or pain, or harm, e t c . ,  on which pursuit or 
avoidance o f  the o b je c t  depends, is  an operation d is t in ct  from the perception 
o f  the image i t s e l f .
Where th is  sense o f  pleasure or pain, o f  good or ev il with reference 
to  an image depends on previous experience, i t  involves memory end association . 
But where there i s  no past experience, as in the case o f  the sheep which, fojr 
the f i r s t  time, encounters a w olf and perceiving danger in i t  f le e s  away, the 
discernment o f  danger on the part o f  the sheep i s  explained by Avicenna as an 
in stin ctiv e  in terpretation  o f  the image by the sou l, although in th is  case also 
the presence o f  the image is  necessary. For A ristotle  such an explanation 
was not necessary, since according to  him the perception o f  the image and 
that o f  harm and good is  one and the some operation, but i t  i s  necessary fo r  
Avicenna since he distinguishes between the two operations." (Avicenna's 
"Psychology", pp. 8 2 -5 ). The intention  seems to be that part o f  the ob ject 
which is  able to  become thought and therefore that, which is  common to both 
image and concept. Brentano was to ca ll in ten tion a lity  "reference to 
something as o b je c t " ,  emphasising what he ca lled  the mental "inexiotcnce" 
o f  the ob ject ; whereas he makes an epistem ological point about the unity o f
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mental and physical phenomena, Avicenna seems more concerned with conduct 
lr.it not en tire ly  so : "Now what i s  f i r s t  perceived by the sense and then 
by the internal fa cu lties  i s  the form, while what only the internal 
fa cu ltie s  perceive without the sense i s  the in ten tion ."  tOo. c i t . .  C b .III, 
p . *50). Avicenna's "intentions" a lso form the basis o f  memory, "the 
retentive or re co lle c t iv e  fa cu lty " which thus stores what in A risto tle  we 
ca lled  "related  images"; so in Avicenna's example, a lso  used by Leibniz in 
"Monadology", the dog w ill always associate being beaten with the stick  
with which i t  i s  beaten. Whether the intentions be conceptual-, moral, or 
emotive, A risto tle , Avicenna and Brentano are a ll agreed that the mind is  
dependent upon the d eriv itiv es  o f  sense fo r  i t s  content.
The authority o f  Avicenna's A ristote lian  psychology was strong and 
persisten t in the Arab world, and i s  c lea rly  seen in the writings o f  A l- 
GhazalT, to judge from Averroes' lengthy comments and q u o ta tio n s .(l) A l- 
Ghazali, describes three internal fa cu lt ie s  which he lo ca tes  in the three 
ven tric les  o f  the brain. In the foremost part o f  the brain he has the 
"common sense" which retains the images o f  things seen and combines them 
to form perceptions, and in  the p oster io r  ven tricle  he puts the estimative 
fa cu lty (2 ) which is  "that which apprehends the intentions*’^ )  and. which 
d if fe r s  from the common sense, the "representative fa cu lty " , which "apprehends 
tho forms" : *
"..an d  the meaning o f  'form s' i s  'th a t which cannot he without matter, i . e .  
body', whereas the meaning o f 'in te n tio n s ' is  'th at which does not require 
a body fo r  i t s  existence, although i t  can happen that i t  occurs in a body' — 
lik e  eranity and concord." (Averroes, op, c i t . .  V oi. I .  s e c .W t ) .
(l ) In Avorroes. 'Tahafut Al-Tahafut", Voi, I , "About The Natural Sciences", 
secs . I ’t'P-b.
( 2) Of "estimative f acuìtv " . Van Ber Borah savs (Averroes. o p .c i t . . Voi. I I .  
p . 188). " . .th e  term is  one o f  the d iffe ren t translations o f the terra 
phontasia, bat has acquired n specia l sense -  in-the Latin translations
i t  is  ca lled  v i8 eastimativa. "
(3) O p .c it ..  sec. ’iVi . Von iter Bergh, (Voi  .IT , p . I88) says o f  the Arabic :
" . .  instead o f  'in ten tion s ' 1 might have translated i t  'meanings' or
' s ig n if ic a t io n s '. "  The Latin i s  intontionen -  " ..a n  intention i s  what subsists 
in conformity with rational presentation . "
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In the middle ventricle  Al—GhazaLx s ite s  the two imaginations o f  A risto tle  
und Avicenna, the animal (sen s itiv e ) and the human (d e lib era tiv e ), ca llin g  
th is  la t te r  the "cognitive fa cu lty " . I t  i s  the function o f  th is  fa c ility  to 
"combine the sensible forms and to compose the intentions with the forms", 
and as i t  i s  between the other two ven tric les  or fa cu lt ie s  man "can imagine 
a horse that f l i e s  and a being with a head o f  a man and the body o f  a horse, 
and other combinations, although he has never seen such th in gs ." (L o c . c i t . ) .
So these acts o f  combining and composing, performed by a creative imagination, 
are ingeniously explained by Al-Ghazoll as a b i l it ie s  o f  a facu lty  which 
receives both form and in tention  o f  an ob je ct . Receiving the form or  image 
o f  a ll  ob je cts , and th e ir  intentions or meanings, i t  i s  able to separate 
these and to rea llocate them, giving new meanings to the forms (or images) 
o f  o b je c ts . To complete h is  internal fa cu lt ie s , and to bring th eir  to ta l 
up to  the give o f  Avicenna, Al-Ghazali adds two kinds o f  retention; one is  
"o f forms o f  sensible th ings" which occurs "as wax retains im pressions", 
and th is  belongs to the representative fa cu lty . The other, based on a 
sim ilar model to the f i r s t ,  i s  o f  intentions which "are impressed" on the 
estimative facu lty  and retained in the memorative fa cu lty . (O p .c it . , s e c .54^).
In a l l  o f  the foregoing account, A l-G hazali's views are very c lo s e ly  
modelled on those found in  the Psychology o f  Avicenna. Augustine's 
b e l ie f  in  the e ffe c ts  on our bodies o f  s p ir it s , which he likens to the 
e ffe c ts  o f  b i le , is  also expressed by Al-Ghazali. When the soul imagines 
something, he says, "the limbs and the potencies in  these limbs" move 
according to theso images :
" . .s o  that when a man imagines something sweet o f  taste the corners o f  
h is  mouth begin to water, and the potency which brings forth  the sa liva  
from the places where i t  i s  springs into action , and when coitus is  
imagined the copulative potency springs into action , and the penis extends; 
indeed, when a man walks on a plonk between two walls over an empty space, 
h is imagination i3 s t ir re d  by the p o s s ib il ity  o f  fa llin g  and h is body is  
impressed by th is imagination and in  fo c t  he fa l l s ,  but when th is  plcuk
lo  on the earth, he walks over i t  without lo l l in g .  Thiu haúpeno because
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the body and the bod ily  fa cu ities  are created to be subservient end sub­
ordinate to  the soul, and there is  a d ifferen ce  here according to the 
purity and the power c f  the soul s . " ( ] ) .
I f  the soul can move the body in th is  way, says Al-Ghazali, then s " . . i t  i s  
not impossible that other things outside h is  body should obey him and 
that h is  soul should control the b lasts  o f  the wind or the downpour o f 
rain, or the striking o f  a thunderbolt or  the trembling c f  the earth, 
which causes a la id  to  be swallowed up by i t s  in h abiten ts.. . " e t c . ,  (L o c .c i t . ) . 
These examples are c ite d  end .ju s tified  by Al-Ghazali in order to  show how 
miracles and other a cts  by prophets ore p oss ib le , but we do n ot have to 
look too deeply to sec how th is , and Augustine's sim ilar b e l ie fs , could 
lend considerable support to magical and alchemical p ractices which sought 
to influence things and events with sp e lls  and experiments whose rationale 
was based on the o ld  elemental science : i f  l ik e  knows l ik e , then tho 
production o f  aerial o r  etherial essences alchiaai c o lly  i s  the lo g ica l way 
o f  in fluencing lik e  enséneos which theologica l authority says ex is ts  unseen 
about us. And i f  i t  i s  imagination by which the soul moves the body, then 
experiments aimed at a ffe ctin g  the imagination w ill give the experimenter 
a deal o f  influence over the imaginations, as well as him self receiving 
the cred it o f  having a powerful imagination. In th is vay does imagination 
acquire i t s  associations with magic, alchemy, and mediaeval medical science.
»
And although these o c cu lt  p ractices have to  a large extent been disabused, 
by modem empirical scien ce , o f  any working c r e d ib ility , 'im agination' has 
not yet relinquished i t s  association  with them.
( l )  Averroea. ou .c iv . . Sixteenth Discussion, s e cs .51 ' i - h .  I t  would be an in te r ­
esting and informative exercise fo r  someone to write a natural h istory  o f  
sim iles and metaphors in  philosophy and psychology; A l-G hazali'e  'plonk* example 
i s  a case in  point, since i t  gives a l iv e ly  indication  o f  what otner men rcud, 
and what o f  th e ir  reading they found p a rticu la r ly  in terestin g . This example is  
borrowed from the "Theorems and N otices" and the "Recovery" o f  Ariccu.ua. I t  io
al w-  t>„ , tí Cr. ( CC ** a*}* ««V y t,
Montaigne ("E eeais", i i ,  1 2 ) . I t  i s  also to  be found in bu r t o n "Anatomy o f 
>ieltaacholyll(pnrt I , s e c t . 2. ar.ab.3. subs.2 . ) who cecriboo i t  to ’ Peter 'iycruus*. 
As Van her Bergli comments, (Averrc o » . ' o p . c i t . .  Vol I I , r . 17---) : "He a ct-n o  
evidently Petrus Bern’ s ' S’ie tro  Boiro) a famous Genoese x’hysicinn and on older 
contemporary o f  Montaigne, who in h is  book Re Poatil>eitia ( chnutcr ih-? ciba et 
pottt) bad a long quotation from Avicenna's Psychology without example, Doubtless 
Montaigne with his great in terest fo r  medicine found i t  th ere ."
i
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I t  in not d i f f i c u l t  to see the parallel between the attempt at a 
s c ie n t if ic  c la ss ifica t io n  o f  mental powers and th e ir  loca tion  in the 
brain described by the Arabs, and the mystical ascent, in both it s  
d ia lecta l and manic phases, described by Richard o f  St. V ictor . This 
ascent or sp ir itu a l journey is  embarked upon Ijy Dante in the "Divine Comedy" 
where, consisten tly  with the mainstream o f mediaeval b e l ie f ,  reason ( V irgil) 
i s  the guide. According to Avicenna, there is  always a part o f  the 
sensible, physical experience which is  retained by 'the mind; we should 
note here the d istin ction  lietween the image and the intention end their 
place on what i s  an ontological scale o f  mental a b i l i t ie s .  Whereas the 
image i s  always physical in i t s  orig in s and associations, the intention 
is  always that part o f the physical and imaged which is  inherently rational 
(and, possib ly , e th ica l) . The intention is  always present; at the animal 
level i t  i s  only in stin ctiv e ly  responded to but at the human leve l there 
is  scope fo r  re fle ct ion  before action-. The image is  the form o f the 
ob ject and fo r  Avicenna as fo r  A ristotle  and the la te r  Brentano i t  has no 
necessary pain/pieasure connections, hut the intention does seem to have 
these and rational connections, entailing a paradox between th is connection 
and the (r e f le c t iv e )  separability . Fundamentally then the image remains 
physical (outer) and the intention mental, (in n er).
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Chapter h : DANTE
Dante is  a s ig n ifica n t and appropriate culmination fo r  the theory o f  
imagination we have so far encountered ; s ig n ifica n t because in h is  works, 
above a ll the "D ivire Comedy", are to be found a ll the major components o f  
the theory o f  imagination, and appropriate because o f  h is stature as a 
creative a r t is t . The "Divine Comedy" i s ,  as I have already said, a 
record o f  a sp iritu a l ascent to heaven and as such i t  owes much to proceeding 
accounts o f  such an ascent, P latonic, N eoplatonic, A ristote lian , mystical and 
th eo log ica l, including within i t s  terms o f  reference the whole o f  mediaeval 
learning, mythology, and elemental science. Although, as we have found, 
imagination has i t s  associations with the element o f  f i r e  and with the 
manic, mystic v is ion , th is  Unpyrean imagination does not yet, even in Dante , 
have quite the exalted power o f  reason. A3 with the S to ics , imagination 
must remain subservient, the handmaiden to reason, and not before the 
sovereignty o f  reason i s  questioned con imagination become the "queen o f  the 
fa cu lt ie s "  as Baudelaire ca lled  i t .  But imagination is  s t i l l  accorded 
th is  visionary power in  dreams by writers such e3 Augustine, Synesius,
Bichard o f  St. V ictor  and Aquinas, and th is  power o f  imagination has a 
prominent place in  Dante's works. In particu lar I re fe r  to the "Vita 
Nuova" and the three great dreams which Dante has daring the three nights 
spent in purgatory -  even the number three i s  s ig n ifica n t, as are the 
numbers o f  the cantos in which they occur. ( Soo appendix B ). The content 
o f  these dreams i s  designed to meot the requirements o f  the progressive 
ascendcnce o f  'the sou l, and th e ir  imagery i s  both symbolic and d idactic , 
so that though the narrative i s  maintained the dreams need in terpretation , 
th e ir  content indicates th e ir  sp iritual qu a lity .
This notion o f  sp iritu a l progression i s  almost absent from the "Vita 
Nuova", fo r  a fter  the in it ia l  v is ion  is  provoked by hia f i r s t  meeting with 
Beatrice there i s  l i t t l e  qualitative change in  the content o f  the ensuing 
v is ion s . As a trea tise  on i>oetry, the "V ita Nuova" unquestioningly assumes 
that imaginative v is ion , esp ecia lly  in dreams, is  the means o f  a r t is t ic
l i t
in sp iration : Dante has dreams whose content and import bocome the matter 
fo r  b is  poetica l works, and.though he has rainima}. contact with Beatrice 
h erse lf, she i s  in e f fe c t  h is Muse, reformulating a r.iytli which was to 
p ers is t fo r  centuries. A fter h is  f i r s t  sight o f  Beatrice, Dante says 
that "..hove ruled over my s o u l . ."  and that he began to acquire 3uch 
assurance and mastery over me, owing to the power which my imagination 
gave him, that I  was obliged to f u l f i l  a ll h is  washes p e r fe c t ly ."  ("V ita  
Nuova", I I . 2 7 f f ) .  Henceforth, says Dante, B eatrice 's  "image" is  "always 
present to my mind". (O p .c it . , I I .  3 8 ). On seeing her a second time, he 
re tire s  to hi3 room :
"As I thought o f  her I f e l l  asleep and a marvellous v is ion  appeared to me.
In my room I  seemed to see a cloud the colour o f  f i r e ,  and in  the cloud 
a lo rd ly  figu re , frightening to behold, yet in  him self, i t  seemed to me., 
he was f i l l e d  with a marvellous jo y . He said many things, o f  which I 
understood only a few; among them were the words : hfro dorainus tuns. In 
h is  arms I  seem to  see a naked figu re , sleeping, wrapped l ig h t ly  in a crimson 
c lo th . Gazing in ten tly  I caw i t  was she who had bestowed her greeting on 
me ea rlie r  that day. In one hand the standing figure held a fie ry  ob ject , 
and he seemed to  say, Vide cor tutun . .  " ( i l l .  l 6 f f ) .  He t e l l s  us that 
th is  "lord ly  fig u re " appears "in  my imagination" ( IX, 1 2 ). w hilst he i s  on 
a journey away from h is  native c i t y  and la te r , during a bout o f  i l ln e s s , 
he bas v iv id  dreams in which the death o f  Beatrice is  fo re to ld . A r is to t le 's  
sceptica l remarks against the alleged prophetic power o f  dreams are ignored, 
forgotten , or unknown, and the f ie r y , e ro tic  v is ion , bearing the heart o f 
the poet, appears in h is  imagination and i s  described out o f  i t .  I t  is  
imagination also which gives to lov e , represented by the lo rd ly  figure , 
th is  mostery over Dante which was to inspire the quest which furnishes 
the narrative o f  the "Divine <k>mody", and so i t  i s  to imagination that
the incidence o f  th is work o f  art i s  oved,
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The three dreams o f  Cantos LX, XIX. and XXVII o f the "Purgatorio" 
have several features in common as well os s ig n ifican t d ifferen ces . All 
are liypnogogic, heralding a new dawn, and they a ll allow o f  a s t r ic t ly  
psychological interpretation  as well as having great symbolic, rather 
than merely decorative, importance. So, as he says in Canto IX. these 
dreams occur "at the hour near morning . . . .  when our mind . . .  i s  in i t s  
v is ion s almost prophetic". here, as in "Vita Naova", Dante constantly 
speaks o f  what "seems" and "appears", but the sign ifican ce  o f  these 
appearances is  very great; as he remarks in  the "Convito", "..w e have a 
continual experience o f  our immortality in  the divinations o f  dreams; 
which could not he, i f  in us there were no immortal p a r t . . . 1 1 (Bk. I I ,
Ch, IX, 5 . ) . In the f i r s t  dream, an e a g le (l)  "with feathers o f  gold" 
and "te r r ib le  as ligh tn in g" catches him up lik e  the mythical Ganymede,
"as fa r  as the f i r e " ,  i , c . to the sphere o f  flame which the Pythagoreans 
believed surrounded the world: " . . .  there i t  seemed that i t  and I burned 
together, and the imagined f ir e  so scorched that perforce my sleep was 
broken." ( Canto IX. I I .  5 1 f f ) . Wien he wakes V irg il t e l l s  him that he 
was v is ite d  by St. Lucy who came to help him on M s heavenward journey, 
adding " . .  and I  in her steps" -  when fa ith  leads, reason must fo llow .
So the events o f  the dream are given an 'actual* explanation as well as 
having in  themselves the symbols o f  Dante's progress; the eagle may be 
inythically interpreted as the messenger from Zeus or Jove who, infatuated 
by the beauty o f  the youth Ganymede, bears him o f f  to Olympus. The 
v isionary  imagery o f  f i r e  and love is  l ik e  that o f  the "Vita Nuova".
I t  i s  Easter Sunday morning, and Dante has reached the gate o f  purgatory.
(1) M  .Savors. ("The Divine Comedy", Vol 2 ) . sees the eagle as a symbol 
also o f  the true empire. "The Home where Christ ¡Tinsel -f i s  n Tinmen"
("Paradiso", XXXII. 102). She odds (p .1~8) : "To th is  true Bnpire . . .  the 
souls o f  mon are brought by the purgatorial path,’ which i s  the fu l f i l l in g  
o f  J u s t ice ."
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In h is  second dream Dante sec-o u deformed, ugly old  woman who, on a 
closer and longer inspection , comes to appear attractive — beautifu l even -  
o f  face and v o ice . She says she i s  Siren who had turned Ulysses from h i3 
way, but V irg il , reason, breaks her fascination  and reveals to  Dante her 
true ugliness again; i t  mast be noted, however, that V ir g i l 's  attention 
to what i s  happening i s  only awakened by a mysterious 'lady* — reason 
sometimes has need o f  the prompting o f  in tu it ion , ( l ) .  D.L. Sayers 
id e n tifie s  the o ld  woman with L i l i th  (2 ) ,  though her ca llin g  h erse lf 
'S iren ' in v ites  another in terpretation  o f  th is  dream, fo r  the Sirens were 
the daughters o f  Earth,( 3 ) and imagination i s  i t s e l f  te rre s tia l in origin 
according both to trad ition  end to Catholic b e l ie f .  On the one hand 
the dreem is  saying that the earthly i s  fou l, and when indulged this 
foulness may come to appear de ligh tfu l; but these delighf.3 are products 
o f  Dante's own se lf-d e lu s ion  : he wishes them upon the foul o ld  crone and 
so succumbs to the pleasures o f  h is  own imagination, loving i t  fo r  i t s  
own suite rather than as a portent o f  d iv in ity . This fa u lt o f  s e l f -  
indulgence, o f  over-elaboration , Dante presumably finds in file f i r s t  
dream, fo r  between the f i r s t  and second dreams he has learned that 
imagination may be servant or master : 123
(1) As l;.Ti. fb-yorr. says, th is  lady cannot be id en tified  with e .g . 
Beatrice or St. Lucy : "She symbolises something immediate, in stin ctiv e , 
and almost automatic : one might c o l l  her an in tu ition , or perhaps the 
re flex  action o f  a virtuous habit, whose instant warning puts the soul 
on the a lert  and x^rompts i t  to think ra tion a lly  about what i t  i s  doing."
(¿IL'-Pli*» P • )
(2) L i l i th  was the "fabled f i r s t  w ife o f  Adam", not a real woman but
"a fentasn o f  Adam's d es ires"; (sec D.L.Savers, o n .c i t . .  n .2 20 ). Hie is  
oI go id en tifia b le  v ith  Hecate, mythological queen o f  witches, and noon- 
goddess, (see B.Graves. The Greek Myths, 31.33.7 .35 .1 . ?■- £ 9 .2 ) .
( 3 ) Sec Graves, o p .c i t . . 120. 3. 15k. 3. & 170. 7 ) . The Sirens promised 
Ulysses "foreknowledge o f  a ll future happenings on ecrih ", and are
---------f  —  -  -  -------~-P J> ------------------------------------------------------------------- TO—  i l i .  1 - . . » .  -  *
imagination as S ircn /L ilith /lieca te , the mythological and psychological 
attributes o f  imagination arc reasserted.
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"0 imagination which so steals us at tines from outward things that we 
pay no heed though a thousand trumpets sound about us, who moves thee i f  
the senses o f fe r  nothing ? A lig h t moves thee which takes form in the 
heavens, e ither o f  i t s e l f  or by a w i l l  which d irects  i t  downwards. "  
("Purgatorio", Canto XVII, 13. 13 -1 8 ).
From the mythical format o f  the f i r s t  dream, through the second dream 
which i s  a product o f  a more autonomous imagination, we move to the 
more obviously re lig iou s content o f  the third dream. In the f i r s t  dream 
the images are both opulent and ambivalent needing actual and psychological 
interpretation  in terms o f  St. Lucy 's help in Dante's ascension. In th is  
second dream the subtler imagery needs no textual explanation, fo r  fa ith  
has awakened reason to recognise and to overcome im agination's ambivalence. 
Thus the imagery o f  the third dream i s  purely b ib l ic a l ,  and an assertion 
o f  true fa ith . Dante dreams o f  the two wives o f  Jacob, Leah and Rachel, 
who in :the writings o f  Richard o f  S t . V ictor represent the two aspects, 
the active and the contemplative, o f  the Christian l i f c . ( l ) .  Dante rea lises  
immediately a fter  hi3 second dream th at the "S p ir it"  i s  h is  and man's only 
way to God ( Panto XIX. 11, 01 & 9 2 ). and a fter  the th ird  dream V irg il , 
whose part in the dreams progressively  diminishes, f in a lly  departs : fa ith  
has supplanted reason. The power o f  v ision  im p lic it ly  surpasses that o f  
reason, raid only in the fin a l Canto, when confronted by God does his 
imagination fa i l  and do words become inadequate to describe the v is ion  : 1
(1) See IRQ.Gardner, "Dante And the M ystics", esp. Ch. V. "Dante and the 
V ictorin os", on Dante's knowledge o f  Richard's works. There is  no doubt 
that Dante knew the "Benjamin Minor", o .r .  Ch.XV. vhero "In h is mystical 
interpretation o f  the th irtieth  chapter o f  Genesis, Rachel s ig n ifie s  
Reason, md Bilbah, her handmaid Im agination." (Gardner. p.frO), Gardner 
also quotes Ch.TV o f the "Benjamin Minor" : "Leah is  a ffe ct ion  inflamed by 
divine revelation ; Rachel is  reason illumined by divine revelation ; Leah,
l u i c b b A v u  vv w w v tfX iiii  a  c j u I  I  t u  ¿Xus u v x u  y j !  j u o u A C c ,  l lu v l t e j .  f  X 'eaavxx c a u . t x i t g
i t s e l f  to Die contemplation o f heavenly wisdom." (O p .c it .. p .2 ?0 ).
"Here power fa ile d  the high fantasy; hut now uiy desire and w ill ,  l ik e  a 
wheel that spins with even motion, were revolved by the Love that moves 
the sun and the other s ta r s ."  ("Paradiso", Canto XXXIII« 11, l f r S -^ . f l ) .
I t  i s  the "high fantasy" which alone gets so fa r , in contrast with the 
low (earth ly ) or intermediate fantasy, which, though Dante does not so 
name them, we may associate with the f i r s t  and second dreams and perhaps 
with the c la ss ifica tio n s  o f  the "facu lty" psychology o f  the neo—A ristote lian  
Arabs.
In those great dreams o f  the "Purgatorio" is  found a creative synthesis
o f  more than a thousand years o f  theory o f  imagination. The S to ic  d irectives
o f  Marcus Aurelius to 'erase fancy * and to ' l e t  sovereign reason have the
mastery' so that 'the illim ita b le  tracts o f  e tern ity ' nay bo contemplated,
together with the enormously in flu en tia l t r ia d ic  d iv is ion s o f  F lotinian
mysticism and the Catholic theology which i t  shaped, are written into the
"Divine Comedy" and interlarded with the n eo-A ristote lian  psychology o f
the Arabs and Aquinas, and the profuse and labyrinthine imagery o f  ancient
myths, Pythagoreanism, and number symbolism. In th is  monumental work,
created ostensibly  to the g lory  o f  God but essen tia lly  to i t s  own glory,
imagination stepped out o f  i t s e l f  and made from i t s e l f  something greater
than t?ic sum o f  i t s  parts . Daate understood, as Plato and P lotinus had
before  him, though perhaps even more c lea rly  then they, that success or
fa ilu re  in a rt, philosophy, arid theology are a measure o f  the degree to
which one intimates the uncommunicable. But with a ll  i t s  vast store
o f  natural Imagery end e so ter ic  learning, the "Divine Comedy" i s  fundamentally
intended to he a Christian a llegory , 01 d despite Dante's own lov e  o f  honour
and esteem, a devotional work. Sven during h is own life tim e  ho was regarded
as a theologian and pnnosopher as much as a poet, though i t  must be said
that in  elevating fa ith  above reason and making imagination the human
v eh ic le  fo r  Loth, he is  intimating to b e liev er  and unbeliever that imagination
( l )  J  -cl a ir , ii; a note to th is  passage ("Divine Comedy" V o l. T'f.p.frgS, 
note 1 h) says ; "I'cntasia is  defined iu the Convito ns 'the power by which
the in t e l le c t  represents what i t  s e cs ."
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transcends rational thought i,o avail i t s e l f  o f  a purer plane o f  mental 
l i f e .  Whether th is  plane is  a psychic g i f t  granted 'to the fa ith fu l, 
or  an innate psychical or mental quality  o f  a small /lumber o f  individual s, 
o r  a ¡aythclogienl nonentity, comes to be a problem o f  some moment. 
.Anticipating the demise o f  metaphysics and re lig iou s b e lie f , an 
em pirically based epistemology must contend with, or ignore, th is  problem, 
aware that in  the works o f  P lato, Plotinus, and Dante, is  to be found the 
meat eloquent testimony to the existence o f  "this ‘ higher p lane '} in the 
daemon o f  Socrates, the mystic v ision  o f  Dante,end the 'fo rgetfu ln ess ' 
o f  P lotinus, we have found strik ing s im ila rities  which become iden tified  
with the burgeoning concept o f  imagination. But under the re str ic tiv e  
authority o f  a ronotheintic re lig ion  th is  imagination, now vaunted, now 
damned, certa in  o f  id en tity  i f  not o f  allegiance, was devoured and 
d iscip lin ed  by a voracious god} only with the b r ie f  tolerance o f  a leaky 
theology, in  magic, w itch cra ft, and pagan mythology, did imagination purport 
to serve other masters.
With Dante, as M.W.Bundy says, 'we complete a fu ll  c ir c le  o f  thought", 
(op .e f t . . p .269 ), and may now conclude th is second part with a short 
summary o f  what we have so fa r  found, alweys keeping in mind the 
fundamental contributions o f  Plato end A risto tle , on idiom the theory o f  
imagination, up to and including Panto, i s  based. /from the synthesis 
o f  Platonic metaphysics, with the contrasting "d ia le c t ic "  and "manic" 
routes to the eidon. and the philosophy o f  mind o f  A r is to t le 's  I>c Ar.ima. 
we have pursued a m ulti-faceted  theory o f  imagination which, token in 
i t s  en tirety , i s  not a coherent whole. There i s  an immediate c o n flic t  
between the image viewed as an epistemological n ecessity  but also as
-«1 -•-i -1 eV 4*. 4-V. «. el II
Plato and in  S tcic ian . The eth ical in fe r io r ity  o f  the image also 
co n flic ts  i.-lth the manic notion , la rge ly  ignored by Arfr.iotle, which 
wan reformulated by the early Cirri y Han mystics owing party to 
traditional b e l ie fs  in the prophetic powers o f  dreams but mainly 5»
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b ib lica l  references to divine revelation in dreams. The association  
o f  imagination with mediaeval and Pythagorean science and cosmology, 
linked with t!ie sp ir itu a l and demonic powers o f  th is o n e ir ic  imagination, 
became the basis o f  alchemical and magical notions o f  a ubiquitous 
imagination whose nature was thought to resemble elemental f i r e  and 
aether. But somewhat in  opposition to these occu lt ideas the Arab 
psychologists, working from A ristotelian  texts and a prim itive knowledge 
o f  the brain, constructed a "facu lty  psychology" in which imagination is  
related to sense, given an autonomous function, and re la ted  to  reason.. 
That rational part which persists  in the world o f  sense and imagination 
i s  the in ten tio . a conception which Brentano was la t e r  to rev ive .
F inally , in Dante, we have found what may guardedly he seen as a fore­
runner to the imagination, empyrean in tendency, o f  the Jtomantics; but 
th is  "high fantasy", with i t s  im p lic it  aesthetic power in the creation 
o f  works o f  art, was to  remain unsung for  more than fou r centuries owing 
to the dominance o f  God and reason.
*
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APPENDIX A.
On "Timaeus", see Klibanskv. op. c i t . .  pp. 28-9 j "This dialogue, 
or rather i t s  f i r s t  p a rt, was studied and quoted throughout the Middle 
Ages, and there was hardly a mediaeval lib ra ry  o f any standing which had 
not a copy o f  C halcidius' version and sometimes also a copy o f  the fragment 
translated by Cicero. Although these fa cts  are well known, their 
sign ificance for  the h istory  o f  ideas has perhaps not been s u ffic ie n t ly  
grasped by h istorian s. The "Timaeuanw ith it s  attempted synthesis o f  the 
re lig iou s te leo log ica l ju s t if ic a t io n  o f  the world and the rational exposition 
o f  creation was, throughout the ea r lie r  Middle Ages, the starting point 
and guide fo r  the f i r s t  groping e ffo r ts  towards a s c ie n t i f ic  cosmology." 
and < "But apart from th e ir  value fo r  the development o f  science, the 
Tiraacus and the l ite ra tu re  to which i t  gave r ise  preserved, through the 
centuries in which an attitude o f  contempt towards the v is ib le  world was 
prevalent in the accepted Church doctrine, the memory o f  the H ellenic 
appreciation o f  the rational beauty o f  the universe. I t  was p rec ise ly  
th is  fusion o f  the rational-mathematical, the aesthetic and the re lig iou s  
elements in the contemplation o f  the universe, th is g lo r if ica t io n  o f  the cosmos, 
that appealed to the philosophers o f  the Renaissance and deeply influenced 
th e ir  cosmological ou tlo o k ."  See also "Timaeus", secs. 40 & 42-43.
(Sensation, for example, is  explained as irregular motion caused by 
welding together the soul and the elements o f  the body). Idibanslcy has 
already mentioned the influence o f "Timenus" on Renaissance thought.
In th is  context, i t  i s  worthwhile mentioning the association  o f  each o f  
the four elements with the regular so lid s . (The fa c t  that there {.re fiv e  
regular so lids was to  cause some d i f f ic u lty  to the practition ers o f  number 
symbolism.). The s o l id s , a ll based on the isoseles or scalene triangle, 
correspond to the elements : the cube -  earth, the octahedron -  a ir , the 
icosahedron -  water, the pyramid -  f i r e ,  and the dodecahedron -  the cosmos.
The f i f t h  construction i s  mentioned almost as an afterthought by Timaeua(Soe.5^
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but as the f i f t h  essence ( quinta essentia) i t  is  the very highest, the 
quintessence, though it s  elemental nature is  inevitably unknowable. The 
geometric structure o f  these solids forms the basis for the plane geometry 
upon which many great paintings o f the quattrocento aro realised, though 
the c ir c le  i s  also very important in this respect, for  the sphere is  
associated with the soul (Tim, sec .44) and so the soul is  sited in the 
head, most nearly spherical o f the parts o f the body.
The linking o f f ir e  with vision has enormous mystical importance; 
there ia  a further link, however, o f  equally great importance for the 
present work, between these and imagination. So far, this mystical triad 
has been found to be im plicit in A risto tle 's  elemental science and partly 
in Plotinus, but only through an understanding o f the B ib lica l, Pythagorean, 
and mystical ingredients which combine and complement each other in this 
triad can the concept o f imagination, even in i t s  modem usage, be fu lly  
elucidated. As already intimated in the manic route to the Platonic eidos, 
and in passages o f the "Ehneads" o f Plotinus, the ecstasy o f the mystic 
vision  comes, as we shall see, to be the apogee o f imagination; hut, ineffable 
and inarticulable, the v is ion 's  aptest metaphor is  lig h t . Thus, from Book VI 
o f  "Bepublic" where the sun symbolises the Good, through the entire b istory  
o f  mysticism, the brightest things have been used to symbolise the v ision , 
and hence the importance o f the sun, moon, and f ir e  for  the mystic and the 
shaman. Perhaps the most moving is  Pascal's account o f h is vision : "From
about h a lf past ten in the evening until half past midnight.
Fire
'God o f  Abraham, God o f  Isaac, God o f  Jacob,' not o f  philosophers and 
scholars. Certainty, certainty, heartfelt, joy , peace." e t c . .  The 
Christians o f  the Middle Ages would not have fa iled  to see the significance 
o f ( e .g . )  God's appearing to Moses as fir e , and o f the paralate's coming,
«I rcauMwuii, aa iougues vil lire.
Thus f ir e ,  the fin est o f the Pythagorean elements and the vehicle o f  
d ivin ity  in both the old  and new testaments, becomes an obvious symbol fo r  
Pascal's v ision . But the modem notion o f the symbol hardly does ju stice
to the unity o f identification  which the four elements indicate, for as 
knowledge is  o f like by lik e , so fire  (fo r  Moses as for  Pascal), the sun, 
the One (fo r  Plotinus and for  numerologists), are not simply "seen as"
God, but are God, in a unity o f states o f being.
t f f f l f f lm ia
Numbers have a great symbolic significance for Dante, as for  many 
o f his contemporaries, ond so any numbers occurring in his works, as well 
as the very numbering o f Cantos e t c . ,  have a wealth o f importance which his 
contemporary readers would have understood but which is  lo s t  to the modem 
reader. V.F. Hopper's "Medieaval Number Symbolism" is  an absorbing account 
o f this lo s t  language o f number, and he t e l ls  o f  the "..s tr ik in g  unanimity 
o f a ll ages and climates in regard to the meanings o f a certain few number 
symbols." And, "An examination o f  these ea rliest number symbols indicates 
that numbers orig ina lly  carried concrete associations, as a result o f man's 
early in ab ility  to comprehend abstraction." (o p .c i t . .  n .3) In pp.4-8 o f  
this work Hopper recounts the significance o f  the number 3 and it s  multiples, 
which are particularly relevant to our present study o f Dante's conception 
o f imagination. So : "The idea o f  3 as implying the superlative, or the 
a ll ,  was never lo s t . I t  appears in such common phrases as ter fe lix  and 
trismegistus. in the use o f the trident and tr ip le  thunderbolt as symbols 
o f greatness and power, in the Egyptian hieroglyphs where a single bar 
marking the picture o f an object indicates but 1, a double bar 2, but 3 
lines indicate 3 or an indefin ite number o f  ob jects . As Aristotle put 
i t ,  'Of two things, or men, we say 'both ' but not 'a l l ' .  Three is  the 
f i r s t  number to which the term 'a l l '  has been appropriated'." ( o p .c i t . . pp.*t-5: 
the A ristotle quotation is  from De Caelo. I . i . ) In th is way, " . . .  the a l l -
embracing 3 became the most universal number o f  de ity ." (o p .c it . .  p .3) The 
occurrence o f groupings o f 3 is  common in fo lk lore , as Hopper says, where 
one finds, c .g . ,  3 wishes, 3 applies, 3 su itors; 'everything happens in
threes' as is  sometimes said. Dante's passing o f 3 days and nights in
I
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Purgatoi r is  therefore not to be token l i t e r a lly  : i t  means he spent a 
very long time. That he has 3 dreams moons they are divinely significant, 
a fact which is  underlined by the numbers o f  the Cantos o f "Purgatorio", wherein 
the dreams occur. As thrice three, nine i s  also a most important number, 
and in part XXIX o f  the "Vita Nuova" Dante explains it s  meaning : "..thinking 
more deeply and guided by in fa llib le  truth, 1 say that eke herself was this 
number nine; I mean this as an analogy, as 1 w ill explain. The number three 
is  the root o f nine, because, independent o f  any other number, multiplied 
by i t s e l f  alone, i t  makes n in e ... therefore i f  three is  the sole factor o f 
nine, and the sole factor o f miracles is  three, that is ,  Father, Son and 
Holy Ghost, who are three and once, then th is  lady was accompanied by the 
number nine, that i s ,  a miracle, o f which tha root, that is ,  o f the miracle, 
is  nothing other than the miraculous Trinity i t s e l f . " Thus, as Hopper 
says : "With the adoption o f 10 as a complete cycle, the number 9 comes into 
prominence as 'almost complete*• Troy was besieged for  9 years and fe l l  
on the tenth. Odysseus wandered 9 years and arrived home on the tenth.
The 9-10 relationsh ip  is  very common in the " I lia d "  and the "Odyssey", 
which both indicate a mush ea r lie r  stage o f  number symbolism than the 
most ancient o f  Babylonian ta b le ts ."  ( o p . c i t . ,  p .1 0 ).
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Intro¿action .
In th is  third part I  shall consider the theory o f  imagination o f  
magical and alchemical p ractition ers during the Renaissance and post— 
Renaissance period. Particular reference w ill be made to the Hermetic 
texts, M arsilio F icino, Giordano Bruno, Paracelsus, and Jakob Boehme, 
finding in the la t t e r ’ s obscure mystical w ritings a culmination, in 
la rge ly  alchemical language, o f  the magical and quasi—s c ie n t i f ic  b e lie fs  
o f  h is  forerunners brought to the service a visionary mysticism which is  
reminiscent o f  Richard o f  St. V ictor . Before Pletho brought the ancient 
Greek, Neoplatonic, and Gnostic texts to I ta ly , magic was frowned upon by 
the establishment though not actually  banned, but the Renaissance saw an 
upsurge o f  in terest in  o ccu lt practices? as P.A.Yatos says o f  the magician: 
"Respectable people might sometimes employ him surrepticiouoly  and he ’./as 
much feared. But he was certa in ly  not p u b lic ly  admired as a re lig iou s 
philosopher. Renaissance magic, which was a reformed and learned magic, and 
always disclaimed any connection with the o ld  ignorant, and e v il ,  or black 
magic, was a fter  an adjunct o f  an esteemed Renaissance philosopher. This 
new status o f  magic was undoubtedly mainly due to  that great flo od  o f  
lite ra tu re  which came in  from Byzantium, so much o f  which deted from those 
early centuries a fter  Christ in  which the reigning philosophies were tinged 
with occultism . The learned and assiduous reader o f  such authors as 
Iambiichus, Porphyry, or even o f  P lotinus, could no longer regard magic 
as the trade o f  ignorant and in fe r io r  persons." ("Giordano Bruno and The 
Hermetic Tradition", no. 17-18).
Prominent and very in flu en tia l in  the r ise  on Renaissance magic were a 
group o f  Gnostic tex ts , translated in to Latin by M arsilio F icino, known 
as tiie “corpus Jierme^ica** ¿ue uuuiojrtuixp o s  uic»e vrurjus vfuu iv ru u & jj  
attributed to Hermes Trismegistus, an alleged contemporary o f  Moses, who 
was id en tified  v ith  the Egyptian p r ie s t  'Thoth; Hermes Trisnegistas, as 
Yates points out, was probably the most important single figure in the 
Renaissance revival o f  magic (O p .c it .,  p .1 8 ).
In conmon with the Greeks, the Renaissance humanists b e lie v e d  in the
value o f  things ancient : the older a p iece o f  work, the greater
the lik e lih ood  o f  i t s  authenticity , since i t  was nearer the or ig in  o f  a ll things
and therefore nearer the 'Maker'. I t  was believed on very good authority,
(that o f  Augustine and Lactantius, see Yates, on. c i t . . pp. 6 & 67). that 
the works o f  Hermes Trismegistus were o lder than the B ible, and that Egypt, 
the land o f  th e ir  or ig in , was the source o f  many o f  the b e l ie fs  o f  Pythagoras 
and Plato; i t  i s  salutory to note that the Medici ordered F icino to translate 
the "Hermética" before the works o f  Plato ( l ) .  But within a hundred years 
o f  F ic in o 's  translation  doubts were raised about their an tiqu ity , and th e ir  
f i n d  dating o f the 3rd century A.D. or thereabouts, by Casaubon in 1614, 
was, as Yates very persuasively argues, an event o f  immense importance 
in the h istory  o f  Western European c iv i l is a t io n (2 ) .  By then the Hermética 
had spread th e ir  considerable in fluence, re in forcing the Pythagorean and 
Neoplatonic idea o f  the cosmos as a liv in g  thing (see Yates, o p . c i t . . p .330). 
helping to make magic respectable -  Pope Alexander VI_ dabbled -  but, most 
s ig n ifica n tly  o f  d l ,  gave to men the impetus to study the n a tu rd  world.
The magician was an "operator" as was the dchem ist, astronomer, and early  
s c ie n t is t , but the impulse to operate, to become occupied in  base manud or 
mechanicd tasks, was h itherto considered unworthy and unsuitable compared 
with occupations such as r a t io n d , ph ilosop h icd  or  th c o lo g ic d  speculation. 
Although the operationd  methods o f  magic and other o ccu lt  p ractices  now seem ’
(1 ) This was in 1471, As G.It.S. Mead says, ("Thrice Greatest Hermes", V ol. I . 
p .9 ) . F ic in o 's  translation  o f  the "Hermética" was enormously popular end ran 
to 2£ ed itions during the period 1471-1611, being printed in  Venice, Paris 
Basle, Lyons and, in 1611, in London. See Appendix A. ( in fra )  on the "Hermética"
(2 ) The P latonic r e v iv d  enjoyed continued support in fh gland by the Cambridge 
P laton ists, and Cudworth even attempted to refute Casaubon's dating o f  the 
"Hermética" (see "The True In te lle c tu d  System o f  The Universe", Vol .2 . p .1 2 7 ). 
The extent o f  F ic in o 's  influence on Q iglish litera tu re  has never been fu lly  
researched, as S.Jl.Jayne points out in h is Introduction to the translation  o f  
"M arsilio F ic in o 's  Commentary on P la to 's  Symposium". For short accounts o f  
th is  influence see P .O .K riste ller, "Renaissance Philosophy and the Mediaevd
xraiii l i o n " ,  uud Jayuu, u p . c i i . . .  u .
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wayward and misguided, what i s  important i s  the s h ift  to attitude which 
gave resp ectab ility  to operations and which ultim ately fostered modem 
empirical science. Whereas th is  sh ift  was not so le ly  e ffected  by the 
"Hermetica" and magic, these Gnostic texts played a great part in shaping 
man's emerging notion o f  him self as the potential and actual maker o f  h is 
own destiny.
To explain the impact o f  the "Hermetica" on the Renaissance i t  i s  
necessary to compare the Hermetic notion o f  man with the Mosaic. Both are 
created in the image o f  God, hut Adam has no d iv in ity  and no creative power, 
and h is desire fo r  knowledge brings h is downfall. Hermetic man, wanting 
to imitate h is  maker by him self being creative, i s  allowed to do so; he has 
the g i f t  o f  creative a b il ity , resembling and ultim ately r iv a llin g  h is  maker: 
"The Fathers o f  the Church had placed man in a d ign ified  position , as the 
highest o f  the terrestia l beings, as spectator o f  the universe, as the 
microcosm containing within h im self the re fle c t io n  o f  the macrocosm. All 
these orthodox notions are in  the oration on the Dignity o f  Man, but the 
Dignity o f  Man as Magus, as spectator, and the magical power o f  marrying 
earth to heaven rests on the gnostic heresy that man was once, and can 
become again, through h is in t e l le c t ,  the re fle c t io n  o f  the divine mens. 
a divine being. The fin a l revaluation o f  the magician in the Renaissance 
i s  that he becomes a divine man. Once again one is  reminded o f  a p ara lle l 
w ith the creative a r t is ts  f o r  th is  was the epithet which th e ir  contempories 
awarded to the great, o f  idiom they often  speak as the divine Raphael, or the 
divine Leonardo, or the divine M ichelangelo." (Yates, op. c i t . . p . l l l ) .
This idea o f  man as creating in  h is sphere o f  operations as God does in 
H is is  c lea r ly  important in a rt as i t  i s  in science, and I shall sr.y more 
o f  i t  la te r ; and whereas the op tim istic , te le o lo g ica l gnosis o f  man as 
divine does much to shape xh is idea, the more F ia tom c, pessim istic and 
d u a lis t ic  notion o f  man as having an a llo tted  and inescapable place in the
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scheme o f  things i s  also in flu e n tia l•( l ) There are two aspects to
llenoissoncc magic, the daemonic and the apiri'tunl, ( 2 ) and the status o f  
Magus such as was sought by Giordano Bruno i s  an unresolved combination 
o f Socratic daemon and panthoistic magician. The optim istic , sp iritual 
magician purports to a ffe c t  and influence ob je c ts , events, and people by 
manipulating the basic elements o f the cosmo6, in cn undertaking which is  
largely  based on the b e l ie f ,  Pythagorean, Snpedoclean and Hermetic in orig in , 
that l ik e  is  known by l ik e .  This i s  supported by a b e l ie f  in ’ God' as the 
prims, materia o f  the cosmos, from which come In te lle ctu s . Spiritus and 
Materia. The sp iritua l magician seeks to introduce sp ir itn s into materia. 
and imagination, c lose ly  related to  " s p ir i t " (3 ) ,  i s  the indispensable medium 
for  th is  operation -  "the basis o f  most theories o f  natural magic is  the 
power o f  im agination." (Walker, op. c i t . . p .149 ). Broadly speaking, 
sp iritual or natural magic seems to have been more outward looking than 
i t s  demonic counterpart, and as practiced  by Paracelsus i t  was put to 
curative or medical use; he believed , as I shall presently show, that i t  
was through imagination that people become sick  or w e l l . (4 ) Demonic magic, 
although having the same impulse towards universal knowledge as sp iritual 
magic, and recognising the mystical importance o f  imagination in achieving 
th is comaon aim, i s  essen tia lly  autodidectic and is  addressed to the 
salvation o f the individual p ra ctition er.
(1 ) On the 'optimism* and 'pessimism' o f  magic see Yates, o p . c i t . . pp. kU—’j .  
B rie fly , the optim istic magician aims to draw down high powers, the pessim istic 
to r id  himself o f  the ev il ta in t o f  the earthly.
(2 ) For a good account o f  Renaissance magic see D.P.Walker. "Spiritual and 
Demonic Magic From Ficino to Canpanella."
(3 ) Soe Walker, op. c i t . . n,78 : " . . . t h e  planets and the operator are not 
supposed to act d irectly  on anything higher than the s p ir it  which is  the 
veh icle  o f  the im agination." On s p ir i t ,  see also Yates, op. c i t . . p .63.
( 4 ) See Walker, op. c i t . . p. 1*38-9 : •'Paracelsus is  taken ns the culmination 
o f  e magical tradition  which, includes the most diverse members s Avicenna, 
Alkindi, F icino, Fomponazzi, who have however the common characteristic  o f
VnaiTi*» +V» oi v w«rrv e* on +!■»«% « awwjv» a ^  i  lnflUCr.CC mm mm
Paracelsus i s  said to d i f fe r  from the others in that he believes, not only 
that the heavens influence our imagination, but that the power o f  our 
imagination can a lter , in fe c t  the stars and compel them to produce e f fe c t s ."
What' links these four figures whom I shall consider in the next two 
chapters i s  an in terest in imagination. I t  i s  n ot d i f f i c u l t  to understand 
how imagination, with i t s  long-established p lace  between the ob jects  o f  
sense and the ideas o f  reason and i t s  associations with elemental science 
and other o ccu lt b e l ie fs , should come to be regarded as having a substantial 
ex istence. Whosoever could tap, influence, or control th is  imagination 
would have enormous power over the physical and the sp iritu a l worlds and 
could aspire even to divine status.
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Chapter 1 : FI CINQ AND BRUNO
SECTION I
In th is  section  I am particu larly  concerned with Marsilio F iciao .
In many ways he epitomises the 'universal man1 o f  the Renaissance, and 
M s range o f  in terests  and accomplishments is  great; he believed i t  was 
possib le  to unite a ll  areas o f  enquiry in to  one, and that there flowed 
through man and the universe a cosmic s p ir i t ,  a " f i r s t  instrument" which 
linked soul with body and physical with ethereal. The splritua o f  Ficino 
i s  likened by D.P.Walker to the Cartesian "esp r it" , centred in the brain 
and flowing through the nervous system, but F ic in o 's  conception has a 
wider app lica tion :
"There appear to  he rea lly  three things in ns : soul, s p ir it ,  and body.
Soul and body, naturally  very d iffe ren t from each other, are jo in ed  by 
tlie median, s p ir i t ,  which is  a certain very thin and clear vapour, 
created from the heat o f  the heart from the purest part o f  the blood; 
and thence d iffu sed  through a ll  the p a rts . This s p ir it  receives the 
powers o f  the soul and transfers them in to  the body. On the other hand, 
the s p ir it  receives through the instruments o f  the senses the images o f 
external bodies; these images cannot be communicated d ire ctly  to the 
soul, because incorporeal substance, which is  more excellent than bodies, 
cannot be given form by them through the reception o f  images. But at 
le a s t , the sou l, being present to the s p ir i t  in every part, ea s ily  secs 
the image o f  bodies shining in i t  as though in a mirror, and through them 
i t  judges bodies, and th is cognition i s  ca lled  by the P latonists sense 
perception. While i t  sees the images, i t  conceives in i t s e l f  by i t s  own 
strength images lik e  them, but much purer. Conception o f  th is  kind we ca ll 
imagination and fancy; the images conceived here are kept in  the memory. 
Through these, the eyes o f  the soul are wakened to behold the Universal 
Ideas o f  things, which the soul holds within i t s e l f .  Therefore i t  sees 
a certain man by sense and conceives him in imagination, and in common 
with i t s  own innate Idea o f  humanity, by tbo in te lle c t  i t  contemplates the
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princip le  and d e fin ition  common to a ll  men, and i t  preserves what has 
heen contemplated.” ( S.It. Jayne. o n . c i t . . 0.189 Speech 6. Ch. VI■).
T h is 'sp ir it*  is  the 'cosm ic s p ir i t ' o f  alchemy, resembling the quinta 
essentia o r  aether o f  Timaeus; th is  cosmic s p ir it  was thought to flow 
through the entire universe, providing a channel o f  communication between 
the te r re s t ia l and the heavenly. Since according to the "Ilermetiea",
Plato ( Timaeus ^Oc-Tla). and Plotinus ( Ban. IV iv  32 ). the world i s  one 
animal, " . . i t s  sou l, l ik e  ours, must have a ' f i r s t  instrument' which 
transmits i t s  powers to  i t s  body." (Walker o p . c i t . . 12 ). we can nourish 
and p u rify  our own s p ir it  by attracting  and absorbing i t .  The ways o f  
attracting  cosmic s p ir it  are numerous, i t  can be done by consuming things 
which contain an abundance o f  i t ,  such as wine, white sugar, gold, or the 
scent o f  cinnamon or roses, or by plants or animals acquainted with a 
particu lar  planet, or by Talismans and by Music: in these la s t  two Ficino 
has much in terest, and the la t te r  he recommends most strongly. The b e l ie f  
that music i s  a particu larly  e ffe c t iv e  means o f  a ffectin g  ce le s t ia l s p ir it  
i s  based on the Pythagorean (and Timaean) theory that man and the universe 
are constructed on the same harmonic proportions; thus there is  a music o f  
the spheres (musica mundana). a music o f  man's body, s p ir it  and soul 
(musica hum ana), and a music o f  vo ices  and instruments (musica instrunenta) . 
F icino, who was a p r ie s t  and a practising  physician, believed firm ly in  the ' 
therapeutic powers o f  music, and wrote :
"Nor i s  th is  surprising; fo r , since song and sound arise from the cogitation  
o f  the mind, the impetus o f  the fantasy* and the fee lin g  o f  the heart, and, 
together with the a ir  they have broken up and tempered, strik e  the aerial 
s p ir it  o f  the hearer, which i s  the junction  o f  the soul and body, they
* On F ic in o 's  use o f  th is  term see P .O .K ristc ller . "The Philosophy o f  
M arsilio F ic in o", esp. r»n. 235. 3bc>ff: when distinguished from imagination, 
i t  i s  a higher fa cu lty , which forms 'in ten tion s '*  Also p.10 ftnote 1 :
• 'In ten tion es ' probably in the sch olastic  sense o f  the f i r s t  stage o f 
un iversa lization  from sense--impressions.. . . "  e tc . The point about the intent.io. 
as we have already seen, is  that i t  i s  seen as an innate id ea lis in g  function; 
in the Phenomenology o f  Husserl, i t s e l f  an id e a lis t ic  philosophy despite i t s  
author's protestations to the contrary, the idea o f  ' in ten tion a lity ' has 
oxaetly th is  function .
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ea s ily  move the fantasy, a ffe c t  the heart and penetrate into the deep 
recesses o f  the mind." ( l ) .  l i is ic  was a halm to the Saturnine melancholy 
to  which Ficino was so susceptible, having 'charms to soothe a savage 
beast' as Congreve la te r  wrote, but Ficino also used incantations -  greatly  
influenced by the Orphic Ilymns -  to accompany h is  magical operations. But 
though we think o f  music in terms o f  melodies and (appropriately) "a irs " , 
i t  i s  important to note that fo r  F icino, as fo r  Renaissance music generally, 
the words had pre-eminence over the instrumentation. Lest the point be 
obscured, i t  should be emphasised that F ic in o 's  psycho-physiological notion 
o f  s p ir it ,  although to be found in a sim ilar guise in Descartes, i s  a concept 
which owes i t s  meaning to elemental science; i t  i s  a technical term, however 
vague, which has long been supplanted by the physiology o f  the nervous and 
endocrine systems.
By whatever means, images are mirrored into the sou l, according to 
F icin o , and fantasy moves; th is  much, in so many words, we have long ago 
found in  A r is to t le . What we do not find  in A risto tle  i s  anything with 
the symbolic power o f  F ic in o 's  talismans. These also a f fe c t  the s p ir it ,  
but talismans are v isu a l, 'images o f  the world' to use Yates' pregnant 
phrase, and v is ion  has a Dantean and Socratic importance in F ic in o 's  
philosophy o f  l o v e . ( 2 ) The a b i l ity  to infuse a visual image with the 
cosmic s p ir it  was considered a divine attribute and, as we have already 
had occasion to note, the best o f  the Renaissance a r t is ts  were ca lled  
•divine's
"And perhaps i t  i s  also ch ie fly  in the imaginative and a r t is t ic  sense 
that we should understand the influence o f  the Renaissance magic o f  the 
type inaugurated by Ficino and l i e ' . The operative Magi o f  the Renai­
ssance were a r t is ts , and i t  was a Donatello or a Michelangelo who knew
(1 ) M. F icino. Onerr. Omni a p.651: (quoted by Walker, o p .c i t . .  p .6  ftnote 3 ) .
( 2 ) The erudite Ficino gives a moving Epicurean account o f  the function
o f  v is ion  in  love , (o f  how .love i s  a commingling o f  bloods e ffe cted  through 
v is io n ,) which i s  too long to be quoted here; see Jovne. o p .c i t .  p.22~:rf.
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how to infuse the divine l i f e  into statues in  their a r t . ” fo r ,  as she has 
previously (s l ig h t ly  ov er-) stated, F ic in o 's  magic " ....w ork ed  through 
the imagination, hy conditioning the imagination through various ways o f  
l i f e  and r itu a ls  towards receiving inwardly the divine forms o f  the natural, 
gods. I t  was the magic o f  a h ighly a r t is t ic  nature, heightening the 
a r t is t ic  perceptions with magical procedures." (Yates, o p .c i i... pp.10'5—1») .
Dr.Yates c a lls  B o t t i c e l l i 's  "Primavera" a "figure o f  the universe", as 
Ficino understood the talisman, an image o f  the world designed to a ttract 
favourable planetary influence and to  avoid Saturn, channelling the 
sp iritu s nrundana rather than the sp iritu s exundi into the b a ffled  gaze o f  the 
modern art h istorian . Imagination features large ly  in Ilenaissance magic, 
and c lea rly , though hy strong im plication , has a somewhat obscure part to 
play in Renaissance aesth etic . Disregarding 's p i r i t ' ,  the ontological image 
and the psycholog ica lly  motive fantasy, owing much to A ristote lian  and to 
P latonic and pseudo-Platonic epistemology, begin to play an increasingly 
important part in descriptions and explanations o f  human a c t iv ity . Nowhere 
i s  th is  more pronounced than in  magic. The Ilenaissance i s  ever regarded 
as a watershed in the h istory  o f  Western European c iv i l is a t io n , but in 
weighing the importance o f  the art-work as talismanic image having a symbolic, 
d iv inely  orientated power, whose e ffe c ts  are dependent upon the imagination 
o f  both maker «aid beholder. P articu larly  worthy o f re ite ra tion  is  the 
ro le  o f  the Hermetic texts in  ch rysta lliz in g  the creative and operative 
impulse o f  Renaissance man; th is i s  o f  crucial importance in the r ise  o f  
modem science and in the lite ra tu re  o f men's explanation o f him self.
In both cases 'im agination' pi ays .a  loading ro le . In the interim period 
when magic and alchemy began to succumb to the achievements o f  empirical 
science, imagination, over the go-between,' has great prominence as both 
elemental en tity  and psychological facu lty , particu larly  in medical p ra ctice . 
But slowly, as wo shall see, imagination begins to exchange some o f  i t s  
ubiquity fo r  a certain exclusiveness in a modem trend which begins by 
regarding 'gen ius' as a function o f  imagination.
134
The Importance o f Ficino, in the development o f oar civ ilisation * has 
paled in relation to other* more rational* thinkers. Bat his b e lie f  in 
the integrity and operational necessity o f imagination, although subservient 
to h is idea o f 's p ir it '*  represents a step outside the traditional and veil 
established Stoic view o f imagination as an ev il detractor from the higher 
ideals o f l i f e .  The place o f imagination in magical operations is  more 
emphatic in Bruno than in F icino. In his express intention to make himself 
a Magas or a Messiah ( l )  Bruno believed imagination to be his means o f 
success -  "He vho in himself sees a ll things* is  all things"* he vrote*
( nDe imaginum compositions” * in Yates, op. c i t . .  P.337). — citing Aristotle 
and Synesius* amongst others* as his authorities. As Dr. Yates infoxms ns, 
Bruno's unique interpretation and employment o f an ancient mnemoteclinic 
sk ill*  handed from the ancient Greeks* demanded a comprehensive imagination 
such as vonld give the operator the key to omniscience.(2 ) P lato 's  "Hiaedrus" 
is  a work -which sheds some lig h t on the attempt to understand what imagin­
ation meant to Bruno* fo r  he published a set o f  love poems* "De g li  eroici 
fu rori" , in Ehgland in 1585» dedicating them to Sir Philip Sidney. These 
poems are based on the four types o f "madness" which we found in "Phaedrus", 
and i t  is  clear that for  Bruno the universal doctrine o f  love and inspiration 
which connects these "fu rori"  depends on imagination. (See Yates, op. c i t . , > 
pp. 281-2). I t  is  in the "Phaedrus" too that Socrates t e l ls  tho prophetic 
ta le  o f  hov the ancient Egyptian god Theuth invented writing and the 
reaction o f king Thamas* who saw in the invention the death o f  memory and 
the degeneration into superficial rather than real wisdom. Apart  from 
illu stratin g  the Platonic doctrine *1 knowledge as reminiscence* th is l i t t le  
fable neatly and aptly indicates what imagination and memory were fo r  Bruno 
and* up to a point* what, they were fo r  any scholar prior to the invention 
o f  the printing preos. A ll the knowledge that books could contain Bruno
(1 ) The messianic illu s ion  was common in the Renaissance* as Yates (o p .c it . . 
P .3 3 9 ) t e lls  us; i t  was* o f  course, equally common during Christ's time.
(2 ) For a fa ll  and stimulating account o f th is sk ill see F.A.Yatcst "The 
Art o f  Memory".
SECTION II
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sought to hold in his head.
The art o f  memory required that i t s  practitioner memorise a ll the 
details o f , o .g . . a building -  a church was ideal -  so that when a large 
quantity o f  information needed to be learned the practitionor simply over­
la id  (or 'attached ') images o f (or corresponding to ) the information on to 
the already memorised, ordered details o f  the 'bu ild in g ':
"This classica l art, usually regarded as purely ranemotechnical, had a 
long history in the Middle Ages and was recommended by Albertus Magnus 
and Thomas Aquinas. In the Renaissance, i t  became fashionable among 
Neoplatonists and Hermctists. I t  was now understood as a method o f printing 
basic or archetypal images on the memory, with the cosmic order i t s e l f  as
the 'p lace ' system, a kind o f  inner way o f knowing the universe........  The
Hermetic experience o f reflecting the universe in the mind is ,  I  believe, 
at the root o f  the Renaissance magic memory, in which classical mnemonic 
with places and images is  now understood, or applied, as a method o f 
achieving this experience by imprinting archetypal, or magically activated, 
images on the memory. By using magical or talismanic images as memory- 
images, the Magus hoped to acquire universal knowledge, and also powers, 
obtaining through the magical organisation o f  the imagination a magically 
powerful personality, tuned in , as i t  were, to the powers o f the cosmos.
This amazing transformation, or adaptation, o f  the classical art o f 
memory in the Renaissance has a history before Bruno, but in Bruno i t  
reached a culmination." (Yates, o p .c i t . , pp. 191-192).
For the non-magical practitioner, the recall o f  infoxmation simply 
required the mental equivalent o f  a stro ll around the architectural 
mnemonic; the 's t r o l l '  could start or fin ish  at any point, or even be taken 
in reverse. Although the mnemonic structure was usually architectural, 
the zodiac or disposition o f the stars could be used, and in th is way the 
memory art was to become, fo r  Bruno, a way o f  "reflecting tho universe 
in the mind", and imagination the essential faculty in the acquisition o f 
universal knowledge.
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"Bruno's magic memory system thus represents the memory o f a Magus, 
one who both knows the rea lity  beyond m ultip licity  o f experiences through 
haring conformed his imagination to tho archetypal images, and also has 
powers through insight. I t  is  'the direct descendent o f F icino 's Neop­
laton ic interpretation o f  the ce lestia l images, but carried to a much 
more daring extreme." (Yates, op. c i t . , p.198).
The p ossib ility  o f 'universal knowledge', or  omniscience, thus l ie s  
in the use o f imagination as a storehouse organised as images in a manner 
based on the ancient art o f  memory, and though i t  can be said that for  Bruno 
the image reflected the ob ject and at the same time stood fo r  a class o f 
ob jects, as-a single ob ject answers to a concept, he certainly regarded 
the image as more powerful and evocative than the word. He conceives the 
cosmos as a magical scale, moving from the individuals o f sense to the 
wholeness o f the universe, each compounded part o f  the scale being attached 
to the next by means o f "links", or "ladders o f  occu lt sympathies" which 
resemble Plotinian "emanations" -  Bruno's "links" serving the Dionysian 
function o f  drawing down the daemon. Tho links were o f three kinds; 
Incantation ( i . e .  songs and music); Talismans ( i . e .  images, seals e t c .) ;  
and Imagination. This la tter  was Bruno's ch ief daemonic device:
"In De Magi a. Bruno relates h is magical psychology o f  the imagination to 
the terminology o f normal faculty psychology, which, however, he transforms 
by making the imagination, and more particularly the magically animated or 
excited imagination, when joined to the cognitive power, the source o f 
psychic energy. This magically animated imagination is  the sole gate 
to a ll  internal affections and the 'lin k  o f  l in k s '.  Bruno's language 
i s  excited and obscure as he expounds th is, to him, central mystery, the 
conditioning o f imagination in such a way as to draw into the personality 
pTri «1 »mi if*?*??? Trill unlcdi h i?  iszic? pcvcrc. This
is  what he vas always trying to do with his magic memory systems, and the 
ob ject vas, as is  quite d e e r  from the dosin g  pages o f De Magia. to achieve 
the personality and powers o f a great Magus or religious loader." (Yates, 
op. c i t . .  p. 266) .
137
Wo have found references to the synthetic power o f imagination and 
i t s  a b ility  to produce chimaeras, unicorns, golden horses and the lik e , 
combining disassociated ideas into new wholes. The grand synthesis 
attempted by Bruno was not simply o f disparate images but vas an e ffo rt 
to reconcile the irreconcilable; on the one hand stood Christian theism 
with an omniscient, transcendent deity, and on the other hand stood 
Gnostic monism whose deity was omnipresent and immanent. .And though 
the teleologica l tenor o f  Bruno's be lie fs  were strongly to influence 
Leibniz, the la tte r  prudently omitted to make public the theological 
consequences o f monism and the magical, Pythagorean and Neoplatonic 
notion o f the cosmos as a single organism whose quick is  spiritus. 
mediator o f  the v is  imaginative, vas largely supplanted by a mechanistic 
philosophy in which men were comprised o f  "strings and pulleys” . This 
transition was a slow one whose agents were men in idiom magical and 
s c ie n tific  practices were o f a piece, and in an age o f  transition one 
expects to find imagination, which is  consistently seen as the agent o f 
change, at the centre o f  interest. With respect to art, this is  not 
the case, except in the talismanic sense o f  Ficino and Bruno and in the 
conceptual sense o f  neo-Aristotelian psychology idle re art is  the "idea” 
made manifest. The visual and literary  arts degenerated into Deration 
neo—classicism and philosophy into Cartesian rationalism t only in the 
theory and practice  which bore modem science out o f  alchemy and magic 
does "imagination" remain en important concept, and i t  is  not until the 
end o f  the 18th century, in the pantheism o f  Wordsworth, that this magical 
aspect o f  imagination vas to re-emerge at the forefront o f  human conscious­
ness. r - -. .
/
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Chapter 2 : PARACEL STJS ANP DOKHME.
SECTION j
During the period o f  transition from alchemy and magic to empirical 
science the major figures frequently combine interests in the old  and the 
new practices. So we find that Copernicus' diagram o f thb solar system 
in h is "De Revolutionibus Orbium Coelestium" o f 15^3 quotes Trismegistus 
as the authority o f  heliocentrism, end though for  us the quality o f 
his proofs depends on his mathematics, the sun d e a r ly  has great religious 
and mystical significance fo r  him. Newton was an alchemist, as was 
Aoreolus Fbilipus Thrcophrastus Bombast o f Hohenheim -  otherwise known as 
Paracelsus, -  but Paracelsus was a successful practising surgeon and 
admired as such by Erasmus. The idea o f  imagination as an actual and 
substantial essence i s  more prominent in Paracelsus than in Bruno, and 
Paracelsus believed that owing to i t s  power and ubiquitousness the 
imagination possessed real medical e ffica cy . On th is power and ubiquity 
he says t "No place is  too far from the imagination to go, and the 
imagination o f  one man can impress that o f  another, wherever i t  reaches.”
( "Phil oso phi a Sag ax", quoted in F. Hartman. 'The L ife  o f  Paracelsus", 
p. 140). He considers too that imagination has a psycho-sexual power, 
and perhaps developing on idea o f A risto tle 's  that the soul is  transmitted 
into the foetus by the male seed, he asserts that by the influence o f 
Cod the imagination o f  man creates semen. Thus the semen has two parts, 
one coming from the imagination the other from what he ca lls  the Mysterium 
Magnum or "spiritual monad” -  the "universal matrix” as Hartman describes 
i t  -  and out o f th is male seed, containing potentially a ll the bodily organs 
and the spiritual part o f  man, the woman makes the child s 
" I t  may therefore be said that the imagination o f  the father sets into 
»fl+.M+jr the rrpB+.i vp imvpr conn Ary to iron a rot* a human being, and the
Imagination o f  the mother furnishes the material 'for  i t s  formation and 
development; but neither the father nor the mother is  the parent o f the 
essential spiritual man, but the gem o f  the la tte r  comes from Mvsterlum 
Magnum, and the God it s  father." (Paracelsus. "Gebaerong dea Menschen",
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in  Hartman, op. c i t . .  P .7 4 ).
I t  vas thought that even the gender o f the child could be controlled by 
imagination and conmonly believed during the 16th and 17th centuries 
that the physical appearance o f the unborn child could be greatly 
influenced by the mother through the power o f  her imagination. ( l )
This influence vas owed to  the foetus' being part o f the mother, sharing 
her blood and imaginative sp irits  :
" I f ,  fo r  instance, a woman in her imagination strongly conceives o f  a 
snail, and then puts her hand upon her knee then w ill the image o f  the 
snail appear on the knee o f  the ch ild . Her w ill (although unconsciously) 
acts in th is way lik e  a master, bidding a painter to paint him a sna il. 
Wherever the touch o f the hand goes, there w ill be the image." (Paracelsus.
"De Virtute Imaginatava" in Hartman, p. 159. )•
I f  a man commit the "unnatural sin o f Oban" the "spexma", says Paracelsus, 
is  taken away by sp irits  and witches to make Incubi and Succubi and other 
monsters, end i t  is  no doubt fo r  holding such views that he is  ca lled  by 
Thorndike a "pretentious fak ir", but the existence o f  such en tities  in 
imagination was really , rather than merely metaphorically, believed by 
Paracelsus. Occupying a realm between the physically real and the purely 
spiritual the imagination could a ffe ct  both o f  these — "a Be solute Imagination 
can accomplish a ll things", he says, bringing to mind Montaigne's "a strong 
imagination can bring on the event" -  intimating that, as with the imagin­
a tion 's  creative power in  respect o f  the life -g iv in g  sperm, the e ffe cts  
are not simply to change the given but to bring something into being ex 
n ih ilo .
Tb j  idea that man in  his sphere o f a ctiv ity  aots as God in His, 
creating out o f  nothing as God did the world, even perhaps riv a llin g  God
( l )  See fo r  instance Burton's "inatomy o f  Melancholy", esp. Pt. l .S e c t . 2. 
Merob.3. Subs. 2. "Of The Force o f  Imagination." See also L. Thorndike.
"History o f  Magic and Experimental Science" (8 V o ls .).
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in h is creative power, had teen disseminated by the Hermetic texts.
I t  i s  s i  idea which is  to be found in Ihgland in the Cambridge Flatoniots; 
according to Paracelsus th is creative power belongs to imagination. As 
Hartman says t
"Imagination i s  the formative power o f man; i t  often acts instinctively  
and without any conscious e ffo r t  o f  the w ill . 'Mon has a v is ib le  and an 
in v isib le  workshop. The v is ib le  one is  h is body, the in v is ib le  one his 
imagination (mind). The sun gives ligh t and this ligh t i s  not tangible, 
bat i t s  heat may be f e l t ,  and i f  the rays are concentrated i t  may set 
a house on f i r e .  The imagination is  a sun in the soul o f  man, acting in 
i t s  own sphere as the sun o f the earth acts in that o f the earth .' ( "O p .cit., 
p. 177. with quote from Paracelsus* "De Virtute Imaginatava".) The 
imagination o f man creates in i t s  way as does the imagination o f God:
"The great world is  only a product o f  the imagination o f  the universal mind , 
and man i s  a l i t t l e  world o f i t s  own that imagines and creates by the power 
o f  imagination. I f  man's imagination is  strong enough to  penetrate into 
every corner o f  his in terior world, i t  w ill be able to create things in 
those corners, and whatever man thinks w ill take form in  his soul. Bat 
the imagination o f Nature is  lik e  a monkey aping the actions o f man, that 
which sum does is  imitated by the monkey, and the pictures formed in the 
Imagination o f man create corresponding images in the mirror o f Nature." 
( Paracelsus, o p . c i t . .  in Hartman pp. 177-8). I t  is  particularly apt 
that at a time when speculative science was beginning to  yield  i t s  
authority to demonstrable, empirical science, imagination, with i t s  
established position between the physical and the mental, should be 
regarded as the most important o f  "facu lties” . The magical and alchemical
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universal method, hut prior to the establishment o f method the apparent 
universality o f imagination was emphasised and employed. Operating oat 
imagination into rea lity  Paracelsus was no doubt a sometime charlatan,
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but h is radical and surgical practices vere famous and notorious throughout 
Europe and his far-sighted« plausible accounts o f  s i l ic o s is  and syphilis 
anticipated la ter developments in pharmaceutic chemistry and homeopathy, ( l ) 
But v ith  Paracelsus and« perhaps« Jakob Boebme« the natural and alchemical 
h istory o f  imagination begins to draw to a close. Though they vere to 
retain a metaphorical use« the associations o f imagination with the blood 
and the heart vere relinquished vith the demise o f  the old  elemental 
b iology . In 1628 Harvey discovered blood circulation and in 16J7 
Sennert attacked the idea o f  a mother's being able to a ffe ct her unborn 
ch ild  by imagination : "The phantasies formed in the brain o f the mother 
cannot be carried to the foetus, fo r  they cannot mingle vith  the b lood ." 
(See Thoyndike. op. c i t . . Yol. VII. Ch. VII. p,214). The biochemistry 
o f  f i r e ,  spiritus. and quinta essentia had to va it until the end o f the 
18th century to suffer i t s  final demise, along vith  the phlogiston theory, 
a t the hands o f P riestley and Lavoisier. Similarly, the astrological 
kingdom o f  heaven, supported by the authority o f  A ristotle and Ptolemy, 
had been shaken by Copernicus and vas further weakened by the astronomical 
discoveries o f Harvey's contemporaries Kepler and G alileo. Thus i t  vas 
that the trans-substantial medium 's p i r i t ' ,  the ubiquitous, synoptic, 
con substantial imagination, and the coalescent doctrine o f  transcendent 
d ivin ity  end love, a ll cemo to be regarded vith  suspicion end d isb e lie f. 
Salvation vas increasingly shown to reside in reason, method and demon- 
stra b ility , and in the epistemology o f  Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz, 
imagination vas given l i t t l e  more status than the eikasia o f Plato. In 
art lea st o f  a l l ,  during the 17th century, vas imagination accorded any 
creative pover such as the Hermetic texts had suggested and Paracelsus 
averred. (l)
( l )  See J.G.Hargrave's a rtic le  on Paracel sue in "Si cyclopaedia 
Britonnica."
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section II
The decline o f b e lie f  in the ob jective  operational powers o f  imagination 
is  accompanied by a Stoic reacsertion o f  the need always to subject 
imagination to the d ictates o f  reason. Thus the sp iritu a l end mystical 
functions o f  imagination fa l l  into disfavour, though the seeds o f  F icin o ’ s 
arid Bruno's Hermetic and magical Neoplatonism f e l l  on re la tiv e ly  fe r t i le  
ground in  England, blossoming into Cambridge Platonism and the Quaker»eia o f  
George Fox and William L ow .(l) This hardy perennial English mysticism o f 
great importance fo r  the concept o f  imagination developed ir  Romantic 
aesth etics, fo r  the Neoplatonic tradition  enters German consciousness through 
the w ritings o f  Hutcheson and Shaftesbury as well as o f  Leibniz and the 
Gnostic mysticism o f  Boehme. The influence o f the la t t e r 's  vork ir  very 
hard to state precise ly  and would o f i t s e l f  merit a study o f  some length} 
in range i t  i s  great, in depth perhaps le ss  s o .( 2 ) William Lew vas 
undoubtedly h is greatest d isc ip le , but in Germany he has been regarded, 
os the father o f  that country's philosophical trad ition  and Hegel, who devoted 
a lectu re  to him, considers that through Boebuae "Philosophy f i r s t  appeared 
in Germany wit]» a character peculiar to i t s e l f " ,  adding that "Leibniz thought, 
very highly o f  him". ("H istory o f  Philosophy".Vo l . 1X1. p.lflB i f . ) . H.U.
Brintan, author o f  the best book in English on Boehme says :
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(1 ) F.J.Powioke« "The Cambridge F la ton ists", in discussing Peter Sterry,states: 
"In Starry*s frequent insistence on the emanative prin cip le  i a  traceable h is  
indebtedness to Platonism or rather Neo-Platonism. Another very marked influence 
is  that o f  Boehrr.e (1575-1621), whose name indeed he does not seem to mention,but 
with whom much o f  h is thought and phraseology present a very close a f f in ity . 
Boehme attracted considerable attention in England. . . . " (p .18 5 , f t .n o -'e 1 . )
(2 )  l)n Boeltrie'e influence oe? a. g . C■ I1*♦ E. Stv tgr.->n. "Mysticism in Ehglir-h Literar- 
ture", p , 27 : ’’The influence o f  JCociuac in the eighteenth and nineteenth centur­
ie s  i s  very far-reaching. In addition to completely subjugating the strong 
in te l le c t  o f  Law,ho profoundly influenced Bleko. Ue also a ffected  Thomas Krakiue 
o f  Lin.latbon, raid through him Carlyle,J.W.Farquhar, F.D.Maurice, and ethers»
‘E egcl,Schoiling and Sclil cgel are alike indebted to hiir.,and Ihrongb them, through
hi <3 Fr^nrb rli p £*+. . Mft■*»+,■»t? „ <yr.rl ihfwrr}» fWl pri rt-to — t«lm w?»« trmoh in
hin — soma o f his root ideas re tv, rued again to liigl and in the ninatcc-utl» century 
Also Hvinton, pp .?> -4 : " . . Track, Ndvalis, the two Schlegels end
Schleiexmachcr, a ll o f  whom were bom about 1770, looked on Ho thine as th e ir  
sp iritu a l an cen ter ." On Hoehmo's influence on Newton and Milton see Spurgeon 
p.P:; and IirI'- on pp .?0 -2 . S.*a al m, A.I),Snyder 's  "Coleridge on Boehme"; fo r  
C oleridge's eornicnts on "iichmen" ,.j he would ca ll mm, bee "Biographic 
L itera ria " Cm . .IX.
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"Jacob Boehme has been appropriately styled the 'father o f German 
philosophy*. The ancestry o f his thought is  no le s s  significant than it s  
posterity, for  in him culminated the l i t t l e  known, and less understood 
tradition which straggled for more than a milieniron to demonstrate experi­
mentally a Platonic conception o f nature. This so-called  'Hermetic philosophy*, 
or 'philosophy o f  the alchemists', is  inextricably embedded in gross super­
stition  and imposture. I t  contained, however, a valuable kernel, which was 
the sincere attempt to erect a natural science on a Neo-platonic basis. In 
this e ffo r t  i t  fa iled , but la ter, married to opposing Lutherism, i t  gave 
birth to Boehme's speculations and through them passed into the romantic 
idealism which characterised the fu ll flower o f  German philosophy from Fichte 
to Schopenhauer. Through Boehme the alchemist tradition also passed into 
Biglish romanticism and into many other protests against shallow rationalism 
or m aterialistic science." ("The Mystic V i l l " ,  p .6) .  ( l )
Boehme was very much a mystical writer who wrote out o f  his own personal 
experiences but in a Christian context, using the alchemical language o f 
Paracelsus. His closest spiritual ancestor, in ay estimation, is  Richard 
o f  St. Y ictor, and like  him Boehme attacks what Brinton ca lls  "the oldest 
o f  a ll great problems" -  the reconciliation o f the subjective, spiritual 
s e lf  with the ob jective, rational world. There i s  a close parallel between 
the manic and d ia lectic  routes to oidos o f Plato, the in telligent and 
rational imaginations o f Bichard, and Boehme's concepts o f  the two w ills , 
as he ca lls  them, Vemunft and Yerstand t
"As Vernunft is  the external human point o f view, Verstand is  the internal
( l )  Brinton also quotes u.45 o f  E.Ederheimer's "Jacob Boehme und die Roman­
tiker" i "The philosophy o f that time is  spoken o f  as poetic Spinosisn. Its  
chief representatives were Schelling and Goethe. As a result o f  Boehme's 
influence the rig id  unity o f Spinoza's teaching was poetized to a unity o f  
the universal l i f e . "
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Divine point o f view. What is  opaque and meaningless and fu ll o f contra­
dictions to Vemunft is  transparent to Verstand because Vemunft attempts 
to go through the external to the internal while Verstand works through the 
inner unity outward. Vemunft straggles in vain from m ultiplicity  to 
unity, Verstand beginning at unity sees rea lity  as a «hole f i l le d  with 
interrelated forms. Thus Vemunft is  conceptual thought and Verstand is  
mystical experience. Verstand internalises the external. I t  sinks into 
the lowest depths o f  the dark abyss within the soul, and rises up with 
God's l i f e  to a deeper understanding o f the same objects dealt with by 
Vemunft. I t  can see the meaning o f things because i t  has come out o f 
the source o f a ll meanings. The transition from the partial point o f 
view to God's point o f  view is  the crossing o f  the deepest abyss in 
nature, «here Vemunft is  crucified and a ll particularity renounced that 
Verstand may rise  to a profounder understanding." (Brinton, o p .c i t . . P.10'5) 
Boehme, a humble Silesian shoemaker, himself had mystical experiences 
but he understood that although such experience claimed to be beyond the 
reach o f  reason, i t  had to be comnunicable. He is  consistent with himself 
in seeing that the particu larity o f h is experience, however meaningful to 
him, could only be fu lly  meaningful i f  universalised. I t  was a kind o f 
pre-Bomantic irony o f  Dante's "Divine Comedy" that the more e ffective  the 
poet's means o f  describing experiences o f an intensely personal kind, the 
more the means become themselves the focus o f  attention} in the tension 
between the nature o f  the experience and the quality o f  the poetry the 
reader may himself have an "aesthetic experience". I t  is  in this gap 
between the public and the private, the Veretand and the Vemunft. that 
imagination abides. Boebme was n' t a poet and the function o f h is  work 
seems to bo more descriptive than re constitutive!
"His ob ject is  not to  abolish reason but to make i t  the outward expression 
o f  a deeper truth then i t  can find within i t s e l f .  Symbol and rea lity  are 
both necessary but the la tter  must bs the controlling fa c to r .” ( Brinton 
o p .c it . ,  p.104.)
The dynamic impulse o f Boehme'a doctrines centres on h is concept o f the 
v i l l ,  a concept which anticipates Schopenhauer, whom Brinton regards as 
Boehme'a main h e ir , and some aspects o f Sarte's existentialism:
"As l i f e  is  Boehme'a organising concept so w ill i s  h is ultimate. All things 
are either w ills  or the ob jectifica tion  o f w ills . Matter is  w ill contracted 
on i t s e l f .  Imagination is  w ill going forth to create. L ife is  the higher 
unity arising out o f the opposition o f  w ill i t s e l f . "  (Brinton l o c . c i t . ) ( l )
La th is function, imagination is  the f i r s t  rea lity  o f  the cosmic w ill, and 
the existential nature o f th is w ill i s  evidenced by Boehme's deliberate 
identification  o f  w ill with activ ity  through the sim ilarity o f  the German 
volien (to w i l l )  and vailen (to move about, agitate). The 'abysmal w i l l ' ,  
as God or the v ita l sp ir it , is  "the ultimate inner nature o f being."
(Brinton. p.106) This abysmal w ill i s  as a nothingness, and the process 
by which this 'nothing' becomes a 'something' is  called "imagination" by 
Boehme. Out o f  the imagination o f  God was created the world. Since any 
thing must have material qualities then log ica lly , as Boehme recognised, 
the materially unknowable God could only be described negatively, as a 
■bo-thing". Through imagination the divine, and therefore the human w ill, 
'c re a te s '; i t  makes 'something' out o f 'nothing', but this creation is  
rea lly  a destruction; i t  is  an 'ob jectifica tion  o f  the w ill ' (As Schopenhauer 
called i t ) :  a reduction o f  the more real to the less  real, an insubstantiatiaa 
o f  the divine. Imagination i s  indeterminate w ill becoming determinate; the 
process is  reminiscent o f A r is to tle 's  potency-act fommla, and a reversal 
• f Plotinus' "forgetfulness"; but Boehme clearly states the need fo r  
"substance” :
"Where no substance is  there is  no creating, fo r  a creating sp ir it  is  no 
conceivable substance, but i t  must draw substance into i t s e l f  through it s
i 5*Rgin i  t-ion .a  :+, 7.^ *0 *: **At- At" ("TnAAiA'AtiA*?",
( l )  Brinton adds here: "Thio voluntarism made strong apped to the Romanticists. 
I f  the d a s s ic  sp ir it  is  the influence o f thought on v i l l ,  the romantic is  the 
influence o f v i l l  on thought."
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All o f  th is shaping, creative volition  is  a manifestation o f  the 
Verstand. This is  positive , outgoing, active w ill -which determines the 
structure o f -whatever i t  encounters; i t  does not simply encounter the 
physical world sensually, hut penetrates the sensual to a 'mirror world 
o f  Imagination« where i t  finds i t s e l f  reflected  and thus acquires a deeper 
knowledge o f  i t s e l f .  This reflection  is  indistinguishable from Plotinus' 
"forgetfulness". In divine terns, the beginning o f a ll being is  in  the 
imagination o f  the Ungrund. as i t  observes i t s e l f  in the world (Grand).
The cosmos is  the imagination o f God, end man stands at the intersection 
between the Dngrnnd and the Grand, between -the Verstand and Vemunft.
This la tte r  'w i l l ' describes a negative, passive acceptance o f  the external 
world, i t  relates to ob jectiv ity , and through i t  imagination by a kind o f 
'e f fo r t  o f  attention ' takes the form o f that upon which i t  is  centred.
In h is  "Aurora” , Boebme speaks o f seven "Quellgeister", or forcos 
(q u a lities) o f nature. The f i r s t  three, or lover ternary, seem to corr­
espond to  Vemunft: then there i s  a mid-point; end then the higher ternary 
corresponding to Verstand. The mid-point, or "Ikirchgangspunkt" i s  tho 
transition stage from the lower, dark ternary to the higher l ig h t  tomary, 
and Boehme sometimes ce lls  i t  "the Cross", at th is fourth stage "Nature 
must be crucified  that i t  may be reborn". (Brinton n .144). This fourth 
stage Boehme also ca lls  " f ir e " :
"For tho origin o f  imagination i s  the f i r s t  form o f nature . . . . .  whence i t  
goes through all forms and is  carried as far as f ir e .  There is  the dividing 
bound o r  mark o f s p ir it , where i t  is  bom . I t  is  now free . I t  may bo back 
again by i t s  imagination into i t s  mother the dark world, or going forward, 
sink uoun through tho anguish o f  f ir e  into death and bud forth in the 
l ig h t ."  (Boehme. "The Six Points". 7 :5 ..  in Brinton p.147).
This fourth stage he also ca lls , most evocatively,, the "Feuerschraok".
This "Feuerschrack" i s  the meeting point o f God, man and nature; i t  also 
suggests tho emotive force o f  Boclime's own mystical experiences. I t  may 
perhaps be interpreted as a kind o f  pre-Freudian birth trauma, or the
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point o f  death where the soul quits the body; or imagination's instan­
taneous option for  Verstand. In more existential terms, actions may be 
m aterialistic, id ea lis tic , or indecisive; bat hopes, expectations end doubts 
rest, in  imagination, on a mass o f  habits, principles or ignorance. For the 
active w ill function determines structure, fo r  the passive w ill structure 
determines function, and for  the indeterminate w ill imagination may respond 
according to the dominance o f habitual action or passion, o r  i t  may experience 
the l!Feuerschrack" o f the mystic. Brin ton, ( o p .c it . . p .1 2 6 )  finds a 
resemblance between the Verstand and Vcraunft and P lato 's lig h t  and dark 
steeds described in "Phaedrus"; ve can find an analogy between the "Feuerschrack" 
and the daemonic vision o f  Socrates pertaining to the four kinds o f  "madness" 
and, again, to Bruno's ero ic i fu rori. Ths significance o f these resemblances 
l ie s  in the developing concept o f imagination which, though having no direct 
counterpart in Plato, becomes with increasing certainty through Ficino,
Bruno, Paracelsus and Boehme, the common identity for  a ll o f  these mystical 
prodigies.
Boehme had understood that in the cosmos whose secrets and knowledge 
are greater in depth and magnitude than the human mind could hope to embrace, 
any interpretation a conception o f  the cosmos is  necessarily a condition o f 
the mind. Mind may lim it i t s e l f ,  or i t  may recognise that i t s  conceptions
r
are less  than i t s e l f  and are products o f  w ill shaped in imagination. The 
imagination is  thus an indiepensible, working configuration o f the known 
as i t  is  known, but must also be a projection o f the honourable. Boehme's 
concept o f  knowledge i s  almost Soeratic, though a product o f  monotheism rather 
than polytheism, in that knowledge i s  absolute, identified  with a form o f 
omniscience, and existentially  viable rather than -  i f  th is is  possible -  
ontologically . For Boehme, who had experienced the 'te rr ify in g  fla sh ' o f 
nyctical revelation, the rational and empirical epietemolgies were im plicitly  
a reduction and a lim itation o f man's potential divinity; they o ffe r  kinds 
o f  knowledge consistent with their modes o f enquiry, (despite claims o f 
exclusivity), but not knowledge i t s e l f  conceived as gnostic, unified whole.
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Imagination, in this ethos, is  regarded as the universal agent and medium o f 
th is  synthesis, end here ve recognise a quality o f 'Bomantic' imagination. 
Through Paracelsus the t r iv ia l ,  undistracted cn eiric  imagination is  
e x p lic it ly  unified with elemental and alchemical science, to he come an 
ubiquitous 'sp irit*  having a substantive -  though unquantifiable -  rea lity , 
able to go anywhere and to be, or become, anything. Fire and the quintessential 
ether are very closely associated with this conception o f  imagination, an 
association which modern metaphorical speech s t i l l  maintains. The important 
question, made pressing by the refutation o f  elemental science and the 
phlogiston theory, and by an increasingly vigorous epistemology and 
psychology, is  whether "imagination" can maintain i t s  pretensions to . the 
immanent, the transcendent, and the universal, and s t i l l  remain a serviceable 
concept. This question may be unanswerable, depending on the mode o f 
enquiry, since in this broad conception "imagination" is  inclusive rather 
than exclusive o f  ( e .g . ) rational and empirical modes. Here we see the 
power o f  metaphor, since reason and experience may be regarded as metaphorical 
excursions into ip iorm ce, in the way that drama is  a metaphor for l i f e .
The danger, often overlooked by rationalists and scien tists , i s  that 
lim itations become obscured by achievements, and w hat starts as a mode o f 
enquiry becomes enquiry i t s e l f .  In this context we see something o f  the 
wisdom, end the optimism, o f  Boehme' s determinitive imagination. And in •
discussing Boehme we discuss a precursor o f  existentialism and Romanticism, 
and in his idea o f imagination and it s  implications -  symbolic and sensual -  
we have an intimation o f  the aesthetic theory w hich sees art as man's greatest 
glory, end imagination as the psychological origin  o f  art. Art becomes the 
statement o f  man's highest aspirations, and the work o f  art the foc'J. point 
o f  the individual's in f in i t i  sing motions, culminating in "inspiration" or 
aesthetic experience. as i'oraceisus nad said s
"Intellectual reasoning may arrive at the door o f  the spiritual temple, but 
man cannot enter without perceiving that the temple exists or that he has 
the power to enter." (in  Hartman. o p .c it . .  p.271).
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As D.P.Walker* s book shows, there were several prominent men who, like 
Ficino, Jruno, and Paracelsas, attempted to create a science out o f Neo­
platonic, Pythagorean, and other occolt b e lie fs  each as Hcrmeticism. What 
these alchemists and magicians achieved was a measure o f respectalility for 
operations whose nature was hitherto regarded as in ferior but whose importance 
grew with the authority o f texts such as the "Hermetica". As well as 
in itia tin g  the rise  o f empirical science, these operators also developed a 
concept o f imagination whose power was seen as (pseudo-) sc ie n tific  rather 
than aesthetic* The attempt by Ficino and Pico della  Mi ran dol a to unify a ll 
knowledge seems to have demanded on instrument o f unity such as Spiritus* 
which, like  imagination, operated between in te lle ct  and matter. For 
Ficino i t  was music which was the primary medium o f spiritus, a view which has 
le s s  orig inality  Then we remember that Renaissance music stressed words 
rather than mnsic and -that Plotinus had suggested the importance o f language 
in linking the higher reaches o f imagination with the mind. The visual and 
ta c t ile  equivalents o f  the Ficinian incantations were Talismans, amongst 
which we may count, as Dr. Yates says, a number o f Renaissance paintings.
With his a b ility  to concentrate and synthesise many visual images into one 
the artist thus achieves the status o f  Magas such as was sought by Giordano 
Bruno. Bruno's assertion that he who in himself sees e ll things is  a ll 
things, put into practice through the ancient art o f  memory, gives to the >
imagination as associative a talismanic function and to the owner o f such 
an imagination a messianic status such as was held by Socrates, Christ, and 
Hermes Trismcgistus. Imagination is  seen to have a symbolic and empyrean 
power hut th is power is  a magical one, tied  to magical b e lie fs  end practices. 
Whereas Bruno's quest was largely autonomous, the medical a ctiv ities  o f  
Paracelsus were more social although they vers partly alchemical and magical 
luu partly :meaical;: in a wore modern sense, and taougn the substantial, 
and ubiquitous power which Paracelsus credited to imagination was greatly 
over-stated wo should not bo too dismissive, as perhaps modern practitioners 
curs, o f psychosomatlcs. But the demise o f elemental science brought the
150
demise o f  th is potent concept o f  a magical imagination, the ugh some o f  the 
old  doctrines, interlarded with neo-Vict©rine mysticism, were passed on 
by Boehme, who was an achnirer o f  Paracelsus« Boehme is  a link between the 
old  magical end Gnostic doctrines and the mystical aspects o f Bomanticism. 
The aesthetic which gave to art a kind o f  religious function and to 
imagination a mystical one has it s  precursor in the mystical writings 
o f  Boehme, who thus anticipates Bloke and Wordsworth as well as having a 
profound influence on the Theosophy movement o f Mae. Blavatskya, o f whom 
Yeats and Joyce were devotees. The empyrean imagination o f  magic and 
mysticism moves, in the space o f  some 150 years or more, from science to 
art.
1J1
APPENDIX A.
There are two translations o f "Homotica "  available, G.R.S.Hoad's 
"Thrice Greatest Hermes" and W,Scott*s "Hermética", o f which S cott's  is  
easily  the best. He dates the "Hermética" at about A.D. 207-310, ( p . 8 ) .  
and considers that they "probably represent the teachings o f a man such 
as Ammonias Saccaa (o f  about A.D. 243) who was the teacher o f  Plotinus, 
as Porphyry t e l ls  u s .” (p .2 ). Plato i s  the greatest influence on the 
Hermetic texts, especially Timaeus. and Scott finds no trace o f Christianity -  
which he thinks the Hermetists considered to be beneath contempt -  and l i t t l e  
evidence o f Egyptian b e lie fs , thou^i the authors were probably Egyptians 
with a Greek education (as was Plotinus).
There is  a notable absence o f  theurgy in the "Hermética", whose 
message is  one o f  se lf-re lian ce  and steadfastness: "Think things out fo r  
yourself and you w ill not go astray." ("Hermética" XI. i i ) . The following 
quotations w ill give a clear indication o f  the significant b e lie fs  expressed 
in the "Hermética" :
" . . . . . . a l l  things that come into being come out o f things that are, not out
o f  things that are n o t ."  ("A Discourse o f  Hermes Trisnegistus to Asdepius" 
Lib. II  Sec. 13).
The philosophy o f  the "Hermética" i s  te leo log ica l:
" . . . .  the Kosmos . . . . .h a s  been made by God. The Kosmoa is  eveivliving; for 
i t  i s  made inmortal by the Father, who i s  eternal. The Father has not been 
made by another; i f  he has been made at a ll  he has been made by himself; but 
i t  ought rather to be said that he has never been made, but ever i s .  Bit 
the Kosmos is  ever being made.” ("A Discourse o f Hermes Trismegistus" (Lib. 
VIII Sec.2 ).
" . . . . . . m an.....has been made in the image o f the Kosmos. Han d iffers  from
fill fithfii.' living vxéáUueó upvu uie vai'tii, ui uiut uu pvesvsBes lajkixu, xux'
do the Father has w illed; and not only docs man find himself to be in union 
with the second God, but he also apprehends by thought the f i r s t  God. Ho 
perceives the second God as body; ho apprehends the f i r s t  God as bod iless." 
(o p .c i t . ,  Sec.5)
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"Men think there is  a difference between sense and thought, in that sense 
i s  connected with natter, and thought with incorporeal and eternal substance. 
But I hold that sense and thought are united, and cannot be sep a ra ted ....."  
(O p .cit.. L ib. IX Sec l . b . )
"And there w ill never come a time when anything that exists w ill cease 
to be; fo r  God contains a ll things, and there i s  nothing which is  not in 
God, and nothing which God is  not. Nay, I  would rather say, not that God 
contains a ll things, but that, to speak the fu ll truth, God is, a ll things." 
(O p .cit.. Sec. 9 . )
"And the v ice  o f  the soul is  lack o f  knowledge" (Op.cit. Lib. X S ec.8 ,b .)
(This i s  in direct opposition to original sin, and the fa l l  o f  Adam owing 
to h is desire for  knowledge).
"For man i s  a being o f  divine nature; he i s  comparable, not to other liv in g  
creatures upon earth, but to the gods in heaven. Nay, i f  we are to speak 
the truth without fear, he who is  indeed a man i s  even above the gods o f 
heaven, or at any rate he equals them in power. None o f the gods o f heaven 
w ill ever quit heaven, and pass i t s  boundary, and come down to earth; 
but man ascends even to heaven, and measures i t ;  and what is  more than all 
beside, he mounts to heaven without quitting the earth; to so vast a 
distance can he put forth  his power. Ve must not shrink from saying that 
a man in earth is  a mortal god, and that god in heaven is  an imnortal ,
man." (Loc. c i t . .  Sec. 24b)
"Bid your soul travel to any land you choose, and sooner than you can 
bid i t  go, i t  w ill be there. Bid i t  pass on from land to ocean, and i t  
w ill be there no less quickly; . . . . . . .B i d  i t  f ly  up to heaven, and i t  w ill
have no need o f  wings; nothing can bar i t s  way .. .. . .A n d  should you wish
to break forth  from the universe i t s e l f ,  and gaze on the things outside 
uu) lu»atuuto (iX iuueeu there la auy tuiug outside ihe Eoamos), even that 
i s  pexmittod to you. See what power, what quickness is  yours." ("A 
Discourse o f  Mind to Hermes" L ib. XI See. 19).
153
" I f  then you do not make yourself equal to God, you cannot apprehend God; 
fo r  lik e  is  known by l ik e ."  — "Think that for  you nothing is  impossible; 
deem that you too ore immortal, end that you are able to group a ll things 
in your thought, to know every cra ft and every science ; find your home in 
the haunts o f  every liv in g  creature; make yourself higher than a ll  heights, 
and lower than a ll depths; bring together in yourself a ll opposites o f 
quality, heat and cold, dryness and flu id ity ; think -that you are not yet 
begotten, that you are in -the womb, that you are young, that you are, 
that you have died, that you are in the world beyond the grave; grasp in 
your thought a ll th is at once, a ll times and places, a ll substances and 
qualities and magnitudes together; then you can apprehend God.” (o p .c it . .
Sec 20.b)
I t  i s  not d if f ic u lt  to imagine the amazement and excitement with 
which Renaissance men read these passages. The Biblical message o f sin, 
gu ilt , repentence, p iety  end damnation, can hardly compete with the fierce  
optimism o f the "Heruetica"; when one considers how wisely read the texts 
mnst have been, to judge by the number o f  editions to which they ran, Dr. 
Tates' estimation o f their part in the Renaissance looks decidedly tentative. 
A Ficino or a Bruno, reading th is revolutionary message, must have asked 
"How?" -  "How can I achieve this godlike omniscience, this 'grasp o f a ll 
things in thought' ? "  The answer, quite naturally must have been "in and 
through imagination", fo r  the ubiquitous, oneiric powers o f imagination had 
long been recognised. We are also to ld  in the "Hermetica" o f  the a rt is t ic , 
image-making powers o f  man:
" .............even as God i s  the maker o f  the gods o f  heaven, so man i s  the
fashioner o f  the gods who dwell in temples and are content to have man for  
their neighbours, Thus man not only receives the lig h t  o f  divine l i f e ,  but 
gives i t  also; he not only makes h is way upward to .God but he even fashions 
gods." Adding "I mean statues, but statues liv in g  and conscious, f i l le d
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with the breath o f l i f e ,  and doing many mighty works; statues which 
have foreknowledge, and predict future events by the drawing o f  lo ts  
aid by prophetic inspiration, and by dreams, and in many other ways; 
statues which in f l ic t  diseases and heal them, dispensing sorrow and joy  
according to men's deserts." ( " Asclcpiua" 25.b -  24.e .)
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Introduction
In this fourth part I am concerned with two things; f ir s t ly , to 
explain and analyse the philosophy o f imagination of what are generally 
considered to be the most important philosophers o f the 17th century, 
and secondly to indicate which aspects o f  their philosophical tenets 
influenced subsequent developments in the theory o f imagination. Of the 
five  chapters which comprise th is part o f  the thesis the f ir s t  is  on 
Bacon and llobbes, the second on Descartes, the third Spinoza, the fourth 
Locke and the f i f th  Leibniz. This is  a period which saw the demise o f 
the old  alchemical and magical practices and the rise  o f  modem empirical 
science, and philosophical interest begins to centre on the nature end 
lim its o f  human knowledge and on the establishment o f universally acceptable 
methods o f acquiring knowledge. As respect and demand for  demonstrable 
evidence increase so suspicious o f  the alleged magical, occult powers o f 
an unquantifiable imagination also grow, and this change o f attitude is  
clearly  apparent in the works o f  Francis Bacon. The concept o f imagination 
suffers comparative neglect at the hands o f  Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz, 
though the Neoplatonic tradition which so influenced Bacon's near contemp­
oraries Bruno and Boehme strongly informs the reactions o f Spinoza and Leibniz 
to the Cartesien ontology. From the old  cognitive triad o f sense-imagination/ 
memory-mind philosophers in the Cartesian tradition tend to emphasise mind 
and i t s  organisational powers at the expense o f the other two, in agreement 
with the Stoic viewpoint; the largely Ehglish empirical tradition tends to 
emphasise the importance o f first-hand experience at the expense o f 
imagination and mind. Imagination, with i t s  associations with discredited 
operr.ciona and practices and i t s  long-established «morality, was o f minimal 
importance, and i t  was not to r ise  to prominence before the loss o f faith 
in the in fa l l ib i l i ty  o f reason and the demise o f metaphysics. In this 
context — the beginnings o f the Romantic theory o f imagination -  we are 
looking ahead to the publication o f Addison's essays "On the Pleasures of 
Imagination" which owed an enormous amount to the publication o f  Locke's
156
"Essay" and which in their turn greatly influenced German aesthetic theory 
o f  the (Sviss) writers Bodmer and Breitinger. I have already said much 
about the mystical tradition passed on by Boehme; this tradition is  very 
important in relation to the "spiritual" aspects o f the rising (and 
established) German nationalism with it s  strong vein o f  pietism, and the 
re-emergence o f the notion o f  a mystical, aesthetic imagination. In the 
aesthetics o f  Itomanticism the lines o f  enquiry, which we have been (and are) 
follow ing, converge. Thus the Cartesian aspects o f  Leibniz 's philosophy 
are passed on to Kant via  Wolff and Banmgarten, and the Pantheism, so 
regarded, o f  Spinoza is  revived by Herder and Schelling -  the la tter  also 
wrote a book on Bruno -  and Boehme' s mysticism greatly influences Hamann. 
Not even the experts seem to have extricated the exact nature and extent 
o f  th is dynasty o f ideas, but the important point is  that the Bomantic 
notion o f  imagination which currently inhabits art educational theory is  
founded no less  on mystical and magical bases than on philosophical and 
psychological ones, and that these bases are very closely  interelated. 
Having considered the mystical and magical, 1 now turn to the philosophical 
ancestors o f the Bomantic imagination.
*
Chapter 1 : P'CON AN I? •.'OBBSS.
The u b iq u i t y  and om n ip oten ce  o f  th e  m a g ica l im a g in a t io n  such ao we 
fo u n d  i n  P a r a c e l  m i s  and B runo, end w hich  was c o n s i s t e n t  w ith  th e  p a n t h e is t i c  
c o s m o lo g y  o f  N e o p la t o n ic  and H erm etic  b e l i e f s ,  comes u n d er  r ig o r o u s  s c r u t in y  
in  E n g lis h  e m p ir i c a l  p h i lo o o p h y .  A g a in s t  th e  e x a g g e r a te d  c la im s  made f o r  
im a g in a t io n  F r a n c is  Bacon a d o p ts  w hat can b e s t  bo d e s c r ib e d  C3 a s c i e n t i f i c  
a t t i t u d e ;  su ch  c la im s ,  he c a y s , n e e d  t o  b e  te G te d  and h e  w i l l  n o t  d ism das 
them u n t i l  th e y  h a v e  been  p ro v e d  w ron g . I t  i s  c l e a r  from  h iu  w ork s t h a t  
Bacon knew  som eth in g  o f  P a r a c e ls u s ,  b u t  h e  i s  s c e p t i c a l  o f  th e  o p e r a t io n a l  
o r  s c i e n t i f i c  u se  o f  im a g in a t io n  a s  P a r a c e ls u s  u n d e r s to o d  i t  and sa y o  th a t  
i t  i s  p o e t r y  w h ich  i s  th e  p r o d u c t  o f  im a g in a t io n , and l a t e r  a s c r ib e s  th e  
o r i g i n  o f  p o e t r y  t o  " w i t “ . T h is  l a t t e r  v ie w  i s  a ls o  h e ld  b y  H obbe3 w ho, 
s t a t in g  th e  o r i g i n  o f  fa n c y  in  e x p e r ie n c e ,  i d e n t i f i e s  "n a tu r a l  g o o d  w i t "  w ith  
" f a n c y "  ( im a g in a t io n ) .  Both Bacon and H obbes a re  s u s p ic i o u s  o f  th e  e a s y  
p r o d u c t s  o f  i n s p i r a t i o n  and r e v e la t i o n ,  fa v o u r in g  th e  la b o r io u s  a ccu m u la tio n  
o f  k n o w le d g e  by e x p e r ie n c e  and m ethod .
I t  i s  a  em ail i r o n y  th a t  L o ck e  s h o u ld  be  go c r i t i c a l  o f  th e  ' s c h o o l s '  
s in c e  w hat i s  l o o s e l y  c a l l e d  th e  * e m p ir ic is m ' i s  t o  a  la r g e  e x t e n t  A r i s ­
t o t e l i a n  in  o u t l o o k .  I f  F r a n c is  Bacon i s  th e  f a t h e r  o f  B r i t i s h  e m p ir ic is m , 
A r i s t o t l e  i.3 i t s  g o d fa t h e r ,  even  th o u g h , R u s s e l !  o b s e r v e d , w ith  an u n ch a ra c ­
t e r i s t i c  d is r e g a r d  f o r  th e  t r u th , t h a t  Bacon "was v i r u l e n t l y  h o s t i l e  t o  
A r i s t o t l e " .  ( " H i s t ,  o f  VT. P h i l . "  p .  1 2 3 ) .  Bacon q u o te s  A r i s t o t l e  w ith  
a p p r o v a l ,  end toast h ave  u n d e r s to o d , o s  L e ib n i z  c e r t a i n l y  d id  ( l )  t h a t  th e  
'A r i s t o t e l i a n ! :  n ' o f  th e  Schoolm en wao q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t  from  th e  t r u e  A r i s t o t l e  
The c e le b r a t e d  end o v e r -e m p h a s is e d  t~d.nl a  vase.» t o  w h ich  L o ck e  r e f e r s  in  th e  
f i r s t  e d i t i o n  o f  h i s  F e e ry , he g o t  from  D e s c a r te e ,  b u t  i t  o r i g i n a t e s  from  th e  
P /y fr i i in -  o f  A r i s t o t l e .  F or  L o ck e , t h e r e  i s  n o th in g  in  th e  m ind w h ich  d id  
n o t  f i r s t  a p p ear  t o  th e  s e n s e s , and c o n s e q u e n t ly  im a g in a t io n , in  i t s  f a m i l ia r  
in te r m e d ia r y  r a l e ,  becom es an u d ju n e t  o f  se n se  b u t a c t s  in  th e  o p p o s i t e
( l )  See 1x1 a A p p en d ix  in  'llaw  E s sa y s "  nn . 6 5 5 -6 4 ? .  in  p r a i s o  o f  A r i s t C t l e .
SKCVICX I
153
d i r e c t i o n  fr o m  th e  r a t i o n a l i s t  a c c o u n t .  In  t h i s  ’..’a y , im a g in a t io n  d o e s  
'* n o t  o r g a n is e  a c c o r d in g  t o  th e  d i c t a t e  o f  r e a s o n , h a t s im p ly  r e f l e c t s  what 
se n se  p r e s e n t s  t o  i t .  Im a g in a tio n  noeraj, h e re  t o  ho d e n ie d  a  c r o a t iv e  
c a p a c it y ,  h u t  B e r k e le y 's  q u e s t io n in g  o f  th e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  n a tu r a l  u n i t y ,  
t o g e t h e r  w it h  H om e's a t ta c k  on  c a u s a l i t y ,  i n e v i t a b ly  e f f e c t  th e  e le v a t io n  
o f  im a g in a t io n  t o  some im p o rta n ce  in  p h i lo s o p h y  and p s y c h o lo g y .  T hese 
ch a n g in g  f o r t u n e s  o f  im a g in a t io n  a re  r e f l e c t e d ,  o s  we s h a l l  s e e ,  in  
A d d is o n 's  " S p e c t a t o r "  e s s a y s  and in  G e r a r d 's  "E ssay  on G e n iu s " .
E n g lis h  p h i lo s o p h y  th e  im m edia te  o r i g i n  o f  t h i s  s t a t e  o f  a f f a i r s  i s  
fou n d  in  B a c o n 's  Novum O rganon , w h ich  u d v o c a te s  in d u c t iv e  m ethods o f  e n q u ir y  
in t o  n a t u r e .  W ith B acon  th e  t r a d i t i o n  o f  E n g lis h  c r i t i c a l  p h i lo s o p h y  b e g in s ,  
and w hat o n e  e n c o u n te r s  in  h i s  w r i t in g s  i s  n o t  a  p o le m ic  a g a in s t . C a th o l ic  
p h o n t a s is in g ,  b u t on th e  w h o le  a  f i n e  show o f  p la in  g o o d  s e n s e .  H is  o c c a s io n a l  
r e f e r e n c e s  t o  P a r a c e ls u s  sa d  t o  m a g ica l p r a c t i c e  g e n e r a l l y  e x p r e s s  r e s e r v a t io n  
r a th e r  th a n  r i d i c u l e ,  a  g ood  u n d e r s ta n d in g  o f  human g u l l i b i l i t y ,  and on 
o m in o u s ly  p u r i t o n n ic a l  fram e o f  m ind -  "The w i s e s t ,  b r i g h t e s t ,  m ea n est o f  
m ankind" ( l )  -  "F a s c in a t io n  i s  th e  p ow er and a c t  o f  im a g in a t io n  in t e n s iv e  upon 
th e  b od y  o f  a n o t h e r . . . . .  w h ere in  th e  s c h o o l  o f  P a r a c e ls u s  and th e  d i s c i p l e s  o f  
p r e te n d e d  n a t u r a l  m a g ic  h ave been  so  in te m p e r a te , t h a t  t h e y  h ave  e x a lt e d  the 
pow er and a p p re h e n s io n  o f  th e  im a g in a t io n  t o  be. much on e  w ith  th e  pow er o f  
m ir a c le  — w o rk in g  f a i t h .  O th e r s , t h a t  draw n e a r e r  t o  p r o b a b i l i t y ,  l o o k in g  <
w ith  a c l e a r e r  eye  a t  th e  s e c r e t  w o rk in g s  and im p r e s s io n s  o f  t h in g s ,  th e  
i r r a d i a t i o n s  o f  th e  s e n s e s ,  t o  p a ssa g e  o f  c o n ta g io n  from  b o d y  t o  b o d y , th e  
co n v e y a n ce  o f  m a g a c t ic  v i r t u e s ,  h ave c o n c lu d e d  t h a t  i t  i s  much m ore p r o b a b le  
t h a t  t h e r e  sh o u ld  be  im p r e s s io n s ,  co n v e y a n ce s  and com m u n ica tion s  from  s p i r i t  
t o  s p i r i t  ( s e e i n g  t h a t  th o  s p i r i t  i s  '.b o v c  a l l  th in g s  b o t h  s tre n u o u s  t o  a c t  
and s o f t  an d  te n d e r  t o  be a c t e d  o n ; w hence h ave a r is e n  t h o s e  c o n c e i t s  (now  
becom e o s  i t  w ere p o p u la r ) o f  th e  m a s te r in g  s p i r i t ,  o f  men u n lu ck y  tuid i l l -  
om ened, o f  th o  g la n c e s  o f  l o v e ,  en vy , and th e  l i k e .  W ith  t h i3  i s  j o i n e d  th e  
e n q u iry  how  t o  r a i s e  and f o r t i f y  th e  im a g in a t io n ; f o r  i f  th e  im a g in a t io n  
f o r t i f i e d  h a v e  so  much p o w e r, i t  i s  w o rth  w h ile  t o  know how to  f o r t i f y  and 
( l )  P on e . "E ssa y  on M an", I t ; ,_  282..
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e x a l t  i t .  And h e r e  com es in  c r o o k e d ly  and d a u g c io u s ly  a p a l l i a t i o n  cr.a 
d e fe n c e  o f  a  g r e a t  p a r t  o f  c e re m o n ia l m a g ic . F or i t  n a y  be s p e c io u s l y  
p r e te n d e d  t h a t  c e r e m o n ie s , c h a r a c t e r s ,  charm s, g e s t i c u l a t i o n s ,  a m u le ts , 
and th e  l i k e ,  do n o t  d e r iv e  t h e i r  pow er from  any t a c i t  o r  s c c r c m e n ie l  
c o n t r a c t  v i t h  e v i l  s p i r i t s ,  b u t  s e r v e  o n ly  t o  s tre n g th e n  and e x a l t  th o  
im a g in a t io n  o f  h im  who u s e s  them . As l ik e w is e  in  r e l i g i o n  th e  u s e  o f  
im ages t o  f i x  t b e  c o g i t a t i o n s  and r a i s e  th e  d e v o t io n s  o f  th o s e  who p r e y  
b e f o r e  th e n  h a s  grown common. My own ju d g em en t h ow ever  i s  t h i s  : though  
i t  be  a d m it te d , t h a t  im a g in a t io n  h a s  p ow er, and f u r t h e r  t h a t  ce re -a o n ie s  
f o r t i f y  and s t re n g th e n  t h a t  p ow er; and t h a t  th e y  be  u se d  s i n c e r e l y  and 
i n t e n t i o n a l l y  f o r  t h a t  p u r p o s e ,  and a s  a  p h y s ic a l  rem edy, w ith o u t  any th e  
l e a s t  th o u g h t  o f  i n v i t i n g  t h e r e b y  th e  a id  o f  s p i r i t s ;  th e y  a r e  n e v e r t h e le s s  
t o  be  h e ld  u n la w fu l ,  a s  o p p o s in g  and d is p u t in g  t h a t  d iv in e  s e n te n c e  p a s s e d  
upon man f o r  s i n ,  ' I n  th e  sw ea t o f  t h e y  f a c e  e h a lt  th ou  e a t  b r o a d ' *  F or  
m a g ic  o f  t h i s  k in d  p r o p o s e s  t o  a t t a in  th o s e  n o b le  f r u i t s  w h ich  God o r d a in e d  
t o  be  bought- a t  th e  p r i c e  o f  la b o u r  b y  a  few  e a s y  and s l o t h f u l  o b s e r v a n c e s " .  
( " O f  Tho D ig n it y  and A dvancem ent o f  L e a r n in g "  ir*c, h■ C h .I I I  rn  400—4 0 1 ) .
B acon  had w hat we m ig h t  c a l l  a  s l i g h t l y  s c e p t i c a l ,  e n q u ir in g  m ind, aau
when h e  d o e s  d e s c r ib e  th e  a l l e g e d  p o w e rs  o f  m a g ic  and im a g in a t io n  in  th e
u s e  o f  w hat h e  c a l l s  " im a g in e d ts * 1 — som eth in g  l i k e  B r u n o 's  ta lis m a n s  -  he
r e s e r v e s  ju d g e m e n t. He i s  c a r e fu l  n o t  t o  condemn su ch  b e l i e f s  o u t  o f  
s u s p e c t in g
h an d , p e r h a p s /t h a t  a  s t r o n g  im a g in a t io n  con  'b r in g  on th e  e v e n t ' ,  bu t i t  
i s  e v id e n t  t h a t  w hat h e  r e a l l y  r e q u ir e s  i s  some in fo r m a t io n  on how and why 
su ch  t h in g s  seem t o  w ork :
"The r e l a t i o n s  to u c h in g  th e  f o r c e  o f  im ag in a tion , and th e  s e c r e t  i n s t i n c t s  
o f  n a t u r e ,  a re  so  u n c e r t a in ,  a s  th e y  r e q u ir e  a  g r e a t  d ea l o f  ex a m in a tio n  
e r e  we c o n c lu d e  upon  t h o u . " ■ ( o p , c i t . . S ec  98*>. p . 6 G6 ) .
TTi -■ - —  -J- l  ~ . .. .  J .  .  . . i  . )  . iv -  . . .»-* **>*•"“* »'♦ vavj»w «•¿u.it'ijv luxu vuc Jf'VBCA Wi ait*
p u r i t a n n ic n l  :in thr '^t th e y  r e c t  on the  p r e c o n c e p t io n  t l ia t  advou 'tagoe nr©
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v o n  o n ly  b y  la b o u r ;  b u t  t h i s  i o  tem pered  by  h i s  r e a l i s a t i o n  t h a t  th e  f a c t s  
■will c n l y  be  d eterm in ed  by  le n g t h y  e x a m in a tio n . P resu m ab ly  sncb en exam in­
a t io n  w ou ld  demand d e m o n stra b le , c a u sa l e v id e n c e  o f  th e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  o f  
• im a g in n n ts ',  f o r  Bacou i s  som eth in g  o f  n m a t e r i a l i s t  who a c c e p t s  th e  
f a c u l t y  p s y c h o l o g i s t s ’  a s c r ip t i o n  t o  th e  v e n t r i c l e s  o f  th e  b r a in ,  o f  th e  
th r e e  ' f a c u l t i e s '  o f  r e a s o n , im a g in a t io n , and s e n s e ,  ( l )  B a s i c a l l y  h i s  
v ie w  o f  im a g in a t io n  i s  A r i s t o t e l i a n ,  c a l l i n g  i t  "an  a g e n t , o r  m essen ger  
o r  p r o c t o r  in  b o th  p r o v in c e s ,  b o th  th e  j u d i c i a l  and m i n i s t e r i a l , " ( 2 )  in  
th e  fo r m e r  c a p a c i t y  i t  a c t s  a c c o r d in g  t o  s e n s o , and in  t h e  l a t t e r  a c c o r d in g  
t o  r e a s o n .  But t h i s  i o  n o t  i t s  s o l e  fu n c t i o n ,  f o r  im a g in a t io n  h a s  i t s  own 
freedom , f o r  w h ich  Bacon q u o te s  a happy m etap h or :
"F o r  i t  was w e ll  s a id  b y  A r i s t o t l e ,  'T h a t  th e  m ind has o v e r  th e  b od y  t h a t  
commandment w h ich  th e  l o r d  h a s  e v e r  th e  bondman; b u t t h a t  r e a s o n  h a s  o v e r  
th e  im a g in a t io n  t h a t  commandment w h ich  a  m a g is t r a te  h as o v e r  a f r e e  c i t i z e n . *  
F or  we se e  th a t  in  r o t t e r s  o f  f a i t h  and r e l i g i  on our im a g in a t io n  r a i s e s  
i t s e l f  above o u r  r e a s o n ; n o t  th a t  d iv in e  i l lu m in a t io n  r e s i d e s  in  th e  
im a g in a t io n ; i t s  s e a t  b e in g  r a tL e r  in  th e  v e r y  c i t a d e l  o f  th e  m ind and under­
s ta n d in g ; b u t  t h a t  th e  d iv in e  g ra ce  u s e s  th e  m o tio n s  o f  t h e  im a g in a t io n  as 
an in s tru m e n t o f  i l lu m in a t i o n ,  j u s t  a s  i t  u s e s  th e  m o t io n e  o f  th e  w i l l  &3 
on in s tru m e n t o f  v i r t u e ;  w h ich  i s  th e  re a so n  why r e l i g i o n  o v e r  so u g h t 
a c c e s s  t o  th e  m ind b y  s i m i l a r i t i e s ,  t y p e s ,  p a r a b le s  v i s i e n s ,  d re a m s ."  ( l . o c .  
c i t . ) The above p a ssa g e  f o l l o w s  B a c o n 's  d i v i s i o n  o f  human le a r n in g  in t o  
t h r o e  a r e a s  -  h i s t o r y ,  p o e s y ,  end ph ilosox>hy -  w hich  c o r r e s p o n d  t c  th e  
t h r e e  f a c u l t i e s  o f  th e  human m ind, memory, im a g in a t io n , e n d  r e a s o n . G iven  
a  r e la t i o n s h ip  betw een  'p o e s y *  and im a g in a t io n , and be tw een  'd i v i n e  i l lu m in ­
a t i o n '  and im a g in a t io n , th e  m aking o f  a  l i n k  betw een  a l l  t h r o e  — p o e t r y ,  
im a g in a t io n  and i l lu m in a t io n  -  seems t o  be  a  l o g i c a l  s t e p  t o  t a k e .  B acon ,
•Tor w b n tev or  r e a s o n s ,  i s  c u r io u s ly  l o a t h  t o  ta k e  t h i s  a t e n .  d e l i h c r a i e l v
( 1 )  Geo "O f the Advancement o f  Learning" Bk.iV . Ch I ,  o . 5 7 0 . F or  e discussion 
o f  Bacon's th e o r y  o f imagination, see h.B.'..'ri] e c o .  "IVancio Bacon on th e  Nature 
o f  lin n " p . . _ 6 j f f .
( 2 )  "O f t iie  D ig n ity  end Advancem ent o f  b e a m in g " ,  B k .V, Cji I ,  pp ,l[0 ^ ..4 0 6 .
*  A r i s t o t l e ,  " P o l i t i c s " ,  1 ,  j . ,
a v o id in g  t o  a s c r ib e  any d iv in e  fu n c t io n  o f  any  co n se q u e n ce  t o  im a g in a t io n , 
au'd la t e :  , l e s t  th e  p o in t  b e  ra isse d , he c o n t r a d i c t s  h im s e lf  in  w hat a p p e a rs  
t o  be  on a ttem p t t o  d e p r iv e  p o e t r y  and im a g in a t io n  o f  any d i v i n i t y :
" ...........I  see  n o  cau se  t o  a l t e r  th e  fo rm e r  d i v i s i o n ;  f o r  im a g in a t io n  h a r d ly
p r o d u c e s  s c i e n c e s ;  p o e sy  (w h ic h  in  th e  b e g in n in g  was r e f e r r e d  to  im a g in a t io n )  
b e in g  t o  be  a c c o u n te d  r a t h e r  a s  a  p le a s u r e  o r  p la y  o f  w i t  th an  a  s c ie n c e '*  
( l o c . c i t ) .  h a v in g  p r e v i o u s ly  s a id  th a t  •poesy* and p a in t in g  a r e  " th e  w ork  
o f  I m a g in a t io n " ,  p o e t r y  he q u i c k ly  d e c id e s  i s  a  k in d  o f  i n t e l l e c t u a l  amusement 
and so  m is3 es  on o p p o r tu n ity  t o  o f f e r  an a e s t h e t i c  th e o r y  w h ich  w ou ld  h ave 
been  some 200 y e a r s  ahead o f  i t s  t im e . T h ere  seem s l i t t l e  d o u b t  th a t  Iktcon 
s u s p e c te d  t o  w here h i s  id e a s  w ere  l e a d in g ,  s in c e  h i s  d i s t i n c t i o n  betw een  
im a g in a t io n  and i t s  m o t io n s  i s  n o t  c o n s i s t e n t  w ith  A r i s t o t l e 's  a c c o u n t , w h ich  
d e s c r ib e s  im a g in a t io n  a s  ' a  k in d  o f  m o t i o n '.  P erhaps Paeon w as s u s p i c i o u s  o f  
th e  e s o t e r i c  n o t i o n s  w h ich  w e re  c r o s s in g  th e  C h an n el, and s c e p t i c a l  o f  a n y th in  
n o t  h a r d -v o m ;  b u t  even  s o ,  t h e  c la im s  and p r a c t i c e s  o f  m a g ic  and im a g in a t io n  
o r e  a t  th e  f o r e f r o n t  o f  h i s  a t t e n t i o n .
SECTION' II
I f  d a c o n 's  to n e  in  o f  p o l i t e  s c e p t i c i s m ,  H o b b e s ' i s  o f  b l u f f  common 
s e n s e .  A f t e r  th e  p r o d ig i e s  o f  m a g ic  and g n o s t ic is m , H obbes b r in g s  n s  down 
t o  e a r t h :  p h le g m a t ic ,  p e r s u a s iv e ,  b u t  q u i t e  m is le a d in g .  L ik e  th e  • s c ie n c e ' 
h e  so  much a d m ire s , H obbes p r o m is e s  and a c h ie v e s  ranch, b u t  at. a p r i c e ;  in  
h i s  c a s e ,  a s  w ith  much e m p ir i c a l  and p o s i t i v i s t i c  p h i lo s o p h y ,  th e  p r i c e  o f  
r e d u c t io n  and s i m p l i f i c a t i o n  i s  d i s t o r t i o n .  Aa admi r e r  o f  G a l i l e o ,  H obbes 
h a d  a  h e a lt h y  r e s p e c t  f o r  tire p o s s i b i l i t i e s  o f  m a th em a tics  oud M ech an ics , 
and a  b e l i e f  in  th e  e f f i c a c y  o f  m eth od . He i s  a n o m in a l .is t ,  r i g i d l y  main­
t a in in g  th e  autonom y o f  m a te r ia l  o b j e c t s  and a r g u in g  t h a t  n o t io n s  o f  sub­
s t a n t i a l i t y ,  aua th e  c o n c e p ts  b y  w h ich  we i d e n t i f y  them , a re  f i c t i o n s  o f  
th e  m in d . N a rro w ly  a v o id in g  th e  ' im p r e s s io n ' t h e o r y  o f  p e r c e p t io n ,  he argu es 
t h a t  se n se  i s  ca u se d  b y  an " e x t e r n a l  b o d y , o r  o b j e c t ,  w h ich  p n s s e ih  th e  organ 
p r o p e r  t o  e a ch  s e n s e . "  ( " L e v ia t h a n "  P t . I . Ch^JL. ) T h is  'p r e s s u r e '  o f  th e  
'm o t io n s  o f  m a t t e r ’  i s  t r a n s m it t e d  t o  h e a r t  and b r a in  "by m e d ia t io n  o f  th e  
n e r v e s ,  end o t h e r  s t r i n g s  and membranes o f  th e  b o d y , "  ( l o c . c i t ), ca u s in g  a 
r e s i s t a n c e  in  b r a in  and h e a r t ,  a  c o u n te r -m o t io n  and p r e s s u r e . . . "  w h ich  
e n d e a v o u r , b e ca u se  ou tw a rd , seem eth  t o  b e  some n a t t e r  w it h o u t .  And t h i s  
se e m in g , o r  f a n c y ,  i s  t h a t  w h ich  men c a l l  s e n s e . "  ( l o c . c i t ) .  B e a r in g  in  mind. 
P r o f .  P e t e r s '  in ju n c t i o n  n o t  t o  c r i t i c i s e  H obbes f o r  n o t  h a y in g  re a d  F reud ,
( i n  "H o b b e s " , p . l l ? ) .  we sh o u ld  n o t  be t o o  c r i t i c a l  o f  h i s  m e c h a n is t ic  me d e ls ,
b u t  P e te r s  i s  in a c c u r a t e  in  s a y in g  t h a t  H obbes " ........... s im p ly  d e v e lo p e d  a
c a u s a l t h e o r y  o f  s e n s a t io n  and saw no n e e d  f o r  c. t h e o r y  o f  r e p r e s e n t a t io n . "  
( O p . c i t . . p .lO O ) • H o b b e s ' p s e u d o -c a a s a l  a c c o u n t  h a l f  im p e ls  him  tow ards 
a  r e p r e s e n t a t io n  th e o r y  o f  s e n s e  and im a g in a t io n , when he q u it e  e x p l i c i t l y  
d i s t in g u is h e s  betw een  th e  o b j e c t  as i t  i s  and th e  p r e ju d i c e  w h ich  'jfiy  be 
e f f e c t e d  b y  o u r  p e r c e p t io n  o f  i t :
" . . . . t h o u g h  a t  somo c e r t a in  d i s t a n c e ,  th e  r e a l  find v e r y  o b j e c t  seem in v e s te d  
w ith  th e  fa n c y  i t  b e g e t s  in  11s ;  y e t  s t i l l  th e  o b j e c t  i s  one t h in g ,  th e  
im ago o r  fa n c y  i s  a n o th e r .  So t h a t  s e n s e ,  in  e l l  c a s e s ,  i s  n o th in g  c l e e  
b a t  o r i g i n a l  f a n c y ,  i . . ”  ( " L e v ia t h a n " ,  P t . I .  Ch. l ) . I l i s  use r,f th e  te r n s
"fancy" and "imagination" in keeping with the habit o f  h is tine, is
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synonym ous, though  he knows th e  L a t in ,  v is u a l  o r i g i n  o f  th e  l a t t e r  and 
> t iie  G reek , "a p p e a r a n c e "  se n se  o f  th e  fo r m e r ; ( s e e  "L e v ia th a n " ,  I’t . I , Oh. I T . )
H is  d is p u t a t io n  a g a in s t  th e  ‘ A r i s t o t e l i a n ’ a c c o u n t  o f  the "p h ilo s o p h y  s c h o o l s "  
i s  som eth in g  o f  a  r e d  h e r r in g  -  u n le s s  th e  Schoolm en c o n fu s e d  A r i s t o t l e  w ith  
D e m o critu s  o r  L u c r e t iu s  — f o r  H obb es ’ t h e o r y  o f  im a g in a t io n  shows e v id e n c e  
o f  h i s  kn ow ledge  o f  " t h e  p h i l o s o p h e r " .  H is  c e le b r a t e d  d e s c r ip t i o n  o f  
im a g in a t io n  as "d e c a y in g  s e n s e " ,  ( o p . c i t . P t , I .  C h . I l ) .  w ith  i t s  o r g a n ic  
r a t h e r  th an  m e ch a n ica l t e n o r ,  seem s t o  r e f e r  t o  th e  mot i o n  o f  th e  ’ ap p ea ra n ce*  
w h ich  grow s e v e r  w eak er  w ith  th e  p a ssa g e  o f  tim e  and a g a in s t  the c o n t in u o u s  
demands o f  o n g o in g  sen 3 e  a lth o u g h , ( p a ce  P e t e r s )  th e  im p lie d  u n i fo r m i t y  o f  
d e c a y  i s  u n a c c e p ta b le  t o  p o s t -F r e u d ia n  p s y c h o lo g y .
H obbes m igh t h ave s u s p e c te d  w eak n esses  in  h i s  th e o r y  o f  im a g in a tio n  
fro m  h i s  two d i v i s i o n s  o f  im a g in a t io n  and from  h i s  o b s e r v a t io n s  on d rea m in g . 
R esem b lin g  A r i s t o t l e ,  and in  a n t i c ip a t i o n  o f  L c c k e ,  he h a s  " s im p le "  im ag in ­
a t i o n  w h ich  f a i t h f u l l y ,  and p r e p e r c e p t u a l ly ,  r e p e a t s  th e  se n se d  o b j e c t ,  and 
"com pou n ded" im a g in a t io n  w h ich  he c a l l s  " f i c t i o n s  o f  th e  m in d ", and o f  w h ich  
an exam ple i s  a  c e n ta u r  a s  a  compound o f  man and h o r s e .  The p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  
w ak in g  any o t h e r  than  a  l o g i c a l  d i s t i n c t i o n  betw een  th e s e  two s o r t 3  o f  
im a g in a t io n  seem s t o  e lu d e  H obb es , who s e e s  t h a t  dream s, a c t i v e  in  th e  
a b se n ce  o f  th e  c lam ou r o f  s e n s e ,  seem c l e a r e r  th an  se n se  i t s e l f ,  m aking i t  
" a  h a r d  m a tte r , and by  many th o u g h t im p o s s ib le "  t o  d is t in g u is h  betw een  
dream ing  and s e n s in g .  l i i s  f a i l u r e  t o  r e c o g n is e  o r  e x p lo r e  th e  e p i s t e m o lo g i c a l  
im p l i c a t i o n s  o f  d i s t in g u is h in g  betw een  dream end re a l i t y ,  o r  th e  c o g n i t i v e  
im p l i c a t i o n s  o f  s e p a r a t in g  dream ing from  p e r c e i v in g ,  le a d s  him  on t o  v e r y  
in s e c u r e  g rou n d . F i r s t l y ,  o u t  o f  b i s  c o n fu s io n  he u ir e  an a c c cp tr -b le  ( t o  
h i s  c o n te m p o r a r ie s )  p r e ju d i c e :
"From  t h i s  ig n o r a n c e  o f  how, t o  d is t in g u is h  dream s, and o t h e r  s t r o n g  f a n c i e s ,
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G e n t i l e s  in  tim e p a s t ,  t h a t  w o rsh ip p e d  sa ty rs ,, f a m e ,  nym phs, and th e  l i k e ;  
cu d  n o w -a -d a y s  the o p in io n  t h a t  rude p e o p le  h ave  o f  f a i r i e s , g h o s t s  and
g o b l i n s ,  and o f  th e  p ow er o f  w i t c h e s . "  ( o n . c i t . .  Pt. 1 ,  Ch. 1 1 . )  Tbo
in c o n s i s t e n c y  and i l l o g i c a l i t y  a r c  com pounded b y  h i s  h a l f - h e a r t e d
r io ll i f ica t io n  o f  the established church: "Nevertheless, there io  no
d ou b t b u t  God can make u n n a tu ra l a p p a r i t i o n s . . . « "  ( l o c . c i t . ) b u t  h i s  
r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  th e  pow er o f  s u p e r s t i t io n  f a i l e d  to  d e f l e c t  th e  chargc-3 
o f  a th e ism  t o  w hich  he becam e s u b je c t .  On t o  th in  e d i f i c e  o f  c o n fu s io n ,  
iiob b es  p l a c e s ,  s e c o n d ly ,  a  r a th e r  w e ig h t ie r  b l o c k  th an  i t  c o u ld  r e a s o n a b ly  
s u p p o r t :  " I f  t h i s  s u p e r s t i t i o n s  f e a r  o f  s p i r i t s  w ere  tak en  aw ay, and
w ith  i t ,  p r o g n o s t i c s  from  dream s, f a l s e  p r o p h e c ie s ,  and many o t h e r  th in g s  
d e p en d in g  th e r e o n , by  v h ic h  c r a f t y  a m b it io u s  p e r s o n s  ab u se  s im p le  p e o p le ,  
men w ou ld  bo  much m ore f i t t e d  f o r  c i v i l  o b e d i e n c e . "  ( l o c . c i t . ) . A lth ou gh  
h i s  p o le m ic  a g a in s t  dream ers and prophex.3 i s  v ig o r o u s  and e n t e r t a in in g ,  
and v e r y  p r o b a b ly  a  t im e ly  and d e s e rv e d  d i s c l a im e r ,  i t  i o  b a sed  on 
a ssu m p tio n s  f o r  w h ich  H obbes h as  e s t a b l i s h e d  n o  g ro u n d s . The s u p p r e s s io n  
o f  im a g in a t io n  in  t h i s  c o n t e x t  i s  seen  a s  p o l i t i c a l l y  e x p e d ie n t ,  w h ich  in  
h i s  day c o u ld  o n ly  mean im prison m en t and p e r s e c u t io n  o f  p r a c t i t i o n e r s  o f  
m a g ic  and th e  l i k e .  t h a t  i s  a t t r a c t i v e  t o  H obbes i o  an in fr in g e m e n t  o f  human 
fr e e d o m , w h ich  may o r  may n o t  he d e s i r a b l e ;  b a s e d , a s  wo s e e ,  on  p r e ju d i c e ,  
i t  i s  h a r d ly  w o rth y  o f  c o n s id e r a t i o n .  What he d o e s  a p p e a r  t o  r e c o g n is e  
i s  t h a t  a  p ro b le m  e x i s t s  a b o u t th e  d e g re e  o f  in d iv id u a l  fre e d o m  w h ich  may 
b e  a l lo w e d  c o n s i s t e n t l y  w ith  ' c i v i l  o b e d i e n c e ' ,  and t h a t  a  th e o r y  o f  
im a g in a t io n  h a s  a p o l i t i c a l  s i g n i f i c a n c e .  The m ain stream  o f  E u ropeca (
p h i lo s o p h y  h as  been  c o n c e rn e d , one way o r  a n o th e r ,  w ith  th e  r e la t i o n s h ip  
betw een  in d iv id u a ls  ( e s p e c i a l l y  o f  s e n s e )  an d  u n iv e r s a l s  ( e s p e c i a l l y  o f  
r e a s o n ) ;  t h i s  c o n ce rn  may be  e x p re s s e d  in  te rm s  o f  a  man and an id e a l  
( e . g .  ’ G o d ',  l o v e , )  o r  a n - o b j e c t  and a c o n c e p t .  The P la t o n i c  and S t o i c  
e x p r e s s io n s  o f  th e  n e e d  t o  su p p re ss  'im a g in a t io n ' in  a l l  b u t  i t s  a g re e d  
ai'.d n e c e s s a r y  fu n c t io n  a s  in te r m e d ia r y  b e tw e e n  th e  s e n s i b l e  and th e  
v rU ft im l /iH ir in p . rnd v i c e  vc-.-sn. c l earl v  h a v e  moral, and p o l i t i c a l  u n d e r ­
t o n e s ;  s e e in g  't h e  on e in  th e  many' may n o t  b e  j u s t  c o n c e p tu a l o r  th e o ­
l o g i c a l  b u t  may a l s o  r e f e r  t o  th e  in d iv id u a l  p e rso n  in  r e l a t i o n  t o  th e  
s t i i t e .  What lia s  been  e s t a b l i s h e d  i o  t h a t  i r o n  th o  tim e  o f  P l a t o ,  H o b b e s ’
g r e a t  fo r e r u n n e r  in  s e e in g  th e  p o l i t i c a l  t h r e a t  o f  en u n r e s t r a in e d
imagine xion, the re!ationsh ip  between tbe individual and the whole has 
always been seen to be occasioned, to varying degrees, by •imagination*.
Only in m ystical, magical and aesthetic terms has imagination seemed to
i
y ie ld  something more then the immediate!y-present in sense and reason.} 
and in on increasingly  pragmatic world, o f  which liobbes wan a harbinger 
and supporter, the mystical 'enthusiasm*) becomes increasingly
periphoral, the magical irrelevant, but the aesthetic, a fter the rigours 
o f  Horatian neo-classicism , grows in importance.
Whatever the weakness o f  Hobbes* psychology, i t  manifests, in common 
with some o f  the superstitions he attacks, the im plication that imagination 
is  at tbe centre o f  human consciousness. He describes understanding as 
"The imagination that i s  raised in man, or any other creature imbued with 
the fa cu lty  o f  imagining, by words, or any other voluntary s i g n s . . . . "  (op . 
c i t . , P t.I«  Ch. IT .) ,  and the primacy o f  motion, a central consideration in 
the new s c ie n t i f ic  age, and which informs b is  theory o f  imagination,leads 
him to describe thinking -  "mental discourse" -  as a "tra in ", a succession 
o f  imaginations, (see o p .c i t . P t .I .C h .I I I ) . These may be "unguided", a 
•Vil d ranging o f  the mind", ( l o c . c i t . ) or regul ftted "by some desire, end 
design": the former (presumably) re ferrin g  to waking or  sleeping dreams, 
the la t te r  he ascribes to  the seeking and prediction  o f  canses and e f fe c t s : 
"In sum, the discourse o f  the mind,, when i t  i s  governed by design, is  
nothing but seeking, or  the fa cu lty  o f  in v e n t io n .. . ."  Foresight, he 
im plies, belongs to God, but the best prophot is  the te s t  gueeser, end 
he the b est "who hath most eii-ns to guess by ." (o p .c i t . P t .I . C h .III. )
M l we imagine, he says, i s  f in it e ,  and when we say a thing is  in f in ite  we 
ate confessing cur ignorance, fo r  as he has unequivocally stated, " . . . .  a
net cu tjc c t  tc  ^cr.ccn —
nemos can be universal, (o p .c i t . P t .I . . Ch. IV. T h u s  reasoning is  simply 
an uddition or subtraction o f  parts, and the giving o f  "bodies to accidents; 
or o f  accidents te- bod ies", and the giving statements about tbe in fusion  or 
insp iration  o f fa ith  arc regarded as nbsurd by Hobbes. Henson, he soya, is
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not (joined by experience alone, nor bom with us as are sense and memory,
"but attained by industry", (o n .c i t . P t. I .  Ch. V. ) Mien he divides 
"good w it" , as he c o l ls  the in te llectu a l ’ v ir tu e s ',  into "natural" and 
"acquired", the le t t e r  i s  reason, "acquired by method sad in s t r u c t io n . . . . .  
grounded in the r igh t use o f  speech, and produeeth the sc ien ces ."  (o p .c i t . ,  
I’t . I .  Ch. V III) The former is  "good fancy", which is  " . . . .g o t t e n  by 
use only, and experience, without method, culture, or in stru ction " i t  
consists o f  " c e le r ity  o f  imagination, that i s ,  sw ift succession o f  one 
thought to another; and aterdv d irection  to some approved end" ( l o c . c i t . ) .  
This swiftness o f  su ccess ion ".. . . i s  caused by the d ifferen ce  o f  men’ s 
passions" and " . . . . t o  have stronger and more vehement passions fo r  anything, 
than is  ord inarily  seen in others, i s  that which men ca ll MAINESS." ( lo c .  I l l )  
Madness, he says, i s  caused by excessive passion oad by- "possession by 
s p ir its  or demons", though the la t te r  i s  c lea rly  absurd — c.n h is own 
argument. In h is emphasis on the sense as the origin  o f  thought, (given a 
degree o f  inductriouaness), Hobbes is  in  anticipation  o f  Locke, and the 
•natural c e le r ity ' o f  the imagination i s  intended to be understood as 
inborn in the way that good physical coordination i s  'g iv e n ',  rather than 
innate capacities o f  the mind (e .g .  P la to ’ s reminiscence) but he is  also 
taking a stand fo r  the new science o f  mechanics against the o ld  elemental 
science and replacing in v is ib le  powers and substances -  amongst which we 
must by inference include the Paracelsan and magical 'im agination' — with 
v is ib le , actual, material bodies. In a ll  th is  there is  also tin aesthetic 
theory which is  quite d ifferen t from that o f  Ponte or Bruno.
Discussing the "succession o f  men's thought", Hobbes o ffern  a guide 
to distinguishing between imagination and judgement which i s  both original 
and in stru ctive , find forms the basis o f  on aesthetic th e o ry (l) ; th is 
d istin ction  is  remarkable fo r  i t s  brev ity , good sense and lack  o f 
adherents.(k) On the subject o f  thoughts he snys:
( l )  Per a fu ll  discussion o f Hobbes' aesthetics see C.D.Thorpes '"Hie
Aesthetic Theory o f  Thomas Hobbes."
(p ) Though n Hindi nr view runs through Pope' s "Essay on Criticism "
" . . . . . t h e r e  i s  nothin,'- to observe in the tilings they think on, hut e ither 
■in jvhat they he l ik e  one another, or in vbat they he u n lik e, or what they 
serve fo r , or  how they serve Midi a purpose; those that observe th eir  
s im ila r it ie s , in  case they ho such as are rarely observed in others, are 
said to have a pood w it; by which, in th is occasion, is  meant a rood fancy, 
but they that observe th eir  d ifferences, and d iss im ilitudes; which i s  ca lled  
dlstinpuishinit. and discerning, and judging, between thing and thing, in case,
such discerning he not easy, are said to have a good .jutlrrocnt ........  The former,
that is  fancy, without help o f  judgment, is  not commended as a v irtu e ; but 
the la t te r  which i s  judgment, and d iscretion , is  commended fo r  i t s e l f ,  without 
the help o f  fan cy ." ( l o c . c i t . ) This d istin ction  between the synthesising 
imagination and the analysing judgment is  the basis for th is  theory o f  
human a c t iv it ie s  which, he says, depend variously an the in teraction  o f  these 
two q u a lit ie s , so that in poetry, fancy is  eminent, in h is to ry , judgment;
"In a good poem, whether i t  be epic or dramatic; a3 also in  Sonnets, ep igrems, 
and other p ieces , both judgment and fancy are required: bu t the fancy must 
be made more eminent; because they please for  the extravagancy; but ought, 
not displease by in d iscretion .
In a good h istory , the judgment must bo eminent. ...F a n cy  has no place, 
but only in  adorning the s ty le ."  ( lo c .c it .)  ( l )
I t  i s  s ig n ifica n t that Hobbes’ m ateria listic  dismissal o f  superstitious
I
fancies, and h is se lection  o f 'c la s s i c 1 X'oetic forms as examples, should be 
consistent with the aesthetic s p ir it  o f h is age, when w it and invention 
were the p o e t 's  special talents, and imitation the aim o f  art. But im itation, 
in re la tion  to Hobbes' views on the origins o f  thought, has a predominantly 
empirical sense, and he castigates the "inspiration" view o f  art with forcefu l 
eloquence:
" , ...Why a Christian should think i t  an ornament to h is poem, e ith er to 
profane the true God, or invoice a fa lse  one, I can imagine no cause, hut a
( l )  Thorpe, o p .c i t . pp.lOG-l’ O w rites: "Vo Hobbes con o f  genius, whether 
astronomers, arch itects , or inventors, discoverers or geographers,mathematicians 
or statesmen, are to be accounted fo r  by the fortunate union o f  a quick fancy 
and philosophic judgment. No one, except the Hobbes-inspired Charleton,. . .  .was 
to say anything ) ike th is  again fo r  a .full hundred years, when Gerard wrote h is 
book on gen ius."
r e a s o n le s s  im it a t io n  o f  cu stom ; o f  a  f o o l i s h  custom , liy  w h ich  a  rs.ta e n a b le d  
to  speak  w is e ly  from  th e  p r i n c i p l e e  o f  n a t u r e ,  mid h i s  own m e d ia t io n , l o v e s  
r a th e r  t o  he th ou gh t to  sp eak  b y  i n s p i r a t i o n ,  l i k e  e b a g p ip e .*
T in e  and e d u c a t io n  b e g e t  e x p e r ie n c e ;  e x p e r ie n c e  b e g e t s  mem ory; memory 
b e g e t 3 ju dgm en t and f a n c y ;  ju dgm en t b e g e t s  th e  s t r e n g th  and th e  s t r u c t u r e  
and fa n c y  b e g e ts  th e  orn a m en ts o f  a  poem . The a n c ie n t s  t h e r e f o r e  f a b l e d  
n o t  a b s u rd ly  iu  m aking Memory th e  m oth er  o f  th e  M uses.  F o r  memory i s  th e  
w o r ld ,  though  n o t  r e a l l y ,  y e t  s o  a s  in  a  l o o k i n g - g l a s s ,  in  w h ich  th e  
ju d g m en t, th e  s e v e r e r  s i s t e r ,  b u s i e ih  h e r s e l f  in  a  g ra v e  and r i g i d  exam in­
a t io n  o f  a l l  tlie  p a r t s  o f  n a tu r e ,  and in  r e g i s t e r i n g  b y  l e t t e r s  t h e i r  o r d e r ,  
c a u s e s , u s e s ,  d i f f e r e n c e s ,  and r e s e m b le n c e s ; w h ereby  th e  fa n c y ,  when any 
work o f  a r t  i s  p e r fo r m e d , f in d s  h e r  m a t e r ia l s  a t  hand and p r e p a r e d  f o r  
u s e ,  and n eed3  no more th a n  a  s w i f t  m o tio n  o v e r  them , t h a t  w hat she w a n ts , 
and i s  th e r e  t o  he h a d , may n o t  l i e  t o o  lo n g  u n e s p ie d ,  so  t h a t  when she 
seem oth  t o  f l y  i r o n  on e I n d ie s  t o  th e  o t h e r ,  and from  h eaven  t o  e a r th  and 
t o  p e n e t r a t e  in t o  th e  h a r d e s t  m a tte r  and o b s c u r e s t  p l a c e s ,  in t o  tb e  f u t u r e ,  
and in t o  h e r s e l f ,  and a l l  t h i s  in  a  p o in t  o f  t im e , th e  v o y a g e  i s  n o t  v e r y  
g r e a t ,  h e r s e l f  b e in g  a l l  she s e e k s .  And h e r  w o n d e r fu l c e l e r i t y ,  c o n s i s t e t h ,  
n o t  so  much in  m o t io n , o s  in  c o p io u s  im a g ery  d i s c r e e t l y  o r d e r e d ,  and p e r f e c t l y  
r e g i s t e r e d  in  th e  m em ory; w h ich  n e s t  men u n d e r  th e  name o f  p h i lo s o p h y  h a v e  a 
g lim p se  o f ,  and i s  p r e te n d e d  t o  b y  many, t h a t  g r o s s l y  m is ta k in g  h e r ,  em brace 
c o n t e n t io n  in  h e r  p l a c e .  But so  f a r  f o r t h  ns th e  fn u c y  o f  man lias t r a c e d  
th e  w ays o f  tr u e  p h i lo s o p h y ,  so  f a r  i t  h a th  p ro d u ce d  v e r y  m a r v e llo u s  e f f e c t s  
t o  th e  b e n e f i t  o f  m a n k in d . A l l  t h a t  i s  b e a u t i f u l  o r  d e f e n s ib le  in  b u i l d in g ;  
o r  m a r v e llo u s  in  e n g in e s  aiid in s tru m e n ts  o f  m o t io n ; w h a ts o e v e r  com m odity  
cieri r e c e iv e  from  th e  o b s e r v a t io n s  o f  th e  h e a v e n s , from  th e  d e s c r ip t i o n  
o f  th e  e a r th ,  from  th e  a c c o u n t  o f  t im e , from  w a lk in g  on  th e  s e a s ;  a id
'  * , • t .•!. JLT . -   !  1 f  A . .  V  « — 1, -1— r  a 4>
\ t ;U U /U 'v > C  V U 1  U .J . »3 » 'U  U J .r.  V A * 1  J . *  V J  w l  * ‘ v- J W J  A *  W u .  W i v  — —
th e  A m erican sa v a g e s ; i n  th e  ./o ilon a n sh ip  o f  fa n c y ,  b u t  g u id e d  by  th e  
precepts o f  th e  tr u e  p h i l o s o p h y .  B u t w here th e s e  p r e c e p t s  f o i l ,  as th e y
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*  H obbes i s  n o t  c o n s i s t e n t  in  tb its  v ie w . Bee p_.g. "Human N a tu r e " ,  Cn .X X. 
(In  "W ork s" , V o l .  t y ) .
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have h ith erto  fa ile d  in  the decline o f  moral v irtu e, there the arch itect 
Fancy oust take the philosopher1a port upon h e r s e lf ."  ( ] )
His account o f  thinking and o f  the part imagination plays is  informed 
by a p articu lar  notion o f  how the world works, a notion which is  not 
d issim ilar from that o f  h is  contemporary Descartes. A nom inalist and a 
m ateria lis t, Hobbes believes that a ll ob jects  are separate and relate to 
each other as parts o f  a machine; hence h is  emphasis on the discretionary 
nature o f  judgment. lie believes also that imagination should serve 
"philosophy", that i s ,  physical science . C.D.Thorpe's enthusiasm fo r  llobbea1 
apparent 'ju s t i f i c a t io n  o f  the constructive imagination' is  misplaced, since 
the "fancy", as is  clear from the early passages o f  ’Tjeviathcn", i s  based 
on sense which mirrors a physical world constructed on mechanical and mathe­
matical p r in c ip le s . The construct i s  already in the world, perhaps net 
y e t explained by science, but mirrored by imagination; only when i t  'traces 
the ways o f  philosophy' does "fancy" b en efit  mankind. As an admirer o f  G alileo, 
Hobbes would have been interested in the physics o f  motion and matter vhich 
a fte r  h is  death was to become the basis o f  modern physics in  Mewton’ s three 
laws o f  motion; he would also no doubt be aware- o f  A r is to t le 's  description  
o f  f antasia as ‘ a kind o f  motion*. But the prevailing model o f  the cosmos 
in  Hobbes * day was a mechanical rather than a dynamic one, and fo r  Hobbes 
the "wonderful c e le r ity "  o f  imagination "coneisteth not so much in motion, 
as in copious imagery d iscree tly  ordered", as though imagination were lik e  
a w ell-ordered mental lib ra ry , whose order corresponds to that o f  the cosmic 
machine. Hie succinct and valuable rule o f  thumb d istin ction  between 
imagination as seeing sim ilitudes, and judfpnent as seeing dissim ilitudes, 
demands a causal interpretation  : judgment iso la tes  the units o f  cause and 
e f fe c t ,  imagination grasps the whole event. Motion has no substantive 
existence: ob iects  move when thov c o l l id e , the movement beinft th eir  chnaeinc
( l )  From "The Answer to iho Preface o f  Gondibert" irp.Vjfl-fr'IO, (Works,Vul .IV ). 
Thorpe, ( o p .c i t .  n .IO i) comments : "Hobbes has presented in th is  page one o f 
the fin est ju s t if ic a t io n s  c f  the constructive imagination to be found in 
l it e r a tu r e ."
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position  rather than some essence which temporarily occupies them. Only 
in so fa  as ob jects  can be shown actu a lly  and analytica lly  to in tore la te  
can there bo said to be imagination.
This emphasis on the d iscrete m ateriality  o f  ob jects  is  a radical 
s h ift  from the Platonic end Neoplatonic views, since i t  seems ‘to deprive 
mind and the individual o f  a ll autonomy save natural wit and madness. What 
i s  missing i s  the scope fo r  in terpretation , fo r  a subjective meaningful ness 
which in s ig n ifica n tly  and valuably d iffe ren t from the ob je ct iv e . There is  
no p o s s ib il ity  o f  a. creative imagination in Hobbes * account, i t  con only 
reproduce or rearrange; w it, invention and discovery are 'fan cy 's*  best 
occupations, shared by "philosophers", (a rch itects , astronomers, and so on ). 
Imagination i s  becoming democratised. Hut the brain-mind correspondence 
which is  implied in Hobbes' psychology has an inadequate model in  the 
machine, be i t  a3 complex as a computer; and even Newton's physical lavs 
o ffered  a temporary a lternative which was to be replaced by an organic model 
in philosophical psychology, and by E instein 's  recognition o f  the in te r ­
changeability o f  energy and matter. Hobbes' view o f  the mind i s  too 
simple in i t s  b e lie f  that a -\iiolo i s  the cum o f  i t s  ports and that a ll  the 
pacts are quantifiable, and too naive in i t s  assumption that quantity and 
quality are proportionate to each other. What is  also g larin g ly  absent 
from h is  account is  any consideration o f  the mind as having innate d ispositions,, 
p red ilection s, or structural p r in c ip le s ; he does not even see f i t  to  challenge 
th is  p o s s ib il i ty .
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Co en  t e r  2 t DFSC/iTtTES.
'  As I  h a v e  a lr e a d y  rem arked, I io o h e s  and D e s c a r te s  w ere  c o n te m p o r a r ie s . 
W h atever th e  g e n e ra l d i f f e r e n c e s  in  t h e i r  p h i l o s o p h i c a l  p o s i t i o n s  th e y  
b o th  r e g a r d  im a g in a t io n  a s  an im p o r ta n t  form  o f  th o u g h t . F or  D e s c a r te s  
a l l  th e  forra3 o f  th o u g h t w hich  a re  " im a g e s  o f  t h in g s "  a r e  id e a s  -  a v ie w  
w h ich  Hume l a t e r  h e ld  -  and i t  i s  u p on  th e  c o n n e c t io n s  o f  th e s e  id e a s  t h a t  
o u r  k n ow led ge  o f  th e  e x te r n a l  w o r ld  and o t h e r  m in ds d e p e n d s . F or  D e s c a r te s  
h ow ev er  th e  m ost c e r t a in  o f  k n ow led ge  i s  th a t  w h ich  th e  w in d  h a s  o f  i t s e l f ,  
b y  in t u i t i o n ,  o r  d e d u c t io n ,  and th ou gh  h e  i s  v e r y  much aw are o f  th e  n e e d  t o  
d is t in g u is h  c l e a r l y  betw een  th e  o b j e c t i v e l y  r e a l  and th e  im a g in a ry , c l o s e  
ex a m in a tio n  o f  h ie  w ork s r e v e a ls  ( a s  w ith  S p in o z a )  h i s  c o n fu s io n  o f  " f i g u r e "  
w ith  " im a g e " . As h e  r e g a rd e d  im a g in a t io n  as a  fo rm  o f  th o u g h t  and t h e r e f o r e  
a s  a  form  o f  e x i s t e n c e ,  t h i s  d i s t i n c t i o n  and c o n fu s io n  a r e  im p o r ta n t , h u t 
t h i s  im p o rta n ce  i s  r e l a t i v e l y  em ail in  th e  o v e r a l l  c o n t e x t  o f  D e sca r te s*  
g r e a t  em p h asis  on th e  m in d 's  e s s e n t ia l  s u b j e c t i v i t y .
E p is t e m o lo g i c a l ly  and t h e o l o g i c a l l y  l )e 3 c e r te s  i s  an o n t o l o g i s t ,  a  f a c t  
w h ich  h a s  i t s  r e p e r c u s s io n s  in  th e  r e p r e s e n t a t io n a l ,  th e o r y  o f  im a g in a t io n  
and p e r c e p t io n  to  be  fo u n d  in  L o c k e ,  w ho, b e s id e s  g e t t i n g  h i s  ’ r e l i s h  f o r  
p h i lo s o p h y ' from  D e s c a r te s , q u i t e  p o s s i b l y  b o rro w e d  h i s  " t a b u la  r a s a "  from  
th e  same s o u r c e .  D e s c a r te s  in  h i s  tu rn  ad m its  a  d e b t  t o  A r i s t o t l e ,  and 
l i k e  L e ib n i z  adm onishes th e  ' s c h o o l s '  f o r  d i s t o i ’t i n g  't h e  p h i l o s o p h e r ' 
b ey on d  r e c o g n i t i o n .  The co g i t o  e r r o  3ura ( " D is c o u r s e  on  M eth od ", IV  p .1 0 1 ) 
i s  m ore th an  a  d e d u c t io n  o f  b e in g  fr o m  th o u g h t , and may a l s o  he u n d e r s to o d  
a s  an i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  o f  b e in g  w ith  th o u g h t , w ith  n o  s u g g e s t io n  -  su ch  a s  may 
b e  fo u n d  in  P la to  -  o f  an i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  o f  b ecom in g  w ith  t h in k in g .  The 
d e d u c t io n  o r  i d e n t i t y  in  th e  b e in g - t h o u g h t  e q u a t io n  i s  f o r  D e s c a r te s  a  
m a tte r  o f  i n t u i t i o n ,  w h ich  h e  d i s t in g u is h e s  fro m  d e d u c t io n  by  th e  l a t t e r * s
I n V ? ?_ V I!1 ^  •»o>*+ m#>v'anvtrrj-. a v  ©.»» f*.f* * * » i n  **. T«a  i  q f / i  flHV
h e  jpeans by " i n t u i t i o n 19 :
"IJy in t u i t i o n  I  u n d e rs ta n d , n o t  th e  f l u c t u a t i n g  te s t im o n y  o f  th e  
s e n s e s ,  n o r  th e  m is le a d in g  judgment, t h a t  p r o c e e d s  from  the b lu n d e r in g
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construction8 o f imagination, but the conception which an unclouded and 
attentive mind gives us so read ily  and d is t in c t ly  that we are wholly 
forced from doubt about that which we understand. Or, what comes to 
the same thing, in tuit ion  is  the urdoubting conception o f on unclouded and 
attentive mind, and springs from the lig h t  o f  reason alone; i t  is  more 
certain than deduction i t s e l f ,  in  that i t  i s  simpler, though deduction, . . .  
...ca n n o t by us be erroneously conducted. Thus each individual can 
mentally have in tu ition  o f the fa ct  that he e x is ts , and that he thinks; 
that the triangle i s  bounded by throe lin es  on ly , the sphere by a single 
su p er fic ie s , and so on . . . . "  ("Itules fo r  The D irection o f The Mind" ITI
PP.-.ZriL)-
Knowledge, -  o f  thought, subjective ex istence, and f i r s t  prin cip les -  
i s  a ll in tu ited ; in tu ition  "springs from the l ig h t  o f reason" ( i o c . c i t . ) .
These two methods, deduction and in tu ition , "are the most certain routes 
to knowledge, and the mind should admit no o th ers ."  ( l o c . c i t . ) Descartes' 
idea o f  in tu ition  has rather a myrttical. pedigree which re la tes h is 
epistemology to P la to 's , fo r  he believes in the immortality o f  the s o u l( l ) ;  
whereas the body i s  a perishable machine, the sou l, created by God, " . . .
..has in  i t  something that we may ca ll d iv ine, wherein arc scattered the 
f i r s t  germs o f  useful modes o f  thought." ( "K o lo s .." IV. p. 1 0 ). To this
#
d iv in ity  o f  the sou l, often referred  to by Descartes, and placed in  ns 
(he scy s) by God — o f  whom th is  some d iv in ity  gives us an idea -  (2 )  his 
'in tu it io n ' must be ascribed. What looks here lik e  l i t t l e  more than a 
sub jective cr iterion  fo r  certainty becomes, in more mundane, ob jectiv e  
terms, c. criterion  fo r  Knowledge when he speaks o f  a piece o f  wax as an 
example o f  intuited understanding.(3 ) .  The wax, deprived o f  i t s  sensible 
q u a lit ie s , lie s t i l l  perceives as "simple f le x ib le  and moveable" but as 
such meaningless to  imagination, which cannot admit o f the in fin itude of 
changes o f  which the wax is  capable : into a square, sphere, e t c . ,
i l )  Sec, o . rr. , Med ita t ions - I .  P h _ lil. and Discou rse on Method, y.. 118.
(2 ) See "Princip les o f  Philosophy" IX p.22" .  XX VI I*pTppl, and "M edilations"III.
(3 ) See "Meditations" Ml pp. 1ht-h.
ad in f ini two. Without i t s  "external forms" the wax is  perceptib le  only
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to the mind, he says, and
i t  is  now manifest to me that even bodies are not properly speaking 
known by the senses or by the fa cu lty  o f  imagination, but by the under­
standing only, and since they are not known from the fa c t  that they arc 
seen or touched, but only because they are understood, I  see c lea rly  that 
there is  nothing which is  easier fo r  me to know than my mind." ("M editations"
II  p, 157) .  There is  an embryonic Berkeleian idealism in th is  position , 
fo r  Descartes is  saying that a ll he can know in th is context is  h is  wind.
The p o s it iv is t ic ,  empirical answer is  simple : that the. wax has sensib le , 
ob jective  qu a lities  even though we may not be able to fin d  words fo r  then: 
and i f  we do not sense (see, touch, s m e ll , .« . )  the wax then we do not know 
that i t  e x is ts . In th is la t te r  view understanding -  the mind's s e l f -  
knowledge -  i s ,  a product, rather than the producer, o f  sense perception.
Demonstrability is  not considered important, i s  not even considered, against 
the in tu ited  certa inty  o f  se lf-ev id en ce ; th is fa c t  o f the Cartesian position  
is  a s ig n ifica n t omission in the face o f  post-Lockcan empiricism.
Descartes' " in tu ition " and "internal l ig h t"  are su b jective , psychological, 
q u a lities , but h is  "deduction" is  a method aid a cr ite r ion  o f  knowledge. lie 
distinguishes deduction from in tu ition , and says that formal ideas such, as 
"duration" and "number" arc acquired and, unlike the idea o f God, seem to 
proceed from him self ( l ) .  E arlier ("Keels". I_ H r l i i ) ,  he had referred to 
"sciences" such as Arithmetic and Geometry, which "only treat o f  things that 
are very simple and very general." end which "contain some measure o f certainty" 
so that, "even though I slept the cose would be the same fo r  a ll that is  
cl early present to my mind is  absolutely tru e". ("Mods." V pp. 18Jfc3./»
C larity i s ,  at: the cog ito  implied, the most re lia b le  guide to truth, and
in c u r  i s  uAUcwueru uuuuiuu uo jjj.cou.ic mm iippureil e cu mi u n u u u v t : un.nu j
( l )  Descartes sometimes says soul and nind arc identical., e . g .  "Mods" I p . l 't l . . 
but in "Mansions o f  The Mind" lie attributes mind to brain and the soul i s ,  
ho says, suffused -throughout the body.
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("P rince. o f  P h il". XLV p.P37)« so, " in tu ition " and 'c la r i t y ' are 
v ir tu a lly  synonymous and Descartes, confounding liis epistemology with his 
theology, is  caught in a c i r c le ,  lip to a point he can break the c ir c le  
demonstrating the truth o f  h is deductions, and in so dciug o f fe r  a 
paradigm fo r  knowledge; hut o further complication o f the 'in tu it io n ' 
theory is  the problem o f  determining tire existence o f  other minds. So 
within the terms o f  h is subjective—ob jective , dualinti c. position , Descartes 
posen an epistemological problem concerning, in simple terms, the status o f  
•composite' sciences (e .g . physics, astronomy, medicine) and 'gen era l' 
sciences (e .g . arithm etic, geometry); and a psychological problem concerning 
id en tity  and it s  re lation  to  the alleged identity  o f  other persons and 
things. In both these problems, some consideration must inevitably be 
given to the p o s s ib il ity  o i distinguishing between the ob jectiv e ly  real 
and the possible misapprehensions o f  imagination, a d istin ction  which is  
rather more important in philosophies which argue the p r io r ity  o f  sense.
And in a rather more scep tica l climate o f  opinion 'than Descartes placed 
h im self, distinguishing between in tu itions and images also poses a problem.
Descartes regards imagining as a mode o f  thought, but can conceive 
him self apart from imagination and fee lin g  as they are "fa cu lties  employing 
modes o f  thinking". There are d i f f ic u lt ie s  here involving the ontological 
nature o f  h is  fiosition ; Descartes cannot speak o f  h im self as pure being *
because he is  not God, (and also because ‘ being*, ae Kant showed, is  the 
copula o f  a p rop osition ). 'Existence* is  not a predicate, and since 
Descartes id e n tifie s  being with thinking, th is too must also be predicated.
The thought must i t s e l f  occupy time, i f  there i s  a relationsh ip  between 
thought end thinking, as w ell as have some sort o f  content : thought and 
'thinking o f  are the some; on Descartes own. argument o f  the id en tity  o f 
Exuu.,v^ ;i. t-xu be.!...;, uuy ccuoubion oi' ¿bought must entail tne termination ot 
ex istence. I t  follow s that modes o f  thinking are also modes o f  existence,
( i . o . imagination, fee lin g  and w illing , as much as to re  abstract modes). 
Ultimately a ll thinking i s  predicated sensibly, though the pattern or 
structure way he r function o i the thinking mind i t s e l f  rather than any
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ob je ctiv e , 'imaged* r e a lity . In the trad ition a l, A ristote lian  v a y  
Descartes says that imagination is  corporeal in i t s  concerns ( l )  -whereas 
in te lle c t  "turns on i t s e l f "  ("¡•ieds". VI p,186.> . i t  is  further distinguished 
from in t e l le c t  by i t s  need fo r  e f f o r t . Bacon and Hobbes were probably 
more correct in saying that thinking demands more e f fo r t  than imagination, 
esp ecia lly  i f  th is la t t e r  includes day-dreaming; jjerhaps Descartes has the 
•motion* sense o f  imagination in raiud here. Or, what he might mean is  that 
since in tu ition s are given, the ensuing deductions are e f fo r t le s s ,  whereas 
the c o l l is io n  o f  mind with corporeal images, and the subsequent attempts 
to organise them, are a d i f f i c u l t  task.
In making a fa i r ly  s t r ic t ,  but by no means absolute (2 ) d istin ction  
between mind and body, Descartes carries h is  analysis into the qualitative 
modes o f  the body. The mind i s  thought and the body may be a dream, so 
he is  faced with the problem o f  distinguishing dreom3 from senoc, a problem 
inherited by succeeding empirical philosophers. This d istin ction  is  
important fo r  dualism, though secondary in importance to the rational 
operations o f  the mind; fo r  em piricists i t  i s  crucia l since the physical is  
held by them to be the orig in  o f  a l l  knowledge, yet we fin d  no arguments 
in ho eke or Uune (nor in Berkeley) which improve on Descartes. Only in 
Leibniz and to  a le s s e r  extent in Spinoza i s  a useful contribution  made -
f
although with the doctrine o f  substance and the 'coherence' theory o f 
truth the problem would appear to bo le ss  pressing than in the 'correspondence' 
aad representational!set o f  Locke. Even the claim o f  greater l iv e lin e s s  o f  
the ob jects  o r  impressions o f  sense, looking as i t  does to be very lik e  the 
'c la r ity *  o f  Descartes, i s  open to dispute. For Descartes, as wo have seen, 
imagination i s  a 'hnode o f  thought"; i t  has i t s  basis in "more simple and more
(1 ) See "M editations" I I  p.152. where he says "to imagine i s  nothing else  than 
to con tempi aio the figure or image o f  a corporeal th in g ."
(2 ) Ho i s  not e n tire ly  consistent in  th is  d iv is ion . In "Passions o f  The Soul" 
Art, IBCt, o . V i5 he cays "the soul i s  united to a ll  portions o f  the body con­
jo in t ly ."  And in "M editations" I I I  p,192 he speaks o f  the "interm ingling o f  
mind and body", where onrliex’ ("Meds" I I I  p .l<)0). he has said o f  h is  soul 
that i t  i s  "en tire ly  and absolutely d istra ct from my body."
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universal" q u a lit ies , orig inating  ob je ctiv e ly  (ph ysica lly ) or su b jectively  
(mentally) -
"..although these general th ings, to w it, (a  body), eyes, a head, hands, 
and such l ik e , may be imaginary, ve are bound at the same time to confess 
that there are at le a s t  some other ob jects  yet more simple ana more 
universal, -which are real end tru e; and o f  those ju s t  in the same way as 
with certain real colours, a ll  these images o f  things which dwell in  our 
thoughts, whether time and real or fa lse  and fa n ta stic , are formed.
To such a class o f  tilings pertains corporeal nature in general, and 
i t s  extension, the figu re  ° i  extended things, th e ir  quantity or magnitude 
and number, as also the place in  which they are, the time whi ch measures 
th e ir  duration, and so on ." ("lleds" I p , l t 6 ) .
He defines thought as "a ll  that o f  which we are conscious as operating 
in  u s. And that is  why not alone understanding, w illin g , imagining, hut 
also fe e lin g , are here the same thing as thought." ("P rincs. o f  P h il" .
Ft. I .  Princ. IX. p .2 2 2 ;. The wall i s  su b jective , n property o f  the action 
o f  the mind (see "Meds". I l l  p.1'59 ) . having desiring, affirm ing, e t c . ,  as 
i t s  modes; and the understanding i s  ob jectiv e , i t s  modes being sense, 
imagination, conceiving the in t e l l ig ib le ,  e tc . :
"Of my thoughts, some are, so to speak, images o f  the tilings, and 
to these alone i s  the t i t l e  'id e a ' properly applied: examples are my 
thought o f  a man or o f  a chimaera, o f  heaven, o f  an angel, or (even) 
o f  God. But other thoughts possess othex* forms ns w ell. For example 
in  w illin g , fearing, approving, denying, although 1 always perceive some­
thing cs the subject o f  the action  o f my mind, yet by th is action I 
always add something e lse  to the idea which I have o f  that thin,.; and o f 
the thoughts o f  th is  hind some aro ca lled  v o lit io n s  or a ffe ction s , and 
others ji'd^aenta.
Mow ns to what concerns ideas, i f  ve consider them only in them­
selves end do not re la te  them to  anything beyond themselves, they curir.et 
properly spooking bo fa lse ; f o r  whether I imagine a goat or u chimaera,
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i t  i s  uo le ss  true that I imagine the one than the oth er."  ( l ) But
r
the need to distinguish between ob jects  and imagination is  important 
in Descartes* on to log ica l metapliysic s b  n means o f  establishing a 
lin k  between body and mind, and also as an epistemological require­
ment since fo r  "sciences studying composite things", such as physics, 
astronomy, and medicine, ("Meds" I I  p .147). the d istinction  i s  fund­
amental. Furthermore, the p o s s ib il ity  o f  the existence o f  other 
minds depends upon the ob jective  r e a lity  o f  ideas . . . .
" I f  the ob jectiv e  re a lity  o f  any one o f  my ideas is  o f  such a nature 
as c lea r ly  to make me recognise that i t  is  not in me either form ally 
or eminently, and that consequently I cannot myself be the cause o f 
i t ,  i t  fo llow s o f  necessity  that I am not alone in the world, but that
( l )  "Meditations" I I I  p,159. Spinoza has a similar idea; considered 
o n to lo g ica lly , ideas a ll have equal veracity . We may venture t ’ne 
opinion that Descartes has in mind here a causal notion o f  ‘ im ages', 
ra is in g  an issue which is  relevant to the study o f Aesthetics as a 
philosophical d is c ip lin e , though neither Descartes, Spinoza, nor 
Leibniz pursues the problem. S tr ic t ly  Bpeaking the on to log ica l image 
i s  not a 'passion* (as Spinoza ca lls  i t )  or a ffe ction , and i s  "o f  something 
real and tra e ". So Descartes says « "For, 03 a matter o f  fa c t ,  painters, 
even when they study with the greatest s k ill  to represent sinews and 
satyrs by forms the most strange and extraordinary, cannot g ive  them 
natures which arc en tire ly  new, but merely make a certain medley o f 
the members o f  d iffe ren t animals; or i f  their imagination i s  extravagant 
enough to invent something so novel that nothing sim ilar has ever been 
6een, and that then th e ir  work represents a thing purely f i c t i t io u s  
aod absolutely fa ls e , i t  is  certain a ll  the same that the colours o f 
which th is i s  composed are necessarily  r e a l ."  ("Meditations" 1 p ,146).
'fh is passage exh ib its some o f the inconsistency o f Descartes* philosophy, 
fo r  whereas h is dualism and ontology are consistent with the notion  o f 
the a r t is t  ( 'im a g in er ')  as an orig in a tor  o f  pure fic t io n s , the idea o f 
art or "general th ings" as a medley or  rearrangement o f  true ( i . e .  
irred u cib le ) 'images* in a passive or kaleidoscopic way obviates the 
ro le  o f  reason in "corporeal nature in  general, and i t s  extension" -  
in what ve should ca ll  natural sc ien ce . The overall tenor o f  Descartes' 
philosophy would demand the former, 'o n to lo g ica l ' in terpretation , though 
here he is  arguing fo r  the la tte r  in terpretation . By im plication , 
aesthetics becomes a s t r ic t ly  rational study, and this is  hov Mansagarten, 
who gave th is  area o f  enquiry i t s  name, conceived o f  'a e s th e t ic s '.
Spinoza, a3 we shall see, id en tified  images with passions, with the 
im plication — unintentional though i t  was fo r  him -  that Aesthetics 
niivulii be a psychological study.
In addition to the foregoing comments on the. above quotation, we 
should note the great sim ilarity  between Descartes' 'id ea s ' qua 'itiogoa 
o f  th ings' and Hume's "impressions" no ideas.
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thorn 4s mother being which e x is ts , or which io  the cease o f  th is 
id e a ,"  ("M editations" I I I  p .l 63 ) .
Thoughts eiiginated sub.jectxyply ere su b jectively  in d istiu gu i8bab le ,(l) 
having no ob jective  referents by vhich to distinguish them; they have 
no proximate cause and are re la ted  to the soul p.3 i f  in i t» (See 
"Passions o f  The Soul", Art. XXV. p.342) .  So although we might have 
recourse to imagination to v isu a lise  a triangle ( 2 ) ,  the original motion 
is  conceptual. In th is way formal thoughts are directed towards 'ihe 
imagination where they find ideas, perceptions, or memories which confirm 
to them (3 ) ;  bo that th is 'Janus' imagination, as Bacon ca lled  i t ,  looks 
both to mind and to body and functions in accordance with each in a 
kind o f  d u a listic  limbo between two states o f  being. Bearing in mind 
the doubts against divine revelation  and in tu ition , the maintenance 
o f  on tologica l status fo r  dreams, imagination and re a lity , and between 
the subjective end ob jective  modes o f  thought, assumes the importance 
o f  a coping-etono in Debcartes' philosophy.
He rea lises  that he cannot expect the same demonstrative certainty 
with respect to physical phenomena as obtain in the deductions o f 
lo g ic ,  ("Meds". VI P.187) and even considers that h is  judgments might 
be m isled by an "evil gen ius". But eince he i s  persuaded that fo r  the 
eubjeetive-ob ective , or mindr-body, duality he "can discover no other 
convenient mode o f  explanation", the p.ostulaticn o f  such an ev il genius
(1 ) Gee "Mods." I l l  p .l64 ; & I I I  p ,l6 3 . whore he says no idea contains 
more than can be found in i t e  cause, though "the re a lity  that I consider 
in these ideas i s  only o b je c t iv e , i t  i s  not necessary that th is  should 
be formally . . . .  "e tc .
(2 ) See "Heus." VI p.185 : "when I imagine a tr ia n g le , I do not jonceive 
i t  on ly  as a figure comprehended by three lin e s  but I also apprehend* 
these three lin e s  as present by the power and inward vision  o f  my mind,** 
and th is  ia  what I ca ll imagining".
* intenor ; ** acic  mentis.
(3 ) So he can, o .g . ,  imagine a pentagon hut not a chiliagon (See "Neds"
XL p -iftS).
■seentf« id le , and be dismisses i t  aa irre levan t. The problem o f 
separately identify  m g imaginations and r e a lit ie s  s t i l l  remains, 
lie argues that ob jects  are independent o f  him since he cannot 
perceive them at w i l l ,  and they present themselves without his 
consent; ("Meds." VI p ,1B8) but th is  is  evidently c ircu lar  since 
the value o f  "uninvited" and "w illed" i s  conditional upon the 
duality which he is  seeking to sustain. He also employs the 
fam iliar argument that ob jective  ideas are more l iv e ly ,  clear, and 
in their way more d is t in ct  than the subjective ones ( l ) .  But 
Descartes* conceptual d istin ction , such as i t  i s ,  has l i t t l e  
psychological v a lid ity , esp ecia lly  iu the lig h t  o f  modem (e .g . 
Freudian) d iscoveries; imaginations and perceptions may be equally 
l iv e ly , as he him self acknowledges when i t  su its h is purposes (see 
"Meds." I_ aeq), and, as he also says, there i s  "an in fin itu d e" o f 
cases where 'ob jects*  are indistinguishable from 'im aginations'. 
("Meds." VI p .189). Again with apparent c ircu la rity  Descartes 
pleads that "we must allow that corporeal things e x is t"  ("Meds."
VI p ,1 9 1 ) a s  God i s  no d e c e iv e r ,  b u t  th a t  we o u r s e lv e s  are  f a l l i b l e ( 2 )  
th e  c i r c u l a r i t y  may o n ly  be  a p p a re n t s in c e  ha i n t u i t s  on  one o c c a s io n  
th a t  God i s  on e  w ith  's u b s t a n c e 1, w ith  'n a t u r e ,  o r  ' t h e  o r d e r  o f  
t h in g s ' ( 3 ) so t h a t  th e  p rob lem  o f  im a g in a t io n  and r e a l i t y  becom es 
on e o f  c o h e r e n c e  ( r a t h e r  than on e  o f  c o r r e s p o n d e n c e ) ,  a s  w ith  S p in o za
( 1 )  See "M eds" VI p .1 8 8 . A lso  "P a s s io n s  o f  The S o u l"  Art..XXVI p . 3 4 5 .
( 2 ) Compere Leibniz, "On the Method o f  Distinguishing Ileal from. 
Imaginary Phenomena", p»719. where he says that the argument that God 
is  a deceiver carries no weight, " . . . f o r  we are deceived by our own 
judgment, not by God, when we assert anything without accurate p r o o f ."
( 3 ) "M e d it a t io n s "  VI p .1 9 2 ;  s e e  a l s o  " P r in c i p l e s  o f  P h ilo s o p h y "  L I ,  
p .2 3 9 t "By s u b s ta n c e , we can u n d ersta n d  n o th in g  e l s e  than  a t i l in g  
w hich  so  e x i s t s  t h a t  i t  n e e d s  n o  o t h e r  th in g  in  o r d e r  to  e x i s t .  And
£ /*- . X «...1 . . . .  • 1 « • »  • - • • • • < • •*«* auow mi.vjf v u c  o u u o t c i e e  v e a  ue uuuurdvuw u w uxcu  u i.cttr.iy
needs nothing e lse , namely, God."
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anil Leibniz; end whereas th is view is  in d ica tive  o f  Descartes* 
influence cu Spincza, refutation  ig  hampered by ita  inconsistency 
v ith  h is own general dualism. I f  we accept the new position  that 
God i s  a l l ,  then imagination end. re a lity  have equal v a lid ity  oud the 
p o s s ib il ity  o f  divine revelation  is  removed; distinguishing between 
imagination and re a lity  i s  e ither a question o f  lo g ica l coherence 
or, (which may ho the s«une), o f  convenience fo r  the judging agent; 
e lse i t  has l i t t l e  ph ilosophical importance and becomes a psycho­
log ica l question o f  pragmatic or ex isten tia l phenomena. B rie fly , 
in so far as he argues an immanent or pen th eictic  deity , Descartes 
is  b iting  the hand that feeds h is main philosophical tenet, and 
im p lic it ly  renouncing h is  own dualism. Returning to h is own 
ontologica l argument fo r  the existence o f  God, he argues that only 
by a "natural l ig h t"  ( "Mods. "  I I I  p . 1CO ) do we distinguish between 
ob jects  and images, tu t the argument stands or f a l l s  with h is 
o n to lo g y .(l)  1
(1 ) See Leibn iz . "P rincip les o f  Nature and Grc.ce, Founded on Reason" 
Sec, k ,  p.i!3; he says that the Cartesians are wrong in fu llin g  to 
rea lise  the d istinction  between perception -  "the inner state c f  the 
monad representing externa*, things" — and apporccntion — "which is
t'Afl p n i I*ill CiTf piir' AH « e  dPI M «44 w  -1 -  -----  • -*• '___ ._  . . ,r -  .. r . r n . --- -  *• -------- -  • -  • •» .«.w .i-V .M gjC  WA »Jl A O A.>UitIA e  vu  v e  tu iu
which is  not given to rJ 1 souls, nor at a ll  times to tho srjna g o a l. . .  
And : " I t  i.s tills  also which made these same Cartesians believe that 
minds alone arc monads, and that there ure no souls in enitnrO.s, «id  
s t i l l  lens other prin cip l e s o f  l i f e . "
ISO
Chaptev *5 ; SPINOZA.
Spinoza has been alternately  d e filed  and eulogised ns a r ig id ly  
eclidean ra tio n a lis t  and a God-intoxicated pantheist, find i t  should 
perhaps be seen as a compliment to h is works, rather than the product 
o f  the bias o r  ignorance o f  h is  commentators, that they should be held 
capable o f  such diverse in terpretations, ( l )  To be now denounced and 
ignored, now lauded and misunderstood, seems to  be the fa te  o f  b is  
philosophy, and i t  i s  only in the la s t  century or so that the balence 
has been struck. His influence, or a t leapt the influence o f h is repu­
tation , i s  most markod in Leibniz and in several o f  the German romantic 
id ea lis ts  whose ideas have so much shaped or modern aesthetic and cultural 
mores s men such as Lessing, Goethe, N ovalis, F ichte, and S cb e llin g ,(2 ) .
The basis o f  Spinoza's attempted recon cilia tion  o f  Cartesian dualism with 
i t s  im p lic it  theology -  a dichotomy which on ly he and Leibniz seem to have 
seen -  i s  probably to he found in the A ristote lian  works o f  Scholastic, 
Hebrew, and Arab w riters end commentators o f  the la ter  Midille Ages, and 
some o f  the most noteworthy and scholarly o f  h is  exponents have found a 
key to th e ir  understanding in these writers ( 3 ) .  Certainly Spinoza's 
'system ' i s  an attempt at an integrated, h o l is t ic  unity which, despite 
i t s  mathematical proceedure, answers more rea d ily  to description in (
(1 ) L. Roih. "Spinoza" p. lAfr. ca lls  Spinoza's thought "a fusion o f  re lig ion  
end ec ien oo ." S. Hampshire,in h is  "Spinoza" pp. 27-8, re fers to the vai'ious 
interpretations o f  Spinoza and the "genuine double aspect" o f  h is philosophy: 
" fo r  some he has appeared prim arily as a man obsessed with God, a pantheist 
who in terprets every natural phenomenon as a revelation  o f  an immanent but 
impersonal God; to others he has appeared as a harsh m ateria list and deter- 
m inist who denies a l l  sign ificance to m orality and re l ig io n ."  And : " . . t o  
Coleridge and Shelley he communicated an almost mystical sense o f  the ideal 
unity o f  Nature. But throughout the nineteenth century he appeared os the 
philosopher who bad exalted and displayed the powers o f  ob jective  and 
dispassionate reason heyoud a ll other philosophers, and fo r  th is reason was 
admired by such men a3 Renan, Flaubert, Matthew Arnold, and Anatole France."
( 2 )  On Spinoza's influence on Hegel, Eradley, and Bosanquet, see L. Roth's 
"Spinoze in Recent English Thought", in Mind XXXVI No. Ifr2. April iV ,y7.
(3 / Seo especia lly  II.A. h'olfson. "The Philosophy o f Spinoza". Also iioth1 s 
"Spinoza" v>. 99 S. pp. 22^-3. where he mentions the influence o f Hobbes and 
Bacon on Spinoza. O. Lidnov. "The Psychology end Ethics o f  Spinoza", P< 238, 
finds a c o n f lic t  in Spinoza between A ristote lian -S ch olastic  and Svoic- 
Certoaien p.cincip les.
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organic rather than geometric metaphors} and in spite o f  I ts  
•ratioualimu' h is  philosophy i s  closer  in s p ir it  to that o f  Locke 
than o f  Descartes s there are even grounds fo r  ca llin g  him an 
'em p ir ic ist ' ( l ) .  However, h is  understanding seeks to  he a l l -  
embracing and se lf-con s ic ta n t, and he dismisses "the Cartesian 
princip les o f  natural things" os "useless, not to say absurd",
(l e tter  LXX. to  Tscbiruhausen), though we should not allow h is 
considerable debt to Descartes to pass unremarked.(2 ) .
Like Descartes, Spinoza accepts the traditional tr ip a rtite  
d iv ision  o f cognition  ( 3 )» but at the lowest lev e l he re je c ts  the 
Representational 1st view and ccnsid&rs imagination, sense, opinion 
and perception together, obviating the actual separation which seems 
to be entailed in  the conceptual d istin ction s mode by other philosophers.(4 ) .  
Like Berkeley, Spinoza w ill not speak o f  an image or other psychic 
event whose truth o r  epistemological status i s  a function o f  i t s  
correspondence with a separate, "external' o b je c t . The erroneouaness 
or correctness o f  practica l knowledge is  dependent upon i t s  coherence 
with o u r  understanding vuth nature, and at th is  level the value end 
effectiveness o f  th is knowledge are subject to pragmat l c  c r ite r ia ; 
th is  view is  a lso  held by Leibniz. Imagination is  defined as " . .
f
the m odifications o f  the human body o f  which fixe ideus represent 
external bodies as present to us . . .  when the mind regards images
(1 ) W olfson, op . c i t . , p.7;t : "Ho was, many views to the contrary not with­
standing, a hard-headed, clear-minded im pirici& t, lik e  most o f  the mediaevals 
and lik e  A r is to t le ."
( 2 ) This is  p a rti cui arly  apparent An "De In te lle c t««  Ihiendatione". Bat, given 
h is  place in a chain o f  in fluences, " ...m ost o f  the issues o f  modem psychology 
and value theory are essen tia lly  tnose which Spinoza faced and t-o which ho 
gave c la ss ic  expression ." (Bidncv. op .c it-. ,
( 3 ) This d iv is ion  i s  fou rfo ld  in the "Be In te ilectu s  Baendatione", but the 
f i r s t  and second secwjons are b a s ic a l Jv the seme; »11 r e fe r e n c e »  to thin 
work herein are to Klv.■••a' edition unless athcnd.se stated.
(4 ) Hampshire, o p .c i t . ,  p.SI says that Spinoza's "im agination.. . .corresponds 
roughly to knowledge derived from sense-perception ." I'or a general discussion 
o f  Spinoza's "imagination. •' see Chi', ‘ . Parin'-non, "Spinoza's Theorv o f  
Knowledge" Ch. VII.
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in th is  fa&hion we say that i t  imagines." ("E th ics" I I .  XVIII. Note. ). 
Imaginations are passions, i . e . the mind i s  passive towards th e ir  
in i t ia l  (and sometimes subsequent) a ffe ction , since they are n ot yet 
translated by the understr.nding into our conceptual scheme, and because 
tiie or ig in s  o f  the in teractions o f the body with other things are 
as y e t unknown. Sach non-conceptualised ’ ideas ' Spinoza c a lls  
"inadequate” or confused. Thus fo r  him the contingencies described 
by 'sense, 'im agination ', 'p ercep tion ', 'o p in io n ', end ' commonsense' 
have their conceptual value in  coherence and tb e ir  actual worth .in 
pragmatics, ( l ) .  The cr ite rion  o f  vividness fo r  distinguishing between 
perceptions end imaginations i s  taken by Spinoza to be proportionate 
to the coherence o f the phenomenon (perceiJtion or imagination) with 
other phenomena : "A mental image is  more v iv ic ,  in proportion as 
i t  i s  associated with a greater number o f  other images" ("E th ics"
V X I I I . ) .  And, as ho says in  the "JDe In to ilectu s  Itaendaiione"
( p -3 'i), tlie great c la r ity  o f  imagination can often lead us to
mistake i t  fo r  understanding, implying a Socratic view o f  m orality,
i_.e_._, tJiat error is  provation o f  knowledge, so that no man knowingly
does wrongly, But every inadequate ideatum has i t s  idea sin ce
in i t s  in it ia l  gui3e, the attribute o f  extension, i t  has exact reciprocation
under the attribute o f  thought, though th is  reciprocation  might not always *
bo c lea rly  seen. ( 2 ) .  Spinoza uses three names fo r  the t o t a l i t y  o f  a ll  thing»: 12
(1 ) Sec Le tt or I,XIV to Tschirnliausen ; "Between a true and an adequate 
ifleuf I  recognise no d ifferen ce , except that the epithet true has regard 
to the agreement between the idea and i t s  o b je c t , whereas the epithet 
adequate lies regard to the nature o f  the idea i t s e l f ;  sc that in  rea lity  
tho>*c i s  no difference between a true- and on adequate idea beyond this 
ex tr in s ic  r e la t io n .."  See also "Ethics " I -  22- Schol. : "Nothing is  
ca lled  contingent except in respect o f  a defect in our knowledge."
(2 ) See "Ethics" I I . VI!»', Note ; "..whether we conceive nature under
the « .t ix -ib u ie  v>Z  vjlLvaib iu u , u 1 tuiuei' cuiy v tu c r  a i v n i » » ,  we etiinj.a
find  the some order, or one and the same chain o f  causes — that is ,
Die same things follow ing in either case ."
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"God","Tubstonce'', iind "Nature"; thebo are essen tia lly  the some but may 
be considered under d ifferen t a ttr ib u tes . So, fo r  instance, we may speak 
o f  nature, in bod ily  terms, and o f  i t s  contingencies -which appertain to 
imagination or opinion; God is  ca lle d  "the cause irraanent" and '’o i l  things 
are in God and move in God" (L etter  XXI to Oldenburg), so that i t  is  
lo g ic a lly  impossible to separate God from h ie  creation . lienee we arrive 
at Spinoza's celebrated -  or notorious -  equation, Deuo g ive Katnra .. ( l )
The mind's inadequate ideas may be a re fle ct ion  o f onr fa ilu re  to ba or 
to  comprehend God, hut as God i s  to  Nature, so is  mind to body, fo r  " . . .  
mind and body are or.e end the same th in g .. ."  (2 ) . In .Aristotelian terras, 
the mind/soul i s  the form o f  the liv in g  body.
Because o f  th is  p erfect duplication o f  what are elsewhere ca lled  the 
'p h y sica l' and the 'm ental', the random, individuated passions o f  the 
imagination can never be said to  be wrong ( 3 ) -  another echo o f A risto tle  -  
since God end Nature p erfectly  cohere, end 'ph ysica l' and 'mental' are both 
attributes o f  substance, considered respectively  under the gaiee o f  extension 
and thought. Any apparent delusion with respect to imagination is  therefore 
either a resu lt o f  our in a b ility  to conceptualise the iinage/pasaion, or o f 
our having compounded images in to  an incoheient whole; a winged horse or 
a talking tree arc Spinoza's examples o f  such incoherent compounds, and 
obsession with a sinhi.c thing would,- he says, 1» a kind o f  madness. Just (l)*3
( l )  " I t  is  on account o f th is phrase that Spinoza has been alternately 
abhorred and venerated nr a pantheist, 'pontheiera' meaning the id en tifica tion  
o f  God with Nature. Pantheism i.o usually a doctrine associated with mystical 
in tu ition s or with a poetica l and romantic fee lin g  o f  the splendour and unity 
o f  Nature. But Spinoza's id e n tifica tio n  o f  God with Nature, however, 
in d irect ly  inspiring i t  may la t e r  have been to tbo poets o f  the Itoraantic 
Movement, in intention at le a s t  owes nothing to poetica l imagination; i t  i s  
conceived to be the outcome o f  exact defin ition  and rigorous l o g i c . "
inhi.tpshi.re. on. ci t . , r»n. 39-1:0) .
2)’ "hU iics" i l l . I I . Note; tlie passage continues : " ..con ce iv ed  f i r s t  under 
ihc aitribuoe 01 1.nought, so con a', y , unaer uae attribute or extension, ihuu 
i t  fo llow s that the order or concatenation o f  tilings in id en tica l, whether 
nature be conceived under the one attribute or the other; consequently the 
order o f  states o f  a c t iv ity  or p assiv ity  in cur body i.j simultaneous in 
nature with the order o f  states o f  a c t iv ity  ciui p assiv ity  in the mind."
(3 ) Tn the "13c Intel 1 «actus liu o n d /v tio u o "  he sa y s  that im o g in a t io n  can  only 
ba e f f e c t e d  by l i r a i i o u l to p h y s i c a l  ob jects , ana that, a t r u e  idea i a  s im p le  
or com pounded o f  simples. (See pp. 31-2).
as images, us inadequate ideao, may be confused passions, the mind 
aleo has i t s  confusions in  the acceptance o f  'transcendental* ideas 
such as "being, "Thing", "Something", "Man", which, be saye, "represent 
ideas in the highest degree confused" ("E th ics" I I .  XL. Note I . ( l ) .
Wien such concepts are used, the imagination is  to ta lly  in e ffe ct iv e  
since small, individual d iffe ren ces , embraced by such universale, 
are negated. Such abstractions are, in Spinoza's oense, unnatural -  
since nan is  part o f  Nature -  and ignore the great variety  o f  
individual passions and perceptions, d iffe ren tly  formed in d ifferen t 
men; as well as making ( in  advance o f  Berkeley and W ittgenstein) 
important points against the abuse o f  language, he seems also to be 
attacking the vagaries o f  mediaeval philosophy j " I t  is  not to he 
wondered at, that among philosophers, who seek to explain things 
in nature merely by the images formed o f  them, so many controversies 
should have ar isen ." ("E th ics" I I . XL. Note 1 . ) .  But those confusions 
must he regarded as exceptions, and though imagination may, lik e  
abstractions, be confused, the aim i s  p e r fe ctly  to cohere the 'natural* 
with the rational, to perceive things "under a certain form o f  e tern ity" 
(s;:n quadon aete.n.i.tis sp e c ie : 1'Etliice" I I .  XLIV. C oroll. I I ) .
Nevertheless, e l l  o b je cts  agree in some measure with others, or 
they could have no adequate ideas in common ("E th ics" I I .  XXXVIII 
C o r o l l  . , & IGOCJX).« For ignorance d iv ides, and ignorance i s  a 
re fillt  o f the individuations o f  imagination.
The cssiurUation o f  the passive imagination into reason is  a function 
o f active mind as w ill o r  understanding — these being the same fo r
(l ) See also "he In te llc ctu s  Ftaendaiione", p. 54 • " . . .w e  may never, 
while we arc concerned w ith enquiries into actual things, draw any 
conclusion from a b s tra ct io n s .."  lie  a l s o  says, ( o p .c i t . ,  pp .49 -5 0 .  
Fishcr -hhwi n odn . ) .  that words are part c f  imagination, end may bo the 
cause : i  groat errors : " I t  i s  to be noted that they are formed 
according to the caprice and notions o f  the vulgar, so that they are 
nothing cat signs o f  things ns they ex is t  in the-imagination, and not 
as they ex is t in the in t e l l e c t . "
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Spinoza -  ( l )  and defines mind's power go a active/passive by the amount 
o f  liia knowledge i .e . by the re la tiv e  predominance o f  reuser* or imagination.
The active  mi.ml has large ly  adequate ideas, the passive mind inadequate 
ideas and passive states so ihat sp iritu a l unhealthiness and misfortunes 
can generally he traced to excessive love fo r  something which i s  subject to 
many varia tion s, and which we can never become masters o f "  ("jSthicc" V. XX.
Note V. ) This view is  a l’c itera tion  o f  De Intel).ectus Bnendatione (pn. 21-2) 
where he says " .  . the less  men know o f  nature the more ea s ily  they can coin 
f i c t i t io u s  id e a s . ." (2 ) But in  h is  Deus sive Natura equation i t  would he 
im precise, even p re ju d ic ia l, to describe th is  action , th is  becoming, to 
reason alone. We are passive to  nature as mind is  to imagination, because 
ve are a port o f  nature and therefore a part o f  God. Spinoza's inadequate 
ideas c a ll  to mind P la to 's  elkaaia. but Spinoza re je c ts  Platonic reminiscence 
and metempsychosis ("E th ics" V. XXII. Proof. Note. ) .  as he must in order to 
remain consistent with h is own position  -  though he maintains that :
" . .  we fee l and know that we are eternal. For the mind fe e ls  these 
things that i t  conceives by understanding, no less  than those tilings that 
i t  remembers. For the eyes o f  the mind, whereby i t  sees and observes things,
(1 ) See "Ethics" I I . XLIX, C oro ll. .  also I I .  Pefs. I l l ,  where he speaks o f th is  
a c t iv ity  as "conception" rather than perception in order to emphasise the 
action and to  avoid any im plication 01 p assiv ity . Sidney, (o p .c i t .  p . b l f f / . 
sees th is  active/passive d istin ction  as a "sharp dualism" in Spinoza and urguea 
that imagination and perception are one source only o f  inadequate ideas. Else­
where, re ferrin g  to "Ethics" V. X ., bo says : "Spinoza tr ie s  to overcome the 
d i f f i c u lt ie s  arising  from h is  b ifurcation  o f  the in te lle c t  and imagination
by maintaining th e ir  essential cooperation and harmony. That i s  to say, 
contrary to h is  previous P latonic notion that the in te lle c t  functions 
independently o f  imagination, he assarts the A ristote lian  theory that there 
may- he images o f  things o f  which we also have adequate id e a s ." (O p .c it . ,  p .2 5 2 ).
( 2 ) Spinoza places groat eth ica l importance on h is passive /a ctivc d istin ction , 
regarding the man who follow s h is  passion as a slave, who follow s h is  reason 
as fr e e .  He also Bays ( : 'o c .c i t . ) t a « t  we need not fear that we fancy, as long 
as the ob je ct  i s  perceived c learly  rad d is t in c t ly  ( i . e .  coherently); the mark 
o f  c la r ity  end distinctness baing s im plicity , i . o . iv re d u c ib ility . In a comple 
or compounded idea. "F alsity  consists so le ly  in the afftririAtion eaneeroing 
anything o f something which i s  not contained in the concept wc have formed o f  
the t ilin g ."  I t  i s  in teresting  to note, in passing, the sim ilarity  in terms in 
respect o f ideas between Spinoza end Locke, who wore exact contemporaries-both 
bom in  1642 -  both t i l l in g  Cartesian 3oil (to  borrow Locke's metaphor), but 
the former categorised a n a tion a lis t, the la t te r  an H ap iricist.
arc none other than proof a. Thus, although wo do uot remember that ve 
existed before the body, yet we fee l that our mind, in so fa r  as At 
involves the essence o f  the body, under the form o f  etern ity , i s  external., 
and that thus i t s  existence cannot be defined in terms o f  time, or 
explained through duration." ("E th ics" V. XXIII. Note) .
His reason fo r  maintaining th is  apparent optimism, (or  determ inistic 
pessimism), i s  contained in h is  Pena sive Nature, fo r  ae he says in  a 
le t te r  to Tschimhansen (LXVl) the mind's power o f  understanding extends 
only to 'things, but, as he also says in another le t te r  (XXVII to I>e V ries) 
the in te lle c t  i s  in fin ite  though i t  belongs to nature as passive; o r , "The 
mind apprehends i t s e l f  better in  proportion as i t  understands a greater 
number o f  natural o b je c ts ."  ("De In te llo ctu s  Rnendatione", p . 14). I t  i s  
arguable that th is passiv ity  o f  the mind to  nature i s  a basic tenet o f  
empiricism and sensationalism, but Spinoza was unconstrained by the current 
notion o f  the body as a machine, seeing, as Leibniz did a fter  him, a 
lim itlessness in man's p o s s ib i l i t ie s .  In a le t t e r  to Blyenburg (XXXIV) he 
expresses the viow, (a lso  hold by D escartes), that the w ill  i s  beyond the 
constraint o f  our lim ited understanding. In simple terns, ve should regard 
our imagination as a measure o f  our ignorance, in so fa r  as they are 
inadequate, rather than in s ign ifica n t delusions. In a very real sense, 
therefore, Spinoza may be said to  regard imagination as a means o f  appre­
hending God -  though h is  d e fin ition  o f  imagination docs c o t  support th is  
interpretation  -  since passions and individuations are innumerable, and 
though confused and inadequate they remain v a lid  in the system o f  D&ug sive 
Nature. As he says in "De In te llectu s  Baendatione" ( pp. 20-1. F ootnote). 
" . . .  fancy never creates or furnishes the mind with anything ne».." Bat 
in reason we strive  to resemble God in essence and to  imitate 'Him' in 
»His* action : the aim i s  omniscience, the reward perfection , and though 
the reword i s  unattainable, man i s  able to apprehend th is  perfection  and 
so attempts to  achieve i t .  Spinoza's p os ition  here i s  l i t t l e  d iffe re n t  
from that o f Giordano Bruno, but the p ra ctica l im plications are d ifferen t, s
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fo r  S p in o z n  th e y  w ere m o ra l»  f o r  Bruno magical and alchemical. For 
Spinoza this*, p e r f e c t i o n  l i e s  in " . . .  t h e  knowledge o f  the union existing 
between th e  m ind  and th e  whole o f  nature" ( o p .c i t . n .6 ); b y  implication 
Cartesian dualism i s  n p r o d u c t  o f  ignorance.
As we have already noted, one important feature o f the Spinozan 
"imagination" i s  i t s  equation with passion , a s ig n ifican t dei>arture from 
the Cartesian view :
"For imagination i s  an idea, which indicates rather the present dis­
position  o f  the huaatn body then the nature o f  the external hotly; not indeed 
d is t in c t ly , hat confusedly} whence i t  comes to pass, that the wind i s  said 
to e rr . For instance, then we look at the sun, we conceive that i t  is  
d istant from us about two hundred fe e t  . . . "  e t c . , ( l )
There i s  a good deal c f  psychological truth in th is formulation, which 
seems to owe something to A risto tle  and the scholastic in ten tio . but 
Spinoza, pursuing the lo g ic  o f  h is  own commitment to Pcu3 sive Natnra. is  
lo s s  cognitive in h is  intimation o f  in tentionol.ity  than h is  defin ition  o f  
imagination leads us to  expect :
" . . .  we trust n ecessarily  admit, that the decision o f  the mind, vhiclr is  
believed to he free , i s  not distinguishable from the imagination or memory, 
and i s  nothing more than the affirm ation , which an idea, by virtue o f  being 
un idea, n ecessarily  involves ( i l ,  XTIX). Wherefore these decisions o f 
the mind arise  in tire round by the same n ecessity , as the ideas o f things 
actually  ex istin g . Therefore those, who b e lieve , that they speak o r  keep 
s ilen ce  or act in any way fret, the free  decision o f tho mind, do but 
drotan with th e ir  eyes open." (2 ) .
Not only d o c s  h e  rea lise  and state tho power o f  imagination, he also has
the acuity to rea liie*  uniquely among h is  contemporaries, that imagination
(1 ) "Ethics" IV. J j  Tho 'sun* example is  borrowed frow A r is to t le 's
lie Arina.
(2 ) Op.ci t . . 1T1_. T_1. ,  Note. I t  i s  p ossib le  to find here ideas which show 
Spinoza's anticipation  o f  Freud, '.w inuhirp, (rr p .c it . .  p .]? ;l ) .  finds 
s im ila r it ie s  between Spinoza's cenatus ;ind Freud's lib id o .
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o f past, present, and future event» may a ffe c t  as with equal strength 
( ‘'Ethics'* T i l .  XVII I . ) ;  'this rea lisa tion  has im plications fox- a possible 
aesth etic , but these are not developed by Spinoza. As on inadequate or 
individuated 'id ea* , be i t  compounded (as a winged horse) or other­
w ise, the imagination i s  always at lea st credible since i t  cannot be 
in*ong. In cases o f uncertainty we may suspend judipnent, but the unrelated 
1 image' i s  never .less than inadequate and always possib le  provided i t  does 
not contravene a kind o f  pre-I»cihuizian 'law o f  c o n tra d ic t io n " .(l)  That 
o b je c ts  could be, and were, made s p e c ifica lly  fo r  a purpose which required 
ju s t  such a deferm ent o f  judgment, with the inevitable  'con fu s ion ', was 
not a notion  entertained hy Spinoza. Throughout h is  entire works and 
le t te r s  he makes only one, passing reference to a rt, seeming to accept the 
id e a lis in g  function o f  im itation which A lberti bad helped to moke a 
commonplace o f  ltenai3sance painting. Beauty, as Spinoza suya in two o f 
h is  le t t e r s ,  (2 ) is  in the eye o f  the beholder, and we deduce from th is  that 
he would, have regarded Aesthetics as a branch o f  psychology. In equating 
the scope o f  the mind (thought) with that o f  the body (extension), he is  
open to  'the ob jection  that what night he considered man's highest achieve­
ments -  o .g . art in e l l  i t s  m anifestations, though he would no doubt dispute
( l )  See "He In te llo ctu s  Ebendatione" p.19 : "I c o ll  a thing impossible -when 
i t s  non-existence would imply a contradiction ; p oss ib le , when neither i t s  < 
existence nor i t s  non-existence imply a contradiction , but when the necessity  
or  im p oss ib ility  o f  i t s  nature depends on causes unknown to us, while we 
fe ign  that i t  e x is t s ."  So, as lie la te r  adds, ( o p .c i t . .  p .21) . ho could not, 
knowing the nature o f  body, imagine an in fin ite  f l y ;  or  o f  sou l, imagine i t  
as square; but he con imagine the existence o f  anything o f  which no 
im p oss ib ility  o f  unne.cessity i s  seen. But by the same token, the more 
the mind understands th e .le ss  able i t  i s  to imagine.
( ? )  To Oldenburg, 1.o tter  XV : " . . .  I  do nob attribute to nature either 
beauty o r  deformity, order or confusion. Only in re la tion  to our imagination 
can things bo ca lled  beautiful, oi' deformed., ordered or confused." This 
unequivocal, statement o f  the dependency o f  beauty upon imagination i s  c lea rly  
in  an ticip ation  o f  (and well in  advance o f )  the aesthetic o f Romanticism; 
as i t  ccmes from Spinoza's correspondence wo should beware o f  making too 
touch o i  i t ,  except i::i uny that th is  view i s ,  as we hove learned, inherently 
N eoplaton istic and im p lic it  in h is  published philosophy. .Ice also Letter LVTII 
to Boxel : "Beauty, my dear Six*, i s  not so much a quality o f  the ob ject 
beheld, as m :1 e f fe c t  w on  him who beholds i t . "
ib is  -  are p o ten tia lly  dcdaciblo from the law» o f  nature ns extended 
substance, ( l ) .  Dut ho is  wall aware o f  the paucity o f  the mechanistic 
model o f  man s
" . . .  the ob jectors cannot f i x  the lim its  o f  vhe body 's paver, or say 
what con bo concluded from a consideration o f  i t s  so le  nature, whereas 
they have experience o f  many things being accomplished so le ly  by the laws 
o f  nature, which they would never have believed possib le  except under the 
d irection  c f  the mind . . . "  ("U thics" I I I .  I£ . ,  N ote).
He adds that " . . .  from nature, under whatever attri.bute she bo considered, 
in fin ite  resu lts fo llo w ."  ( l o c . c i t . ) .  Saw's cr it ic ism s are surely circum­
vented hero, fo r  Spinoza is  saying that a ll  o f nature i s  governed by laws 
but that these laws ere not known; the real problem i s  the truth o f 
Spinoza's assertion about natural laws, a 'tru th ' which must n ecessarily  
accompany omniscience and which cannot therefore be accessib le  to  man.
Xn h is  support, ’the s c ie n t i f ic  procedure o f  theory -  hypothesis — law 
soems to a fford  increasing knowledge, c r  at lea st  technology, o f  nature, 
but within th is  process, even at the fore fron t o f  research, expectations 
can oid  do shape perceptions and resu lts . Cut oven here Spinoza's fore ­
sight o f  the possib le  abuses o f  universal ideas and h is  refusal to 
denigrate "inadequate ideas" i s  a recognition that in  or through th is 
inadequacy we may fin d  the more adequate laws o f  the future. As we eigh t 
say, exceptions only prove the rules which can account for  them.
Qualifying Vo I f  sen, i t  could he said that Spinoza was a kind of 
'em piricist* who co-extended the in fin itessim al d iv is ion s o f  lo g ic  and 
maths to the parts o f  nature, o ffe r in g  thereby a rather more complex and 
exalted idea o f  man than that propounded by those -  em piricists jnd others ■ 
who accepted a mechanical model. But l ik e  A ris to tle  in the wake o f
( l ) itor a discussion o f  th is point, see R.h.Saw. "The Vindication o f 
Metaphysics", ( e .g . y..59; " I t  nay be objected that Spinoza has the very 
practica l aim o f  showing us how to increase our knowledgo, and that he 
should not be c r it ic is e d  because he has at the seme time not given an 
account o f  a r t i s t i c  creation. He has, however, not merely fa ile d  to give 
on account o f  such imaginative construction, but ho has given such a 
description o f  tha functioning o f  the in te lle c t  that i t  i s  .impossible."
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Platonic dualism, Spinoza in the wake o f  Cartesian dualism did not
c
en tire ly  r id  h ie  psychology o f  the inconsistencies produced by regarding 
philosophical concepts as psychological o c tu e lit ie s . The suspicion o f 
a representationalist theory o f  imagination enters Spinoza’ s account when 
he seek3 to separate memory from imagination, a suspicion which is  almost 
certa in ly  -  according to Wolf son1 o close analysis — a product o f  h is 
acquaintance with A ristotelian  ism. As we have seen, A r is to tle  d istin ­
guishes between what wo ca lled  "productive" and "reprodoctive" imagination,
( l )  the la t te r  being a retentive function bearing some resemblance to 
memory. In h is  d e fin ition  o f  "imagination", occuring la te  in  the ''Ethics"
(V. XXXIV.. Pea.) .  Spinoza ca lls  i t  "an idea by which the mind contemplates 
any ob je c t  as present", whereas ea r lie r , in  "Do In te llectu s  Bnendatione", 
a ’ thing imagined’ i s  "not as we picture i t  to b e " (quoted in Wolf son, 
o p . c i t . . P.8'5) .  Prom these two passages two functions o f  imagination obtain : 
one i s  productive, and pertains to the image as unrelated; th is  the la tte r  
passage. The d istin ction  is  maintained in a Note to hi s d e fin ition  o f  
imagination in "E thics" I I .  XVII. where he speaks o f  "the images o f  things"
( rerum imagines) which "do not reca ll (re feren t) the figures o f  things"
( renun figurae) -  a d istin ction  between ’ images’ auü ’ fig u re s ’ which 
probably re fers respectively  to the d istinction  between productive and 
reproductive imagination. Wo should note that Descartes a lso confuses *
•figure’ and ’ image’ ("Mediations" I I ) in h is d e fin ition  o f  "imaginer"  (F r .) 
as nothing e lse  than to contemplate the figu re  or image o f  a corporeal 
th ing". Spinoza makes no c la r ifica t io n  o f the separation o f ’ f ig u re ’ from 
’ image’ , though they are o f  considerable importance in h is  philosophy in 
seeming to demand a separation o f  "adequate" frem "inadequate" imaginations, 
with c r it e r ia  fo r  making such a separation, such aa is  nowhere to he found
( l )  See Wolison, op. c i t . ,  pp.Ba-? : "..from  the various statements o f  
A r is to t le ’ s discussion o f imagination in mediaeval Arabic and Hebrew ph il­
osophic texts i t  appears that a d istinction  is  t o  be drawn between the kinds 
o f  imagination which nay he designated by the terms ’ reten tive imagination’ 
and ’ composite imagination’ corresponding to what is  ca lled  today reproductive 
and productive imagination". And : "Suggestions o f th is  d istin ction  . . .  may 
bo discovered in the various scattered passages which occur in  the writings 
o f  Spinoza."
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,in the "E th ics". Normolly we would id en tify  th is  reproductive imagination 
with memory, where the 'o b je c t ' i s  understood to be posited as absent, and 
Spinoza's d e fin it io n  o f  memory i s  extraordinarily  close to A r is t o t le 's . ( l ) ,  
For Spinoza then, there i s  the 'im age ', which i s  a passion, ( 's u f fe r e d ',  
in A ristote lian  terms, by the body), which, whatever the degree o f  i t s  
•inadequacy' seems to  enjoy some sort o f  on tologica l status; there i s  also 
tlie 'f i g u r e ',  o b je c t  o f  the image-passion, -the recognition o f  whose object­
iv i t y  i s  both a function  o f  memory and (conceptually speaking) a stage in 
the becoming adequacy o f  the imagination. Memory is  a stage in the 
conceptualisation, o f  imagination. These weaknesses in Spinoza's ' system' 
ore a re su lt  o f  h is  attempt to  recon cile  the stasis  o f  philosophy and 
theology with en telech eia  o f  psychology and m orality, an attempt, in 
h is  own words, to  rea lise  man's highest aim, on understanding o f  the 
relationsh ip  between mind and nature (God); th is  remains what i t  has always 
been, a fundamental task o f  philosophy.
We have found sim ilar tensions and inconsistencies in the ph ilosoph ica l- 
psychology o f  A r is to t le , where Wolf sen finds the origin  o f  Spinoza's im plicit 
d istin ction  between imagination and memory, as fo r  A risto tle  the memory- 
image i s  both the a ffe ction  and that from which the a ffection  i s  derived :
"In so fa r  as i t  i s  regarded in i t s e l f ,  i t  i s  only an ob ject o f  con-
I
tempi a ti on ( theorems, specul men turn) or a phantasm (phantasma. . ) ;  but when 
considered as r e la t iv e  to something e lse , i t  i s ,  as i t  were, a likeness 
(e ikon. iraaro) and a mnemonic token (mnemoneuma. incnoriale) . "  (2 )
Memory i s  defined by A r is to t le  as " . .  'the state o f  a phantasm ( phantasma.
Gk. & L a tin )" , ( 3 ) So memory i s  not a mere phantasm (phantasma) or 
a ffe c t io n  (patho s )  bat i s  the likeness ( eikon) o f  a thing -  though 
A ris to tle  had e a r l ie r  ca lled  memory " . .  on impression (typos) or p icture 
( pr.vuho ) within u s . " (4 ) I t  seems very l ik e ly  that Spinoza derived h is
(1 ) See "De J n to llectu s Baendntione" p 4 7 .. where memory i s  ca lled  " . .  the 
sensation o f  impressions on the brain accompanied irith the d e fin ite  duration 
o f  the sen sa tion ." A r is to t le , be Memorlo <sl Berniniu c«y;itia. 449b. 19-22.6 28.
( 2 ) From A r is t o t le 's  Do Monor ia  at ihsnlniscontla. 4'10b^  12-27; quoted in 
Vol f  son. o p . c i , p .8b.
(57  hoc ., cj,t,
(4) hoc, o it .
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memory-imagination d istinction  from these pásenles, end Wolf son o ffe r s  
in tei’esiting circumstantial evidence to support th is  h y p oth esis .(l)
Having lineartied the inconsistencies in  Spinoza'a thought, caused 
by a c o n flic t  o f  philosophical and psychological enquiries, ve must 
re itera te  that the overiding impulse and concern o f  h is work is  
essen tia lly  'h o l i s t i c ' ,  and that conceptual n ice t ie s  are a product, and 
n ot a necessary precondition, o f  experience. The apparent correspondence 
o f  the memory 'image' to an ob je ct , so expressed, is  better understood in 
Spinozan terns as the recognised coherence o f  that image with other 'im ages' 
in  a way which i s  hot?; pragmatically (or  functionally ) e ffe c t iv e  and 
conceptually adequate -  these being actually coincidental. Spinoza 
recognises no p r io r ity  in the relationship between wbat other philosophers 
b ifurcate as the physical end the meutal, and in th is as in the qu a lity  
o f  h is in te lle c t ,  h is c losest philosophical ancestor is  A ris to tle , and h is 
h e ir  Leihniz. An important epistem ological question fo r  Cartesian dualism, 
as has hcen shown, is  the d istin ction  between imagination and r e a lity . 
Spinoza, who l ik e  locice owed much to Descartes, endeavoured to fo r e s ta ll  
the problem by denying the duality and ca llin g  a ll  things "God or Nature". 
I t  i s  not d i f f i c u l t  to find  in th is  phrase, and in many o f  the passages 
o f  the "Ilmeads" o f P lotinus, a kind o f  pre-Homan t i c  Wordsworthian 
pantheism. Eat in Spinoza (as, usually, in Wordsworth) -there i s  none o f  
that vacuous absence o f  discernment in which so many quasi-mystical and 
pantheistic minds seem to flounder; h is i s  a mind whose sa tis fa ction  i s  
in  the recurrent recognition o f  harmony, order ond coherence. In a way, 
imagination in  i t s  on eir ic  sense as the producer o f  unicorns, h ip p og r iffs  
and the l ik e , i s  a f o i l  to the adequacy o f  coherence, but os long as such 
imaginings remain lo g ic a lly  possib le  they continually te s t  the a le r t  mind 
by in v itin g  i t  to comprehend them. This gadfly function o f  imagination (l)
( l )  See Wolfson, op.f i t . ,  pp.ft6~7 : "Now* in an old hatin translation o f  
A ristotle, which was accessible to Spinoza typos is  translated by f i gura»•" 
etc. See disc- on .oih .. p.fi6, footnote 5 : tbe passage! roferred to is  bo 
Memoria et Rcariniscontia. AJOb, 16. from Aristotle* Onsii.a Ouao Extant 
Opera o i 157 'i.
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ie  already o f  considerable importance fo r  the age (or the nura ) for  which 
(or  -whom) there ie  tlin b e l ie f  that much i s  to be learned, and unless 
th is  function atrophy any new idea has the potential, to enlarge the 
understanding. Indeed Spinoza urgec upon h is  reader the importance 
and value o f  v e r s a t ility  and new experiences, bringing to mind Bruno's 
messianic quest fo r  omniscience and IMmbaud's injunction not t o  fear 
exposure to uncertainty. The ex isten tia l importance o f  imagination i s  
c lea r , but i t s  aesthetic im plications contain & small irony f o r  the 
Spinozan 'system '. For i f  ’the art-work i s  on im itation, not on ly  can 
i t  not present a p erfect form o f idea l (since we cannot know such an 
ideal i f  we are not 'G cd ') , but in  order to  be a 'p e r fe c t ' im itation  i t  
mnst therefore be in come way im perfect or "inadequate". The best would 
be the most p er fe ct ly  im perfect. But i t  i s  not only in art bu t in a ll 
spheres o f  l i f e  that the imagination has th is  important function  o f  at once 
giving the mind txi exclusive confidence in i t s e l f  by which i t  designates 
seme phenomena 'r e a l ' arid others 'im aginary'; on indication o f  i t s  oiu 
inadequacy in fa ilin g  to account fo r  the 'im aginary', and the challenge 
o f  the pocsibie-in -the-im oginary wherein the mind apprehends (al so) the 
p o s s ib il ity  o f  i t s  own perfection . Within the Spinozan te le o lo g y  such 
a state i s  lo g ic a lly  im possible, so that the mind cannot hope to  attain 
i t s  own goal, and wo must conclude that i t  i s  the attempt which i s  e l l -  
importont, a conclusion at which any te leo log ica l system must arrive.
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Chapter 4 : LOCKE
The influence o f  G alileo and Newton on the b e lie fs  and practices o f 
th e ir  contemporaries was immense, hot fo r  a more complete and satisfactory  
account o f  the impact ar.d the import o f  Locke's "Escay" we must. entertain 
other considerations. The absolute fa ith  in the B ible and in  tlia old  
testament as h istory  which charp.c to r i nee the Reformation was ca lled  into 
question by an increasing number o f  d iscoveries. The b ib l ic a l ly  generated 
b e l ie f  that the world was created in 4004 B.C. was undermined by the great, 
age o f  Chinese c iv ilis a t io n , evidently  predating the b ib lica l creation, by 
the discovery o f fo s s ils ,  and by the discovery o f  other so c ie t ie s  and ethnic 
groups, particu larly  in the Americas, which had independent morul codes, laws, 
and mythical b e l ie fs . I t  i s  p a rticu la r ly  within the context o f  these socia l 
d iscoveries that Locke's attack on the doctrine o f  'innate id ea s ' should bo 
seen, and th is  should not be forgotten  in relation  to h is inheritance from 
Descartes or h is  debt to cor.temporary natural scien ce . Locke's account o f  
the mind is  compositional, as to  a certain extent ±3 D escartes', but Locke 
i s  perplexing in h is inconsistency and h is  insistence  on an "active power" 
o f  s i t s  uncomfortably with h is  passive "tabula rasa" metaphor(l). He is  
open to attack on a ll sides s as on em piricist/sensationalist he is  
repeatedly attacked by Leibniz f o r  overlooking the innate capacities o f 
the mind; when he speaks o f "mental power" he sounds lik e  a dualist; and in 
so f o r  as he embraces these two views unreconciled, he i s  confused and 
in consisten t. On top o f e l l  th is , Berkeley attacked him as a Vtepresentation- 
a l i s t .  Nevertheless the "Essay" became the b ib le  o f  an age end Locke' a  
exhortation -  "Reason mast be your Inst judge and guide in everything" -  
an in fa l l ib le  ra le .
Locke'o doctrine o f  ideas in  the basic o f  a ll ho says about thought,
knowledge, raid language, and in  th is  doctrine h is fun demon ta i ambiguities
ore deeply rooted. Of the ba lf-dozcn  or so de fin ition s o f  "idea" in the
"Essay", ’the moat fam iliar — " . .  whatsoever is  the ob ject o f  the under-
( l )  Only in the f i r s t  edition  o f  the "Essay",and nowhere o lse , does the use 
o f  the "tabula rasa" pinnae occur in Locke, but i t  i s  constantly used in 
reference to him. 'White paper" or "empty room" would be more accurate.
standing when o man th in k * .."  ("Essay" 1. 1 . 8 . )  ( l )  -  may he taken to<
re fe r  to "ob ject" as active aim or as passive presentment. In the 
former case i t  may he "whatsoever the mind perceives in i t s e l f "  (op .c : l t . .
2 . 8 . 8 , ) . i .e . "nothing hnt bare appearances or perceptions in our 
minds" ( op. c l t . ,  2. 52. I . )  and "nothing hut particu lars" ( or*, c i t , , h .  17 .  8 . ) ;  
o r , in the la t te r  case, "actual perceptions o f  the mind" ( 2. 10, 2.1; 
("abstraction " i s  described as a process rather than an e n t ity ) . (2 ) .
These ideas have two sources only, sensation and re fle c t io n , (which owe 
something to  Descartes* su b jective -ob jective  d iv is ion ). Understanding is  
passive in i t s  reception  o f  the "sim ple'' ideas o f  sensation, which Locke 
says are produced by primary qu a lities  extant in bodies ( g. 3 . IP .)
(qu ite  d ifferen t from the irreducib le  in tu ition s o f the* Cartesian mind): 
these simple ideas are produced in us "as in  a m irror" (2 . 8 . i 6 . )  -  very 
much a P latonic s im ile . They "im itate" real existences k ,  2 . ). are 
thus impressions on the mind (^. 4. 1 1 .) (P lato again), and are in fa ll ib le  
( f>. 1. t . ) ; they cannot be framed, invented, or destroyed, ( 2. 2. 2 . ) .  Tut 
simple ideas can be united " . . .  to an almost in fin ite  v a r ie ty ."  :
"These simple ideas, the m aterials o f  a ll  our knowledge, are suggested 
and furnished to the mind only by those two ways above mentioned, v iz . 
sensation and re f le c t io n , l/hen the understanding i s  once stored with these
I
simple ideas, i t  has tire power to repeat, compare end unite them, even to 
nu almost in fin ite  variety , and so car. make at pleasure new complex ideas.
But i t  i s  not in the power o f  the most exalted w it, or enlarged under­
standing, by any quid-mess o f  variety  o f  thought, to invent or franc one 
mow simple idea in the mind, not taken in by the ways before mentioned t nor 
can any force  o f  the understanding destroy those that are there. T. would 
have anyone try  to  fernery any taste which had never a ffected  h is  palate,
(1 )  Also, lo o , c i t » , : "..whatever is  meant by phantasms, species, or what­
ever i t  i s  which the mind con be omnloyed about in th inking."
(2 )  See "Essay", 2» 2» 9 .»  Both Locke end Loilrt. z use "reason" cogn itively
rather then in a " fa cu lty " sensa. bee also l .o itn iz 's  'New Essays" p-Thl. 
foo tn ote , ' *-------
or frame the idea o f  a scent he had never smelt s and -when he can do th is ,
I  w ill  also conclude that a b lind  man hath ideas o f  colours* and a deaf 
man true d is t in ct  notions o f  sounds." ( 2 . 2 . 2 . )
We have already traced a long established trad ition  which takes the mental 
power (or  fa cu lty ) o f  repeating and uniting ideas -  i f  not comparing 'them — 
to  he imagination; Locke, perhaps vary o f  the more esoter ic  notions 
already adhering to th is  concept, emits to give imagination the epistemo­
lo g ica l importance i t  seems hero tc be oved. Ho asserts that the con­
form ity o f  simple ideas with the existence o f things i s  su ffic ie n t  fo r  
knowledge (4 . 4 . 4 . ) , and he equates the "retd 03813100" o f  simple ideas 
with th e ir  "nominal essence" ( 3 . 3 . 18 ). Ideas are "simple" because they 
are "oncoriporjided", iuje. irred u c ib le, and they ou st a ll  have come to us 
through one or other o f  our f iv e  senses ( l ) ;  simple ideas are coeval with 
sensation. As well as 3imple, we also have c.nnplex ideas, which come from 
re fle c t io n  ana which are made by the active mind out o f  the simple ideas 
(2 . 12. 1 . ) . Whereas simple ideas are che necessary product o f  primary 
q u a lit ie s , secondary q u a lit ie s  are produced, "by the operation o f  insensible 
p a r t ic le s  on our senses" ( 2 . 8 . 1 3 . ) that is ,  by some m o t io n .. . . .o f  nerves 
or animal s p ir its  . . .  to the brains or  the scat o f  sensation, there to 
pi-odnco in our minds the particu lar ideas we have o f  them." ( 2 . 8 . 1 2 ) . 
Secondoiy q u a lit ies , e .g .f ig u re . number, bulk, have 110 "resemblance" in 
bod ies. Our complex ideas o f  substances are made up o f  ideas o f  the primary 
q u a lit ie s  o f  things, "which are discovered by our senses", and j
"Thirdly, the aptness, vo consider in any substance to give or receive 
such a lterations o f  primary qu a lities , as that the substance so altered 
should produce in us d iffe ren t ideas from what i t  d id  before; these are 
ca lled  active and passive powers." ( 2 . 23. ft .)
( l )  This contention i s  the reason fo r  L eilm is 's  ca llin g  Locke's empiricism 
"b e s t ia l" . For further discussion see L c . i h n i "New Essays" p;<,44-G &. 3 5b; 
also "Mon ado logy" seer;. 2^-9. at;d "Principles o f  Nature and. o f  Grace" p .
C f . also Fes cartes and Gpiriossa ( "vipra)
*  In ausver to Dr. Mclyucuar's problem, presumably.
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A substance is  defined according to it s  q u a lit ie s  by Locke, and is  not
c
a mysterious, unknown and unknowable '’essence". Complex ideas are 
divided into ideas o f  "Modes, which mu y  he simple or mixed, Substances 
or Relations ( 2. 12. 3 . f f . )
The great importunce o f Locke's "ideas", and their origin  and 
nature, th eir  d iv is ion  into simple end complex, i s  in their being the 
foundation o f  our reason and knowledge. Knowledge is  a product o f 
experience, o f  the observation o f external, sensib le  ob jects , or o f 
the op era tion eo f our minds within us. This simple-complex division  
i s  so important because the to ta lity  o f  human understanding i s  "to 
corajiound and divide the materialo that are mode 'to h is hand" (2 .2 .2 .) 
and knowledge depends on the agreement or disagreement o f  ideas. This 
agreement may be perceived immediately, or i t  mey be demonstrable : 
in the f i r s t  instance the knowledge is  called, in tu it iv e ; "the c lea rest 
and the most certain that human fr a ilty  is  capable o f "  (4. 2. 2 . , 4. 17» 2. )  ( l ) 
so that, fo r  example, we see "as on eye doth l ig h t "  that white is  not 
black, ncr a c ir c le  a triangle; ve distinguish with in tu itive  certa inty  
between simple ideas. In the second instance, demonstrative kncwicdgo, 
reasoning i s  required to prove the agreement or disagreement o f  ideas, 
but the steps o f  reasoning depend upon an in tu it iv e  recognition o f 
agreement/disagreement : mathematics are the epitome o f  reasoning. (l)
I
( l )  See also "Essay" 4. 9« '5. : "Experience teaches us that we have an 
intu itive  knew!edge o f  our own existence, and an internal in fa ll ib le  
perception that we a r c ."  This is  pure Descartes. Leibniz, "New Essays" 
P.499, commenting on th is section , says : " I  am en tire ly  agreed to a l l  
th is . And I add that the immediate apperception o f  our existence and o f 
our thoughts furnishes uo the f i r s t  truths a p o s te r io r i , or o f  fact- i .c .  
the f i r s t  experiences, as the identical propositions furnish the f i r s t  
truths a p r io r i or or. reason, i . c . the f i r s t  l ip h ts  (leo  premieres luinieres). 
Both are capable o f  proof, and may be ca lled  immediate ; the former because 
they - -;V lV.VU.dli.tc L.. C 1 L «  uutxi.tauuiu^ ci.itl i t s  ob ject ; cite iu ccer  
because they ere immediate between the subject and the pred ica te ." L e ib n iz 's  
additional remarks say something quite d iffe re n t from the " tabula rasa" 
empiricism o f  Locke, Luf. the difference' i s  one o f  emphasis, and as we see, 
i t  is  not even eonaistratiy  adhered to by Locke : fo r  him the nind finds 
I t s e l f  in the world, for  L eiln iz  the raind finds the world iu i t s e l f ,  and 
"these "two" occurences arc- simultaneous.
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Locke has a th ird  kind o f  knowledge, ca lled  "sen sitive" ( l )  which 
is  le ss  certain  than in tu itive and demonstrative knowledge, depending as 
i t  does on '‘ fa ith  nod opinion" and lacking the certainty o f  the other 
two kinds o f  knowledge. (&). Disregarding in tu itive  knowledge, Locke 
soys i t  is  by .judgment that we accept agreement or disagreement or 
diseex-n the tru th  or falsehood o f  propositions.. Propositions nay he 
o f  reason, pertaining to rational knowledge, or o f  fa ct , pertaining 
to knowledge o f  sense; ( 3 ) the greater part o f  our knowledge depends 
on rational deduction and on the intermediate ideas o f  sense ("Essays”
4. 1 7 .  2 . ) .  Henson contains sagacity , by which i t  "fin ds ont", and 
i l  1 a lien , by which i t  see3 connections hy ordering intermediate ideas. (l)*3
( l )  There is  a fourth kind, which Locke guardedly udrnits ("Essays"
4. Ch.18 ), which is  "rev e la tion ", and which he says is  le ss  secure 
than knowledge from sense. Ue distinguishes between th is end "enthusiasm" 
which he c a lls  "the conceits c f  a warmed or overweening brain" (4. 19» 7«) » 
C l. Leibniz, o p .c i t . , p . S?8. : "Enthusiasm was at the beginning a good 
term. And ns the oophism properly indicates an exercise o f  wisdom, 
enthusiasm s ig n if ie s  that there is  d iv in ity  in ns . . .  Socrates maintained 
that a god or daemon gave him internal warnings, so that enthusiasm could 
he divine in s t in c t ."  See also p . 35 : Enthusiasm . .  springs forth  only
from the imagination o f a heated and conceited s p ir i t " ,  and again p . j4 : 
"he may yet c a l l  such a fancy sight o r  l ig h t , yet i t  i s  nothing raxre than 
b e lie f  and con fid en ce ."
(? ) See "Essay" 4. 1 1 8 . ,  where Locke implies that sensitive knowledge 
is  the basis o f  science, as well as o f  everyday experience, but says 
4 . 11. 10 . ) ,  : "he that, in the ordinary a ffa ir s  o f  l i f e ,  would admit o f  
nothing hut d ir e c t  plain demonstration, would be sure o f  nothing in th is  
l i f e  hut o f  perishing q u ick ly ."  L eibniz, (c p .c l t . . p p .312-3) says :
" . . .  the truth o f  sensible things ie  ju s t if ie d  by their connection, which 
depends upon the in te llectu a l truths ground in reason and upon constant 
observations noon the sensible things themselves even when the reasons 
do not appear."
( 3 ) This d is tin ction  between fa cts  and reasons is  L e ib n iz 's  ("New Essays"
p .314 and "Konadology" ¿3 )  but i t  i s  im p lic it  in Locke.
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Reducing Locke's jihilosophy to i t s  barest bone«>, i t  i s  true to 
say that fo r  hira knowledge derives from simple ideas ("sim ple" Ì3 
used sim ilarly  by Descartes and Spinoza). Whether he is  correct 
in in sistin g  on this p r io r ity  is  debatable, since the existence o f  
such "ideas" as "white", "round", e t c . ,  other than as f ic t io n s  or 
predicates, may bo disputed. Locke assumes that tùey rea lly  e x is t  
in some ob jective  sense, as had Descartes, but goes rather les3 
deeply into the problem o f  demonstrating their existence than does 
h is predecessor. His statement that i t  is  id le  to expect demon­
stration  o f  the undemonstrab ie is  c ircu lar , where there ure no 
sa tis fa ctory  grounds fo r  distinguishing between them. I t  is  surely 
•the case that simple ideas are abstracted, having a conceptual iden­
t i t y  rather than an in tu ited  determination by the senses (th is  Berkeley 
also ob jects  t o ) ,  to be o f  use in complex ideas. As h is d e fin ition s 
o f  "understanding" show, Locke is  vulnerable to Berkeley's attack 
on h is representationalism, and h is statement that the ideas o f  
primary qu a lities  o f  bodies are resemblances o f  them" ( 2. 18. 1 5 » ) . is  
met by Berkeley's contention that "an idea can be lik e  nothing but 
another idea" ("P rincip les o f Human Knowledge" J))» which Hume ca lled  
"one o f  the greatest and most valuable d iscoveries that has been made 
o f  la te  years in the republic o f  le t t e r s ."  ("Treatise on Human 
Knowledge" Bk.I. Sec. V i i ) .  Locke's secondary q u a lit ies  are an odd 
l o t  too , produced by "insensible p a rtic le s "  and "animal s p ir it s " ,  and may 
have been suggested to him by Epicureanism cr  contemporary m icrobiology.
I f  a ll our ideas ex is t only in the uund, the problem o f  distinguishing 
between the "real and the 'imaginary' ones, a problem with which Locke is  not
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greatly concerned, i s  o f  some epistem ological importance o f  a correspondence 
is  claimed betwecji these idees and an ob jective  world or i f  i t  i3  B'.3in- 
tained, as Locke maintains. that th is conformity- between our simple
ideas and the existence o f  things i s  su ffic ie n t  fo r  real knowledge."
("E ssay" 4 . 4 . 1 . ) . L e ib n iz, ( ’’New Essays" p . 44|5) answers :
" . . .  the ground o f  our certitude in regard to universal and external 
truths is  in the ideas themselves, independently o f  the senses, fo r  
example, that o f  being, unity, id en tity , e tc . But the ideas o f  sensible 
q u a lit ie s , ns colour, savour, e t c . (which in re a lity  are on ly  phantoms), 
come to us from the senses, i . e .  from our confused perceptions. And the 
basis o f  the truth o f  contingent and singular things is  in the succession 
which cauces these phenomena o f the senses to be righ tly  un ited  as the 
in t e l l ig ib le  truths demand."
The Cartesian duality o f  droora and re a lity  is  as acute in  Locke as i t  
i s  in Descartes, and lias a d irect hearing on oar claims to knowledge with 
respect to the agreement or disagreement o f  ideas. Ilobbes had said, that 
imagination un ites, judgment discerns: fo r  Spinoza, imagination -  amongst 
other functions -  deals in particu lars ; Locke’ s "judgment" i s  that "whereby 
the Blind takes i t s  ideas to agree or disagree" ("Essay" 4. I ? . 3»)• Bearing 
in mind the nature o f  Berkeley's attack on Locke's representationolisia, we 
should say that either there is  something in the nature o f  ideas (o r  the 
mind originating them) which them agree; or that- there i s  an ob jectiv e ,
natural, world which in teracts aid in terrela tes and which we observe and 
describe and, presumably, change by intervention. Between the two philo­
sophical poles e f Cartesian dualism cud Lockean empiricism, i f  we may 
t o l c a t c  momentarily these over-sim plified  categories, there f e l l s  the 
p o s s ib il ity  o f  «  th ird , broad p os ition  which attempts to operate within 
the two co n flic t in g  and apparently irrecon cilab le  poles. This attempt 
has been undertaken in some measure by A ristotle  and by Spinoza und I.eibaiz, 
and with Descartes these philor.ophers o ffe r , to varying degrees, theories 
of. imagination. Locke, fo r  whom in h is notion o f  complex ideas a uniting
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and retaining princip le  seeino cru c ia l, hardly mentions imagination 
throughout the "Essay" and y e t, hy attacking innate ideas and implying 
the p o s s ib il ity  o f man's self-dependency end salvation, in a manner 
somewhat d ifferen t from that o f  the "Eerraetica", be unquestionably 
precip itated  the new prominence o f  imagination in Romantic aesthetics.
Both Locke and Descartes state that 'id e a s ' and 'w i l l '  are greater in 
scope then present understanding, but as modern psychology has learned, 
man can condition both him self and h is  world according to h is precepts, 
and the known can p re fix  the knowable despite a b e l ie f ,  as Locke holds, in 
the nea i'-in fin ity  o f  ideas. Even so , Leibniz admonishes Locke fo r  having 
too  lim ited a view o f  the knowable ( l ) .  The influence o f  Leibniz -  the 
public , Cartesian Leibniz — on the philosophy o f  art was as great as 
L ocke 's , although he seems to have no opinions on the subject o f  art, 
ju s t  as Locke, on the occasion when he mentions the subject, i3  quite 
disparaging. Baumgarten, who gave "A esthetics" a t i t l e  and who f i r s t  
treated i t  i s  a philosophic d is c ip lin e , based h is theory on W olff who 
was a d isc ip le  o f  L eibn iz. The e f fe c t s  o f  L ocke's "Essay" were to be 
rather more far-reaching and d ire c t , s o c ia lly , p o l i t ic a l ly ,  and
( l ) Locke, "Essay" 4»p .2 2 .. says t "The causes o f  our ignorance, I suppose, 
w ill  he found to be ch ie fly  three :
F irst, Want o f  Ideas.
Secondly, Y/ant o f  a discoverable connextion between the ideas we have. 
Thirdly, Want o f  tracing and examining our id ea s."
L eibn iz, 'New Essays" p.459. rep lies  : "Above e l l  we should be very wrong 
to  complain o f  the defects o f  our knowledge, since we avail ourselves so 
l i t t l e  o f  that which charitable nature presents to n s ,"  A lso, w>.444-5 : 
"Some one who has net understood the importance o f  having good ideas, and 
o f  understanding their agreement or  di«agreement, w ill  think that iu 
reasoning upon them so ca re fu lly  we have been building ccstlei. in the a ir , 
and that there w ill be in our entire system only the ideal and the 
imaginary. An extravagant man whose imagination is  heated, w ill have the 
advantage o f  possessing ideas more v iv id  and greater in number, thus he 
would also have more knowledge. There w ill  be as much certitude in the 
v isions o f an enthusiast as in the reasonings o f  a uober man, provided
t u l «3 c u  u i u o x u o t  C v x a e x  to o v x i vjly  9 a u u  a  v  » h i  u s  c ia  i x  u s  LV fcicty  tt L t U j ^
i s  not a centaur as to say a square i s  not a c i r c l e . "
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a esth etica lly , as much as ph ilosoph ica lly . The aesthetic im plications o f  
Locke's empiricism f i r s t  become manifest in Addison's "Spectator" a r t ic le s , 
where the essaye on the "Pleasures o f  Imagination" began to appear. The 
magazine, extremely popular in i t s  tine had i t s  im itators in ]Europe as 
did Addison's praise o f  the imagination and Ü 3  pleasures, and foremost 
amongst the im itators were Bodmer and B rletinger, through whose agency 
"imagination" becomes the central concept in the a r t is t ic  theory o f  (reman,
then English, iiomanticisiu
£03.
Chapter 3 : LE1ENIZ.
« AJ ■ hough he says he is  more impressed by P lato, the influence o f 
A risto tle  on Leibniz is  very strong and particu larly  noticeable in 
the "Monadology"; elsewhere th is influence is  hard to extricate from 
L e ib n iz 's  unacknowledged debt to Spinoza, as fo r  instance i.n the form er's 
attempts to distinguish between real and imaginary 'phenomena' ( l ) .  But 
whereas Descartes emphasises mind at the expense o f sense, «r>d Locke 
sense at the expense o f  mind, we find in Spinoza tnd Leibniz some 
pos itive  attempt to overcome dualism. For Leibniz, adapting the 
Cartesian cr ite rion  o f  distinctness -  h itherto applied only to conceptions ~ 
"Being i s  explained by a d is t in ct  concept . . . .  Existence by a d is t in c t  
percep tion ." lie accepts with Descartes that, whatever he thinks i t  i s  
s t i l l  hc_ who is  thinking, and so, using the unprc.judicial term 'phenomena' 
he asserts that the rea lity  o f  phenomenon i s  determined by the phenomenon 
i t s e l f  and by the antecedent and consequent phenomena, with the three 
c r ite r ia  o f  vividness, m ultip lexity, and contigu ity  :
" I t  w ill be v iv id , i f  the q u a lities , as l ig h t ,  colour, heat, appear 
s u ff ic ie n t ly  intense} i t  w ill be m ultiplex i f  they are varied, and 
adapted to many tests  and t-o the in stitu tion  o f  new observations; fo r  
example i f  we experience in the phenomenon not only colours but also sounds, 
odours, flavours, ta c t i le  qu a lities , uml these things both in the whole 
and in i t s  various parts which again we can discuss ir  various re lation e 
(v a riis  caueis ti-actare). Which things, indeed, a long series o f  obser­
vations, in stitu ted  esp ecia lly  with design and with choice, is  wont to 
meet neither in dreams nor in those images which the memory or the 
phantasy presents, in which the image i s  very often weak and also 
disappears ( dispero t) in the course o f  the discussion . The phenomenon 
w ill be congrous vhen i t  consists o f  many phenomena, the reason o f  which 
can be given ix*om themselves in turn, or from some common hypothesis
( l )  See "On The Method o f  IHstinguirhinp Real from Imagine,ry Phenomena"; 
in Appendix  XII o f  'New Essays", pp. 717-720-
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Clin liter 3 : LK1 Till'd.
• Although he Bays he is  wore impressed by Pluto, the influence o f  
A ristotle  on Leibniz is  very strong and particu larly  noticeable  in 
the "Monadology"; elsewhere th is influence is  hard to extrica te  from 
L eibn iz 's  unacknowledged debt to Spinoza, ae for  instance in the form er's 
attempts to distinguish between real and imaginary 'phenomena' ( l ) .  But 
whereas Descartes emphasises mind at the expense o f  sense, and Locke 
sense at the expense o f  mind, we find  in Spinoza and Leibniz some 
positive  attempt to overcome dualism. For Leibniz, adopting the 
Cartesian c r ite r io n  o f  distinctness -  h itherto applied only to conceptions -  
"Being is  explained by a d is tin ct concept . . . .  Existence by a d is t in ct  
perception ." He accepts with Descartes that, whatever be thinks i t  i s  
s t i l l  he. who i s  thinking, and so, using the unprejudicial term 'phenomena' 
he asserts that the rea lity  o f  phenomenon i s  determined by the phenomenon 
i t s e l f  and by the antecedent and consequent phenomena, with the three 
c r ite r ia  o f  v ividness, m ultip lexity, and contigu ity  j 
" I t  w ill be v iv id , i f  the q u a lities , as l ig h t , colour, heat, appear 
s u ffic ie n t ly  intense; i t  w ill be jou ltiplex i f  they are varied, and 
adapted to many teats and to the in stitu tion  o f  new observations; fo r  
example i f  we experience in the phenomenon not only colours but also sounds, 
odours, flavou rs , ta c t ile  q u a lities , and those things both in the whole 
and in i t s  various parts which again we can discuss in various relations 
(v a riis  causis tra cta re ). Which things, indeed, a long series o f  obser­
vations, in stitu ted  especia lly  with decign and with choice, i s  wont to 
meet neither in  dreams nor in those images which the memory or  the 
phantasy presents, in which the imago i s  very oiten  weak and also 
disappears ( diaparot) ju the course o f  the discussion. The phenomenon 
w ill he congroue when i t  consists o f  many phenomena, the reason o f  which 
can be given from themselves in turn, o r  from some common hypothesis
( l )  See "On The Method o f  Distinguishing Real from Imaginary Phenomena"; 
in Appendix XII o f  "Now Essays", pp. 717-720.,
s u ff ic ie n t ly  simple; then i t  w ill he congruous i f  i t  preserves the 
usage o f  other phenomena which have frequently precepted themselves 
to no so that the ports o f  the phenomenon have that position , ordc-r, 
resu lt, which sim ilar phenomena have had. Otherwise they w ill be 
suspected; fo r  i f  we should see men moved in the a ir ,  s itt in g  upon 
the h ip p eg r iffs  o f  A riosto , we should doubt, I think, whether we were 
dreaming o r  awake. But th is  proof can be referred to another head o f 
considerations assumed from the preceeding phenomena. With which 
phenomena the present phenomenon roust he congruous i f ,  mimely, they 
preserve the some usage, that i s ,  i f  the reason o f  th is  can be given 
from the preceding, or a l l  agree with the sane hypo thesis as a 
common reason. But, undoubtedly the strongest proof is  the agreement 
with the whole course o f  l i f e ,  esp ecia lly  i f  very many others affirm  
that the same agrees with th eir  own phenomena a lso ; fo r , that other 
substances similar to us ex is t , i s  not only p oss ib le , but indeed certain, 
ns I sh a ll scon sey. But the most powerful proof o f  the re a lity  o f 
phenomena, which, indeed, alone s u ffice s , i s  the success in predicting 
future phenomena from the past and present, whether that prediction  is  
founded on reason, or in the hypothesis thus far aucceeding, o r  in the 
usage thus far observed. Nay, though th is entire  l i f e  were said to 
he nothing hut a dream, and the V isib le  world nothing bnt a phantasm,
I would c a ll  th is dream or phantasm real enough, i f ,  using reason w ell, 
we were never deceived by i t ;  but ju s t  as we know from these what 
phenomena must he regarded as rea l, so, on the other hand, whatever 
phenomena co n flic t  with these which we judge rea l, also these whose 
fa lla cy  we con explain from th e ir  own causes, these only we think 
apparent.
Bat i t  must he confessed that the proofs o f  real phenomena which 
have been thus far brought forward, howsoever united, are not demon­
stra tiv e ; fo r , although they hove the greatest p robab ility , o r , no is  
oomcKinly said, produce a moral certainty, they, neverthelens, do not
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create a metaphysical certainty, so that tbc assertion o f the contrary 
im plies a contradiction . And thus, by no argument can i t  he 
absolutely  demonstrated that there are bodies, nor anything keep 
certain  w ell-ordered dreams from being ob jects  to our mind, which are 
considered by us as true, and on account o f  the agreement among 
themselves with respect to use are equivalent to tru ths." ( O p .c it . , 
pp, 718 -9 ). ( l ) .  Having o ffe red  rather mors convincing arguments 
than Descartes' Leibniz concludes in similar fashion to h is  that, 
in respect o f  'phenomena' (L eibn iz 's  tern) he w ill neither admit 
rashly nor doubt un iversa lly , and conjecture with p robab ility  that 
body ex ists  (see "Meditfttione" I I I ) . L eibn iz ’ s arguments are not 
dissim ilar from Hume's, as we shall see, and they are characterised 
by an evident b e l ie f  in a certain uniformity, as is  clear from the 
'con gru ity ' and the 'agreement with the course o f  l i f e '  arguments.
There i s  some uncertainty a s 'to  whether he is  o fferin g  some kind
o f  proceedurol guide fo r , c .g .  empirical science, or on existentia l
guide fo r  everyday use; in the former case, h is la s t  argument -
"which . . .  alone su ffice s "  -  o f  pred ictive accuracy is  undeniably
strong, but i t  could be disastrous in the la tte r  case, where i t
would not be d i f f i c u l t  to think o f  cases in which experience would
be too  dearly bought to he o f  any future use. The argument from <
vividness, so important to Hume, Leibniz himself ca lls  in to  question,
giv ing i t  rather le ss  weigh* than Ilnme was to do, and the argument
based on coherence with the whole o f  one 's l i f e  seems to advocate
( l )  He ea r lie r  had qu a lified  h is reliance on vividness, but not on 
'bonnection o f  the phenomena" : "..although feelings are wront to be more 
v iv id  than imaginations, i t  i s  nevertheless a fa ct  that there are cases 
when imaginative persons are impressed as much or perhaps more by their 
imaginations than another i s  by the truth o f  things; so that I think
* C!« j o ^  +V| a ** an <i n +)ia r»n«v' rtf'
o f the phenomena, i , r. the connection o f that which takes p lace in d ifferent 
p laces and times, and in the experience o f  d ifferen t men who are themselves, 
each to the others, very important phenomena in this resp ect. And the 
connection o f  the phenomena whioh guarantees the truths o f  f act in respect 
to sensible things outside o f  ns, i s  v er ified  by the truths of  reason; 
as the phenomena o f  op tics  are explained by geometry." (".Mew Kssays" v . k Z U ) .
in f le x ib i l i t y  ns much ns to assume uniformity, which may be adequate 
Where circumstances arc foroeeable but in su ffic ien t fo r  anyone involved 
in  s c ie n t if ic  research or confronted with unique or unusual phenomena. 
Adopting fo r  a moment an argument o f  Hobbes, we might well maintain 
that the a b il ity  to distinguish among phenomena be a function  of 
judgment, the a b ility  to pee s im ila rities  -  uniform ity, coherence, 
congruity, -  a function o f imagination, so that the problem o f  
separating 'r e a l ' from 'imaginary' phenomena i s  further complicated 
by the degress o f  r e a lity  or imagination exhibited by some phenomena.
But L eibn iz 's  views stand comparison with any to be found in philosophy 
on these points, and h is  'course, o f  l i f e '  point has, at the very le a s t , 
the unusual philosophical m erit o f  o r ig in a lity . The problem of 
discerning between imagination and re a lity  was not one which caused 
him any lastin g  concern, and he is  not unduly disturbed by the p o s s ib il ity  
that our l i f e  might he "a continuous and everlasting dream", although 
th is  is  h ighly unlikely, and " ...p rov id ed  the phenomena are connected, 
i t  does net matter whether they are ca lled  dreams or not, since experience 
shows that we are not deceived in the measures we take concerning 
phenomena when they are understood according to the truths o f  reason." 
("New Essays" p. >i22) .
Whereas for  Leibniz the argument from contigu ity  is  lo g ica l with 
pragmatic consequences, fo r  Locke, as an em piricist, the congruity 
pertains to  the causal in teraction  o f  ob jects  presented (o r  represented) 
to  us. "Knowledge.. . "  he states, "..seems to me to he nothing hut the 
perception o f  the connexion and agreement, or disagreement and 
repugnancy, o f  any o f  our id ea s ."  He continues t "Where th is  perception 
i s ,  there is  knowledge, and vhero i t  i s  not, there, we may fancy, guess
i or. . .rf. + wo nl won. .onto a}».«.1 rtf Vnftvl orl.. . 11 nr TV
» V w ,--------- - - —
Ch. I .  Sec. 2 ) . And, us he had previously said t "The mind, in mailing 
i t s  complex ideas o f substances, puts none together, which are not
5-06.
,ouppot) d to have an onion with nature," (O p .c it . ,  1>k. l'TI, Ch. 6t 
Sec. 23) .  ( l ) .  Locke l i s t s  four kinds o f  agreement/disagreement,
£ 0 ? .
the very foundations, fo r  him, o f  human knowledge : 1. Identity  or 
d iversity ; 2. Relation; 3 . Coexistence, or necessary connexion;
4. Real existence. (O p .c it . ,  Bk. IV. Ch. I . Sec. 3 ) .  Leibniz 
reduces these to "comparioon or  concurrence" ("New Essays" pp. 400 -1 ) .
The most immediate problem seems to be L ocke 's "real existence" which 
i s  a r e l ic  o f  Descartes' ontology -  'God' being an example o f  'rea l 
existence" -  and which he might more happily have termed "v er ifia b le  
existence", and which fo r  Leibniz would be a question of coherence 
with other phenomena. L ocke 's Cartesian reliquary continues to display 
i t s e l f  when he says that "in tu ition  and demonstration are the degress 
o f  our knowledge" (o p .c i t . .  Bk. IV, Ch. 2 , Sec. 1 . ) .  -  adding la te r , 
"sen sitiv e" knowledge -  and that in tu itiv e  knowledge, when "the mind 
perceives the agreement or disagreement o f  the ide&3 immediately by 
'themselves, without the intervention o f  any other . . . .  as the eye 
doth l ig h t "  is  "the most certain  the human f r a i l t y  is  capable o f . "
The ’ knowledge' to which Locke here re fe rs  locks very lik e  that which 
Socrates sought in Meno, but the presence o f  such knowledge hardly 
accords with a "blank ta b le t"  or "empty chamber" theory o f  the mind. 
Sim ilarly, Locke's d iv is ion  o f  knowledge into in tu it iv e , demonstrative 
and sensitive demands a mind that is  active  and, so to speal:, outgoing, 
and against which 'this 'empty' or 'b lank ' description  m ilita tes .
The popular Leihnizian philosophy which percolated v ia  W olff to 
Baumgarten, Becoming the coping stone o f  the new study ca lled  "A esthetics",
( l )  Leibniz, i t  should be noted, argues that the agreement or d is­
agreement o f  our ideas is  a ground fo r  truth , but not, he says, fo r  
know!edge o f  truth : "For we know truth only em piricollv . from having 
experienced i t ,  without having the connexion o f  things and 'the reason 
there is  in what we have experienced, we have no perception o f  th is  
agreement or disagreement, unlesp wo mean that we feel i t  in a 
confused way without being conscious o f  i t . "  ("New Essays" p. 400) .
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i s  Cartesian in o r ig in . Kant belongs h is to r ica lly  as v e il  as
ph ilosoph ica lly  in th is  lin e  o f  'r a t io n a lis t ' thinkers, having based 
many o f  h is  lectu res on the "Metaphysics" o f  Baumgarten. I t  i s  safe, 
i f  not en tire ly  true, to say that i f  Locke way broadly speaking be 
ca lled  an 'e m p ir ic is t ',  emphasising the orig in  o f  a l l  knowledge in 
experience, Leibniz is  a 'r a t io n a lis t ' emphasising the mind's innate 
d isposition  to structure experience according to lo g ica l c r ite r ia .
But ju s t  as Locke is  not en tire ly  consistent in h is empiricism -  
believing in in tu ition  and mental 'pow er ', and suggesting a qnasi- 
d ispositiona l account o f  memory, w ill  and understanding -  so Leibniz 
rocojyiises the enormous importance o f  sense—experience, but r ig id ly  
maintaining the innate organisational capacity o f  the mind and arguing 
that in sofar as ve are only empirical wc are no d iffe ren t from beasts; 
i t  i s  reason alone which elevates us. The A ristotelian  tenor o f  th is 
b e l ie f  is  appropriate fo r , althouth Leibniz is  c r it ic a l  o f  the 
A ristotelian /C artesian  tabula rasa o f  L ocke's "Essay", finding, 
as ho says, more value in P la to 's  "reminisconce" ( l ) ,  there can be no 
doubt o f  h is  great debt to A r is to t le , a debt vdiich he c lea rly  indicates 
in the Appendix to h is  critiqu e  o f L ocke 's "Essay". The "Monadology", 
as I have sa id , i s  fundamentally A risto te lia n , as well as owing something 
to the Spinozon doctrine o f  substance. I t  is  in teresting  to r e f le c t  «
that L eibn iz, whose in d irect influence on the course o f  aesthetics was 
considerable, was a man o f  extraordinary in terests and accomplishments 
whose in te lle ctu a l acumen, l ik e  Spinoza's, led  him far in advance 
o f  the b e l ie fs  o f  hie day hut whose love  o f  good opinion kept him 
fror p u b lic is in g  many o f  h is findings end from openly pursuing h is 
notions to th e ir  (unacceptable) conclusions. His psychology and 
epistemology are a combination or an tuinenamg xaitn in tae princip les
( l ) See "Mew Essays" p.lft. f f .  (e^jy. " . . . I  think . . .  I  can sey that 
our ideas even those o f  sen sib le  th in gs, come fj-oia w ith in  our s o u l ."
( "dc nost re pr opre fonds" ) .
r
209
o f  J.ogic and a close knowledge o f  the emerging sciences o f his time, 
esp ecia lly  b iology ond palaeontology; ve may surmise that he would 
have found confirmation o f  the axiom that a conclusion can contain 
nothing not contained in  i t s  premi se in the new m icroscopic di o~  
coveries o f  Leeuwenhoek ( l ) ,  who indicated that liv in g  organs are 
compounds o f  smaller organisms. That the possib le  i s  potentia lly  
in  the ex isten t, and the given contuins the possib le  as well oa the 
rea lised , are fundamental b e lie fs  o f  Leibniz.
Not unlike A risto tle , though with the ben efit o f  s c ie n t if ic  
d iscoveries and consequently greater c la r ity , Leibniz anticipates 
Darwin in h is  b e lie f  in the interconnectedness o f  species ( 2 ) , though 
the idea o f  a 'chain o f  being' was common in the seventeenth century.
His 'law o f  con tin u ity ', holding that nature makes no leaps, at osce  
has b io log ica l im plications as well as o ffe r in g  an alternative to 
Cartesian mind/body duality ; as a concomitant to th is 'low ' Leibniz 
adopts the Spinozau "substance" and o ffe rs  h is  own, but not completely 
original., theory o f  the "monad" ( 3 )» In proposing the monads as 
simple substances, in d iv is ib le , without shape, parts or extension,
Leibniz i s  faced with the problem o f  accounting fo r  th eir  orig in , a 
problem which remains insoluble today with respect to the modern physical 
equivalents o f  monads. Leibniz says they can only begin end end at once
(1) Leeuwenhoek's d iscoveries were well and widely known in h is day. From 
about 1674 he had observed bacteria and protozoa in rainwater, pond and 
well water, and in the human month and in testin es; these organism« he 
ca lled  "very l i t t l e  animalcules". In 1683 he published the f i r s t  drawings 
o f  bacteria  in the "Philosophical Transactions" o f  the Royal Society .
With respect to L e ib n iz 's  "law o f  continuity", Leeuwenhoek also disproved 
the notion o f  spontaneous generation by showing that ants, w eevils, e t c . ,  
come out o f  eggs and not spontaneous]y out o f  sand, wheat, or whatever.
In 170 2  he wrote t "In a ll fa llin g  rain, carried  from gutters into water- 
butts, animalcules are to be found; an d ... i n 'o i l  kinds o f  water, standing 
in the oo**xi nnn +.imi mv. «« r%,"ry
carried over by the wind, along with b its  o f  dust flou ting  in the a i r . "
(2 ) See "Mon ado logy " (?£_; also "Fragment o f a  Letter' to An M t'ioui Person" 
o f  Oct lb th  I7 0 7 . See also Locke. "Essay" 3. 6. 12.
(3 ) " A sim ilar inconsistency occurs in "New Essays" 1».U2 s " ..th a t  n atter 
can think i s  a miracle o f  God."
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and are therefore created by God ( "Monadology" 6_), on exception then 
» to h is o^ ni law o f  c o n t in u ity .(l) . He ca lls  h is  monads by the 
A ristotelian  term entelechiea (o p . c i t . . 18)t th is  proposing a 
dynamism fo r  h i s  irreducible substances which, b e i n g  created by God, 
are in a condition o f  becoming according to logical, p rin cip les , 
embracing the laws o f  contradiction and o f  su ffic ie n t  reason ( o p . c i t . ,
31 & 32). Since a ll organisms are reducible to common substances and 
have common prin cip les , they are in d e fin ite ly  intercownunicable :
"For as the whole is  a plenum, which means that the whole o i natter 
is  connected, and as in a plenum every movement has some e f fe c t  on 
distant bodies according to their d istance, so that eech body not only 
i s  a ffected  by those which touch i t ,  and is  in some way sensitive to 
whatever happens to them, but also by means o f  them is  sen sitive  to 
those which touch the f i r s t  bodies by which i t  i s  i t s e l f  d ire c t ly  touched} 
i t  follow s that the conmunication stretches out in d e fin ite ly . Conse­
quently every body i s  sensitive to everything which is  happening in 
the universe, so much so that one who saw everything could read in each 
body what i s  happening everywhere, and even what has happened and what 
w ill happen, by observing in the present the things that are distant in 
time as well as in space; . . . .  But a soul can only read in i t s e l f  what 
is  d is t in ctly  represented there} i t  i s  unable 'to develop e l l  a t once 
the things that are folded within i t ,  fo r  they stretch to in f in i t y ."  
("Monadology" 6 1) . (l)
( l ) C .f. Berkeley, "Principles o f Human Knowledge" Sec.123 t " . .  no in fin ite  
extension contains innumerable parts , or  is  in f in ite ly  d iv is ib le . "  Hodem 
science appears to support Leibniz. See also heibni z*n "Princip les o f  Nature 
and Grace, Pounded on iteason" 13. t "The beauty o f  tho universe could be 
learnt in each soul, could one unravel a ll i t s  fo lds which develop percep­
t ib ly  only in time. But as each d is t in c t  perception o f  the soul includes 
an. in fin ite  u« üusî u î cuuxuoeù pervcpuvua waxed) emnrace a il une universe, 
the soul i t s e l f  does not lenow the th ings which i t  perceives, except in  so 
fa r  as i t  has perceptions o f  them which ere d is t in c t  raid heightened î and 
i t  has perfection  in. proportion to i t s  d istin ct perceptions. Each soul loiovs 
tlie in fin ite , Knows everything, but con fusedly ." There is  something o f 
Spinoza in th is , but again the closeness, o f Bruno is  remcrknble -  only tho 
emphasis on "imagination" i s  ui seing.
213.
The s im ila rity  o f the b e lie fs  expressed here with those already 
found in Giordano Bruno are most striking« but Leibniz, cautiously 
om itting to land the imagination, prudently adds the caveat that the 
s o u l 's  representations) must be d is tin ct in  order to portend the 
in f in it e .  Nevertheless he c lea rly  affirm s that a ll sou l3 contain 
p o ten tia lly , i f  largely confusedly, (with monads and “plena") 
expressions o f  the whole uni verse; hut these cannot he the property 
o f  contingent things ; " . . .  bodies and th e ir  representations in 
s o u l s . . . "  -  hut must cone from God. ( l )  A liv in g  thing is  a unity 
o f  body and mcnad, in a manner not unlike A r is to t le 's  unity o f  body 
and soul, and i s  a "mirror o f  the universe" (honadology" G%) whereas 
the soul, which Leibniz c a l ls  the "mirror o f  the indestructib le  
universe", is  " . . .  i t s e l f  in destru ctib le , but also is  the animal 
i t s e l f ,  although i t s  machine may often  perish  in part, and cast o f f  
or  put on particu lar organic integuments." ("Mbnadology" 7 7 ). The 
indestructib le  soul is  an  ag^regatum o f  monads, and because monads 
ore cntelech ies and in fin ite  in number, th e ir  combinations also are 
in f in ite  according only to the law o f  contradiction , and a ll  bodies 
are "in  a state o f  perpetual flux lik e  r iv e rs , and parts are passing 
in  and out o f  them con tin ua lly ." Leibniz also invented a mathematic, 
ca lcu lus, to describe th is  dynamic which Newton — who invented calculus 
at about the same time — ca lled  "flu x ion s". Although Leibniz uses 
the "machine" metaphor which was common in h is time, th is  "body-machine" 
is  «mlike man-made mechanical ob jects  t
" . . .  every organic body o f a liv in g  thing is  a kind o f  divine 
machine, a natural automaton, which in f in ite ly  surpasses a ll a r t i f ic ia l  
automata. Because a machine1, which is  made by the art o f  man, is  not a
lu u u l i l u i f  JLu n u c L  u l  i  is £> X u w  w iu  m a w u A U t ;»  v  jl u c  v a x e i  u u u w  o w OU)
liv in g  bo diet;, ore s t i l l  machines in the least, o f  th e ir  parts ad in f  ini ton', 
( l ) See "Monedology" Secs. 8 ( . ft.
This i t  i s  which make? the difference between nature end cr t , that 
is  to ear between Divine a rt and ou rs ."  ("lion ado logy" 6'i) ♦
Tbs idea o f  the monad, together with on organic view o f man and 
nature o f fe r  Leibniz a means o f  overcoming Cartesian dualism :
"These prin cip les provide me with a way o f  explaining naturally 
the union, or rather the conformity, o f  the soul and the organic body.
The soul fo llow s i t s  ora lows, and the body i t s  ora likew ise, and they 
accord by virtue o f  the harmony pr e -established among a ll substances, 
since they are a ll representations o f  one and the same universe."
("llenadology" 7 s ) . He prudently avoids the complete id en tifica tion  
o f  the Spinozan Dens s iv e Katurn. though he is  patently cn the brink c-f 
such a step, preferring to  speak o f  "conformity" and "harmony" -  "the 
two kingdoms, o f  e f f i c ie n t  and fina l causes, arc in harmony with one 
another" — as nature makes no l e a p s . ( l ) .  The monad, as we have already 
noted, pertains to God; th is  is  the aspect o f  i t s  fina l cause; i t s  
e f f i c ie n t  cause relates to  the "universe o f  created things" j "souls in 
general", be says,
" . . .a r e  the liv in g  mirrors or images o f the universe o f  created 
things, whereas minds are also the images o f the Divinity Himself, or 
the Author o f  nature, capable o f  knowing the system o f  the universe, raid 
o f  im itating something o f  i t  by arch itectonic patterns, each mind being 
as i t  were a l i t t l e  d iv in ity  in i t s  ora deportjnent."(2) '
( 1 ) Borkeley t ".It may indeed on some occasions be necessary that the 
Author o f  nature display His overruling power in the producing appearances out 
o f  tue ordinary series o f  things. Such exceptions from the general rule o f  
nature are proper to surprise end awe men iuto the acknowledgement o f  the Divine 
Doing; hut then they are to be used seldom, otherwise there is  a plain reason 
wby~they f a i l o f  that o b je c t ." ("P r in c ip le s "  Sec.6 5) . Berkeley, lik e  Leibniz,
is  prepared to allow the almighty occasionally  to break the rules o f  lo g ic ;  
the p o s s ib il ity  o f  a m iracle, or o f  a visionary imagination, is  not to ta lly  
precluded.
(2 ) "Monadology" §2,. See also "P rincip les" 1 f t , : "As regards the rational soul 
or mind, there i 3 in i t  something more than in monads, or even in simple rea ls . 
I t  is  not only a mirror o f  the universe o f  created things, but also an image 
oi' the Deity. The mind not only has a perception o f  the work3 o f God, but is  
even capable o f  producing something lik e  them, though on a small sca le . For, 
not to mention the wonders o f  dreams, in which we invent without e f fo r t  (hut 
also without w il l )  things which wc could only discover a fter  much thinking when 
awake, our soul is  arch itectonic in i t s  voluntary a c t iv it ie s  also, and, dis­
covering sciences in accordance with which God bod regulated things (pentere, 
raonsorn, pnucrc, e t c . ) ,  i t  in it ia te s  in i t s  own sphere, and in the l i t t l e  
world which i t  is  allowed to act, what God performs in the groat w orld ."
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In both his "Monadology" and "Princip les o f  Nature and (-race" Leibriit
r
reveals a great debt to h is Neoplatonic forerunners, ().') and c le a r ly  
adhered to the "chain o f  being" account o f  a universe created by an 
immanent God and overseen by that etuie, nov transcendent God; the 
lo g ica l im posoib ility  o f such a conception o f  God was no wore l o s t  on 
Leibniz then on Spinoza, but Leibniz wanted to  have his metaphysical, 
cake and eat i t  — the redundancy o f  the "God" concept was a p o s s ib il ity  
too dangerous to suggest, i f  not to contemplate — and he seems to have 
devioed the monad as a stop-gap. ,
There are sim ilar inconsistencies in h is philosophy o f  mind. As 
we have seen, he has some sympathy fo r  the P laton ic notion o f  cognition as 
•reminiscence' as against the empirical view o f  Locke, and ho attacke 
the "blank ta b le t"  account o f  mind (2 ) .  He also denies that knowledge 
is  innate i f  understood ae the actual •consideration* ( envieasement) 
o f  ideas and truths. Ideas are innate as "in c lin a tion s, d isp osition s, 
habits, or natural p o te n tia lit ie s , and not as a ction s ,"  ("New Essays" 
p.46) and as "the immediate internal ob ject  o f  & notion, or o f  what 
the log ic ia n s  ca ll  an incomplex term" (O p .c lt . .  p♦21). He adds «•
" . . . i t  s u ffice s  at the la s t  to recognise that there is  an internal 
lig h t  bom  with us, which comprises a ll the in te l l ig ib lo  ideas and a ll 
the necessary truths which are only a resu lt o f  these ideas and need 
not experience in  order to be proved." (O p .c it ..  p .2 2 ).
(1 ) For a discussion o f  th is  and other in fluences on Leibniz, e.K. 
Cabalism, P lotinus, Pythagoreanism, Bruno, e t c . ,  see J.Pol H o l la  
"Platonism, Aristotelianism , and Cabalism in  the Philosophy o f  Leibniz ;1 
P o lit e l la , (p .8 ) . writes : " . .th a t  he was influenced by and drew 
extensively frem, the Pythagoreans, P lato, A r is to t le , and Neo—PIatonists, 
the Cubalisto, and other e c le c t io  scholars o f  h is own day, i s  not 
d i f f i c u l t  to demonstrate." Also, p . 54. P o l it e l la  quotes u le t t e r  o f  
Leibniz : " 'A ll the order o f  natural beings must, necessarily  form own 
chain in  which the d ifferen t classes, lik e  so many lin k s, are so c lose ly  
connected with one another that i t  is  impossible fo r  sense or  imagination 
to deterraino exectly  the point where one o f  them .begins or e n d s . . . ' . "
(2) See "New Essays" pp .46-7 * "16 our soul then by i t s e l f  snch a blank 
that besides the images borrowed from without i t  i s  nothing? This is  
not an opinion, ( l  am euro) that our ju d iciou s author conld approve.
And whore do ve fin d  tab lets that have no v a rie ty  in themselves?"
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From th is "internal l ig h t "  and not from sense-experience come the 
"prim itive truths" such aa the p r in cip le  o f contradiction  (and 
id en tity ), hut fo r  Leibniz, as fo r  Locke, 'innate ideas' are in 
no way to he considered as foreknowledge as might ho construed from 
the Platonic metempsychosis. Bat th is  'in ternal ligh t*  looks rather 
more substantive than 'in c lin a tio n s , d isp os ition s ' e t c . ,  and further 
confounds the epistem ological with the psychological in  re fle ct io n  
o f  the in consistencies in h is  metaphysics. One i s  reminded o f the 
problems A risto tle  inherited from P lato, end indeed there is  much 
that i s  A ristote lian  in both the monadology and the 'd isp o s it io n a l ' 
account o f  ideas as many o f  h is  terms and references show ( l ) .  Both 
A ristotle  and L eibn iz  give prominence to the concept o f  "motion" t 
"...m otion  i s  not given in  bodies as a real en tity  in  them, but 
I  have demonstrated that whatever moves io continually created, that 
bodies in any instant o f assignable motion are something, at any 
intervening time between instants are n oth in g .."  ("New Essays" p,<Vi8 ). 
But Leibniz gives no intimation o f  a psychology o f  imagination -  which, 
we remember, A r is to t le  ca lled  'a  kind o f motion* — ju s t  as he resists  
any mention o f a concept o f  'im agination ' in  the context o f  h is  view 
o f  the mind as a mirror o f  the universe end an image o f  the Deity; 
th is  cannot be oversight fo r  though he may not have read A ristotle  in 
the original he certa in ly  knew o f  Bruno, and 'im agination ', although 
an occu lt concept, was much discussed in the seventeenth century. The 
omission must in  part be ascribed to what D.F.Bond c a l ls  a "d istru st" 
o f  imagination, and to L e ib n iz 's  p o l it ic a l  d iscretion ; the connection 
o f  imagination with creation had to  wait fo r  about a hundred years 
before acquiring re sp ecta b ility . The A ristote lian  potentiel-actual
( l )  Puesell, in  h is  book on the philosophy o f  Leibniz, (p.C, f t n t . l ) ,  
agrees iu ascribing much o f i t  A ristote lian  in fluence, but says tbut 
there is  no evidence to show that Leibniz ever actu a lly  studied 
A ris to tle .
formula, io  much in evidence in L eibn iii's  psychological speculations; 
he speaks o f  a passive "power" in  matter and mass, whereby a body 
r e s is ts  penetration and also motion (K epler's "natural in ertia  o f  
b o d ie s " ), ca llin g  th is  power A ntitrine . This antitype is  rather 
snbtler than the time-honoured "imprint" or "impression" sim iles 
fo r  sense-experience (and imagination), being le s s  s ta t ic  and rather 
more repercussive or reverberative in it3  im plications and offerin g  
a useful corroborative to  h is 'course o f  l i f e '  guide fo r  distinguishing 
the 'r e a l '  from the 'im agined ', ( 2 ) :
"Whatever men continually  think extension is  (although in truth 
i 3 always is  body and has antityp ia , although insensible to us, yet 
perceptib le  by the in te l le c t )  they do not at once ca ll that body; for  
sometimes they think that i t  i s  a mere appearance and pfaantaamata.
But whatever they not only see .hut also touch, that is ,  in  which they 
find antityp ia . that they ca ll  body; but whatever lacks antitypia. that 
they deny to be body. In tbe two, therefore, men both educated and 
uneducated place the nature o f  body, in extension and antitypia taken 
together; they take that from sight, th is  from touch; whence also from 
the ’.uiion o f  both senses we are wont to be c e r t i f ie d  concerning things 
which are not phantusmata." ("New Essays" p .64 7 ).
So the sn titvp ia  is  a qu a lity  which distinguishes things from phantasies 
by resiatence and in pen etrab ility , a notion which is  akin to A r is to t le 's  (l)
( l )  The "Concise Oxford Dictionary" gives "that which a type or symbol 
represents" fo r  "antitype", fi-om the Greek antitupos : "reponding as an 
impression to  the d ie " , derived from "a n ti-"  (opposite, against, in exchange, 
instead, r iv a llin g ) and "tupoa" (a  blow). L iddell and Scott have t "the 
iu$>rr.ss o f  a seal, the stamp o f  a coin , a p rin t, mark o f any k in d ...fig u res  
or impressions wrought in metal or stone t u figu re , image, statue o f  a 
man . . .  an ou tline , sketch, draught . . .  e f fe c t  produces on the ear by a
M ow« #if? tbp of bofaop f«o+. M T?C*^ YCT,f r?2?7Cd fITCI1
the o ld ,  Diatonic 'im pression ' (or  the newer, Ikuneuu one), L e ibn iz 's  
concept o f antltvpla i s  on attempt to perform for ' psychology what the 
monad d id  fo r  metaphysics.
statement that bodies 's u f fe r ’ the physical actuality  o f  other bodies.
The ’ sense-experience", vhich ie  the 'a n t ity p e ', has a iiieanc o f 
corroboration to separate i t  from Hie delusions o f  imagination (vhieta 
must be o f the mind's making), ar.d on im plication o f  a kind o f  Kobbesien 
decay which is  missing from the wax-seal account. But thin im plied, 
antitypica l 'resonance' is  qualitative  as well as temporal, so that 
the proxim ities and the peripheral associations, which the antitype 
must have, help to id e n tify  i t  as 'r e a l ' i._e. as congruous with the 
course o f  one 's l i f e  and resisten t to the 'm otions' o f  imagination.
There i s ,  or so one assumes, some tiling lik e  a causal explanation fo r  
th is  series o f  an tityp ica l re la tion s , whereas imagination, i f  i t  i s  
fo r  Leibniz what i t  i s  fo r  A risto tle  -  a kind o f  motion -  , must ever 
be created; th is  suggests a lin k  between the immanent and the trans­
cendental, forged in  imagination. But th is  is  speculation.
The second o f  L eibn iz ’ s bod ily  'powers' i s  entclccheia , "too 
l i t t l e  understood by the schools; fo r  such a power involves act (actum) 
. . . "  ("New Essays" p .7 0 l ) t th is 'power has also been c lo se ly  id e n tifie d  
with the monad. "Entelochy" i s  tw ofold, and may be prim itive (sub­
s ta n tia l) or  d e r iv itiv e  (a ccid en ta l); the prim itive active fo r ce , ca lled  
forma substantiae, i s  united with the material or passive power to  form 
an unum per se . 'D eriv itiv e  fo r c e ' is  a mode o f the prim itive, and 
approximates to the w ill  ( l ) ;  i t  acts according to  the d ictates o f  
the mind upon contingencies, in  accordance with the harmony o f  the 
kingdom o f  fin a l ca u ses .. Though the idea i s  "something which i s  in  
the mind" (o p .c it « .  p .7 1 6 ) .  th is  inherence is  dispositional and "consists 
not in  a certuin a c t  o f  thought but in  n power (fa cu lta f e ) . and we say 
•we have on idea o f  a thing, although we do not think o f  i t ,  provided
( l )  "New Essays" p«7p3> where the w ill i s  described as : " . . . t h a t  
which some ca ll irapetua, a couatao evidently, or tendency so to  specie, 
to  a certain  determinate m otion ..."
we eon on a given occasion think o f  i t . 1* (L o c .e i t . ) The idea has
t
a conceptual, abstract cement and a concrete, antityp ica l moment :
"There must necessarily , therefore, he something in ire, which not 
only leads to the thinrr but also expresses i t „
This is  said to express anything in  which are contained conditions 
corresponding to the conditions o f  the thing expressed." (L o c .c i t . )  .
In emphasising the actual un ity  o f  concept and antitype Leibniz 
is  o ffe r in g  on A ristotelian  a lternative to tho Cartesian account o f 
the mind, hut lik e  A ristotle  he i s  careful not to overlook the con­
ceptual d ifferences between the idea  and i t s  expression (an tityp e).
(See "New Essays" p. 716). So a given triangle exem plifies the idea 
o f  triangularity  but does not ex clu s ive ly  embody i t }  or a given cause 
and i t s  observed e f fe c t  demonstrates, but does not exclu sive ly  contain, 
the notion o f  causality . On the one hand there are expressions o f 
m i l . and on the other hand expressions o f  nature, and " . . .  the deeds 
o f  each one represent h is mind, and the world i t s e l f  in  a measure 
represents God." ("New Essays" p«716) ( l ) .  B7  inference, my actions 
are analogues o f  my s e l f ,  and the descriptions o f  my actions provide 
•the concepts by which I  predicate myself (or  others predicate me) 
as an individual. Sim ilarly, the world is  a representation, expression, 
or analogy o f  God. Leibniz is  a t issue with Locke on the problem 
o f  the orig in  o f  ideas such as "tr ia n g u la r ity " , " s e l f " ,  and "cau sa lity ", 
and whereas Locke would say that the mind in fe rs  these abstractions 
from constant observation o f  nature, Leibniz re la tes them more c lose ly  
to a Platonic view o f  ideas ( 2 ) ,  though i t  would be wrong to  make too 
ouch o f  th is  resemblance. But l ik e  P lato, he i s  faced with the 
d i f f ic u lty  o f  giving an in te l l ig ib le  account o f  the orig in  o f  abstract 
ideas, i f  they are not a product o f  the senses. That the mind is  an
0 -) £*£.* Jjerkgl ey, '"Treatise" 1’c c . lO j  f f . on the dangers o f  analogy,
(2) See P oli'te lla . o p .c i t . .  1>.62. on the closeness o f L e ib n iz 's  "monad" 
to P la to 's  Idea. •
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a ctiv e  prin cip le  i s  not in contention, the problem i s  how, or whether, 
wo can know that the structures end codes by which wo liv e  and 
experience are, or are not, inherent in  the mind, rather than 
acquired. As Spinoza c le a r ly  rea lised , there are f ic t io n s  o f  the 
mind, such as Cartesian dualism, as v e il  a3 illu s io n s  o f  the censes, 
to  be discriminated from the 'r e a l ' ,  and Leibniz, owing an unacknow­
ledged debt to  Spinoza's metaphysic, o ffe r s  acceptable, practica l 
adv ice . The problem o f id en tity  is  approached d iffe ren tly  by Harae(i) ,  
who has much in  cannon with Lccke, and who denies 'the p o s s ib il ity  o f 
an on to log ica l, iso lated  ' s e l f ' ,  apart from perceptions and predicates, 
equating psychology with philosophy, knower with known, indicating in 
h is  way the anomalies o f  Cartesian mind/body duality . There are 
a f f in it ie s  between Hume and Leibniz in  th e ir  observation o f the unity 
o f  s e l f  end other, a unity which is  a source o f  optimism fo r  Leibniz, 
o f  pessimism fo r  Hume; bat Leibniz has learned from Descartes that 
the s e l f  i s  a centre o f  consciousness but that, against both Hume 
and Descartes, i t  both perceives end apperceives t
“In a word, the insensible perceptions are as eminently useful in 
Raeuzuatology as are the insensible corpuscles in Physics, and i t  is  
equally  unreasonable to  r e je c t  the one or the other under the pretext 
th at they are out o f  the reach o f  the senses." ( "Lev Essays" p .5 0 ).
Because the monad is  irreducib le  and ubiquitous, and because the
"rational soul or mind" has in  i t  more than is  in  monads, the mind,
us we have learned, " . . .  i s  not only a mirror o f  the universe o f
created things, but also an image o f  God” . "Each sou l" , Leibniz affirm s
"knows the in f in ite , knows everything; but con fusedly ." JJan imitates
God, according to the innate, organisational capacity o f reason, acting
on an in fin ity  o f  perceptions; th is im itation  is  what he c a lls  a
pleasure o f  the mind, but i t  is  not the only such pleasure t
( l )  See STrure1 s "T reatise", Lk.I. P t.IV . . Sec .V I. : " . . .  when I enter most 
intim ately in to wbat X c o ll  .myself. I. always stumble on some particu lar 
impression or o th e r . . ."  e tc .
, "Martyrs and fanatics (although the a ffection  o f the la tte r  is  
ill-re g u la te d ) show o f  what the pleasure o f  the mind is  capable i and 
what is  irere even the pleasures o f  the senses are in the lo s t  resort 
in te llectu a l pleasures, confusedly known. Music charms us although 
it s  beauty only consists in the harmony o f  numbers, and in  the account 
which we do not n o tice , and which the soul none the less  takes, c f  the 
beating or v ibration  o f  sounding bodies, which meet one another at 
certain in terva ls . The pleasures which the eye finds in proportions 
are o f  the same kind, and those caused by the other senses amount to 
much the same thing, although we may not be able to explain them 
d is t in c t ly " . ("P rin cip les" Se c .1 7 ) .
L e ib n iz 's  b e l ie f  in  the beauty o f  harmony and proportion vas an 
aesthetic commonplace, and what many a rtis ts  and composers practiced 
was c learly  in l in e  with 'rational* philosophy. More mysterious 
ore the vibrations "which we do not n o tice " and which perhaps have 
some re la tion  to the "antitypes", end which presumably e f fe c t  confused 
(or inadequate) resonances, struck pre—conceptually within us. Perhaps 
these are also sim ilar to the 'i l l -r e g u la te d  a ffection s o f  fanatics'., 
pleasurable because, within the te leo log ica l unity o f  the universe, 
they intimate a harmony which is  as y e t not understood. This again 
is  not too far removed from the F icin ion  incantations and the Bruno on 
talismans -- the potentia l fo r  omnipotence is  certa in ly  sim ilar, given 
method and the desire to  experience a l l  -  and Leibniz may himself have 
rea lised  that the potentia l fo r  omnipotence was u n fu lfill  able hut 
that to  recognise i t s  p o s s ib il ity  is  an almost mystical 'pleasure o f 
tho mind*, as h is  own "Philosophical Dream" ( l ) ,  Socratic in i t s  
v isionary qua lity , Indicates. There i s  also something Pythagorean 
in h is  avowal o f  the pleasure o f  harmony and proportion, and h is lack (l)
( l )  Gee "Philosophical W ritings" pp. GTj-G'j?
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pf cone ;mnation o f  ftrt is  a notable break iron  the S toic tra d ition .
But he i s  not always so tolerant in h is remarks about suoh prodigies 
as *fa n a tics ' and enthusiasts:
"Some idots with a restless  imagination form conceptions which 
they had not before; they are in a condition fin e  or a t le a s t  very 
animated things in th eir  opinion; they admire themselves and make 
others admire th is  f e r t i l i t y  which passes fo r  insp iration . This 
advantage comes to them la rge ly  from a v iv id  imagination which passion 
rouses and from an excellen t memory which has well retained the 
methods o f  speech o f  the prophetic books which the reading or 
discourse o f  others had rendered fam iliar to  thorn" ("New Essays" p.599) ( l )  
The function  o f  imagination in th is context reminds us that Leibniz 
conspicuously avoids imputing to i t  any o f the powers which were 
claimed by Paracelsus, Bruno, or Boehme, even, though he is  unquestion­
ably w ithin the ancient trad ition  which argued a 'unitarian* cosmology 
rather than a dual if* t i c  one — to use Walter P agel's  term. Pngel 
places Leibniz within the "k abbalistic" tra d ition  with H u l l . .  .Pious, 
Jleuchlin, Agrippa o f  Kettesheiin, Bruno, A ls te d iu s .."  and Paracelcus; 
P o l it e l la  shares th is  opinion. Magic, acting  through forces  which 
are linked  sympathetically, i s  founded on the harmony o f  the universe 
as a "s in g le  liv in g  creature" (Timaeuo 30b); the idea o f  such a 
harmony underlies a powerful and persistent philosophical trad ition  
apparent in  Stoicism , P lotinus, Cudworth, and Leibniz. (2) Like Spinoza, 
Leibniz believed in  the unity o f  ideas with nature and in  the pre- 
established harmony o f  a ll  things, a b e l ie f  a lso  shared by Ficino
(1) He goes on to speak o f  (p .60 l) a 'S ile s ia n  man', " . . . a  man o f 
knowledge and judgment, but who had since indulged in  two kinds o f
v i f l " !  o n f l *  A n n % l 1 V  at#* v o n * .  +V »« AH A A -f  o n + l m o v n o + d   ^ + U a  A + V a j .  r  f
a lch e m is ts ..."  Leibniz is  quite possib ly  re ferrin g  to Boehme hero, 
lie adds that i f  such "insp irations" rea lly  enlightened us, or gave 
knowledge, or i f  th e ir  professors had made gold , wc should have 
grounds to give them credence. Even Locke had attempted to make gold .
(2) See A. F itzgera ld ' 3 comments on Synowius' Be Int*oraliit* (p.Jt39). 
from where the quotation from Timacuo is  taken.
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and Brunoj L eign iz  strongly a ttests  to the pleasure afforded to 
the mind by the beauty o f proportion aud harmony as did Ficino 
before him, end as Ficino nees talismans as “images o f  the -world" 
so Leibniz secs the soul as the mirror or image o f  a l l  created things 
and o f  the d e ity . In the unity o f  mind and nature Spinoza sees 
p erfection . Even Hobbes says "memory is  the world". From the 
magical and e l chemical b e lie fs  we have encountered, imagination is  
regarded as the crucial agent o f  th is  unity o f  a ll tilings end the 
key to both omniscience and power, as such i t  i s  the counterpart 
o f  the ph ilosophers ' substance and an essentia l component o f  the 
technology o f  a p r e -s c ie n t if ic  age. Even i f  th is  idea o f  imagination 
cannot be maintained the psychological value c f  i t s  function o f  
seeing sim ilitu des (licbbes) must be o f  great importance in  our 
experience o f  universal harmony. But th is  function has another 
aspect, fo r  the seeing o f  s im ila r it ie s  i s  essentia l to recognition  
and fa m ilia r ity , the ex is ten tia l act3 by which we make sense o f  
the world, and therefore to  our psychological w ell-bein g . As 
Descartes im plied , imagination as a mode o f  thought i s  also a mode 
o f  beinrr. end so the 'im aginative l i f e '  i s  something rather more, 
and rather more important, than phantasmagoria or a concourse o f  >
chimaeras and h ip p og r iffs . These too have an epistem ological status 
and a 'g a d f ly ' function despite th e ir  imprecation o f 'c i v i l  disobed­
ience ' and 'inadequate id e a s ', fo r  in  th e ir  le s s  outlandish mani­
festa tion s they remind us, according to th e ir  in e x p lica b ility  and 
o r ig in a lity , o f  the lim its  o f  our knowledge.

Intro dn ;tion .
Thi.j part o f  the thesis i s  concerned with Renaissance and poet- 
Kenaissonce theories o f  art, s p e c if ic a l ly  o f  A lberti, Leonardo, Horace 
and Boileau. L it t le  cred it i s  given,by any o f these w riters , to 
imagination as an important power in the making or appreciation o f 
a rt; th is  fa c t  is  noteworthy in relation  to the subsequent emphasis, 
daring the 18th century, on the role  o f  imagination in genius and 
taste , i t  is  also a useful f o i l  against which to consider th is  great 
r ise  in the importance o f  imagination in the context a rather d iffe ren t 
climate o f  opinion. Despite, and perhaps because o f ;  the high regard 
in  which imagination was h eld  by alchemists, magicians and m ystics, 
the S to ic  view and d istrn st o f  imagination held sway over the minds 
o f  most thinking men at le a s t  up to the beginning o f  the 18th century; 
we have found evidence fo r  th is  in the works o f philosophers, and in 
Gianfrancesco Pico della  M irandola's heavily  A ristotelian  account o f  
imagination we fin d  an e a r l ie r  confirmation o f th is view. In Section 
I I  o f  the follow ing chapter I  have commented on P ico 's  analysis o f  
imagination with the in ten tion  o f  indicating why the a rts , in a period 
o f  th e ir  ascendency, should have no association  with th is  low -status 
concept.
Broadly speaking, post—Renaissance b e lie fs  are dominated by the 
authority o f  the Bible and the c la ss ics  ( l ) ,  Horace's Are Pootica  being 
by fa r  the most important s in g le  work on aesthetics. L ocke 's "Essay", 
with i t s  attack on "innate id ea s", broke the grip o f  those authorities 
and undermined the dominance o f  rules over a ll areas o f  human a c t iv ity , 
and Addison's a r t ic le s  on "The Pleasures o f  Imagination" — strongly 
influenced by Locke's "em piricism ", -  did much to elevate imagination 
to a central position  in the aesthetic and philosophic theory o f  the 
18th and 19tb centuries. Daring the period o f  about 300 years p rior  to (l)
( l )  Sec N. Hemp son. "The Enl ightenment", p.16
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1800 we see a radical v e lto -fa cc in western European man's idea o f  
liim self : a move from the acceptance o f  the universe as on ordered 
mechanism, operating on mathematical p rin cip les , engineered and 
serviced  by God, to a b e lie f  in  anthropocentrism and the i n f a l l i b i l i t y  
o f  reason, and f in a lly  to absolute, unprincipled subjectivism . The 
notion  o f  an ordered, harmonious cosmos, operated according to rational 
p rin cip les discoverable by man, was eroded by events, b e l ie fs , and a 
sw elling tide  o f  opinion, which argued on irregu lar structure governed 
hy chance, irra tional fo rces . Experts have pinpointed several events 
which e ffe cted  th is  change -  e_._g. the Lisbon earthquake o f  1755» the 
French Revolution, Hume’ s attack or causality  -  and certa in ly  the 
demise o f  reason and i t s  consequent replacement by what was seen as 
the arch facu lty  o f  concupiscence and ind iv idu a lity , imagination,
•was informed and presaged by such events.
The deposition o f  rule and reason, and the presumption o f  imagin­
ation , are the theme o f  th is fourth part. The f i r s t  chapter dea ls, 
in  three sections, with A lberti and Leonardo, P ico, and Horace and 
Boileau. In the second chapter I consider the r ise  end persistence 
o f  Platonism in England, ind icating  i t s  importance in relation  to 
English and German Romanticism. Chapter three is  one o f  the most 
important in th is  entire work, dealing as i t  does with Addison's 
resurrection and reinstatement o f imagination as a central aesth etic  
concept; the extent o f  Addison's achievement has not been fu lly  
rea lised  h itherto , nor has h is  enormous reliance on Longinus and Locke. 
The fourth and fin a l chapter o f  -this pert deals with the epistem ologica l, 
psychological and aesthetic developments o f  the concept o f imagination 
follow ing Locke and Addison, with sections on Berkeley, Hume and
fiovAnl •
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Chapter 1 :
' EFLAISSAHCE ASP POST-BIN ATSSANCE AESTHETIC.
SECTION1 I
A lb erti ’ s treatise  "On Painting" i s  a s ig n ifica n t document in the 
aesthetics o f  visual art during and a fte r  the Ilenaissuace.. I t  was the 
ch ie f source o f  1 5 th century theories o f  painting and the basis fo r  
the Academies o f Prance (from 1651) and England where i t  ran to  four 
ed itions during the years 1726 -  1755» greatly in fluencing Hogarth and 
Heynolds. Based on the works and methods o f a r t is t s .l ik e  Brunelleschi,
Donatello and Masaccio, the treatise  foreshadowed the art o f  Kenaissartce 
Florence but, (though he quotes Herises Trismegistua), A lberti does 
not emphasise the imagination, strongly  advocating the v irtues o f
c lea n -liv in g  and hard work. Like Leonardo, Alberti. -  who c a lls  painting 
"the master art" -  was concerned to emphasise i t  ns "most worthy o f  lib e ra l 
minds", though the ba ttle  to raise i t s  status, hard-won by Leonardo, was 
to  have a deadening e f fe c t  owing to  the la te r  conservatism o f  the 
Academics :
"Academic painters from the la te  sixteenth through the eighteenth 
centuries were searching fo r  a rational art which allowed no place 
fo r  fantasy. In such an art the s o l id  virtues o f  d iligence and 
opp lication  advocated by A lberti take on greater importance than the 
bravura o f genius. The academies bow in Pella p ittu ra the means to 
f i l l  th e ir  needs." (j.H .Spencer. In tro , to "On Painting", p .1 2 ).
A lberti moot certa in ly  does emphasise the values o f  d iligence in favour 
o f what he ca lls  " in te lle ctu a l ardour", stressing too the importance 
o f  observing and drawing from nature ( l ) .  In h is section  in "Is to r in "  
(p .90 ) he also emphasises "invention" -  attributed some 250 years la te r
( 1 ) As he 3ays, n ,91 : "Never doubt that the head and p rin cip le  o f th is 
art, and thus every one o f  i t s  degrees iu becoming a master, ought to be 
taken from nature. Perfection  in the art w ill  bo found with d iligen ce , 
application  and study."
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to imagination -  but disapproves o f anything which i a related to
r
* imagination; on the portrayal o f  vigorous movement iri figures he
says th is  i s :  " . . .n o t  only without grace an.l srectnoss but moreover 
they show the too f ie ry  and turbulent imagination o f  the a r t is t ."  
(p .3 0 ). ( l ) .  And though he advocates the se lection  o f  the best 
parts from nature, (somewhat as A risto tle  had intimated in his 
"conceptual" approach), as a lso Raphael vas to do, A lberti also 
strongly  advises the constitu tion  o f  a carefu lly  vorked-out plan 
before starting drawing oi’ painting. h’othiug, i t  seems, vas to be 
l e f t  to  chance or to imagination, and perhaps Alberti was prudent 
in th is , since imagination, as the S toic tradition  had long estab­
lis h e d , was an in fe r io r  fa cu lty . But imagination, lik e  painting, 
was s t i l l  prim arily v isu a l. as opponents o f  the ut picture poo3is  
theory were quick to point out. 1
(1 ) "The notion o f decorum i s  nearly as dominant in the eccond book 
o f  A lb e r t i 's  P e lla p ittu ra as in Horace's Ars poetioa'i ( R . M . I h p ,  
"Ut Picturn P oesis", p. 229. Pint. 146).
SUCTION I I
The a r t i s t 's  need fo r  imagination, understood as the a b il ity  to 
put together new combinations, is  recognised by Leonardo, but lie 
regards th is  as the "weakest, side o f  pa in tin g". ( "Paragone" , 5 !i).
In h is  concern to elevate painting to the le v e l o f  the seven lib e ra l 
arts ( l )  he compares i t  favourably with poetry, seeing th is  la t te r  
an a p la g ia r in t ic  art which r e lie s  on imagination to c o l le c t  and 
jo in  together things "stolen  from the other sc ien ces ."  (2 ) .  In 
i t s  re lian ce  on imagination in th is  sense, poetry comes o f f  hudj y 
in  comparison with painting which, argues Leonardo -  perhaps with 
P la to 's  famous denunciation in mind — depends upon true perception :
"The imagination cannot v isualise  such beauty as i s  seen by the 
eye, because the eye receives the actual semblances or images o f  
ob jects  and transmits them through the sense again to the under— 
standing where they are judged. But the imagination never gets outside 
the understanding (aenrras communis): i t  reaches the laemoxy and stops 
and dies there 3 f  the imagined ob ject is  not o f  great beauty} thus 
poetry i s  bom  in the mind or rather in the imagination o f  the 
poet who, because he describes the same things as the painter, claims 
to be the p a in te r 's  equal! But in truth he is  fa r  removed, as has 
been shown above. Therefore in regard to im itation , i t  i s  true to 
say that the science o f painting stands to poetry in the some relation  
as a body to i t s  cast shadow} but the d ifferen ce  is  even greater} 
because a shadow penetrates through the eye to the understanding
(1) The "Artes Liberal os", Grarmar, D ia le c t ic , Rhetoric, oad Arithmetic, 
Geometry, Astronomy, arid Music, were considered to be f i t  occupations for  
fro .—bora c it iz e n s ; not so the mechanical a rts , such as Painting and Sculpture, 
which required manual labour. The Liberal Arts were looked upon as dis­
c ip lin es  thi-ough which man could conquer the ignorance resu lting  from the
11 j ^ ,.v i * al „ l  c ^  Z“ 'c2. **0 ~tz vied cm* (See r.AL.*! eon« ’’The
Scvol L iberal A r ts " .)
(2) Leonardo may have Horace's phrase ut p ictu re  popsis (a lso  attributed to 
Plutarch and Simonides) in mind} he was probably the f i r s t  to exploi-e the 
re la tion sh ip  between these sister arts , as poetry end painting were co lled , 
and tr e a t ise s  on art and l i  teraturc from the mid 16th to the 18th century 
nearly always l-emark on th is relationsh ip .
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while the o b je c t  o f  the imagination does not conic from without hut is  
bom in the darkness o f  the wind's eye, What a d ifferen ce  between 
forming a mental image o f  such lig h t  in the darkness o f  the mind's 
eye end actu a lly  perceiving i t  outside the darkness." ("Paragone", 1 8 )« ( l ) 
lie agree3 that both art3 i mitate, but argues that painting serves the 
superior sense -  the eye is  "the window o f  the sou l" ( o p .c it . , 23) -  
and that the image o f  God or o f  man is  much more godlike or manlike 
than the word. Painting, ho says, i s  " . . .  the grandchild o f nature and 
related to GocI", ( o p .c i t . , 2.)» a s ig n ifica n t change in status fo r  
riato '3  'cop ie s  o f  c o p ie s '.
Leonardo i s  not always disparaging o f  imagination, and i t  i s  clear 
that he regards a ta len t fo r  painting us a g i f t  (2 ) , and not something 
that can he learned or s in g ly  acquired through d iligen ce , as A lberti 
seems to intim ate; but, l ik e  A lberti, he does underline the great 
importance o f  drawing from nature ; " . . .  you should apply yourself 
f i r s t  o f  a ll to  drawing, in order to present to the eye in v is ib le  form 1
(1 ) H ostility  towards creative litera tu re  and the freedom o f imagination was 
also voiced by Savonarola; (see J . B, Snincram' r. "A H istory o f L iterary  
Criticism  in the Renaissance", p. 1 Ji ff~). I t  is  in terestin g  to compare 
Leonardo's views with A. Al i son 's : "The Painter addresses him self to the 
eye. The Poet speaks to the Imagination" ("Assays on The Nature and 
Princip les o f  Taste", p»91 ) . Written some 30 years a fte r  Addison’ s 
popularisation o f imagination, A lison 's  views are rather more favourable 
towards poetry , a fa c t  which re fle c ts  the change in fortune o f  "im agination".
(2 ) I t  is  in terestin g  and informative to compare the views o f  A lberti and 
Leonardo with those expressed by Dryden some 200 years la te r  in his 
"Parallel Between Poetry and Painting". Dryden cays that the painter and 
sculptor try  to imitate God, and try  to improve on nature ( p.132) . He 
says: " . . .  a learned printer should form to him3elf on idea o f p erfect 
N atu re ..", c it in g  Raphael's famous le t t e r  to Castiglione as well as 
A lb erti, I.eorurdo, Horace, A risto tle , Phil os tra ins, and various French 
and Ita lian  c r i t i c s .  Dryden stresses that the aim o f  painting is  to 
please by im itating "the best o f  nature" ( pp.lbO—3 ). With Leonardo, and 
against A lb e r t i*3 "d ilig en ce ", he regards Die a b i l i t y  to  paint or p oe tic ise  
as a g i f t :  "Invention i s  the f i r s t  part, and absolutely  necessary to  them 
both; yet no rule over ves or can be given to compass i t .  A happy geniu3 
is  a g i f t  o f  Nature : i t  depends on the influence o f  the stays say the
on  •Mia ftrrroriB o f  Mia “hcwlv «A*r +>»a *8+. •? <*
particu lar g i f t  o f  heaven say Hie divines, hath Christiaa and heathen.
How to improve i t ,  many Looks can t o l l  us; how to obtain i t ,  none; that 
nothing can be done without i t ,  a ll  agree", (pp, 5) See also U.G.
IToward, "Ut Pi d u ra  P oesio", p . AO.
I t  woold he wrong to make too ranch o f  th is  passage, hnt i t  does suggest 
a function o f  imagination unknown to  A lberti, a function which is  
also absent from M ichelangelo's theory o f art where the concepts 
" in te lle t to "  arid "concetto" are regarded as the basis and goal o f 
a r t is t ic  endeavour.(l} And though M ichelangelo's use o f  these concepts 
betrays h is  sympathy with the more mystical aspects o f  Platonism, h is 
"ircaginativa" is  a trad itional and conservative notion , as i t  seems 
to have been lo r  noct o f  h is contemporaries.
the purpose «rut invention created or ig in a lly  in your imagination........ "
(1 ) See h.«T.01e.prn ts, "M ichelangelo's Theory o f  A rt", p . 17 f f . .  and
P- f f .
229
SECTION I I IT* ' . .....
That. Jionni S3ance pnychoiogi cal theory was S toic ami A ristote lian  
is  c lea r ly  indicated liy Gianfrancesco Pico della  Mirandola's tree tise  
o f  lfjOO, "On The Imagination". Iiis account is  based squarely on 
the "De Anima", to -which book he d irects  the reader fo r  a  knowledge 
o f  imagination ( Ch. VI) . and though P ico ’ s trea tise  shows Ilia knowledge 
o f  F iato, Aquinas, Augustine, Averroes, Avicenna and Synesius, there 
is  no sign in  i t  o f  the tendency to mysticism to which h is famous 
uncle (Giovanni) was prone. Gianfrancesco i s  a great admirer o f  Zeno 
and E pictetus, c it in g  them an exemplars ( Cli. aI I , p .9 5 /« and considering 
the high esteem in which so many o f  the cacieut w riters were held 
during the Penaissar.ee i t  i s  not. very surprising to find no orig in a l 
views in  h is trea tise , though this is  a s ign ifican t fa ct  in the lig h t  
o f  the claims made fo r  imagination by the magicians and th e ir  fo llow ers . 
Like so many w riters (e .g .  ITohbes) Pico uses the terras "phantasy" and 
"imagination" synonymously : "Wow th is  power o f  the mind, which the 
Greeks tern fantasia , in Latin is  ca lled  imaginatio. And th is  name 
i t  receives from i t s  fu n ction ; from the images, that i s ,  which i t  
conceives and forms in i t s e l f . "  ( Cli. I , p . 29) .  The function o f  th is 
"power o f  the mind" accords with the accepted tradition  : " . . .  fo r  
imagination i3  placed on the border between in te l le c t  and sense, and 
bolds the intermediate ground." ( Ch. I I I . Hut, with A risto tle ,
he regards imagination cs an indispensable part o f  cogn ition , thought, 
and action : " . .  we must admit that our actions fo r  the most part 
depend upon the nature o f  th is  power; lo r  under 'imagination* I at 
present comprehend the whole inner force  o f  the sensitive son l, by 
whatever names i t  might be known to oth ers ."  ( Cli. V, p. h \ ) . And :
"What co.aaniieation would the rational part have with the irra tional , 
i f  there were not fantasy in tom ediate, somehow to pvepore fo r  rooocii 
the in fe r io r  nature, and se t up th is nature to be cognised V" (Ch.VI,
twhole moral and ex isten tia l importance which Pico real ises i t  has, ere 
not expanded or explored by him} he war. e ither being prudent or hs did 
not realise the im plications fo r  a non-magical theory o f  imagination 
beyond that which "conceives and fashions likenesses o f  th in gs ."
( Ch, IV, p . 37)• And though he la te r  indicates an awareness o f  the 
great importance o f sense experience in the formation o f Joiowledge (as 
does Leonardo), he again disappoints by not elaborating on b is  obser­
vations, though we are reminded o f  the A ri3toteiian  orig in  o f  some o f 
Locke's views s
"When the rational soul is  infused into the body, i t  i s  l ik e  a clean 
surface on which nothing ha3 been painted, nothing delineated. I t  
fo llow s, therefore, that i t  cognizes nothing out o f  i t s e l f ,  but 
acquires a ll i t s  knowledge and science from the senses through the 
medium o f phantasy." (Ch. VI, pp. 42-5). The remaining chapters o f  
the treatise  are a predictably S toic attack on imagination and it s  
resp on sib ility  for  disputation, sins, maladies, and brutish degeneracy; 
reason, man's most Godlike fa cu lty  trust govern and dominate imagination: 
"Nor is  i t  hard to prove that universal errors which occur as much in 
c iv i l  l i f e  us in the philosophic and Christian l i f e ,  take th eir  
beginnings from the defect o f  the imagination. The peace o f  the state 
is  disturbed by ambition, cruelty , wrath, avarice, and lu s t .  But then 
the depraved imagination is  the mother and nur3e o f  ambition, end 
thinks i t  is  a fine thing to ou tstrip  a l l  others, a lb e it  without 
regard for  the virtue or n o b ility  whereby those may shine whom the man 
fired  by ruinous ambition busies him self to surpass in honours. Cruelty, 
wrath and passion are bom from and nourished by the imagination o f  
an ostensible but deceptive good, which one who is  carried away by 
perfervid sense mid rash imagination to in su lts , wounds, and murders, 
thinks inherent in re ta lia t io n . Wliat e lse  kindles the ardour o f  lu st?
, the "inner force" o f imagination, andithe
Jlfid vha- e lse , i f  not the deceitfu l imagination, brings to the fore  
the other v ices which fo r  want c f  time I omit to mention? Neglecting 
reason, she gives preference to in ju stice  rather than to ju s t ic e , to 
lu s t  rather than to continence, to savagery rather to clemency, to  
avarice rather than to generosity, to discord rather than to peace ." 
( Ch. VII. p.A5) .
With regard to  these remarks, and with respect to e a r lie r  ones 
where the value o f  imagination is  recognised, i t  is  not d i f f i c u l t  to 
relate P ico 's  views to the exaggerated claims o f magicians and to  he 
in sisten t that i t  is  a de fe c t  o f  imagination, not imagination i t s e l f ,  
which he is  attacking. Nevertheless, this weakness o f  imagination was 
i t  seems, (despite what we have found in Dante) su ff ic ie n t  to debar 
i t  from being given a position  and function o f  any value in aesthetic 
theory. Only the in fe r io r  arts , or that which is  in fe r io r  in art, 
depends upon imagination, as Leonardo said; i t  is  the rather complex 
concept o f  "im itation" which dominates Renaissance and subsequent 
aesthetic theory.
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sncTio'i i v .
P rior to the beginning o f  the 18th century, humanistic aesthetic 
theory i s  predominantly Roman, being based on the "Ar3 Poetica" o f  
Horace a.ud, to  a smaller extent, the "P oetica" o f  A ris to tle . Whereas 
the early  Greek poets such as Hesiod and Honor had, lilte Plato, regarded 
th e ir  art as a product o f  divine in sp ira tion , the Horatian th eorists  
stressed the virtues o f  good sense, reason and taste, and the practice  
o f  im ita tion , didacticism , end decorum. These poets and th eorists , 
among them the Angastous in Rn gland, saw V irg il as their exemplar — 
he had been a friend o f  Horace -  and as la te  as 1743 Akenside, w riting 
h is  lengthy poem "On The Pleasures o f  Imagination" under the aegis o f  
Addison’ s "Spectator" essays, says he took V irgil (end Panto) as h is  
model. Indeed, as A.S.Cook t e l ls  us ("The Art o f  Poetry", p. 256).
V ir g i l 's  works ran to 22. editions before 1580. Vida's "Art o f  Poetry", 
published in 1527, recommends using V irg il c.e a model and underlines 
the importance o f c la r ity , coherence and the avoidance o f  obscurity ; no 
place fo r  imagination b c r e . ( l )  Although he ca lls  inspiration "the 
sacred flame" Vida is  very much a man o f  h is  time in asserting that 
"to  copy nature is  the task o f a r t ."  (0;>. c i t . , 1.395) » (2 ).
"Im ita tion ", a central concept in  humanistic theories o f  art, is  
not easy to yin  down. Horace advocated the im itation o f  the great 
a r t is ts  o f  the past and was obeyed, A lberti advocated the im itation 
o f  nature, and "im itation" also came to re fe r  to an ideal as for  
ins+i ice in the "ccrta  idea" o f Raphael; cmd though th is concept remains 
in many respects what It.M. Lee cu lled  "decorum" s a "pseudo A ristote lian " 
concept; i t  never corresponds to the A ristote lian  mimesis . Hut the 
development from the notion o f  copying to  that o f  idea lising  is  s ig n ifica n t :
(1 ) Ci.f. Diderot 's  remark, some 250 years la te r : " I t  is  one thing to make an 
idea c lea r , and .mother to make i t  a f f ecting to the imagination." (Quoted in
II. U ellek, "A History o f  Modem C ritic ism ", Vol .11 , j» .5 l) .
(2 ) V.G^oward, (C p .c i t . , y.. 75 f t . ), remarks or. the s im ila rities  between 
Vida and du__Pror_io;_'s "Do arte graphic a" o f  1668. (du Frosnoy was also greatly 
influenced by ho do view Pol co vboae "Dialogo della  Pit.tura" o f  1557* "one o f 
the most iiiportr. ii, books "cn painting" (Howard, p .56). states that painting
is  "nothing but im itation o f  nature."
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"In the .sixteenth century the doctrine o f  ideal im itation had net yet ♦
e n tire ly  supplanted the older and scarce ly  compatible notion that art 
is  an exact im itation o f  nature, and i t  is  not unusual, at le a s t  until 
past the middle o f  the century, to fin d  them disconcertingly  side by 
side — e. fa c t  which, the reader w ill  agree, does not argue fo r  the 
ph ilosoph ical capacities o f these w r ite rs ."  ( h.M.Lec . op. c i t . , p .20Li) .
The high ideals which a r tis ts  sought to imitate were inevitably  regarded 
as the product, o f  reason, though the notion that the best a r t is ts  axe 
born and not made is  also c lose ly  re lated  to th is  a ttitu de. In B oileau 's 
enormously in flu en tia l "Art Pootiguc", published much la te r  (in  1674) 
these two aspects o f  th is attitude recur. In th is  la te r  work, the 
need fo r  organic unity in the a it s , as stated hy A r is to t le , Horace raid 
Longinus, is  transformed into the prescrip tive  device o f the famous 
three u n ities  o f  time, place and space, which crane to dominate French 
c la s s ic a l  dram a.(l) Such is  "the s p ir it  o f Descartes transferred to 
p oe try ". (2 ) .  This r ig id , rule-based approach to a rt, together with the 
Stoi c—Ho ra ti an dictum that art should instruct as well as delight, (end 
a corresponding emphasis on "decorun:"), inev itab ly  led  to the adoption 
o f  form alised means o f representing emotion uid human behaviour, 
e f fe c t iv e ly  fo resta llin g  any pretensions an a r t is t  might have had to 
o r ig in a lity . Hut the rational traditionalism  o f  th is  "academic"
(1 ) See Foil can, op. c i t . , Canto I TT. 11. 38 i f . ;  I era s p e c if ic a l ly  
re ferr in g  here to fiacine and C orn eille . I t  i s  in drama perhaps above 
a ll  tlie arts that one sees the contrast between the so -ca lled  "c la s s ic ” 
and "romantic” approaches; the ea rly  Tioraanties, esp ecia lly  the Schlegels, 
held  Shrd:eepcai*e in the greatest esteem, and litre one sees the contrast 
between the drama o f con flictin g  duties (c la s s ic )  and that o f  con flic tin g  
values (rom antic).
(2 ) in i3  quotation is  from Demogoot, in A.S.Cook. o->. c i t . ,  p. XI.TV. See 
c l  so K, Gas - r c r .  "The Philcsojihy o f  The Enlightenment" pn.. 229—90 :
"B oilcan  in Ilia Poetj c. Ar t  attempts to arrive r.t a general theory o f  the 
frnr» n-P Ttno+in  ^ ¿T,<5+ Z't'tciZ£JCZ "tz Cirri VC c t  «
theory o f curves. In tlie wealth o f  actually  given forms he seeks to 
d iscover the ’ p oss ib le ’ form, ju s t  as the mathematician wants to know the 
c i r c l e ,  tlic e l l ip s e , the parabola, in th eir  ’ p o s s ib il ity * , that i s ,  in 
the constructive law from which they can be d erived ." On the influence 
o f  Descartes on the course o f  17th and 13th century aesthetics see O ,_jVl 
o f  C ass irer 's  hook; see also ll.ir.boe. op ,c i t . .  p. 221 f f .
attitude, "founded on the ideal antique end sustained by a se t o f 
thoro-.ifiily form a lis tic  concepts" (Lee, p .2 b l ) , and the cosmology o f 
which i t  wns symptomatic, come into question in the face o f  the a ll 
too obviously unmethodical, liv in g  world o f nature, whose apparently 
in fin ite  m anifestations were becoming apparent to  the new science c f  
b io log y . I have already referred to these developments in the chapter 
on L eibn iz. In aesthetic theory Boileau, besides poTtul arisin g  the 
formalism o f  the c la ss ica l approach to lite ra tu re , al go helped e f fe c t  
i t s  supercession by translating, in 1674, Longinus' "On The Sublime", 
thrusting into prominence the long-recogniseA, undervalued, idea o f 
"orig ina l genius". Notions such as "genius" cud "the sublime" are at the 
very centre o f  attention in pre-3lomauiic and Romantic aesthetic theory, 
and are intim ately connected with the theory o f  imagination} Longinus' 
work, with Locke's "Essay", i s  one o f  the twin foundations o f  Addison's 
essays "On The Pleasures o f  Imagination". But the Romantic exaltation  
o f imagination, which Addison did so much to inaugurate, was not an 
autonomous reaction to c la ss ica l formalism} i t  was greatly  informed, 
as I  have been at pains to maintain, by the continuing and resilien t. 
Neoplatonic trad ition  which, retaining i t s  magical and m ystical aspects 
in Bruno and Boehnic and i t s  philosophical aspects in L eibn iz , was also 
firm ly rooted in England as I shall show in the next chapter.
Chapter 2 i EiCLISH H.ATOttISM.
f
Introduction.
In considering the enormous impact e f  empiricism, wrought. by 
Bocon, Hobbos and Locke, on the in tellectual clim ate o f  Britain, 
ve should not underestimate the importance o f  Cambridge Platonism 
and i t s  orig ins in the Florentine Renaissance. The distrust o f  
imagination, inherited la rge ly  from Stoicism, which runs through 
the predominant English in te lle ctu a l mainstream o f  Puritanism and 
empiricism, r e f le c ts  a concern fo r  c la r ity  and method in natural 
end discursive philosophy rather than an attack on the arts ( l ) .
The Cambridge U n ion ists  were very much at odds with th is mainstream, 
however, preferring to stress the v irtues o f  m editation, contemplation, 
and learned research, and the fundamental a n tith esis  between these 
two schools o f  thought is  evidenced by the polemic against Hobbes 
which underlies a ll  c f  Cudworth’ s works; Locke's attack on "innate 
ideas" has also been seen as d irected  against Cudworth.(2) Ernst 
Cassirer considera, erroneously in nry opinion, that the empirical 
trad ition  made no noteworthy contribution to a esth etic  theory, an 
area o f  enquiry in which ho considers the f i r s t  major contribution 
to have been made by Anthony Ashley, 3rd Earl o f  Shaftesbury, the 
"beloved Plato o f  Europe" a a Herder ca lled  him. Though not ea3y to 
categorise, Shaftesbury belongs to the trad ition , o f  Cambridge 
Platonism, which preserved a nucleus o f  genuine ancient philosophic 
trad ition , and passed i t  on uncontaminated to the centuries to come."
(E. Cassirer. "The Platonic llennis3ance in England", p. 202). Ve 
shou1 d note again, with Cassirer, "the agreement in  basic princip les 
between Leibniz and the Cambridge men." ( O p.cit , ,
(1) See D.F.X-ond' b '"D is tru st ' i l l  Imagination in  English H eo-C lassieim ",
2t31 5 •neo-classical 'd is t r u s t ' o f imagination is  in large part concerned 
not with cr it ic ism  o f imaginative litera tu re  (tra g e d y ,e p ic ,ly r ic  p o e tr y ,e tc .) 
at a l l ,  but with criticism  o f  in te llectu a l l ite ra tu re  (eloquence, philosophy, 
science, e t c . ) . "
(2) In Cassi rer, o p .c i t . . jpji : "The fundamental tendency o f  Locke's attack 
on 'innate p r in c ip le s ' seemed quite clear only in relation  to ¡he doctrino 
o f  the a prior i developed in Cudworth'c In to llectn u l System."
The s im ila r it ie s  be tween Leibniz arid the Cambridge P laionists
f
serve to confirm, should i t  be necessary, that, we ore here dealing 
with a powerful and permanent tradition  which stretches bnck at lea st  
as far as Plato and o f  which the Cambridge school i s  hut one m anifestation. 
This tradition  maintained . the cosmology o f  the "Great Chain o f  Being", 
analysed in A.O.Love.jo y 's  hook o f  that, t i t l e ,  which saw a ll things in 
an ontologica l sca le  •.;hich stretched from the merest en tity  to  the ens_ 
perfectlsr.jr.r.iri. This cosmo)ogy io  N ecplatonic, founded on tlie Plotinian 
"princip le  o f  plenitude" in v/hiclx can he found the orig in  o f  L eibn iz 'a  
"law o f  con tin u ity ": "Among the great ph ilosoph ic systems o f  the 
seventeenth century i t  i s  in that o f Leibniz that the Chain o f  Being 
i s  most conspicuous, most determinative, and most pervasive, " ( l )  The 
concomitants o f th is  cosmology neem to have favoured the development of 
e th ics  and aesth etics  as much as natural scien ce , fo r  the notion o f  a 
"Chain o f  Being" seemed to support the find ings o f  b iology , and Leibniz 
■was not alone in seeing th is  notion confirmed by Leeuwenhoek's discov­
e r ie s . But the great Chain come to he seen a lso as a programme o f  nature 
rather than an inventory, and the a r t is t 's  function was increasingly  
seen ns on im itation  o f  the deity  as mind o r  "nature", as method or.d 
product, God being manifest in change and becoming and thereby as 
insatiab ly  c r e a t iv e .(2 ) *
(1 ) A.jO._T.t_vejoy_, o ji^ cit. ,  p , lV : ; see also p.153 where he says that the 
princip le  o f  plenitude is  "inherent in the very substance" o f  Spinoza1o 
doctrine, though "in  i t s  s ta t ic  form". See also S .'i'onlrain fc <J. Goot’ f i e l <1 ,
"The Discovery o f  Time" on the "Great Chain" : "This conception dominated 
eighteenth century thought, to an extent which i t  i3  hard to appreciate today. 
From Leibniz and Locke, through Addison, Bolingbroke and Pope, Puffon and 
Diderot, to Kant, Herder and S ch ille r ; one a fte r  another, one fin ds the 
most in fluentia l eighteenth century authors accepting this notion  uuquest- 
ion ingly. In an un likely  a llian ce , Voltaire and Samuel John con were the 
only s c e p t ic s ." ( pp .117-8). In the Lisbon earthquake o f 1755» which 
occasioned a quarrel between himself and Rousseau, V oltaire found con­
firmation o f  h is  d isb e lie f  in divine order and plenitude.
(2 ) See Love.joy, o p .c i t . ,  £.2p^6 : "Since the strain in Western thought 
surmied uj) in the doctrine o f tiro Chain o f  Being thus consisted in  an 
increasing emphasis upon the conception o f God as insatiably  crea tive , i t  
fo lloved  that the man who, us moral agent or us a r t is t , would im itate God, 
must do to hy being him self 'c r e a t iv e '.  The word, which through much 
repetition  has in our own day become n so r t  o f  tiresome cant, could s t i l l  
in the ? ate oigh teentli contur> express a very ex citin g , and fo r  the arts
a w r y  stim ulating idea. Han'c high ca llin g  was to add something o f hie 
own tc the cron lion , to enrich the 3un o f  tilings, and thus in bin  f in ite  
fashion, coiiTciou&ly to collaborate in the fu lfilm en t o f  the Uni vernal Benign,
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The idea o f  the a r t is t  as creative acquires something lik e  common 
currency during the Romantic era, but i t  vas an idea which grew out 
o f  Neoplatonism : " I t  i s  to be remembered, also that a revival o f  the 
d irect in fluence o f  Neoplatonism vas one o f  the conspicuous phenomena 
in German thought in the n in eties . A special student o f  tills  period* 
has gone so fa r  as to declare that ’ i f  we are to speak o f  a key to 
early Romanticism, i t  is  to be found in one o f the thinkers o f  antiquity, 
P lotinus. For th is  Neoplatonic philosopher not only inspired the 
active system o f  Novelle, scattered through inumarable fragments, 
and many o f  the ideas o f  Schelling in  h is  middle period; hie arm 
reached further : through Novalis and Schelling he exercised an influence, 
though an in d ire ct  one, on both the S chic gels, and without a knowledge 
o f  th is fa c t  many a passage in the 'Dialogue concerning Poetry' and 
in  the Berlin lectures remains an enigma.’ " (Love.joy. o p .c i t . ,  p p .297-8)« 
The Platonic and Neoplatonic themes contribute greatly  to the .Romantic 
cad pre-Romantic theory o f imagination, end in th is  way enter the 
mainstream o f  art educational theory in ih gl and; th is  short chapter 
deals with the introduction o f  Platonism into England during the 
Renaissance and moves to a consideration o f  Cudvorth and Shaftesbury, 
fo r  there i s  also a continuous lin e  o f  influence which lin k s these tifo 
thinkers with Kant and Coleridge.
v j ' . uexxr. "Ji'upfcorion" , ( ly m ) ,  p.591; no ih g lish  translation o f  
th is work i s  available.
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SECTION I
I t  was John Colot who introduced the Florentine Neoplatonism 
o f  Fieino into Engl and in 1496, giving great impetus to the mystic 
theme which is  so strong in English poetry and which immediately 
becomes evident in Spenser and S id n ey .(l) F ic in o 's  commentary 
on P la to 's  "Symposium", ao Cassirer says, "..w as a source book o f  
English poetics throughout the whole o f  the sixteenth centuxy.
English lite ra tu re  found here the real philosophical ju s t if ic a t io n  
o f poetry, the in te lle ctu a l foundation and legitim ation  o f p oe tic  
genius and enthusiasm." ("The Platonic Renaissance in Ihgland", 
p . l l l ) .  I t  i s  more the s p ir it  than the le t te r  o f  Neoplatonism 
that one finds in Sidney's "Apology", a work which s t i l l  contains 
references to A r is to t le , llorace, and the notion o f  im itation :
"Poesy . . .  is  an art o f  im itation, fo r  so A r is to t le  teacheth in 
h is word mimesis, that is  to say, a representing, counterfeiting , 
or figu rin g  forth  : so to speak metaphorically, a speaking p ictu re  : 
with th is end, to teach and d e lig h t ;"  ( p .223). The synthesising function 
o f  imagination, which had become a commonplace o f  posir-Aristotelion 
psychology and epistemology, is  also im p lic it  in Sidney's views v/hen 
he speaks, in the fam iliar Renaissance way, o f  " idea or fo re -co n ce it  
o f  the work" and o f  how the poet : "coupleth the general notion with 
the particu lar example. A p erfect picture I say, fo r  ho y ie id eth  to 
the powers o f  the mind, an image o f  that whereof the philosopher 
bostoweth but a wordish description  . . "
Spenser was in "close  fa m ilia r ity " with Sidney and in 1579 dedicated 
h is  "Shepherd' s Calendar" to him. In the Argument to the Second
\ «■' _  .  n  n  . .  J . i  . 4  . . .  • „  n .  4  . v  r  .• J  ______j .. . . .  m  r * ..
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deals at length with the sources o f  European mysticism in Plato and 
P lotinus, e .g . the "ilym s" o f  Spenser he says are "saturated with 
the s p ir it  o f Plato, and they express in musical form the l o f t y  ideas 
o f  the Symposium and the Phacdm6 . . . " (op. c i t . , p .2 4 ).
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'IOclogue' (October) o f  th is  work wo fin d  something o f an am plification 
o f  Sidney's "old  proverb", orator f i t ,  noetr. nascitnr when Spenser 
»I<eaks o f  poetry as a "divine g i f t  and heavenly in stin ct" , n ot got, 
as A lberti implies o f  painting, by labour and learning. Says Spenser, 
poetry i s  "poured in to the v it te  by a certain enthusip.sines, and 
ce lestia l in sp ira tion ."  A sim ilar view is  to be found in Sidney’ s 
"Apology" :
"Neither l e t  i t  bn deemed too saucy a comparison to balance the 
highest point o f  man's w it with the e ffica cy  o f  Neture : but rather 
give r igh t honour to the heavenly Maker o f  that Maker; who having 
made mail to his own likeness, sat him beyond and over a ll the works 
o f that second nature, which in nothing he ehowetli so much os in 
poetry : when with the force o f  a divine breath, he bringeth things 
forth fa r  surpassing her doings, with no small argument to the 
incredulous o f that f i r s t  accursed fa l l  o f  Adam j s ith  our arected 
w it, makr.th us know what perfection  i s ,  ana yet our in fected  w ill ,  
kcepoth us from reaching unto i t . "  ( p.222) .
before considering the Cambridge F latonists I would l ik e  to draw 
attention to the concept o f  "w it" as i t  occurs in Spenser and Sidney, 
lie have already seen Hobbes' id e n tifica tio n  o f  "good w it" with "good 
fancy’1, and though I shall have a l i t t l e  more to say on the subject in 
the chapter on Addison, the point should be made that th is "w it" , which 
may he taken as that part o f  fancy which moot c lose ly  re la tes to 
reason, is  that which for  Sidney g ives us a knowledge o f  p erfection . 
Remembering Hobbes' "promiscuous" use o f "fancy" and "imagination", 
vo c cm trace the cl ear im plication that i t  it  11; c in te lle ctu a l part 
o f imagination which in able to tend towards the mystical heights.
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SUCTION’ II
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The idea o f  the poet as an inspired being, breathing the brecth 
o f  God, vos quite common in England during the 1 6tb and 17th centuries. 
Gradually, from the Renaissance to beginning o f the 19lh century, there 
i s a  revolution in the idea o f the function o f the a r t is t : from 
im itator o f  nature to im itator o f  God (by liis  in sp ira tion ), to rival 
o f  God and creator in hie own r ig h t and realm. And though the idea 
o f  inspiration  is  ancient, that o f  imagination ns i t s  medium is  not 
w idely accepted before the 18th century; to some extent th is  "revolution" 
is  im p lic it  in the writings o f the Cambridge P la ton ists, fo r  whom :
"The Dialogues o f  Plato and the Enneads o f  Plotinus have gained an 
almost cononical v a lid ity ; they are placed on a par with the books 
o f  the Eible and treated with equal veneration a3 sources o f  re lig iou s 
knowledge." (E.Cass ire r . "The P latonic licnaissance in Eugland", p.2'>)«
Strong elements o f mysticism and even the influence o f  the Cabbala 
are to  be found in Henry More's works, and in Peter Sterry the para lle l 
between God's creation and a r t i s t i c  creation is  unequivocally drawn -  
th is  i s  the case fo r  musicians and painters :
in  one in d iv is ib le  Act, o r  Idea o f  beauty, in the S p ir it  o f  the 
Painter, l ie  together o i l  the d iffe r in g  l in e s , l ig h ts , shades, and 
co lou rs , by wbich that Idea r e fle c te th  i t  s e l f  in Picture upon the 
eyes and sp ir its  o f  the Beholders. In lik e  manner, the far greater 
p erfection , the W ill o f  God, being a simple Act o f  Goodness, supremely 
in v is ib le  and eternal, containcth o r ig in a lly , eminently within i t  s e lf  
compl ocency and aversion, love  and hatred, with th e ir  several ob jects , 
in th e ir  several forms and degrees, in th e ir  several r is in gs  and fa llin g s , 
most x>roi>orly and harmoniously suited to each o th er ."  ("A Discourse o f  
the Freedom o f  the W ill" , pp. 22 -5 ). ( l ) .
( l )  Ort Sterry in ib is  context see P.d .l wwicke. "The Cambridge Pla.tonists", 
Ch. VI3. Powicke writes o f  " ..th e s e  Divine Sp irits (ns they ore esteemed 
and styled) honor, V irg il , Tasso, our English Spenser" o f  whom he says 
"The works o f  these yorsonu are called Poems. Go is  The Work o f  God in 
Creation and in i t s  contrivance from the beginning to the end named 
E ílíílil •• " e tc . (Oi-.C) t . .  p .ISV -fi)
, Sterry a lso otates the potency o f  the "image", an assertion vhich 
io  peiliaj.a based on Christ’ s being the image o f  God s *’Our thoughts 
are liv in g  Images in various pooturen and motions. They are in a 
manner the Creation, the Creatures c?  oar Soul. They l iv e ,  move 
and have th e ir  being in  our soul a" ( O p .s i t . .  p .4 l ) . That images 
are “creations o f  our sotó” ia  c lea rly  contrary to Locke's somewhat 
ambivalent attack on "innate ideas", and idea o f  mind’ s "p ro lep tica l" 
function (as Ccdworth ca lled  i t ) ,  together with the notion o f  the 
a p r ior i ( l ) ,  arc an important aspect o f  the epistenology and psy­
chology o f  the Cambridge philosophers; a3 Cassirer says :
"The mere impression a ffectin g  the soul can never s u ffic ie n t ly  account 
fo r  our consciousness o f th is  impression. The act o f  consciousness 
requires rather on orig inal spontaneity from which i t  alone can 
arise . The flux o f  seuse— impressions muet be referred to  end measured 
by fixed  and enduring thought patterns. I t  i s  only because wo eon 
think such unified, existences, that we are able as i t  were to bring 
to a stan d still the abundance o f  individual images in  the mind, and 
relate them to , and compare them with one another." (Op c i t , ,  p . rT7) .
In Cudworth's concept o f  the "p ro lcp t ica l“ there is  some oim ilnrity  
with the sch olastic  "in tention ", and wc shall find a sim ilar notion 
in  liutcheson'o "Enquiry", a work which was heavily influenced by 
Shaftesbury. L ike, A r is to t le , whoso work he knew and quoted, Cudvorth 
maintains what lie c o l ls  "the V ital Sympathy betwixt the Soul end Body", 
but the emphasis i s  very, much on the mind though the soul/mind 
d istin ction  is  unclear. lie says that the soul has an Innate 
Cognoscitivo Power U niverse!ly . . "  and eo "a Potential. Omniformity", 
agreeing with A risto tle  ''That the Soul i s  in  a manner A ll Things'1
( l )  See E.Cfa.-n-irer .  o p . a i t . ,  p . f í') f t n t  1 :  "In 'th e ir  defence o f  the 
a p r io r i ,  most o f  the th in k er;.: o f  th e  Combridge S ch oo l do net distiugui&h 
betveen th e  ' l o g i c a l '  and the ' t e m p o r a l '  sense o f th e  a p r io r i  concept. 
Meneo they argue n o t  only f o r  th e  a_p r io r i^  v a lid ity  o f  theoretical and 
ethical p r in cip les , but also f o r  the 'innateness' o f  these p r in c ip le s .
In ib is  respect they advocate essen tia lly  the position  which Loekc 
assails in  the f iv .-t  book o f  h io Messy. "
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> ("A Treatise Concerning Eternal and Inaiuxable Morality” , 33k. IV» Ch. I . 5) .
T3)is innate "cognoscitive power” o f  the soul i s  the mind : "For to 
know or Understand a thing, is  nothing e lse  hut by some Inward 
Anticipation o f  the Mind, that is  Nature and Domestick, and so 
fam iliar to i t ,  to take Aquaintance with i t  (u p .c i t . ,  E k .IlI , Ch.
I l l ,  Sec. l ) .  13odies «ire perceived by "Understanding alone" and not 
by sense or imagination ; "The Sensible Ideas o f things are bat 
Urabratile and Evenid Images o f  the sensible things, l ik e  Shadows 
projected from them} bat Knowledge is  o  Comprehension o f  a thing 
P ro lep tica lly , as i t  were a p r io r i . "  (>” . I I I .  C h .lII. Sec. ~j) . He 
makes no d istin ction  between sense and image such as -was so important 
to Leibniz: "Phantasms and Sensible Ideas are rea lly  or Materially 
the seme th ing, which A r is to t le  intimates . . . .  fo r  both Phantasms 
and Sensations are Passions or Sufferings in  the Soul from the Body." 
( i-k.III.Ch. IV. S ec.^ ). Im plicit here is  a fam iliar Platonic and Stoic 
judgment on the re la tive  unimportance o f  the sensib le , which is  no 
more than the pbantastic, and o f the su p eriority  and the autonomy 
o f  the rational and. in te lle ctu a l :
"..w e can have no certa inty  by sense alone e ith er concerning the 
Absolute Hatnrc-s o f Individual Corporeal things without uc, nor 
indeed o f  th e ir  existence; hut a ll the Assurance that we have thereof 
arises from ilenson and In te lle c t  judging o f  the Phantasms or Appearances 
o f  Sense, and determining in  which o f  them there is  Absolute Reality, 
and which o f  them are but meerly Relative o r  P hentastica l." (O p .c it . .
V k . TV. Ch. T. Sim . J i ) .  ( I )
( l )  See E. Cassirer, "The Plutonic Renaissance in England", n .*>8 :
"The image or 'jihentasm1 is  meaningless without the idea or t)'Ocna;
3>y which i t  i s  determined or  given s ig n if ica n ce .” • And : "Genuine 
knowledge does not proceed by im itation, hut by anticipation ; i t  is  
n c i a copy o f  the given, but 'p r o le p t ic a ll• ."
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'» Many o f  the b e l ie fs  o f  the Cambridge P la ton ists  are sim ilar to
others vo have found in the Denaicsnnce. S te rry 's  likening o f  the 
creative acts c f  musicians and painters to th a t o f  God i s  almost 
id en tica l with the Dermatic idea o f  man’ s creatin g  as God does 
( see P.127 supra), and Cudvorth's comments on perception  are very 
lik e  those o f  F ic in o . For Paracelsus, and p a rticu la r ly  fo r  Boehme, 
the world was made 'out o f  the imagination o f  God* -  i t  i s  the divine 
and the human imagination which creates not reason or in te lle c t»  
Cudworth's P la ton ic metaphysic la rge ly  explains hie disdain fo r  
sense end imagination, and the operational fu n ction  o f  imagination 
would hardly have endeared i t s e l f  to h is sch o la r ly , contemplative 
nature. As I have shown, the magical and alchemical operators se t 
great store by imagination; the development o f  con trolled  empirical 
science , despite relinquishing the substantive imagination fo r  method, 
brought a central aesthetic and epistem ological role  f o r  imagination 
in  the works o f  Addison and Hume. N evertheless, despite i t s  omission 
from the works o f  the Cambridge philosophers, the la te r  (Kantien) 
relationship  between imagination and what Cudworth c a lls  "Absolute 
E eality" — which is  l ik e  Kant's "Ideas o f Deacon" and P la to 's  eidos -  
owes something to  th is Platonic rev iva l.
SECTION I I I
Cudworth's views have th e ir  moral and aesthetic counterparts in  
Shaftesbury, who forms a s ig n ifica n t lin}c in the l in e  which leads 
from Cambridge Platonism to K en t.(l) I t  is  s ig n ifica n t tbr.t 
Addison's "Spectator" essays o f  1711 were on the pleasures o f 
imagination, and th e ir  praise and description o f  the phyGical nature 
o f  th is  pleasure i s  as antipathetic to the Cambridge men as one 
would expect frora someone so heavily imbued with the s p ir it  o f  Locke.
Bat Shaftesbury, whoso principal bete noire was Hobbes and who had 
been tutored as a boy by Locke, w ill only countenance i n te?Icitual 
pleasure, attacking the transient nature o f tho physical :
"Can there be strength o f  inind, can there be command o f  on eself, i f  
the ideas o f  pleasure, the suggestions o f  fancy, end the strong 
pleadings o f appetite and desire are not often withstood, and the 
imaginations soundly reprimanded and brought nnder subjection?" ("The 
M oralists", Vol» I.T reatise  I I I ,  P t .I l I .S e c .I I . p .20P,) (2 ) .
Shaftesbury considers, as does h is admirer Leibniz, that lasting  
pleasure comes from the beautiful and the well-proportioned, and 
from princip les such as are afforded by mathematics, (see l o c . c i t . ,
P« 297)l such pleasures are purely in te llectu a l and in many respects 
anticipate Kant's "Analytic o f  The Sublime", Cassirer considers that 
Shaftesbury v ir tu a lly  founded aesthetics t " I t  is  almost universally  
assumed that the in ten sifica tion  o f  the aesthetic in terest in the
i l )  See C assirer ' s "The P latonic llenaissence in England", p.138,
( 2 ) As a young man Shaftesbury made a study o f  the works o f  Whichcote, 
whose views on imagination are sim ilar t By Mind, and Understanding, 
and W ill, he (man) hath intercourse with God, and things in v is ib le ; and by 
these he is  f i t t e d  to the improving a ll the lower Objects to Heavenly 
Ends and Purposes. Bat tboii, by Sense, Imagination and bruitieb A ffection , 
we can only maintain Acquaintance with this outward and lower W orld."
(from :;xhe Work 01  .'season’* 01 1 0 l>U, quoted in g.F .B jnd, "The N eo-Classical 
Psychology o f  Imagination", p .252). See also C.P.'fhT.rpe, "Addison and 
Hutcheson On Imagination", p.222 f f . t (e .g . s "..Shaftesbury finds hii:’3 e lf 
ratable to conceive o f admiration o f  physical beauty iu person, without 
reference to beauty o f  mind.". And s "..S ha ftesbury 's  theory o f  imagin­
ative pleasure . . .  rests upon the assumption o f  a preconceived idea o f 
absolute beauty, by which ’the re lative  beauty o f  external ob jects is  
measured.'').
eighteenth century is  explicab le  in terms o f  the extension and 
refinement o f  psychological enquiry; and that the aesthetic problem 
is  simply a fu rther development and natural outcome o f  basic 
psychological, tendencies. Bat contrary to  th is  supposition i s  the 
fa c t  th at p re c ise ly  the great systems o f English psychology con­
tribu ted  p ra c t ica lly  nothing towards the real foundation o f  aesth etics .
There were o f  course investigations o f  the orig in  and structure and 
fe e lin g  which f i r s t  marked out the paths elong which aesth etics  was 
to develop. But a ll  o f  these investigations -  as we have them in 
Hutcheson and Lord Karnes, in Burke and Ferguson -  go back to  the 
pup ils and d is c ip le s  o f  Shaftesbury, not those o f  Locke, Berkeley and 
Hume." ( O p .c it .. p . 1 9 6 ) .  ( l ) .
The experts are divided on the question o f the orig in  o f  aesthetics
as an autonomous area o f  enquiry, and in opposition to  C ass irer 's
view, notwithstanding Shaftesbury's influence and importance, both
E.L. Tuvo.oon and C.D, Thorpe make much o f the Q iglish  em pirical influence
stcraning from Locke. Hutcheson, fo r  example, who is  an ardent admirer
and promoter o f  Shaftesbury, nevertheless owes more in h is aesth etic
theory tc  Locke; th is  is  also Thorpe's view. For Tuveson, commenting
on Addison (who was a d isc ip le  o f  Locke) 1 " . . .  'The Pleasures o f  1
Imagination' i s  the f i r s t  work ever w ritten on aesthetics as a wholly
antononons s u b je c t ."  ("The Imagination as a Means o f  Grace", P .9 2 ).
I t  is  perhaps o f  no store than h is to r ica l in terest to decide who or 
what started  the study o f  aesth etics , hut more valuable, I  think, to 
ascertain  the- nature o f  th is study according to b e lie fs  o f  those who 
in it ia te d  i t .  The Bomantic notion o f  imagination is  a combination 
o f  Fiutuuiu metaphysics aaa empirical end speculative psychology,
(1) See C assirer 's  "The Philosophy o f  the Enlightenment", p.^12 
fo r  a sim ilar view.
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and i t  i s  th is  notion which is  w ritten  into modem art educational 
theory. Aesthetic theory end the theory o f imagination are very 
c lo s e ly  intertwined, and it. eceras c lea r  to ice that the re sp on sib ility  
fo r  stimulating an in terest in both is  largely  Addison's.
S&7.
Chapter 3  s ADDISON
Intro dt ;c t ion .
Oui contemporary ideas ou imagination, and the lip -se rv ice  paid to 
i t s  importance in numerous areas o f  human l i f e  — including education — 
had th e ir  resurgence in  the 18th century, The ori.giue o f these ideas I  
have endeavoured to trace in Greek myth and the philosophy and psychology 
o f  Pinto and A ris to tle , and though there i s  a net; emphasis on the niythopoeia 
o f symbolism and ambiguity in  the la te r  19th century, th is resurgence, and 
the focussing on iu tercst on imagination, cannot be so le ly explained by events 
snd b e l ie fs  dating back some iiOOO years. The Renaissance had brought a new, 
Hermetically inspired anthropocentrism, as (Giovanni)' Pico d e lla  Mirandole 
proclaimed (amongst others) : "Thou, constrained by no lim its  . . .  shall ordain 
fo r  th y se lf the lim its  o f  thy nature. We have se t thee at the w orld 's cen tre ., 
thou mayest fashion th yse lf in  whatever shape thou shalt p re fe r ."  ("Oration 
on The Dignity o f  Man", in Cassirer. "The Renaissance lh .iloaophy o f  Man").
Yre have seen something o f  the ex otic  hybrid, product o f  magic, alchemy 
and mysticism, which wa3 the post-Home t i c  "imagination" o f Boehme'a 
forerunners; th is empyrean, in f in it is in g  imagination pers ists  and. can bo 
seen in  aesthetic as well as th eolog ica l theory, passing from Boebme through 
lTunaxm and German Romanticism to Kiekegaard and from Blake and Wordsworth 
to  Yeats. Generally speaking, certa in ly  p r io r  to  about 1800, th is  meta­
physical aspect o f  imagination maintains a greater prominence on the >
continent than in Britain where the philosophy o f  mind is  dominated by 
L ock e 's  attack on "innate i d e a s " . ( l ) .  L ocke's "Mssay" is  a crucial work
( l )  See D.F.Bond. "The N eo-Classical Psychology o f  The Imagination." :
'•English neo-classicism  was formed in  a time o f  c o n flic t  between two 
basic  points o f  view. The supremacy o f  P latonic idealism  or o f  Cartesian 
rationalism  would have meant a continuance in Ha gland o f  a dualist! c 
psychology in which imagination would occupy an in fe r io r  distrusted 
p o s it io n . I t  was owing to tko r ise  o f  the em piricist psychology that the 
prestige  o f  the imagination was enhanced and that a more intensive, and 
unbiassed, study was made o f i t s  operations. Phantasms were no longer 
uvuiuuieu oy an iaeai in ru i, mvc Dy tne truuti o f  falsehood o f  the oeusotions 
which brought them into ex istence. To the creative w riter imagination meant 
not only the reproducing o f  images, but the making o f  comparisons and 
the combining o f  material»? in to  new aid  hitherto undreamed o f  situations 
end characters. Thanks to Hobbes and h is  fo llow ers, the imagination was 
no longer to be associated merely with error or passion, tkonks to both 
Hobbes and Locke i t s  associative  {sowers were to be studied more in ten tly  
u;u more sympathetically.
in  the d volopment o f  the concept o f  imagination, inaugurating or 
symptomising (depending on one’ s view o f  h istory ) a revolution  in 
consciousness hy irrevocably a ltering nan 's view o f h im self, voicing 
in  i t s  way the rea lisation  that man's povcr to 3hapo him self was his 
alone and not by the grace o f  God — os I’i c o  believed. I f  God died 
at the end o f  the 19+-h century He was certa in ly  unwell at the end o f  
the 1 7 th .
The attack on innate idee.3 was not a sudden, naive denial o f  a ll  
inborn p oten tia lity  but was part o f  the erosion o f  abeyance to the 
unquestioned authority o f  p r in cip les , id ea ls , and de ity . The centre 
o f  man's consciousnese sh ifted  to what had hitherto been considered 
to  be the lower fa cu lt ie s  such as sense and imagination, end away 
from the higher, nearer-to-God ro tio c in a tiv e  fa tu it ie s . This anthropo- 
psychic revolution , i f  I may be allowed so to ca ll i t ,  i s  s t i l l  ongoing 
today; what i t  brought about at the beginning o f  the 10th century was 
what was to become an 'operational* involvement with human psychology 
rather than a restr icte fily  metaphysical o r  speculative one. The 
s p e c if ic a l ly  human powers become p articu larly  in terestin g , and moral 
approbation no longer automata ca lly  attaches i t s e l f  to purely human 
pleasures : imagination is  to be enjoyed fo r  i t s  own take. This enjoy­
ment i s  the theme o f  Addison's essays on imagination, which are largely  
Lockion in language and conception but which are also greatly  influenced 
by Longinus and, to a lesser  extent, by Kalebranche.
I have ca lled  th is  chapter "Addison" because i t  deals with the 
content o f ,  influences on, and e ffe c ts  o f ,  h is eseoys "On The Pleasures 
o f  Imagination." In the follow ing sections 1 w ill consider, respectively , 
T.orxriniis* "On The Sublime". Addison, the concept o f  "t.eBfce". and the 
th eories, o f  Hutcheson, Malebranche, i f  1 son, and /'kentide, where 
these are concerned with imagination. In ray estimation Addison is
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the single person who has ¿one most, during the 18th century, to 
bring inagination to the fo rc iron t o f  .attention in  aeothetic theory; 
so fax as I  CEi aware thin view is  not held by other students o f 
th is period.
2;k>
A ction t .
Longinus' "On 'xhe Sublime" i s  a work which, through Addison's 
ugoncy, eontriLuted enormously to the elevation  « f  the concept o f  
imagination to  the fore fron t o f  Western European aesth etic  theory, ( l ) 
'Die notion o f  ti e sublime i s  ono which cxane to occupy the attentions 
o f  several important aesthetic th eorists  up to and. including Kent, 
but my immediate concern i s  more with the concepts o f  taste end 
genius, re la tin g  respectively  to the appreciation o f  making o f  art, 
both o f which are seen to  depend upon the imagination. Somewhat 
in  opposition to  Locke's attack on "innate ideas" the idea o f  an 
'o r ig in a l gen ius' as en id ea lis in g , innate power comes to Addinon 
from Longinu3 : " . . b y  some innate power the true sublime u p l i f t s  our 
sou ls; we are f i l l e d  with u proud exaltation  and n sense o f  vaunting 
jc y ,  ju st ae though ve had ourselves produced what we had heard."
("Cn ihc Sublime",, ch.7 ) . Since Leonardo i t  i s  in  connection with the 
l ite ra ry  arts that imagination has moot prominently figured , though in. 
th is  c o n t e x t  the word "imagery" i s  most su itab le , since what ore 
referred to are the images which poets, f o r  example, describe and 
evoke. Longinus r.lso speaks frequently o f  fee lin gs and emotions, in 
a way which ran counter to the n eo -c la ss ica l advocation o f  restra in t 
and decorum, and without condemnation o f  thei.r c lose  lin l:e  with 
"images" *
" .»d ify iity , grandeur, end the lower o f  persuasion are to a very large 
degree derived from images -  fo r  that i s  what people ca ll  tb.e represen­
tation  o f mental p ictu res. In a  general way the term 'image* i s  need 
o f  any mental conception, from whatever source i t  presents i t s e l f ,  
which g ives  r i s e  to speecaj kit, in  current usage the word i s  applied 
to passages in which, curried away by your fee lin g s , you imagine yon
(l ) Addison lied v is ited  ftoilonu on h ie travels in Europe vhou a young 
man. lie also quotes Boil can and Bouheux'« with evident approval 
(Spectator, 6 ii).
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' are a tu o lly  seeing the subject o f  your description , and unable 
your audience an ■well to  see i t , "  ("On The Sublime", C h .lh )«
Bold imagery, soys Longinus, i s  indi spensable to the "onward rush 
o f  passion" which sweeps a ll before i t  ( ch, 52) and the a b il ity  to 
achieve such e ffe c ts  i s  a "mighty heaven-sent g i f t "  o f  great genius 
( ch. J24)* as Gerard's "Essay on Genius" (177^) shows, the acceptance 
o f  imagination es the sine qua non o f  genius came to bo a conmon- 
place o f  pre-Bomantic (and Romantic) aesthetics.
The most d irect and obvious o f  Addison's borrowings from Longinus 
are the categories o f  "uncommonness", "greatness" end "beauty" which 
Addison says bring pleasure to what he ca lls  the "primary imagination". 
These categories are almost iden tica l to those c f  Longinus :
our ideas often go beyond the boundaries by which we are circum­
scribed, and i f  we look  at l i f e  from a ll  sides, observing how in 
everything that concerns us -the extraordinary, the great aid  the 
beautifu l p lay the leading part, we shall soon rea lise  the purpose o f  
our cre a t io n ."  (O p .c it .. ch. '55 ).
Addison’ s "primary imagination" i s  c lea rly  based on L ocke's "primary 
q u a lit ie s ”  which "produce simple ideas in  us" and perhaps i t  was no 
great t e a t  t o r  Addison to produce a popular oynthosis o f  th is  con­
ception o f  Locke's with Longinus three categories} the synthesis 
required imagination in  more senses than one. But I shall discuss 
Addison in  the next section . As to Longinus, i t  would bo o f  some 
in terest to  be able accurately  to  date h is  work — at le a s t  in 
respect t o  the h istory  o f  aesthetics and o f  the concept o f  imagination -  
hut th is date i6  unknown though i t  may be the 1st century A.D .. I t  
corta in lv  had a »Treat e f fe c t  on 18th century theories and n t  a time 
when the rational., academic tradition  was waning and fashionable talk
was o f  the c o n flic t  between the "heart" and the "icind” ( l )  ond i t  
was he coning clear that the heart had i t s  reaeons o f  which the mind 
had no knowledge.(2 ) .  12
252.
(1 )  I  have cl reedy investigated tho ancient notions about the heart 
in  the chapter on A r is to t le . la  tho 17th and 13th centuries the heart 
was regarded as tho seat o f  the passions» the mind o f  reason. Sec 
Bouhcurs• "Art o f  C r it ic is e "  fo r  an i llu s tra tio n  o f  th is  c o n f l ic t .
( c . g . : " I t  must ho confessed . . .  that tho Heart and the Hind
are very fashionable things ; There is  scarce anything elne te lk 'd
o f  in fine Company." This heart (pt;S3ion)/miucl (reason) duality  Is 
Cart© si an .
(2 ) For Pascal *s views on Imagination see h is  "Penseeo", ¿fc. ("Imagination 
decides everything : :*.t creates beauty, ju s t ic e  end happiness, which i s  
the w orld 's supreme good ." e t c . ) .
SECTION IT .
Daring the f i r s t  h a lf o f  the ISth century three o f  the main concerns 
o f  aesthetic tLeory were established, each in  i t s  way based on longhcld 
convictions. V.lioroas AdcLieon*» views aro a fedrly  d ir e c t  outcome o f  
Locke's empiricism, i t  i s  from a mixture o f  N eoplatonic, S toic, and 
pseudo-A risiotolian  psychology that Siofioebury derived h is  b e l ie fs  
and i t  i s  he who, with Addison, chapes the aesthetic o f  Hutches ■.<» 
end -  to a great extent — o f  Wordsworth end Keats. Baumgsrten1 s "Aesthetica" 
is  strongly influenced by the Cartesian elements in Leibniz and Wolff, 
iliese throe major creeds s empiricism, Neoplatonism, und Cartecioai£K<, 
thus spawn our modern theories o f  art a lb e it  in terlarded with other 
in fluences.
From Addison there emerges, c lea r ly  end unequivocally, the view 
that art, in  the making and appreciating, depends on imagination bat 
that imagination, ir o n ic a lly  and in  defiance o f  the popular toskian 
pos ition  ( i f  not the true one), i s  innate . In the creating  o f  works 
o f art imagination come to  he the f i r s t  requirement o f  genius, end in 
the appreciating, c f  ta s te . Only to the few were genius and taste  
attributed. That imagination might also function somehow between the 
two, and that these might even be c lo se ly  related a c t iv i t ie s ,  was not
»
immediately considered; nor was i t  said that th is e l i t e  imagination 
(which the A rintotelian  tra d ition  had said even animals wight possess) 
might be the b irth righ t o f  a ll  and not ju s t  the s e l e c t . ( l )  For Addison 
the imagination i s  autonomous, pleasure giving, re la ted  to fee lin g  not 
thought, and i s  in  nc way the "hancfcsldden,, o f  reason :
"Nowhere do we fin d  the traditional, and hitherto inescapable warning 
that imagination must remain the fa ith fu l servant o f  reason. Nowhere 
does Addison assert that Die pleasure obtained from the imagination must
( l )  Nevertheless, the "Spectator" was cn extremely popular publication  
which purported to publish the speculations o f  the "Spectator Club", a 
group o f  gentlemen from middle elans professions who endeavoured to 
bring learning out o f  l ib ra r . es end co lleges to ’the tea -ta b le , the club, 
end the co ffee  house.
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be used An the service o f  "truth. Nowhere does he moke the compromise 
that, although poetry e x is ts  prim arily fo r  the purpose o f giving 
pleasure, the pleasure ou st disguise a ra tion a lly  ju s t if ia b le  
purpose.
On the contrary. The very absence o f  rational a c t iv ity  becomes 
a v irtue o f  imagination.." (E.L. Tavceon. o p . c i t . , p.94. on Spectator 
411). Addison's autonomy o f  tho imagination depends heavily cn 
L ocke 's representational ism, esp ecia lly  with regard to the pleasures 
afforded by imagination through art s the "secondary imagination" as 
Addison c a lls  i t .  ( l )  Tuveson considers that fo r  Addison the 
imagination i s  a means o f  recon cilin g  man to  a cosmos become a lien , 
impersonal, and menacing, and th is  certa in ly  bolds true fo r  the 
"primary imagination". Prom his very f i r s t  essay on the subject,
Addison emphasises that he is 'concerned with a visual facu lty  t " . . .  
by the pleasures o f imagination 1 moan only such pleasures as arise 
o r ig in a lly  from s ig h t ."  (Spectator, 411). lie states that the 
"images" derived from s ig h t can be retained, a lterod, or compounded 
by us, and con bo r e ca lle d  as though in a kind o f  private p ictu re - 
show : by th is  facu lty ’ a man in  a dungeon i s  capable o f  enten-
tainiug him self with scenes and landscapes uorc beautiful than any 
that can bo found in th e  whole compass o f  n  -ta re ."  ( h o c .c i t . ) .
( l )  Addison never a ctu a lly  says what imagination i s ,  end certa in ly  
no explanation can be found in Locke, who rare ly  mentions i t ;  how Addison 
came to use the term can only bo explained by reference to Longinus end 
p ossib ly  Molcbronclie. His "secondary imagination" i s  very’ much u 
representational, v isu a l facu lty , whereas the "primary1 imagination" 
i s  very lik e  perception ; whot they have in common i s  the visual 
referen t, the ob ject , ( ' ’fig u re " in  Cartesian and Spinezen terminology) 
and tho imago presented in the o b je c t 's  absence with tho associated 
fee lin g  o f p) e astir©. L ock e 's  pat sage on Association  o f  Ideas ("Essay" 
jjk. '¿. un. i n ) was not added until the 4th ed ition  o f  1?00, end ho says 
nothing d irectly  and ex clu s iv e ly  about "im agination", i'e doc3 say that 
ideas ore nscociateu haphazardly, "wholly owing to  cbonco and custom", 
but without investigating  the creative p o s s ib i l i t ie s  o f  such associations.
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C o m p a r iso n  o f  th is  passage with the description  o f  the prisoners in 
P la to 's  cave gives an indication  o f  how fo r  the imagination has
advanced in p restig e . The pleasures o f  the "primary imagination" 
com  from the immediate experience o f  cense, when the ob ject  i s  
actually  in fron t o f  our eyes, such pleasures coning mostly from 
n a tu r e .( l ) .  "Secondary imagination" i s  o f  o b je c t s . . . .
" . . .  not a ctu a lly  before the eyes, hut are ca lled  up in to our 
memories, o r  formed into agreeable v is ion s o f  things that are e ith er 
absent or f i c t i t i o u s . "  (l- io c .c it i) .
There i s  a degree o f  pa3siveness in  h is  "primary imagination" and o f  
creativoness in the "secondary imagination", and the former sects  to  
7jo more re lated  to appreciation (ta s te ), tho la t te r  to creation 
(genius) though he does not e f fe c t  these re la tion s . Ids pleasures 
o f  the "primary imagination" do not obtain with respect to art, 
except fo r  arch itecture.
Although in  h is  introductory essay and elsewhere he does dwell 
on tho autonomous pleasure afforded by imagination, avoiding condition­
ing these Ijy reason, he does fee l o llig e d  to make a b r ie f  comparison 
with the pleasures o f  understanding, regarding the la t te r  as more 
refined  and preferable but no mere intense than those o f  imagination —
"a description  o f  Homer has charmed more readers than a chapter in 
A r is to t le "  lie remarks.( 2 ) .  So fa r  as imagination i s  concerned, Addison
(1) A.O -T.oyu.joy fin ds more then 18 meanings o f  "nature". See 'Nature As
A esthetic horn".
( 2 ) Sec also Spectator ftSd s "The understanding, indeed opens an  in f in ite  
space 0:1 every side o f  us, trut the imagination, a fte r  a few fa in t  e f fo r t s , 
i s  immediately at a stand, and findp h erse lf swallowed up in the immensity 
o f  the void that surrounds i t  : our reason can pursue a p a rtic le  o f  matter 
through an in f in it e  variety  o f  d iv is ion s, but the fancy scon loses  sight o f  
i t ,  and fe e ls  i t s e l f  a kind o f  chasm that wants to ho f i l l e d  with matter
<jl u i~'o¿-c uitutiiijlc hu lk , i.e con neitner widen nor conuraco one xacurcy 
to tho dimensions o f  either extreme : the o bj a ot i s  too  big fo r  our 
ca p acity  when wo would comprehend tho circum ference o f  tho world, and 
dwindles in to  noth ing when we endeavour a ft e r  tho idea o f  an atom."
Addison gives a d istin ction  hero which Knit also states in h is "Analytic 
o f  The Sublime". Ho uses iiio words "fancy" and "imagination" 'promiscuously* 
as he cays, (Spectator V .I ) .
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ia  re ferrin g  to a perceptrml »and representational component which i s  
pleasurable tad vlircb we might ca ll the aesthetic :
"The colours paint themselves on -the fancy, with very l i t t l e  attention  
o f  thought o r  application  o f  mind in the beholder. We are struck, we 
know not how, with the syraaetry o f  anything we see, and immediately 
assent to the beauty o f  an o b je c t , without enquiring into the 
particu lar causes end occasions o f  i t . "  (L o c .c i t . ) . Later explanation a 
o f  th is  "immediate assent" sometimes ta lk  in terns o f  associations o f  
tangoa, bat Addison's description  i s  reminiscent o f  Descartes' in t u i t i ons 
also recognised by Locke — but the suggestion o f  on innate response, 
to symmetry fo r  example, i s  not acceptable to him, as h is analysis o f  
"primary imagination" shows. This kind o f  imagination, he says, a r ise s  
from " . .  the actual view and survey o f  outward ob jects ; and these I  
think, a ll proceed from what i s  great, vnooaioon, or b ea u tifu l."
(O n .c it .. 412). These "sigh ts" are, as I have already remarked, 
borrowed from Longinus; but there i s  a s ign ifican t d ifferen ce , fo r  
whereas the Greek says i t  i s  "nature" that has "implanted in  our sou ls  
an tin conquerable passion fo r  a ll  that i s  great and fo r  a ll that i s  
more divine then ourselves" ("On The Sublime", Ch.35). Addison, fo llow ing  
Locke, o ffe r s  what seems to be an empirical account o f  how we experience 
these "sigh ts" and th eir  pleasures; the great in nature ca lls  out the 
groat already in  iaen fo r  Longinus, fo r  Addison the great produces 
greatness in  m cn .(l) Dut in  h is  explanation o f  the e ffe c ts  o f  great­
ness Addison says that beoause God i s  great, contemplation o f  Him o r  
His works insp ires our astonishment and devotion ;
( l )  See E.L. Tuyceon, o p .ci t . . p,104 : "Ultimately, th is  i s  why 
physical s ize , quantity, and so on are o f  f i r s t  importance in
o  ¿'u j j c  c .  u o  L-j_i y  it Li v  C l  C U ’U  I K  U V U ^ I U U » .  . ** i U  U l O U g i l  U 1 . \ S
"greatness" is  quantitative i t  s t i l l  seems to evoke a corresponding, 
qualitative  response when the imagination ia  f i l l e d  with the sigh ts 
o f  tire "stupendous work" o f  nature" : "We arc flung into a pleasing 
astonishment at such unbounded views, and foo l a delightfu l s t i l ln e s s  
and amazement in the noui at the ax>prel»enoion o f  them." (Spectator,
412).
“Ho has given almost everything about us the power o f  raising an 
agree able idea in the imagination." ( O p .c it . . 4) j ) . Mot only do 
va fin d  hero a suggestion o f  the innate, hut also >m intim ation o f  
imagination’ s tendency towards "understanding" and i t s  love to  "grasp 
at anything that is  too big  fo r  i t s  ca p a c ity ."  His account o f  the 
pleasures o f  imagination contains many such ambiguities, and not 
surprisingly  considering h is attempted synthesis o f  Longinus and 
Locke and the many ambiguities in the la t t e r 's  "Ss3ay". V/bat i s  
important about Addison i s  h is popularisation  o f  imagination and i t s  
association  with the pleasures o f  nature and art. His praise o f  
"uncomcionnos3" i s  the very antithesis o f  harmony and proportion , as 
c t .f f .  in i t s  inclusion o f  "monsters" and "im perfections", and as such 
serves to emphasise the degree o f  Addison 's sh ift  from the aesthetic 
norms o f  h is  con tempo rain e s . His in clu sion  c f  "beauty" as the th ird  
c f  h is  sources o f  pleasure is  something o f  a g loss on greatness and 
mcommonness as i t  was losin g  some o f  i t s  former importance as an 
aesthetic conceptr as Tuveson comments r "Beauty as a value in art 
allows a marked decline in importance as the great emerges to occupy 
i t s  own p lace  in aesth etics ."
Turning now to h is "secondary im agination" and i t s  pleasures we 
fin d  that these, l ik e  the "primary im agination" ore f in a lly  dependent 
on the three categories got from Longinus, on L ocke 's  associatiouism , 
and I  suspect, on the o ld  doctrine o f  ideal im ita tion . Ultimately 
however i t  i s  impossible fo r  him to say vhy th is  "operation e f  the 
mind" givus no much ploaenre : " . . .  the secondary pleasure o f  tho 
imagination proceeds from that uction  o f  the mind, which compares 
the ideas arisinir from the orig in a l ob ject* , with the idea* we receive 
from the statue, p icture, descrip tion , or sound that represents 
them." (O p .o it ..  41 _6).
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' "Wit", (an important concept in the 17th and 18th centuries) is  
dependent upon tbo a f f in ity  o f  id  »as -wfa-V ch i s  the basis o f  the 
"secondary imagination". But th is  a f f in ity  i s  by no means random 
or haphazard, and there i s  the intimation o f  a p rincip le  ouch as 
•taste’ in  Addison’ s (nco-Hobbesioa) d istin ction  between "w it" cad 
" fa ls e  w it" , the la t te r  being the a f f in ity  o f  le t te r s , as in 
anagram, a crostic ; or  o f  sy lla b les , as in doggerel rhymes, echoes; 
or o f  ■words, os in puns, quibbles; or o f  a whole sentence o f  poem, 
to  wings and a lte rs . ” Of w it i t s e l f ,  he continues t "The fin a l cause, 
probably, o f  annexing pleasure to th is  operation o f  the mind, was to 
quicken and encourage us in  our searches a fter  truth*, since to dis­
tinguish  one thing from another, and the right discerning betwixt our 
id eas, depends wholly on our comparing then together and observing 
the congruity or disagreement that appears among the several works 
o f  n atu re ." (O p .c it .. frl6). Wit perhaps deserves a thesis to  i t s e l f ;  
i t  i s  c lear from Addison and others ( l )  that i t  i s  c lo se ly  e l lie d
(1 )  I  have already quoted Sidney and llohbes on "w it"; Dryden thought that : 
"Great w its are sure to madness near a llied ,
And th e ir  p a rtition s do th e ir  bounds d iv id e ."
Dryden• s view i s  rather P latonic, as i s  Sidney’ s association  o f  w it 
with p erfection . L ocke 's de fin ition  o f  w it is  lik e  Hobbes’  "fa lse  
w it " ,  rad quite c lea rly  separates w it from judgment : "For wit ly ing  
most in the assemblage o f  ideas, and putting those together with quickness 
and variety , wherein can be found any resemblance or congm ity, thereby 
to  ncko up pleasant p ictures and agreeable v isions in the fancy; .judgment. 
on the contrary, l i e s  quite on the other side, in separating care fu lly , 
one from another, ideas wherein can he found the lea st  d ifferen ce , thereby 
to  avo.; d being misled by sim ilitude, and by u ffin ity  to take one thing 
f o r  another" ("Essay", 2. XI. 2) .  L ocke 's d istin ction  here i s  very lik e  
Hobbes’ between judgment and fancy, implying a resemblance between w it 
and fancy. Eat Addison seems to be c loser  to Halebranche as both the words 
and the sense- o f  h is  remarks on 'f i t  in d icóte , foi> Malobranche re la tes  wit 
to  ’ our rational p a rts ’ , imagination to the irra tion a l malevolent parts, 
stating  that a strong imagination goes with a "wont o f  w it"; (see "Search 
A fter  Truth", Vol. I .  Hk. ^ F t .  I l l  : "Of the Contagious Comtsunication 
o f  o w/uug Jiuugimi i xoas-• ( í ó y v j .
*  The use o f  th is phrase, bo i t  deliberate or accidental, further 
suggests the influence o f  ihvleblanche or. Addison’ s thinking.
io  creativeness, p a rticu la r ly  in lite ra tu re . The relationsh ip  between 
w it and imagination i s  strained by a c o n f l ic t  o f  two philosophies, 
fo r  whereas i l l o g ic a l i t y  becomes imagination, w it seems to  belong 
with the ambivalencies and equivocations o f  'r ig h t  judgement*.
Addison's "w it" i s  c lose  to  h i3 "understanding" suggesting, despite 
h is  Lockian vocabulary and ideas, the p r io r ity  o f  reason and the 
continued re liance  on 'in n ate ' a b i l it ie s  to  guide discernment aud 
taste ;
" fliis  d iffe re n t  taste must proceed, e ith er from the p erfection  o f  
imagination in one more than another, or  from the d iffe re n t  ideas 
that several readers a f f ix  to the same words. For to  have a true 
re lish  and fora  a r igh t judgment o f  a description , a man should be 
born with a good imagination, and must have well weighed the force 
and energy that l i e s  in the several words o f  a language, so as to 
be able to  distinguish which are most s ig n ifica n t and expressive o f 
th e ir  proper ideas, and what additional strength end beauty they are 
capable o f  receiv ing from conjunction with others. The fancy must be 
warm, to  retain  tho prin t o f  those images i t  hath received  from outward 
o b je c ts }  and tho judgement discerning, to know whet expressions are 
most proper to clothe and adorn them to best advantage. A man who is  
d e fic ie n t  in  o ithor o f  these respects, though he may rece ive  the 
general notion  o f  a descrip tion , ho can never see d is t in c t ly  a ll i t s  
p a rticu la r  beauties as a person with a weak sight, may have the confused 
prosjjoet o f  a place that l i e s  before Iiira, without entering into i t s  
several paxt3, or discerning tho variety  o f  i t s  colours in their 
fu l l  g lo ry  aud p erfection . "  (i-.o c . c i t ) .
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"any mental conception, from whatever source i t  presents i t s e l f ,
which g ives  r ice  to epieeoh", ta t  th is  speech, lik e  pcotry  cud l i t e r ­
ature, needs the dioeeremi'iit o f  jxidga.f.nt fox' Addison, as too fo r  Popo t
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"True w it i s  nature to advantage dressed«
What o f t  weo thought but n e 'e r  so well expressed.”
From the variouo opinions canvassed, i t  would seem that the creative 
a r t is t  needs that aarriago o f  a warm fancy and good judgment which i s  
w it, that nature and art a ffo rd  primary and secondary pleasures 
respectively , and these pleasures depend on imagination but are more 
refined  by discernment such ns i s  possessed by the man o f  taste .
The pleasures o f  imagination which Addison c a lls  "secondary” arise 
from the compari3011 o f  our ideas with representations o f  art, therefore 
demanding judgment and ta ste . Although natural s igh ts , esp ecia lly  
o f  that which i s  great or uncommon, provide iraaediato, "primary" 
pleasure to the imagination, i t  i s  the imprinted images which are 
more beautifu l fo r  Addison, as in h is  example o f  the man in  the 
dungeon. But "good imagination" and "right judgment" belong 
together,ind icating that fo r  Addison the imagination i s  best which 
i s  c loser  to  what Malebranehe ca lls  "our rational p arts", and that 
he s t i l l  cannot avoid the shadow o f  Stoicifm .
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t
’> The view that "good imagination" o r  "tantc" are only given at
birth  to the few, and that these few are o f  noble or gentle b irth , 
ie  implied by Addison but c lea rly  stated by HaJ ebranche. For Addison 
discernment end taste  ore innate, fo r  Malebranche : " . . I  would have 
i t  presuppos'd that Princes ex ce ll in  Strength sod Vigour o f  Imagin­
ation (G p .c it .. V o l, I .  15c.2, Pt. I l l ,  Ch. I I ) . Attempts to  
establish  a standard o f  taste daring the l? th  and 18th centuries 
have a moral as well as an aesthetic in tent, fox- i f  judgments o f  art, 
nature, and human action s were os subjective as a free imagination, 
general notions o f  good and bad, or o f  "r igh t" (Addison) and "regu larity" 
(A lison) would bo nueupportable except on grounds o f consensus. In the 
"Critique o f  Judgment" Kant sought to  estab lish  the notion o f taste 
as a common ground extant in a ll  human nature, with beauty as i t s  
ex p ress ion .(l) Ifith in  the Cambridge P latonic trad ition  Hutcheson
avoids the problem o f  establishing such a common standard by emphas­
is in g  the morally u p lift in g  e f fe c ts  o f  the morally good in  art : 
when we form the idea  o f  a morally good action , or we see i t  represented 
in the drama, or read i t  in epics or romance, we fee l a desire arising 
o f  doing the l i k e . " ( "Essay on the Nature and Conduct o f  Passions and 
A ffection s", p . 69. in  P . K iw . "Francis Hutcheson..", p . 10. f t a t .  21 ) .  
A lison 's  notion o f  "regu larity " in  re la tion  to taste and imagination 
i s  almost a synonym f o r  preceding notions c f  discernment and judgment, 
maintaining the b e l ie f  that imagination needs the brake o f  reason >
" . . I  should wish to  appropriate the term Relight, to s ig n ify  the peculiar 
pleasure which attends the Bnoticns o f  TASTE, o r  which i s  f e l t ,  WHEN 
THE IMAGINATION IS EMPLOYED IN TIP? PltOSECUTICN OF A HBGlhAB TRAIN OF 
IDEAS OR QJ0TI0N." (Essays on The Nature and P rincip les o f  T aste".r».l21) .
(1) See E.Cassirer , "The Philosophy o f  The Enlightenment", p .293 * "This 
approach considers ta ste  tut n  sort o f  *isonoe* shared by a l l ,  and i t  begins 
i t s  formulation o f  the problem vnth the question o f  the nature und poss­
ib i l i t y  o f  such a 'common sense' ( census conuminia). " See a lso on
Shaftesbury's notion o f  the beautiful as "an orig in a l function o f  the 
s p i r i t . "
There i s  no question "that A lison 's  book ovea much to Addison's essays, 
h is  deligh ts o f taste being much the same as Addison's p ie a cure a o f  
imagination, and even ir  1740 centuries o f  S toic reservo ensured that 
imagination, however wonderful, fre e , or de ligh tfu l, a t i l l  needed 
the restra in ts  o f  discernment, rectitude and regu larity  which, under 
the new empiricism, were believed  and hoped to reside in human 
nature. (1 )
liven Ifc®e was cn old-fash ioned morel 1st when deal.lag with the 
problems o f  art and imagination s
"To chech the s a ll ie s  o f  the imagination, and reduce every expression 
to  geometrical truth and exactness, would be the most contrary to 
the laws o f  cr it ic ism ; because i t  would produce a work, which, by 
universal experience, ka3 been the most in sip id  and disagreeable. But- 
though jxietry can never submit to exact truth, i t  must be confined 
by ru les  o f a rt, discovered to the author e ither by genius or obser­
v a t io n ."  ("On The Standard o f  Taste", p .7 . )
He does seem to  be saying that imagination i s  necessary and needs some 
freedom, but v.hen a ll  i s  said and done, ru les are needed; deviation 
from ru les and p rin cip les  must have "Just reason" fo r  Ilune s 
'The general p r in cip les  o f  taste are uniform in human nature t where 
man vary in  th e ir  judgments, some defect o r  perversion in the fa cu lt ie s  
may coriiionly bo remarked, proceeding either from prejud ice, from vent 
o f  p ra c t ice , o r  want o f  de licacy : there i s  ju s t  reason fo r  approving 
one ta ste , and condemning another. Bat where there i s  such u d iv ers ity  
in tno internal frame or external situation  us i s  en tire ly  blameless
\ f*. *.s j. i t  a *r M.. . . i r .  i a . .» __ • t r m  ............... j. . . • »t _ i.
• -- • 1- 9  » e  »• y  ' ; > » W  w \ . m  «  V  v. V»» «.J, J. «•> »-V /J O . e u ( V ,M  V O  V A  i * C t l  W A U  O
Philosophy", n t. 11. ch. VII : " I f  a ll men spoko the same language, we 
should always be in clin ed  to believe that there i s  a necessary connection 
between words and ideas. But a ll  men speak the same lunguage with 
respect to the imagination. Nature nays to a ll  : when you have seen a l l  
colours fo r  a certain length o f  time, your imagination w ill represent 
to you in the same manner the bodies ‘to which those colours seem t o  
belong . "
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on both sides, end leave» no room to give one the preference above 
the other; in that case a certain degree o f  d iversity  in judgment 
i s  unavoidable, and we seek in vain fo r  a standard, by which we can 
recon cile  the contrary sentiments." ( O p.cit . ,  np, 19-20).
Out o f  th is  tension between the free don o f  the imagination and a 
tenacious adherence to the quest fo r  ruler, end prin cip les (natural 
rather than log ica l.) was boro empirical psychology, with i t s  attempt 
to f in d  uniform ities in  human nature. Increasingly, with the r ise  
o f  Itoraorticiain, i t  i s  the d iv ers ities  rather then the common elements 
o f  aesth etic  judgments which in terest creative a r t is ts , a trend which 
i s  already signalled  by Addison, who includes the strange end the 
disagreeable as pleasurable to  h is "secondary imagination" when "in 
apt descrip tion " (Spectator 418). Even a dunghill, su itably expressed, 
pleases the imagination. Here he has a nose fo r  disunity i f  not fo r  
a n tith esis , suggesting that perhaps the aptness o f  the description  
'“may be more properly ca lled  the pleasure o f  the understanding than 
the fa n cy ." (h o c .ca t . ) .  He suggests that the pleasure wo do get 
from disagreeable things — "torments, wounds, deaths" -  comes from 
secre tly  comparing ourselves with what i s  described and consequently 
r e jo ic in g  in our comparative safety  and good fortune : pleasures which 
do n ot obtain when such things rea lly  happen, assuming (as Addison 
unquestioningly does) a clear d istin ction  between "secondary imagination", 
"primary imagination", and perception . But i f  he i c  lig h t  about th is  
comforting e f fe c t  o f  imagination vhc-t he i s  praising is ,  in .Platonic 
terms, a i  indictment.; ho ie  also assuming an autonomy for  art, based 
on imagination as representational.
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I hove already cade b r ie f mention o f  two o f  Addison's aesthetic 
h e irs , Hutcheson and A lison. Though c o t  a great o r  orig inal 
th eorist, Hutcheson vas on in flu en tia l one, end both Home ond Kent 
acknowledged M s value, though what one fin ds in h is  "Inquiry" i s  
b a s ica lly  a re itera tion  o f  Addison's Loekian empiricism and i t s  
anomalies, compounded with Shaftesbury's Neoplatonism.. Hutcheson's 
"Inquiry" i s  essen tia lly  a theory o f  hehutv . hut he uses the concept 
so lo o se ly  that i t  may on h is account he attached to  almost anything, 
as well as having a moral dimension. As Kivy comments : " . . .  we 
have d i f f i c u lty  in  discovering whether he meant by the idea o f  beauty 
a pleasure or a secondary qu ality  because he saw no real d istin ction  
between them; both had the some perpetual u n ity ."  ( O p .c it .. p « l9 ) .
Hutcheson was a defender and a supporter o f  Shaftesbury and though 
h is  aesthetics are based more on Lockinn p rin cip les , and the "Inquiry" 
was published 14 years a fter  Addison's essays on imagination, these 
essays seem not to have influenced h im .(l) I t  was not until 1728 
that Hutcheson, in h is  "Essay on the Nature and Conduct o f  the Passions 
and A ffection s", wrote o f  the s im ila rity  o f  h is  ideas to  those o f  
Addison : "I have examined Addison's papers on the Imagination carefu lly  
ond compared h is ideas with my own on my essay on Beauty; I  fin d  that 
we are talk ing about the same thing s h ie  Pleasures o f  the Imagination 
are equivalent to my pleasures perceived by the 'Internal Senses*."
(Quoted in  C.D.Thorpe. op i c i t . , P.2'33).
Itutchoscu's use o f  the phrase "Internal Senses" i s  strik ing and 
in trigu ing, and may perhaps, ha equated with Addison's "secondary
( l )  Sec C.D.Thorpe. c p .c i t . ,  p r. gl|>-6. However, as Thorpe says, i t  was 
Hutcheson, aided by h is friend and colleague J.Arbuckle, rather than 
liken side, among prominent eighteenth-century w riters, who f i r s t  gave 
currency to Addison's phrase "Pleasures o f  the Imagination" as properly 
descrip tive o f  aesthetic response, and read into i t  a meaning which 
was compatible with Addison's own."
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’» im agination", and in h is  "Essay" Hutcheson w rites o f  'The Pleasures
o f  the Imagination, or o f  the Internal Sense o f  Beauty, and Harmony."
C.D.Thorpe says that Hutcheson got h is notion o f  "internal seine" 
ir o n  Descartes, end that Shaftesbury, Hobbes, and Locke had a ll "noted 
the existence o f  an 'in ternal sen se '. For my part, the idea o f  "internal 
sense" immediately r e c a lls  the Arab psychologists Avicenna and Aver roe a, 
whose concept o f  in tcn t io . with i t s  d istin ction  between the formal and 
the physical aspects o f  the image, the in tontio  being what Avicenna cn lle  
"a  thing which the soul perceives from the sensed ob ject vithout i t s  
prev iously  having been perceived by i t s  external sense". Certainly 
Hutcheson's notion re fe rs  to  the formative powers o f  the mind, end 
i t  i s  quite possib le  that he was influenced by a d istin ction  o f  
Maiebranche's, (idiom ho quotes and o f  whom he was an admirer), between 
the active and passive parts o f  imagination -  a d istin ction  which i s  
strongly  A ristote lian  ;
"• . . .th e  fa cu lty  o f  Imagining, o r  the Imagination, consists only in 
tho power -that the Soul has o f  forming to i t s  s e l f  Images o f  ob jects , 
l a  producing a change in  the Fibres o f  th is  part o f  the Brain, which 
nay he ca lled  the principal part, since i t  answers to a l l  the parts o f  
our bodies, and in the place where our Soul immediately resides, i f  
we may be permitted to  say so .
That shows ns evidently , that th is power which the Soul hath o f 
forming Images includes two things, the one depending upon the Soul 
i t  s e l f ,  and the other upon the Body. The f i r s t  is  Action, and the 
ConruaiA o f  the W ill. The second i s  the Obedience that i s  given to i t  
by  the Animal S p ir its , which trace  these Images, and the Fibres o f  the 
Brain, upon which they must be imprinted. In th is  discourse the name 
o f  Imagination i s  in d iffe re n tly  given to c ith er  o f  these two things, 
nor are they distinguished by the words Activ e  raid Passive •which 
might be given to them; because, by the sense o f  what we shell speak,
may easily  be understood -which o f  the two we mean, whether i t  be- the 
active Imarrinntior- o f  the Soul, or the passive Imagin a tion o f the Body." 
(O p .c it .. Vol .1 , 13c« 2 ,  p t .I ,  pp, 119-20).
Early in S ection I I  o f  th is  chapter I mentioned the essen tia lly  passive 
nature o f  Addison's 'primary imagination' and the active nature o f  hie 
•secondary im agination '. Although the evidence i s  rather circumstantial 
i t  seems h ighly l ik e ly  that Addison borrowed th is  part o f  his d istinction  
from Malebronche (as might Hutcheson h is "internal, senses" though not 
from th is  p recise  lo ca t io n ). I  have also referred  to the Hermetic and 
P latonic idea o f  man as creating-in  h is sphere ns an im itator, and 
f in a lly  as a r iv a l, o f  God in His; in  respect to these ideas o f  human 
creativeness and the 18th century concept o f  genius, th is  active , 
secondary imagination i s  o f  v ita l importance*
But with Hutcheson and Addison the centre o f  in terest i s  very much 
the pleasure o f  appreciation and the quality  o f  what came to be called  
"ta ste ", and in  the function o f  imagination in th is  pleasure. In 
A lison 's  "Essays on The Nature and P rincip les o f  Tasto" (1740) one 
finds something o f  a compendium o f  contemporary opinion -  largely  
based on Addison — on taste , i t s  re lation  to good breeding, and the 
dependency o f  the fee lin g  o f  the sublime on imagination. Ho defines 
taste as " . .  that Faculty o f  the human Mind, by which we perceive and 
eujoy whatever i s  BEAUTIFUL or  SOIL IMIS in the works o f  Nature or A rt."
( O p .c it .. p .V I l ) . These perceptions and pleasurable emotions depend 
upon imagination i
"The emotions o f  sublim ity and beauty are uniformly usexibod, both in 
popular and in  philosophical language, to  the imagination. The fine 
tu -ia  uro considered ns ine errs whic-n are addressed to the imagination, 
and the pleasures they a fford , are described, by way o f  d istin ction , as 
the Pleasures o f  Imagination. The nature o f  any person 's taste , i s ,
in ccnR>on l i f e ,  generally determined from the nature or character o f
M s •»wtij ination , and the exx»rossion o f  any d e fic ien cy  in th is  power 
o f  mind, i s  considered, as synonymous with the expression o f  a sim ilar 
deficiency  in point o f  ta s te ."  ( O p .c it .. Essay X. s e c . l ) .
Repenting the prejudice o f  M s time he goes on to  say that " I t  is  only 
in the higher stations . . .  or  in  the l it e r a l  p rofessions o f  l i f e ,  that 
we expect to find  men cith er o f  a delicate or comprehensive taste " 
f d u l l ,  p . 6 2 ) having previously remarked, with unconscious irony,
■that " I t  is  upon the vacant and unemployed . . .  th a t -the ob jects  o f 
taste malre the strongest im pression." (Essay I . s ec . I I ) . We must 
note in passing the status o f  the "fin e  arts", which includes painting 
(Ali soil c ite s  Lorrain as well as Handel and M ilton) as a lib e ra l 
profession , hut now, despite Leonardo's early d is t in ctio n s , they 
are addressed to the imagination, ( l )  But in ev itab ly , with Alison 
os with M s forerunners, the imagination i s  not fre e  but i s  constrained 
though A lison 's  reins o f  're g u la r ity ' and "consistency ' are perhaps a 
l i t t l e  le s s  tigh t than o th e rs ': " . .whenever the Eaoticns o f  Beauty 
or  Sublimity are f e l t ,  that exercise o f  Imagination i s  produced which 
consists in the prosecution o f  a train  o f  thought." ( Ch.II. p .112).
And : the d istin ction  between such tra ins, and our ordinary trains
o f  thought . . .  con sists . 1st. In the ideas which compose them being 
in a ll  cases Ideas o f  Bnotion; and, 2ndlv. In th e ir  possessing an 
uniform p rin cip le  o f  connection through the whole o f  the tra in . The 
e f fe c t ,  therefore, which i s  produced upon the mind, by ob jects  o f 
Taste, may be considered as consisting in the production o f  a regular 
o r  consistent train  o f  Ideas or Haotion." (Loc. c i t . ) . A lison 's  
Hobbesian "trains o f  thought" are neither uncontrolled f l ig h ts  o f 
fancy nor lo g ica l progressions and ore linked w ith  emotions, lik e  (l)
( l )  See also Reynolds' "I>iscour3os on Art", Oiercurso Thirteen,
where the 'modern' notion o f  imagination, i t s  su p eriority  to im itation , 
has replaced Leonardo’ s in the o f f i c ia l  academic thinking.
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Addison's pleasures o f  imagination; ¡but there i s  some lack  o f  c la r ity  
as to whether the emotions produce the train  o f  ideas or occur 
concurrently with them. At a ll events, i t  i s  c learly  established 
that the perception and enjoyment o f  the beautifu l and the sublime 
in nature and art depend on imagination»
In Akenside's enormous poem on "The Pleasures o f  Imagination" , 
corny 1 eted in 1743, there i s  some attention paid to the function o f 
imagination in  the creation  o f  art as opposed to  the appreciation.
The poem is  rather bombastic and se lf-con sc iou s ly  erudite, and Akensidc 
quotes (in  h is  notes to the work) Shaftesbury, Longinus, Leibniz,
Huyghens and Hutcheson; except fo r  a greater than usual attention 
to the Stoic warnings against the e ffe c ts  o f  imagination on our da ily  
l iv e s , i t  i s  more o r  le ss  a repetition  o f  Addison. But about 30 years 
a fter  the publication  Akenside wrote a new General Argument to h is  
revised poem, relinquishing h is  S toic warnings, follow ing Addison 
even more c lose ly , and according with the views o f  Gerard'o "Essay on 
Genius" which was published in the same year (1774) :
"Hitherto the pleasures o f  the imagination belong to the human species 
in general. But there are certain particu lar men whose imagination is  
endowed with powers, and susceptible o f  pleasures, which the generality  
o f  mankind never p a rtic ip a te . These are the men o f  genius, destined by 
nature to  excel in  one or other o f  the a r ts ."  ( 'T oe tica l Works", p ,7 7 ) .
Old Akenside no doubt included him self in the small but i llu s tr io u s  
company hole described, but p oster ity  woul d probably judge h is  poem 
le s s  indulgently than he did, (though i t  was a highly influential, 
work in  i t s  tim e); but that i s  a matter o f  ta ste .
The e ffe c ts  o f  Addison's essays o f  tho pleasures o f  imagination 
were f e l t  strongly in  Germany as well an in England, as I shall indicate 
in. Part 6. Although I have dealt e.o far- with the place o i imagination 
in  tho concept o f  taste , the more a ctive , oreative function o f imagination 
in  the concept o f  genius is  a l B O  being developed as Akenside's remarks
show. Nowhere i s  th is function o f  imagination more fu l ly  discussed 
thon in Gerard's essay on genius, a work which owes much to i t s  author 
personal knowledge o f  Hume and h is ideas. Despite the increasing 
importance o f  imagination in aesthetics and in the theory o f  mind 
the o ld  S toic doctrine o f  restra in t and discernment retains i t s  hold 
on the freedom o f  imagination which, though no longer the handmaiden 
o f  reason s t i l l  remains a ju n ior partner. This state o f  a ffa ir s  
p ers is ts  despite the epistem ological and psychological importance o f 
imagination in  Hume's "T reatise", and the duality o f  'a c t iv e ' and 
'p a ss iv e ' (Halehranche) corresponding to Addison's 'secondary* and 
'prim ary' imagination recurs in  Kant's 'produ ctive ' and 'reproductive* 
imagination where, despite some d iscon tin u ities  in the argument, 
imagination remains subject to understanding and reason.
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Introcaction .
With the examination o f  the b e lie fs  about imagination o f Addison 
and hie follow ers we are moving towards the central tenets o f  Roman­
ticism  as found in Kant and transferred by Coleridge and Wordsworth 
in to the mainstream o f English aesthetic theory. Both Eumo and 
Kant continued the traditions which their philosophical forerunners 
bequethed to them, in the case o f Hume i t  was Locke and Berkeley, 
and fo r  Kant i t  was lfume but mainly the rational trad ition  o f  L eibniz. 
In both cases imagination has a central position  in  epistemology and 
psychology and in Kant in aesthetics too . With Herder, Kant i s  
probably one o f  the two most important figures in early Romanticism, 
which i s  certa in ly  a German m anifestation imported into England by 
Coleridge. I t  i s  arguable that Romanticism constitutes a permanent 
human attitude, but h is to r ica lly  i t  owes i t s  r ise  to the peculiar 
situation  in Germany during the 18th century, which country was a 
co lle c t io n  o f  states without such cultural and oociat homogeneity 
as existed, fo r  example, in France. Germany was dominated by re lig ion  
and the B ible, contemptuous o f  learning, and given to in trospection , 
Pietism and r itu a l; although re lig iou s  b e l ie f  was to  ba eroded by 
s c ie n t i f ic  discovery the habits o f  nqrcticism and occultism  retained 
th e ir  grip  and became a permanent feature o f  Romanticism. Whereas 
in Britain there was an im p lic it  b e l ie f  in the psychological foun­
dations o f  human knowledge, the growth o f  German philosophic l it e r a ­
ture is  la rge ly  guided by Leibniz ( l )  and though association!sm  was 
not s ig n ifica n tly  challenged before Kant's "Critique o f Pure Reason" 
a reaction against i t  had se t in follow ing the publication  o f  L e ib n iz 's  
"New Essays" in 1765. As Cassirer says, " ..th e  doctrines o f  Locke
and Berkeley, o f  Hume and Condillac, never gained unchallenged rec­
ognition in Germany." ("Philosophy o f  the Euglightenment", p. IP-0); (l)
( l )  Soe C essirer 's  "Philosophy o f  the Enlightenment", p.80.
but Hume i t  was who awoke Kant from his philosophic slumbers. Doth 
Leibniz end Kant shared an admiration fo r  Shaftesbury, whose 
"C haracter!sties", available in parts in German from 1730, was 
fu lly  translated during the years 1776-1779«( l )  Before the r ise  o f  
Romanticism aesthetic theory in Germany had what Cassirer ca lls  an 
"intimate dalliance" with lo g ic , and certa in ly  Baumsarten (though 
not very in flu en tia l) based h is  theories on W olffian ra tion a lise .
This trad ition  i s  s t i l l  c learly  evident in  Kant, but h is  "Critique 
o f Judgment" betrays a debt to Neoplatonism.
In the f i r s t  chapter 1 shall deal large ly  with Hume's theory o f  
imagination, with some opening remarks on Berkeley and a final 
section on Gerard's "Essay on Genius". The imagination occupies 
a central position  in  Hume's "Treatise" and consequently in Gerard's 
concept o f  genius, and i t  i s  somewhat in response to the former that 
Kant's f i r s t  cr itiqu e  was w ritten , and I shall be considering Kent's 
theory o f  imagination j.n Chapter 2. In the third and fin a l chapter 
I w ill discuss the theory o f  imagination in  Coleridge and Wordsworth. (l)
( l )  See T.Fowler. "Shaftesbury and Hutcheson", Ch.V. n .lS l . Fowler 
says m at onaitesoury’ a "unaracterxsties" had a great influence on 
Herder.
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Chapter I -  BKRKHEY. HliHB AND GERMtO.
SECTION I .
Thin casual description  o f  Locke, Berkeley and Iluine as empir­
i c i s t s ,  which is  sometimes made, stands up poorly to scrutiny.
Berkeley's views may indeed he, as 6 . Waruock says, "pn resitic  
on the doctrine o f  Locke” , but h is influence on Hume, except for 
the attack on abstract ideas, seems minimal. Indeed Berkeley's 
influence on Kant, despite the la t t e r 's  protestations, i s  fa r  greater, 
and though Berkeley says l i t t l e  about imagination and lens about 
aesthetics h is  "peculiar union o f  Platonism and sensationalism"
( i ,  Berlin. "The Age o f  ILlightenment", p.22) a ffe c ts  Home and Kant 
resp ective ly . His "P rincip les o f  Human Knowledge" was published 
shortly  before Addison's essays on imagination, and given that 
Berkeley returned from Ireland in 1713, entering the lite ra ry  c ir c le  
o f  which Addison was part, i t  i s  interesting  to speculate how far his 
attack on the Lockian dualism o f  "primary" and "secondary" qu a lities  
might have a ffected  Addison’ s view o f  im agination .(j) Berkeley was 
strongly antipathetic to  what he ca lls  "the whole corpuscular philosophy" 
which in fo  lined Locke's theory o f  perception, arguing that, in B erlin 's  
words, ' ' . . i f  we do not allow  ourselves to be befuddled by s c ie n t i f ic  
terminology which suggests the existence o f  imperceptible matter, 
while at the same time basing e l l  our knowledge on the evidence o f  
what can be perceived and i t  alone, we shall arrive at en orthodox 
Christian position  that the universe i s  sp ir itu a l in  character." (Op. 
c i t . . p .2 2 ).
His attack on Locke's notion o f  abstract ideas i s  sharp t "Whether 
others have th is  wonderful faculty o f  abstracting ideas, they best can
( l )  For studies on Berkeley's theory o f  imagination see K. Woodhouac. 
"Berkeley, The Sun that I see by Bay, end that which I imagine by 
N ightV  aud R. A t t f ie ld 'a reply, "Berkeley and Imagination." See 
a lso  B.tf i l l  jams' "Imagination and The S e l f .”
t e l l For m yself, I  find  indeed I have a fa cu lty  o f  imagining, or
o f  representing to inyself, the idea o f those parti c»xlar things I 
have perceived, end variously  o f compounding and dividing then." 
("P rin cip les", S ec.10. P .49).
The ocapogoat Schoolmen are bl tuned fo r  the "fa lse  p r in cip le " o f  
"abstraction", and the tendency to abstract i c  owed to language 
( se cs .11 & 18). there being fo r  Berkeley on ly  three sourced o f  ideas i 
" I t  i s  evident to anyone who takes c, survey o f  the ob jects  o f  human 
knowledge, that they are either ideas a ctu a lly  imprinted on the 
senses; or else such as are perceived by attending to the passions 
and operations o f  the mind; or la s t ly , ideas formed by help o f  memory 
ana imagination — eith er compounding, d iv id in g , or barely representing 
those o r ig in a lly  perceived in  the a foresaid  ways." (O p .c it . ,  Ft. 1 
S c c . l ) . In h is  la te r  "Three Dialogues between xiylas and Ehilonoua" 
assorts that he does not mean "imprinting" in  the "gross l it e r a l  
eense” o f  the seal impression on wax t "My meaning is  only that the 
mind comprehends or perceives them; and th at i t  is  a ffected  from 
without, or by some being d is t in ct  from i t s e l f . "  (p .24 5 ). The ob jects  
o f  sense are, he says, unknowable; ( end sensation cannot e x is t  without 
a perceiving mind): "th eir  ease is  p e rc ip i"  as he soys in a famous 
phrase, and ideas — "immediate ob jects o f  the understanding" -  are 
passive and in ert : "A l i t t l e  attention w i l l  discover to  us that the 
very being o f  an idea implies passiveness and inertness in i t ,  that 
i t  i s  impossible fo r  an idea to do anything, or, s t r i c t ly  speaking, 
to  be the cause o f  any th in g ." ("P r in c ip le s " , s e c .25. P .7 7 ). He asserts 
that there is  no action  d is tin ct from v o lit io n  and that an active being
i n  n  iinliHl. « .W  h  in no»» tinwo no lil.» of on »VWmhH aii
— b  \ u  # -  --------------  r  •
such as u n it, any unifying o f  ideas must be doue by the percip ient — an 
observation which Hume regarded highly. These passive and active 
functions were regarded by Malebranche as aspects o f  the passive and
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active imagination, fo r  Berkeley the evident connection o f  our ideas 
o f  sense t e s t i f i e s  to the wisdom and abundance o f God in  whose mind 
the 'world o f  o b je cts ’ (so to  speak) has i t s  existence; but we can 
have no knowledge o f God nor o f  these ob jects  which are l ik e  the Kantian 
th in g -in - it s a lf  . Berkeley thus acknowledges "a tw ofold state o f  things", 
ca lling  these the "ectypal" and the "archetypal", the former "created 
in time" and the la t te r  "existed  from everlasting in the mind o f  God," 
("D ialogues", p,2fr9) » This d istin ction  i s  very P latonic with i t s  
unknowable archetypes which are lik e  the Forms (and ulso resemble 
Kant's "Ideas o f  Reason"), the ectypal, natural world end, presumably, 
our images o f  the ectypes — the 'cop ies  o f  c o p ie s '. But Berkeley 
clearly  asserts  that our ideas whether we describe then as 'o f  o b je c ts ' 
or  'images' a l l  ex is t in the p erc ip ien tjh is  ectypes do not admit o f  
such a d is tin ction  as I have presumed.
B erkeley 's conception o f  the s e l f  i s  something o f  an abstraction, 
and is  much more lik e  Kant's "transcendental unity o f  apperception" 
than Hume's conception; he asserts that there is  a " . . .  perceiving, 
active being (which) is  what I ca ll HIND, SPIRIT, SOUL, or Hi'SELF."  
("P r in cip le s " , sec 2. p .65) .  and la te r  he adds : "A s p ir it  is  one 
simple, undivided, active being — as i t  perceives ideas i t  i s  ca lled  
the Understanding, and as i t  produces o r  otherwise operates about them 
i t  is  ca lle d  the W ill. "  There is  then that which perceives, the s e lf  
or  s p ir it , in  which perception i t  i s  presumably passive; th is  s e l f  or 
sp ir it  a lso  produces, which must then re fe r  to -the ideas "formed by 
help o f  memory end imagination" which he has said arc compounded and 
divided. Both understanding and w ill seem to depend respectively  on 
the imprints o f  the (passive) imagination and the compounds o f  (active ) 
imagination; d iv ision , elsewhere ca lled  discernment, being perhaps a 
function o f  judgment. I f  we omit the (apparently redundant) 
abstractions such an "God" and the " s e l f " ,  the dependency o f  human 
ideas and therefore knowledge on imagination in i t s  two function is
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almost complete, and th is  i s  v ir tu a lly  Home's position  in the "T reatise". 
Berkeley him self asserts that be ha3 a "notion" o f  s p ir it  hut "not, 
s t r ic t ly  speaking, an idea o f  i t . "  ("D ialogues". p .225 ). This 
d istin ction  i s  between knowing what the word means and how to  use i t ,  
and having a substantive idea o f  s p ir i t ;  we can only know other sp ir its  
(mind) by analogy with our own (see "P rin cip les", sec, 140. p .13 6 ). 
which opinion was also K ant's. Berkeley adopts a sim ilar view with 
respect to the concept "man", saying that when we 's e e ' a man we 
perceive only "certain  sensations or ideas excited  in our own minds" 
so that " . .  i t  i s  plain we do not see a man — i f  by a man is  meant that 
which l iv e s , moves perceives and thinks as we no ~ hut only such a 
certain  co lle c t io n  o f ideas as d irects  us to think there is  a d is tin ct 
p r in cip le  o f  thought and motion, l ik e  to onraelves, aceompenying en d  
represented by i t .  And a fte r  the came manner we see God . . . "  (0j>. 
c i t . , sec. 148, P.140).
I  think that there can he l i t t l e  doubt o f  the influence o f  
Berkeley's theologica l b e l ie fs  upon h is philosophical speculations, 
fo r  without them he might very well have stated as much as Hume was 
to  do. The empirical view, commonly imputed to  i.ocke, o f  perception 
and knowledge as the product o f  o b je c ts ' impressing or  imprinting 
the senses, depended on an ob jective  world thus available to the senses. 
The basic counters o f  human knowledge are impressions o f  sense, images 
o f  an assumed ob jective  world which was only assumed (as Berkeley 
rea lised ) seeing that a l l  we conld re a lly  experience were these 
impressions o r  'im ages'. And since these e x is t  in our minds then any 
connection between them mast also be a product o f  mind. This i s ,  simply 
put, the basiB or Hume: a epistem ological accpi.ici.au, which haul e»»«jeu  
to  answer in traditional terms, making asBomptions about the unknowable 
much as Berkeley had.
SSgflON I I
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Although quite d ifferen t in. philosophical stance and s ty le , iluiae 
and Kant in some respects share sim ilar views. Both agree, fo r  example, 
that the imagination ploys a crucial role in  perception; and though 
th e ir  explanations o f  why imagination so acts are quite d iffe re n t, 
they also agree that how imagination performs th is role i s  a great 
mystery. On the whole -  and i t  i s  impossible to he more precise -  
Hume's claims fo r  the function o f  imagination in art, e sp ec ia lly  in 
genius, are less  exaggerated than K ent's, the la tte r  having a funda­
mental b e l ie f  in "Ideas''’ , the content o f  pare reason which are lik e  
the Platonic eidos, and whose existence the aesthetic, imagination i3  
able to intimate d ire ctly .
Ilume’ a ))M losophical b e lie fs  have been much expanded and analysed, 
including h is theory o f imagination and i t s  function in perception and 
cognition ( l ) ,  and his "im agist" notion that " . .  our ideas are images 
o f  our impressions, so i/e con. form secondary ideas which are images 
o f  the primary" ("T reatise", Blc.l' S e c .I . )  has been most notably 
mauled by Ryle. ( 2 ) .  "Imagination1' is  a central concept in  Hume's 
"T reatise", K.H. Price says i t  i s  ,;tho keyword o f  Hume's whole theory 
o f  knowledge "("Hume's Theory o f  The External World", pp.15-1 6)« though 
i t  has markedly le ss  prominence in  the la te r  "Enquiry"; th is  may well 
be fo r  "reasons o f  economy" as Furlong suggests ( 3 ) hut I  am more o f  
the opinion that th is change r e f le c ts  nume's uncase at the acknowledged 
mysteries o f  imagination: th is "magical facu lty" aG he c a l ls  i t ,  which
( l )  See esp ecia lly  J.Wilbanks' "Hur-.e's Theory o f  Inagination"; Wilbanks 
gives c r it ic a l  comment on -¿he main Hume scholars, including E.J.Furlong. 
N.K.Smith and P.F.Strawson. See also H.Wamock's "Imagination" eep. Pta. 
1 & I I .
( '¿ )  See his "Concept o f  Mind", Ch»8, also S.Hampshire'a review o f  th is 
work.
( 3 ) In h is  a r t ic le  "Imagination in  Hume’ s Treaties and Enquiry Concerning 
The Human Understanding. "
ie  "always most perfect, in the great geniuses" ("T reaties, Etc. I ,  Sec.VI . ) .  
Thi3 imagination, with i t s  "uni.united powers" o f  forming relations 
and dividing ideas o f  v is ion  or f ic t io n , has now come to fu l l  
prominence ep istem ologica lly  as i t  would aesth etica lly  :
"Reason not only loses  i t s  position  o f  dominance} even in i t s  own 
f i e ld ,  in. the domain o f  knowledge, i t  has to otirrender i t s  leadership 
to  the imagination. Thus reason and the imagination hove now changed 
sides in the controversy surrounding the foundation o f  aesth etics .
Whereas formerly imagination had to  fig h t fo r  recognition and equal 
r igh ts , i t  i s  now treated as the fundamental power o f  the soul., es 
the leader and ru ler to  whom a l l  the other fa cu ltie s  must submit."
(E.Cassirer , "The Philosophy o f  the Ihlightennent", EjJvOq).
This universal uneasiness about imagination also a ffected  Kant, 1 
h e liev e , provoking the s ig n ifica n t changes which he made in the 
Transcendeutal Deductions o f the f i r s t  end second editions c f  his 
"Critique o f  Pure Beeson". I t  i s  important to note also that, th is 
"reason" which imagination usurps i s  by no means o. consistent concept, 
ond that the metaphysical tradition  which Kant belongs to has a 
rather more id e a lis t ic  concept o f  reason than the more empirical 
trad ition  to  which Hume belongs; much more could he said about 'this 
d istin ction , but i t  i s  important with respect to C assirer's obser­
vations to under-stand that Hume undermines both these concepts.
According to  Hume .ideas are associated in imagination on 
three general p r in c ip le s , which are "resemblance, contigu ity , end 
causation", ("T reatise , Ek. I .  S e c . i l ) : these are the basis fo r  b e l ie f  : 
"Season can never s a t is fy  us that the existence o f  one ob je c t  does 
imply that o f  another; so that when we pass from the impression o f  
one to tho idea or b e l ie f  o f  another, we are not determined by reason, 
but by custom or a p r in cip le  o f  a ssoc ia tion ." (O p .c it .. Bk.I. S ec .V II.) .  
Oar f ic t io n s  and b e l ie fs  d i f fe r  only in the manner o f  th e ir  conception,
that ii , ' "An idea assented to fe e ls  d ifferen t from a f ic t it io u s  idea, 
that the fancy alone presents to n s ."  (L o c . c i t . ) . This rather vague 
hut extremely important 'fee lin g *  ho ca lls  "superior force- or v iv a c ity , 
or  s o l id ity , or firmness, or steadiness. " . and i t  distingmishos ideas 
o f  judgment (understanding) from the f ic t io n s  o f  imagination -  though 
i t  can happen that "in  a few instances" impressions (fee lin g s ) and 
ideas (thoughts) have a resemblance. ( See Bit.I . S e c . i ) . This l iv e lin e s s  
and strength o f  b e l ie fs  is  contrasted with the faintness and languour 
o f  the "perfect ideas" o f  imagination — perhaps because these are un­
associated . But imagination has, as Hume admits, a fa c i l i t y  fo r  
connecting and separating ideas as i t  p leases, though the "associating 
qu a lity" is  "a gentle force which co>iiuonly p rev a ils " end the simple 
ideas (o f  sensation) " fa l l  regularly  into complex ones". This very 
shaky foundation fo r  human b e l ie f  Ì3 farther weakened by Hume's In ter 
affirm ation o f  the "c lose  union" o f  "imagination and a ffe ction s" (op. 
c i t . ,  Ck.II, F t . I l l ,  Sec. VI. )  so that " l iv e ly  passions commonly 
attend a l iv e ly  imagination", and his adding, in the same breath as 
i t  were, that "a mere f ic t io n  o f  the imagination" has l i t t l e  influence 
on our passions.
\
Wilbanks, in h is  study o f  Hume's theory o f  imagination, says that 
Hume had "a general conception o f  imagination" (p .3 ) saying that in  Hume's 
view imagination " i s  the facu lty  o f  forming, uniting and separating 
ideas" (p ,7 2 ): these two b r ie f quotes say as much as Wilbanks' entire 
book. In fa c t  Hume's theory o f  imagination i s  vague and se lf-con tra ­
d ictory  and the epistem ological tasks wished by him upon imagination 
are very much a part o f  an a ssoc ia tion is t  psychology which is  based 
upon the paradiem o f  mechanical physics and the old  «enee/im eginetinn/ 
understanding tr ia d  o f  facu lty  psychology. The prominence o f  imagination 
in understanding in  the "Treatise" has a degree o f  shock valve since
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imagination seems to  have supplanted "reason” , but as the "Enquiry" 
reveals, Home was certa in ly  not an out-aud-oufc em piricist and scep tic .
In th is la te r  work he constantly re iterates the dependency o f 
knowledge on "custom", but there is  also on intim ation o f  the 
Berkeleyan "God" or the Kantian "Ideas o f  Reason" in h is defin ition  
o f  "custom" as " » ,  a kind o f  pre-established harmony between the 
course o f  nature and the succession o f  our ideas" (Sec.V. p t . I l ) , 
and elso in h is  assertion that "by a natural in stin ct  or prepossession" 
we are led  to "repose fa ith  in . . .  senses" and always to suppose 
■without reason "an external universe" (soc .X ll ,  pt . I l ) . Because 
o f  th is rather metaphysical f a c i l i t y ,  the l ik e  o f  which he has been 
a t pains to disprove, Hume is  able to  make a contrast between "correct 
.judgment", confining i t s e l f  to "common l i f e ,  and to such ob jects as 
f a l l  tinder d a ily  p ractice  and experience", and the "imagination o f 
man" which is  "sublime" and delights in things remote or extraordinary 
such as are the truck o f  "poets, orators, p r ie s ts  and p o lit ic ia n s ."
(Sec.X II. p t . I I l ) .
The im p lic it  d iv is ion  in the "Oiquiry" between a 'schem atic' and 
an 'a e s th e t ic ' imagination, to use Kantian terms, does in fa c t  an ticipate 
Kant to some extent but i t  also has i t s  repercussions on Gerard's 
theory o f  genius, so much admired by Kant. But an important aesthetic 
function fo r  imagination was already well established whereas the 
epistem ological function, h itherto obscured or minimised, was never 
so  baldly affirm ed as in Hume's "T rea tise". In a footnote to h is 
"Critique o f  Pure Reason" (A 120) Kant remarks that "Psychologists 
have h itherto fa ile d  to rea liso  that imagination is  a necessary
o f  percept.!on i t s e l f " ,  hut th is ia  no more true o f  lirnne 
than o f  A r is to t le . In Hume the "continu 'd  and d istin ct existence 
o f  body" ("T rea tise ", ?3c.l. Pt.TV. S e c .i l )  — what modem psychologist«
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ca ll the 'constancy o f  perception ' -  ie  en tire ly  dependent on imagin­
a tion . In Strawson's phrase, our past perceptions are a liv e I d  the 
present ones, whereas fo r  Kant i t  is  the concept which ie a live  in 
the present perception î T h is  is  whet i s  now expressed in speaking 
e t  the intentiona l i tv  o f  perception, as o f  im aging.", as Strawson 
describes i t . ( l )  Prom th e ir  d iffe ren t viewpoints both Hume and Kant 
regard the imagination ns the "ch ie f agent" (Strawson) o f  applying 
concepts to cases; fo r  him th is  re la tion  or application  is  habituai 
or customary, fo r  Kant i t  i s  transcendental. but, as I remarked 
at the beginning o f  th is section , there are s im ila rities  between the 
theories o f  Kant and 3Iume in  respect to  the imagination. Respite 
hi3 scep tica l position  in the T r e a t is e "  on the organisational powers 
o f  reason Hume retracted , by omission, the epistem ological importance 
o f  imagination, as the la te r  "Enquiry" shows. The leek o f  what 
Leibniz ca lled  a 'metaphysical c e r ta in ty ',  fo r  distinguishing between 
ideas and f ic t io n s , seems to have disturbed him almost as i t  did Kant, 
and we see him fa llin g  back on the o ld  (Neoplatonic) princip le  o f  pre- 
established harmony, a prin cip le  which i s  also im p lic it  in Kant's 
(P laton ic) Ideas o f  Xteason.
( l '  O p .c it . . y .5 2 . See also pp.fr9ff. fo r  Strawson's discussion o f  
W ittgenstein 's treatment o f  th is view o f  "imagination".
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SECTIO ! I I I .
Before moving to a consideration o f  Kant’ s epistem ological and. 
aesthetic imagination I vould l ik e  "briefly to mention some o f  the 
aesthetic notions which were entertuinea in the year3 between the 
publication  o f  Hume's "Enquiry" and Kant's f i r s t  Critique, p articu larly  
o f  Gerard. Me might describe Gerard as a wavering Humean a ssoc ia tion !s t , 
but as we have seen there was also in Digland c strong Neoplatonic 
tra d it ion . In the 1750's Edward Young had spoken o f  genius as 
"God w ith in ", as partaking o f  "something divine" — ju st as William 
Blake was la te r  to speak on imagination as "Divine V ision", and even 
sober psychologists rea lised  that the mechanics o f  as& ociaticnisu 
were perhaps not adequate to  the task o f  explaining creative a b i l i t ie s  : 
"The association  o f  ideas can never account fo r  the origin  o f  a new 
notion" as Dugald Stewart wrote in h is "E lem ents..." ( Ch.VII, p .1 9 6 ): 
and though he published th is  work in 1792 -  two years a fter  Kant's 
"Critique o f  Judgment" -  Stewart's b e l ie f  in the imagination as f. 
modifying and combining power with ‘the a b il ity  to  form new wholes 
(o p .c i t . .  p.72) indicates that the "transcendentalism" popularised by 
Coleridge was not a novelty  in substance i f  i t  was in name.
Hume's influence on Gerard is  c le a r ly  apparent, but the la t t e r 's  
theory o f  imagination is  not en tire ly  a sso c ia tio n is t . Gerard's "Essay" 
was published in Germany in 1776 ondwas v e il-re ce iv e d , and Kant was 
among the admirers o f  th is  work, which B. Fabian c a lls  " . .  the best 
considered and most ca re fu lly  wrought contribution  to  the lite ra tu re  
on a su b ject which engaged the attention o f  p ra ctica lly  the whole 
period from 1750-1800." ( Introduction to Gerard's "Essay", p .X I .) ( l )  
Fabian odds :
"Gerard was, as Kant immediately recognised, among the f i r s t  la te
( l )  Fabian refers to Kant's "Menschenkunde Oder philosophische 
Anthropologie" fo r  remarks by Kant on Gerard, (see Fubi3n's In tro . .  
p.XXXVITI) ; but I have been unable to  la y  my hands on this book.
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eighteenth-century proponents o f  the new concept o f the imagination 
as 'productive* Einbildungskraft." But Gerard is  by no means as 
brash as Blaise in h is  description  o f  imagination, speaking o f  
imagination as genius in i t s  associating  power ( ' ’Essay", p i . I .  Sec.
1X1. p .41 ) , and " . .  the force o f  imagination, or the vigour o f  the 
associating p r in cip les , produces gen ius." (p .60 ) . The "simple 
prin cip les o f  association" are, says Gerard, " r esemblance, con trariety, 
and v iv a c ity " . (p t .I I ,  Sec-I . p .109). and though he w ill allow  that 
a high degree o f  genius must be accompanied by enthusiasm (p. 66) -  end, 
lik e  Young, use3 on organic (vegetab le !) analogy fo r  genius ( l )  — he asserts 
that iiaagination caiuiot be unbridled and must be subject to the law3 
o f  understanding. He sayH that "Even the brightest imagination can 
suggest no idea which is  net o r ig in a lly  derived from sense and 
memory" (p t .I .  Sec.V. r».98). m  assertion  which Hume i 
would not agree v ith ; hut Gerard does emphasise invention rather 
than o r ig in a lity  as the main part o f  genius. This emphasis concurs 
with h is d istin ction  between two kinds o f  genius, a d is tin ction  which 
anticipates Kant in some respects} Gerard says there is  s c ie n t i f ic  
genius, requiring what he ca lls  "penetrative" imagination, and which 
seeks information and understanding; there is  also the a r t is t i c  genius, 
dependendent upon a "bright" imagination, which seeks taste and 
pleasure, (See p t . I I I .  S e c .I l l ,  p c . '524-q) . The traditional b ifurcation  
o f  imagination into a higher and a lower part is  now brought to 
inform the concept o f  genius, making the higher the s c ie n t i f ic  and 
the lower the a r t is t ic ,  a d istin ction  and an embryonic formulation 
which i s  also recognisable in Kant'G 'schematic* and 'a e s th e t ic '
- J . ,  . J J ----«.
j u i t u ^ x n u  v a v u o  •  (l)
( l )  I t  i s  possib le  that Gorard was influenced by Linnaeus. (See 
Fabian, p.XXVl).
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Chari ter 2 ; KANT.
SECTION X.
Kant's theory o f  imagination has had a d irect in fluence on English 
aesthetic theory, on aesthetic education, end on art educational 
theory. Herbert Head's theory o f  imagination he got from Coleridge 
and Wordsworth and they in th e ir  turn -  esp ecia lly  Coleridge — 
are la rge ly  Kantians. But th is influence is  by no means clear and 
uucomplicr.tion : Coleridge borrowed much fr o m  Schelling, whose 
in te lle ctu a l attachments vere no more stable than his own, and Kant’ s 
theory o f  imagination in the "Critique o f  Pure Reason" and the 
"Critique o f  Judgment" owe a much to  h is philosophical ancestors 
as fa r  back as Plato and A r is t o t le . ( l )  Kant sees imagination a3 a 
v ita l part o f  perception and cogn ition , operating as a bridge or 
synthesis between sense and understanding, (much in the A ristote lian  
mould) as well as an occasional d ire ct  lin k  to the Ideas o f  Reason, 
as he c a lls  them, these la t te r  being deliberately  P laton ic in con­
ception . Broadly speaking the Kantian imagination functions in 
what, in  the discussion o f  P lato, I  have called  the d ia le c t ic  and 
manic routes to the eidos: in the f i r s t  and second ed ition s o f  the 
"Critique o f  Pure Reason" i t  i s  -the former 'rou te ' which i s  expounded, 
in the "Critique o f  Judgment" the la t te r , a lb e it  couched in  Kant's 
ch aracteristic  philosophical language which, whatever i t s  peculiar­
i t ie s ,  does not v e il  the truth o f  II.H. P r ice 's  remark that fo r  Kant, 
no le s s  than fo r  Rumc, the imagination is  a very mysterious fa cu lty . (l)
( l )  I  have already quoted A.W.Levi on Kant's "unacknowledged debt" to 
A r is to t le ; see also "Literature, Philosophy, and The Imagination", p.18 
"Kuiii'u uccuuui ox the process or acquiring Knowledge in the Critiou e  
of  Pure Reason (wherein he exh ib its the advance o f  knowledge from 
particu lar perceptions to universal concepts) l i e s  under the ta c it  
influence o f  A r is to t le 's  Do Anima. "  See also Brentano's "Psychology 
from an Qnpiricol Standpoint", nn. 181 f f .
28 '*.
As N.K. Smith's commentary on the "Critique o f  Pure P-cason" c learly  
shews, these ’ m ysteries' lu re  Kent in to serious d iscon tin u ities , 
and have a lso , I ehould add., migrated into the heart -  perhaps I 
ought to say the dead centre — o f  a rt educational theory in  England, 
through the mediation o f  Coleridge and Head.
The 'd ia le c t ic ' o f Kant's Antinomies o f Pure Reason, in flu en tia l 
in  i t s  tum  on Hegel, derives from the respective philosophical 
tra d ition s , represented by Leibniz and Iftune, which Kant sought to 
recon cile  in  what he saw as the primary problem fo r  metaphysics — "How 
are syuthetic judgments a p r io r i  p ossib le?" ("Prolegomena to any 
Future M etaphysics..", Se c .5. p .5 5 ). In the solu tion to th is  problem 
imagination plays on importont part, being "a fa cu lty  o f  a priori 
syn th esis." I t  i s  indeed arguable that imagination is  the facul fcy 
o f  a p r ior i synthesis, but in  h is theory o f  imagination Kant is  not 
always in agreement with h im self. But he is  undoubtedly in dis­
agreement wi tli Hume's theory o f .  causality  and the la t t e r 's  "hasty 
and in correct" views on reason:
" . . .  he in ferred  that Reason completely deceived h erse lf with th is 
concept*, in fa lse ly  taking i t  fo r  her own ch ild , whereas i t  is  nothing 
but a bastard o f  the imagination fathered by experience. The imagin­
a tion , having by experience brought certain representations under the 
law o f  association , passes o f f  a subjective n ecessity  arisin g  out o f  
th is , namely custom, fo r  an ob jectiv e  necessity  from in s igh t. From 
th is  he in ferred : reason has no power to think such connections, not 
even only to think them u n iversa lly , because i t s  concepts would then 
be mere f ic t io n s , and a ll  i t s  ostensib le  a p r io r i knowledge is  nothing 
but fa ls e ly  stamped ordinary experiences; which is  as much as to say 
there i s  no metaphysics at a l l ,  and cannot be any." ("P rolegom ena...", 
P reface. I I .  p .6 ) .
*  i . e .  "causality"
Kant endeavtiure in  the "Critique o f  Pure Reason" to estab lish  the 
functions o f  und.ers¿unding and reason in human knowledge : "A ll our 
knowledge starts with the senses, proceeds from thence to understanding, 
and ends with rea son .."  ("Critique o f  Pure Reason", A 298. B 55^» P.311J 
hut th is  formulation is  not adequately reconciled  with the notion o f 
reason as a set o f  innate prin cip les governing the mind's conceptions.
The d iffe ren t Transcendental Deductions which Kant wrote for  the 
two ed itions o f  h is  f i r s t  critique contain d iffe ren t theories o f  imag­
ination , and though the changes ore su p er fic ia lly  small th e ir  im plications 
ore great. Wliat he c o lls  "productive imagination" in the f i r s t  ed ition  -  
a conception which was so important fo r  Coleridge — is  omitted from the 
second where imagination is  v ir tu a lly  a coextension o f  understanding, 
a handmaiden to the Categories; th is  is  in diametric opposition  to 
Humean empiricism. In the f i r s t  ed ition  the "productive imagination" 
is  "the ground o f  the p o s s ib il ity  c f  a ll knowledge" (A 118. P .IV5): 
that i s ,  us opposed to  the subjectivism  o f  the second ed ition , the 
imagination seems (in  my view) to be the pi-vot-cl point at which the 
Kantian things—in—themselves, unknown and unknowable, coa lesce, as i t  
were, with the Ideas o f  Pure Reason (also unknowable). E ffe ctiv e ly  
th is  'point* i s  an actual recognition  in imagination o f  the rational 
in the empirical t the true a p r ior i synthesis. But i f  "productive 
imagination" i s  simply the spontaneous action o f  understanding on the 
s e n s ib il ity  (B 152)then, on Kant's own terras, there would be no need 
fo r  a philosophy o f  imagination : the synthesis o f  imagination is  
merely reproductive and subject to the empirical laws o f  a ssoc ia tion ist 
psychology. This, on C oleridge's somewhat arbitrary  d istin ction , would
n l  1 +  ♦ /»  H fn n a t fW  re +Vi A + s * a n  a l  **4-4 *»»■» ^' • * • o • •   • w * — - o * - c* — * * ---- *" — ———■ - — — —-
o f  imagination as Coleridge understood i t .
The very f i r s t  sentence o f  Kent's "Critique o f  Dure Reason" affirm s 
h is b e l ie f  that a l l  knowledge comes from experience, end that "In the 
order o f  t im o .. . .  we have no knowledge antecedent to experience."
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The ob jects  o f  sense ore represented in in tu it ion , and this is  the 
empirical ground o f  knowledge! we cannot know the (assumed) orig in a ls  
o f  -what appear in sense, the things—in-themselvee, and i f  wc could 
there would be no a p r io r i since a ll I inowledge would depend so le ly  
on the things—in—them selves.(i) Since we only have in in tu ition  what 
Kant ca lls  the "manifold" o f  appearances, these appearances u ltim ately  
depend on the organisational powers o f  the understanding, the cate­
gories , which are the pure concepts o f  understanding end ere i mmanent 
in experience; these in  th eir  turn re ly  on the pure concepts o f Reason, 
the Ideas, which Kant says arc t ranscendent. Understanding is  what 
S, Jioraor c a lls  "the fa cu lty  o f  cognition through concepts which re fe r  
to sense-given particu lars" ("Kant", p.50) and in applying a p r iori 
concepts to in tu ition  Kant, compares him self to Copernicus, who made 
the stars stationary and the spectator m obile. Sense provides the 
matter o f appearances, understanding the form, and these are synthe­
sised  in imagination and in th is (representative or reproductive) 
imagination i s  a 'necessary ingredient o f  p ercep tion '. This synthesis 
is  both th reefo ld  and spontaneous, so :
" . .  knowledge is  (e ssen tia lly ) a whole in which representations stand 
compared and connected" and "recep tiv ity  can make knowledge possib le  
only when combined with spontaneity. Now th is  spontaneity is  the 
ground o f  a th reefo ld  synthesis which must n ecessarily  be found in a l l  
knowledge; namely, the apprehension o f  representations ns m odifications 
o f  the mind in  in tu ition , th e ir  reproduction in imagination, and th e ir  
recognition  as a concept. These point to  three subjective sources o f  
knowledge vh ich  make possib le  the understanding i t s e l f  -  and consequently 
e l l  experience as i t s  empirical product." (A 101. PP.1'50-1) . (l)
( l )  Nor would there be any need fo r  philosophy; see "Critique o f 
Judgment", In tr o ., S e c .I I . p.IO : "So fa r  as our concepts have 
a p r io r i app lication , so fa r  extends the use o f  our cognitive fa cu lty  
according to p rin cip les , and with i t  philosophy."
So, as he soy3 a l i t t l e  la te r  :
"There arc three subjective sources o f  knowledge upon which rests 
the p o s s ib il ity  o f  experience in general and o f  knowledge o f  i t s  
ob jects  — sense, imagination, and apperception. Kach o f  these can 
can be viewed as em pirical, namely, in  i t s  application  to given 
appearances. But a ll  o f  them arc likew ise a prio r i  elements or 
foundations, which make the empirical employment i t s e l f  p ossib le .
Sense represents appearances em pirically  in  perception, imagination 
in assoc ia t io n (and reproduction), apperception in the empirical 
consciousness o f  the iden tity  o f  the l’eproduced representations with 
the appearances whereby they are given, that i s ,  in  recogn ition ."
Ke should note that fo r  Kant there is  already an assumed duality  
between the unknowable thing—i n - i t s c l f  and the appearance to sense, 
whereas a p lainer (ilaiuenn) view would be that what appears and what 
is  said to originate i t  are to all in tents and purposes the same 1
thing. Iiaat also assorts that outer sense i3 conditioned by the pure 
a p r io r i in tu ition  o f  space and inner sense by the pure a p riori  
in tu ition  o f  time ( l ) ,  both o f  which forms o f  in tu ition  have th e ir  
appropriate functions in the aesthetic theory o f  imagination in the 
"Critique o f  Judgment". Time also plays a crucia l ro le  in his 
concept o f  apperception, hut before considering this and the related  
concepts o f  consciousness and meaning i t  i s  important to  make c lea r  
exactly  what Kant- docs say about imagination.
Kant c a lls  imagination " . . a n  active  fa cu lty  fo r  the synthesis o f  
(the) m anifold", dividing i t s  functions in to  two types, the reproductive 
(em pirical) and the productive (transcendental):
( l )  Cf. L ess in g^  "Laocoon" : " . . . t h c  boundless f ie ld  o f  our imagination, the 
s p ir itu a lity  o f  i t s  images, which con be ranged beside each other in the 
highest profuoeness and variety , without covering or marring one another, 
os might be the case with tilings ‘themselves, or th eir  natural symbols, 
within the natural lim its  o f  space and tim e." ( Ch. VI. p .4 (>). See also 
Ch.XIT. p .90 . where ho says that poetry  a rticu la tes  sounds in time and 
painting colours in space.
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"The transcendental unity o f  apperception . . . .  re la tes to the 
synthesis o f  imagination, as on a p r io r i condition o f  the p o s s ib ility  
o f  a l l  combination o f the manifold in  one knowledge. Hut only the 
productivo synthesis o f  the imagination can take place a p r ior i?  
the reproductive rests on empirical conditions. Thus the prin cip le  
o f  the necessary unity o f  puro (productive) synthesis o f  imagination, 
p r io r  to apperception, i s  the ground o f  the p o s s ib il ity  o f  a ll  knowledge, 
e sp ec ia lly  experience." (A 118)
The em pirical, reproductive function o f  imagination i s  responsible 
fo r , in  Strawson's words, bringing past perceptions a live  in tho 
present, and th is  action in for Kent purely nub.icctive. Judgments 
o f  perception , as he sayn in the "Prolegomena", have only subjective 
v a lid ity , pertaining to a single consciousness. Judgments o f  
experience have ob jective  (necessary, universal) v a lid ity  and 
re la te  ’to consciousness in  general; the a p r io r i p rin cip les o f  possible 
experience are the universal laws o f  nature, and the transcendental 
imagination re lates to these:
"The ob jective  unity o f  u ll  empirical consciousness in  one conscious­
ness, that o f  original perception, is  thus the necessary condition o f  
a ll  possib le  perception; and (th is  being recognised we can prove 
that) the a f f in ity  o f a l l  appearances, near o r  remote, is  a necessary 
consequence o f  a synthesis in imagination which is  grounded a p r io r i 
on ru le s .
Since imagination i s  a facu lty  o f  a p r io r i synthesis, we assign 
to i t  the t i t l e  o f  productive im agination." (A 123) .  I t  is  the 
necessary unity o f  the manifold fo r  which productive imagination is  
responsible, and this un ity  is  o h ie c t iv c . f i )  As he says in the
( l )  In the second ed ition  o f  the "Critique o f  Pure Reason" th is  unity, 
o f  the sensible and ra tion a l, is  achieved by the schemata, which are 
"sensuous correlates o f  tho pare categories . . . .  produced by the 
im agination." See also H.W.Cassirer*s "A Conmcntary on Kant's Critique 
o f  Judgment". p»29.
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"Prolegomena", appearances not re lated  under a p r io r i p rin cip les are 
dynamic .  and those appearances must belong to the reproductive imag— - 
ination  "which has only subjective v a lid ity " (D 141). We are now on 
to Itant's la te r  formulations o f  h is  theory o f  imagination which have 
a tearing on h is aesthetic theory, esp ecia lly  th is dynamic, subjective 
aspect which, as shall be shown, has s im ila r itie s  to the function o f  
imagination in re lation  to the sublime in  the "Critique o f  Judgment", 
In the second ed ition  o f  the f i r s t  critiqu e  Kant re fers  to "the 
understanding, under the t i t l e  o f  transcendental synthesis o f  imag­
ination" (BJL52L), ^  in  a footnote to II 162 understanding and 
imagination ore again id en tified  with each other. Imagination here 
is  d e a r ly  deprived c f  an measure o f  autonomy Guch as may be deduced 
from the f i r s t  ed ition , Kant perhups being mindful o f  the traditional 
n il r e l ia b i l i t y  o f  imagination, i t s  mystery and outversiveness, and yet 
re luctantly  ob liged  to  recognise i t s  function in perception and 
cognition  :
"Synthesis in general . . .  is  the mere resu lt o f  the power o f  imagin­
ation , a b lind but indispensible function o f  the sou l, without which 
we should have no knowledge whatsoever, but o f  which we ore scarcely  
ever conscious." (A 78. B 103). So i t  i s  -that the imagination i s  
free  only to obey the lows o f  understanding in th is second edition  
o f  the "Critique o f  Pore Reason", and i t s  hidden, b lind functions 
must be constrained within a ll  possib le  lim its  t 
"In  so far as imagination is  spontaneity, I sometimes a lso e n tit le  
i t  the productive imagination to distinguish i t  from the reproductive 
imagination, whose synthesis i s  en tire ly  sub ject to empirical lows,
¿he laws, utuuuiy, ux tmevvxttuuu, tuiu nuiui uienxuin wutiliml«
nothing to the explanation o f  the p o s s ib il ity  o f  a p r io r i knowledge. 
The reproductive synthesis fa l l s  within the domain, not o f  trans­
cendental philosophy, but o f  psychology." ( B 1*52).
He turning to Kant's notion o f  apperception, it- is  th is -which must
bo added to imagination to make the la t t e r 's  function in te lle c tu a l, 
fo r  apperception makes consciousnc?s o f  represeufcations p ossib le .
I t  i s  here, I think, that Kant's opposition to Hume has one o f  i t s  
soundest and most valuable formulations, fo r  whereas the other two 
aspects o f  subjective synthesis are em pirically accoptable their 
a p rior ity  is  more an act o f  fa ith  than a provable or demonstrable 
fa c t .  'fho unity o f  apperception, which N.K. Smith believes makes 
Hume's nssocintioniem untenable, i s  not em pirically  accessible.
I t  is  simply a consciousness o f  duration (time) which retains it s  
id en tity  throughout the succession o f  experiences but which, is  not 
i t s e l f  discoverable to or by experience; fo r  Kant consciousness 
involves sel f—consciousness, a mere- form whoso contents ore not the 
s e l f  but are fo r  the s e l f ,  so that self-consciousness is  only possible 
as consciousness o f  the n o t -s e lf .O )T h is , I think, bears a s ig n ifican t 
s im ila rity  to Berkeley’ s notion o f  " s p ir it " ;  Kant speaks o f  th is  " I " ,  
"ego", "thinking s e l f "  or "sou l" as neither a subject nor a concept 
but :
" . .  o i ly  a designation o f  the ob je ct  o f  inner sense in so fa r  as we 
know i t  through no further predication ; and though i t  cannot i t s e l f  
he the predicate o f  another thing, i t  cannot a lso  be a determinate 
concept o f  an absolute su b ject, but only, as in a l l  other cases, 
the reference o f  inner experiences to the unknown subject o f  them".
("Prolegomena", Sec. !>6. p. 98).
And though he adds in a footnote that " i t  i s  nothing more than feeling  
o f  on existence without the s lig h tes t  concept, and only representation
ISA. w u a v  b U  U U 1 C U  ttJLJL U U I U I J L U ^  O  b t U X U O  U t l  X * C A t t V X V U  y h U A S  X  • • • C I S
a regulative p r in c ip le , serves very well -wholly to  destroy a ll  mater­
ia l  i s t i c  explanations o f  the inner nppearunces o f  our s o u l . . . "  (l o c .  
c u t ) . The importance o f  this concept o f  consciousness is  in i t s
(1 ) See also my remarks on Kierkegaard, p.514 f f . . in fra .
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transcendental in action  as i'or Kant, as H.K. Smith says, " consci ousness 
i s in o i l  cases awareness o f  moaning" ("A Commentary on Kant*c 
'Critique o f  Pure Heason"', p.XL. ) ,  and he cause o f  th is , "human 
experience becomes in te l l ig ib le  S3 a purposive a c t iv ity  that d irects 
i t s e l f  according to  Ideal standards" (N«K. Siaitb. o p .c i t « .  p. X h ii) .
This purposivcneS3, which 'belongs to the natural human tendency 
fo r  te le o lo g y ', i s  a notion o f  central importance íd the "Critique 
o f Judgment".
To the productive and reproductive imagination o f  the "Critique 
o f Pure Reason" Kant adds the aesthetic imagination o f  the "Critique 
o f  Judgment," and the elevated function o f  th is  la t te r  aspect o f 
imagination is  to present us with sublime ob jects  which are linked 
with the Ideas o f  He as on. The "Critique o f  Judgment" also gives us 
Kant's c lo se ly  re la ted  theories o f  taste, bounty, and genius, 
pertinent to the making and the judging o f  a rt , and as an essential 
component o f  h is theories he introduces the concept o f  "purposivenese" } 
" . . .  the concept o f  an ob je ct , so far as i t  contains the ground o f  the 
actu a lity  o f  th is o b je c t , i s  the purpose; and the agreement o f  a thing 
■with tiiat constitu tion  o f  things which is  only possible according to 
purpose is  ca lled  the purposiveness o f  i t s  form. Thus the princip le  
o f  judgment, in respect o f  the form o f  things o f  nature under empirical 
laws generally, i s  the purposiveness o f  nature in i t s  variety . That 
i s ,  nature i s  represented by neons o f  th is  concept as i f  an under­
standing contained the ground o f  the unity o f  the variety  o f  i t s  
empirical laws.
The purposiveness o f  noture is  therefore a particu lar concept,
a p r io r i , which has i t s  orig in  so le ly  in r e fle c t iv e  judgment, 
("Critique o f  Judgment", In tro . m  ¡ ¡ ¿ i l l -
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Burposiveness is  a te le o lo g ica l concept, the fundamental princip le  
o f  judgment, ( l )  and i t  pertains to the formal as opposed to the 
material aspect o f  o b je c ts . Where such judgments give pleasure the 
o b je c t  in question i s  ca lled  beautifu l, Kant says (op . c i t . , In tro.
VII, p .27 ). and the judgment o f  beauty is  a function o f  ta s t e ;( 2 ) 
where they concern the formal purposiveness o f  ob jects  such judgments 
Kant considers are "v a lid  fo r  a ll  men" as with a ll empirical judgments.( 3 ) .  
But aesthetic judgments reveal a subjective purposiveness in re la tion  
to  the form o f  the ob je c ts , springing from "n sp iritu a l fee lin g  related  
to the sublime" :
"S u scep tib ility  to pleasure from re fle ct ion  upon the forms o f  things 
(o f  nature as well as o f  art) indicates not only n purposiveuess o f  
the ob jects  in  relation  to the re fle ct iv e  judgment, conformably to the 
concept o f  nature in the sub ject, but also conversely a purposiveness 
o f  the sub ject in respect o f  the ob jects .accord ing  to  tlie ir form or 
even their form lessness, in virtue o f  the concept c f  freedom. Iiencc 
the aesthetic judgment, i s  not only related as a judgment o f taste to 
the beau tifu l, but is  a lso  as springing from a sp ir itu a l fee lin g  re la ted  
to  the sublim e." ( O p .c it . , In tro . , VII. p .2 9 ). 1
(1 ) See Kant's Introduction. Sec.IV. p.15. where he says that judgment is  
e ith er determinant or r e f le c t iv e, the former being regulated a prio r i  
but the p rin cip le  o f  the la t te r  can only be based on our considering 
empirical laws as being " . .  in accordance with such a unity as they would 
have i f  an understanding (although not our understanding) had furnished 
them to our cognitive fa cu lt ie s , so as to make possib lo  a system o f  
experience according to particu lar laws o f  nature." On re fle c t iv e  judgment 
see also H.17. Cassirer, o p . c i t . . pp. 219 f f .
(2 ) See also Intro.., sec .V II. P.26 : " . .  the ob je c t  is  only ca lled  purposive 
when i t s  representation is  iim icdietely combined with the fee lin g  o f  pleasure, 
and th is very representation is  an uestheticnl representation o f  purposiveness.' 
C f. Lessing, o p .c i t . . p .15 : "The aim o f art . . .  i s  pleasure, and pleasure is  
not indispensitde. I t  may therefore f i r s t ly  be l e f t  to the lawgiver to 
decide what kind o f  pleasure, and what degree o f  each kind he w ill a lio « /.
Hie p la s t ic  arts esp ec ia lly , in addition to th e ir  in fa ll ib le  in fluence 
on the national character, are capable o f  producing an e f fe c t  which 
requires the c losest attention  o f  the law ." Kant's lawgiver seems to  be 
Reason through the categories o f  understanding.
( 3 )  See also Intro. Vj I .  p. 2S. Bernard (tran slator's Introduction p.TCC) 
says that th is agreement among men on the appreciation of beauty is  a 
sensns coanuni8.
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B. .a ica lly  fo r  Kant tlie beautifu l is  that which is  purposive in 
re lation  to  our fa cility  o f judgment, anti judgments o f taste depend 
on the harmony which ex ists between understanding and imagination -  
th is la t te r  being, as the second ed ition  o f  the "Critique o f  Pure 
Reason" argued, in conformity with understanding. It is  not alone 
able to furnish an idea o f bcGuty. Thus the beautiful is  r e la t iv e ly  
lim ited , needs 'ex tern a l’ grounds, and affords an idea o f  an 
indeterminate re la tion  be tee on imagination and understanding; whereas 
the sublime is  a property o f  the mind, i s  more subjective than the 
beautifu l, and is  based on an "indeterminate and indeterminable" 
relation  o f  imagination and Reason; as J.H. Bernard says in h is  in tro­
duction to  h is translation to the "Critique o f  Judgment" : " . . .  in 
aesthetical judgments about the beautifu l the mind is  in restfu l 
contemplation, bat in  the case o f  the sublime a mental movement is  
excited  . . . "  (p.aX). The sublime is  tea t which is  absolutely  great 
and so pertains to  the Ideas o f  Reason only, and the fee lin g  o f  the 
sublime i s  achieved by im agination's s tr iv in g  fo r  in fin ite  progress, 
in which i t  overreaches i t s e l f ,  attains a kind o f  absolute measure, 
and the sublime is  f e l t .  Whereas the beautiful is  associated  with 
pleasure tee sublime is  associated with pleasure and/or pain y ie ld ing , 
as i t  sometimes does, the d iscon tin u ity  between im agination 's e s t i­
mation o f  magnitude and reason 's, (pa in ), and giving pleasure because 
fo r  Kant our str iv in g  fo r  tee Ideas i s  a kind o f  law, imposed by 
reason. (1 )
I t  may be sum ised that, in  respect o f  Kant's comnents on appear­
ances end reproductive imagination in both the "Prolegomena”  end tee
+■? o f  P o A a o n " (ZLLiL) +>’ '' «TvrioftfAnooq not. >*o1 n+o^ +.o
a -priori p r in cip les  are dynamic, therefore do not belong to  the
( l )  Kant's ideas on beauty and the sublime bear sup erficia l resemblances 
to Burke's; sco J .T.Boulton's Introductionto Burke's " in q u iry .. . "  fo r  a 
short discussion o f  th is resemblance. (u.C^XV).
schemata, are subjective, and ere what Kant ca lls  "images" :
"This schematism o f  our understanding, in i t s  application  to appearances 
and th e ir  mere form, is  an a rt*  concealed in the depths o f the human 
sou l, whose real nodes o f  a c t iv it y ,  nature is  hardly l ik e ly  ever to 
allow  us to discover, and to have open to our gane. This much only
ve can assert : the image is  a product o f  the empirical facu lty
o f  reproductive imagination, the. schema o f  sensible concepts, such 
as o f  figures in space, is  a product and, as i t  were a monogram, o f
pure a pr io r i  imagination, through which, and in  accordance with which,
images themselves f i r s t  become p o s s ib le ."  ("C ritique o f  Pure lteaaon",
A 141—2. P. 180-1). ( l )  The success or fa ilu re  o f  Kant's defence o f  
metaphysics seems to binge to a great extent on h is  concept o f  imagin­
ation , which is  not .completely resolved e ith er as purely a p r io r i 
anB schematic or as reproductive and dynamic, making possib le 
resp ective ly  the beautiful and the sublime, Kant's epistemology, 
a esth etic  theory, and h is psychology, are a ll  c lo se ly  in terelated j the 
th ree fo ld  synthesis o f  imagination, the very basis o f  a ll knowledge, 
depends en tire ly  on a blind and perhaps (depending on how one in ter­
prets Kant) indeterminate function  o f  tho soul which is  im agination's 
task . Kant remarks that i l lu s io n  l ie s  in talcing the subject fo r  the 
o b je c t iv e , yet the crucial epistem ological issue at stoke here is  
one o f  recognising which i s  which, fo r  a p r ior ity , the entire structure 
o f  transcendentalism, is  f in a l ly  an act o f  fa ith , as Kant him self 
s ta te s . The d istin ction  between the schematic and the aesthetic 
imagination is  essen tia lly  th at between the d ia le c t ic  and the manic 
routees to the c id oe o f  P la to . There seems to me to he a generic
( l ) IX n o  S h i u  a n  uaaucittbiuu ox* lin k  between reproductive imagination ana 
the sublime, th is  woald in d ica te  an ultim ately psychological interpretation  
o f  sublim ity. 1T.W. Cassirer, o n .c i t . .  r>.i?17. says o f  aesthetic imagination 
" I t  i s  both productive, not merely reproductive, and free , fo r  i t  i s  
independent o f  any determinative lows o f  tho understanding." I t  is  
experience says Cassirer which i s  the product o f  the productive imagination.
*  "Kunst"
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rela tion  between the soul -  Platonic and A ristote lian  -  and Kant13 
apperception and his concept o f  Gei s i  j.D the "Critique o f  Judgment".
A.U.Levi considers that the duality o f  Kant's d istin ction  between 
the 's c i e n t i f i c '  and the 'humanistic* underetanding o f  the two 
cr it iq u es we have been discussing to  be n  "schism o f the mind" inherent 
to  hum anity.(l) As with Coleridge, Levi seems to regard Kant's 
"productive imagination" as the creative fa cu lty  o f  the human mind, 
but th is essen tia lly  schematic, a p r io r i facu lty , must, ultim ately 
serve the categories, but may also function in the Judgments o f 
taste end the b eau tifu l. What Coleridge overlooks, as Levi aptly 
remarks, is  the contribution imagination makes to human values : the 
needs i t  may answer, which Kant attempts to answer in. h is doctrine 
o f  purpoEivoness. For, as he says in  the "Critique o f  Judgment"
(sec . £9 ) Kaouiifiu ob jects  may luck "the animating prin cip le  o f  the 
mind", "the in defin ite  harmeny o f  the mental powers, th e ir  su b jectively  
purposive re la tion "} that i s ,  they may he ohne G eist. Only an art work 
( fo r  example) which has th is Geist (or  "sp irit." -  c f  Berkeley) can 
make us fe e l the harmony o f  the mental powers, end th is C eist, "the 
fa cu lty  o f  exhibiting aesthetic Ideas" is  a quality  o f  gen ius.(2 ) 12
(1 ) See "L iterature, Philosophy and the Imagination" pp,2 f f  and Cf.
11. J . dc yioeschnuwcr, "The Development o f  Kantian Thought", Cli.II. Scc.k. 
p.8fr : "Because o f i t s  confused nature the function delegated to i t  is  
not everywhere the same and Kant is  forced to mark the d ifferen tia tion  
between the functions by designating them by corresponding names : i t  is  
in  th is way that the theory o f imagination is  singularly complicated by 
the d istin ction  between empirical and. transcendental imagination, between 
reproductive and productive imagination. The same confusion is  to be 
traced in  the rosiilt to  which these functions give r ise  t At one time 
they produce e ither the analytic o '  the synthetic u n it; at another time 
i t  is  the Gcstal ten which are produced to which Kant expressly denies 
the character o f  u n ity ."
(2 ) See II. Blocker, "Kant's Theorv o f  The Relation o f  Imagination and Under­
standing in Aesthetic Judgments o f  Taste", p . hk t "Genius is  what furnishes 
the s p ir i t  which animates works o f  a rt; but fo r  Kant s p ir it  and ta3to are 
opposed in  certain respects. Genius is  tbc spontaneous, free , sensuous, 
uninhibited pole o f  aesthetic production; taste the pole o f  lim ita tion , 
d is c ip lin e , con tro l."
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This hamony Ì3 c lea rly  superior to that evidenced by the beautiful 
(between imagination and understanding) and has i t s  Neoplatonic 
counterparts. Kant emphasises the spontaneity o f  the unity o f  
apperception, reproduction and recognition , and th is spontaneity is  
important fo r  the aesthetic imagination end fo r  d istin gu ising i t  
from the apprehension o f  the mathematically sublime which is  
numerical and progressive in i t s  magnitude, and the aesth etica lly  
sublime which is  visual  ( i . e .  iu tu ition  by the "measurement o f  tilt 
eye", s e c .26) and which belong to imagination. I t  i s  imagination 
which attempts to gra3p magnitude in one in tu ition  and in reaching 
an absolute lim it  in th is attempt, experiences the sublime} only 
aesthetic imagination can arrive at an idea o f  the absolutely  great, 
o f  the in f in ite , since the mathematically sublime is  merely pro­
gressive . Imagination rediscovers the function which tante gave 
i t  in  the "Purgatorio", the attainment o f  the b ea u tific  v is ion , 
the inexpressible :
" . . . .  by an aesthetic idea I understand that representation o f  the 
imagination which occasions much thought, without any d e fin ite  thought, 
i . e .  any concept, being capable o f  being adeguate to  i t ,  i t  consequently 
cannot be completely compassed and made in te l l ig ib le  by language. V.'e 
e a s ily  see that i t  i s  the counterpart (pendant) o f  a ra t ional idea. 
which conversely is  a concept to  which no in tu ition  (or  representation 
o f the imagination) can be adequate.
The imagination ( as a productive faculty o f cognition) la very 
powerful in creating another nature, as i t  were, out o f the material 
that actual nature gives i t .  Ve entertain ourselves with i t  when 
experience becomes too commonplace, and by i t  wo remould experience, 
always indeed in accordance with analogical laws, but yet also in 
accordance with principles which occupy a higher place in reason (lews, 
too, which ore just as natural to us as thooc by which understanding
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comprehends empirical nature). Thus we fe e l our freedom from the 
law o f  association  (which attaches to the empirical employment o f  
im agination), so that the material supplied to  us by nature in 
accordance with th is  law can be worked up in to  something d ifferen t 
which surpasses nature.” ( l )  Kant’ s assertion  that aesthetic 
imagination is  free  and that aesthetic Ideas can never be fu lly  
expressed or be made l in g u is t ica lly  in t e l l ig ib le ,  no d e fin ite  thought 
or concept being adequate to i t ,  prompts H.U. Cassirer to  call the work 
o f  art an '‘'indeterminate concept" (o n .c it .  , p . ?80 ) . Certainly Kant
is  propounding a symbolic function fo r  art, attainable on ly  by genius 
and applicable ju s t  to art and not to s c ie n c e .(2) With respect to 
the special, quality  o f genius and the ra r ity  o f  the fe e lin g  o f the 
sublime I understand from Kant that those belong to the non-schcmatic 
imagination, i . e . ,  to those few uncategoricnl in tu itions which, 
because o f  the assumed a f f in ity  o f  a ll appearances, immediately 
equate with the Ideas o f  Season. They are " fr e e ” from the regular 
constraints o f  understanding and reason and from the other organisa­
tional forms o f the rational mind, such as language.
A ll o f  th is , as indeed the entirety o f  Kant’ s epistemology and 
aesthetic, i s  based on a fa ith  in the fundamental a f f in ity  o f the 
a p r io r i and the em pirical, o f  the ob jectiv e  and the su b jective ; a 
very close p ara lle l to Spinoza's (N eoplatonic) conception Deua sive 
natura. and h is unity o f  mind and nature. The s im ila r it ie s  between
(1) "Critique o f Judgment", s e c .49. A.V/.Levi ca lls  th is  second paragraph 
"the Kagna Carta o f  Romanticism", ("The Two Imaginations", p .193).
(2) jvI though Gerard, us we have seen, did n ot make such a d istin ction .
See also Abrams. o p . c i t . . 0 .508 : "Almost a l l  the romantic theorists 
commented on the d isparity  between imaginative and s c ie n t i f ic  perception,
fmH lia n l r»■»»<■»/I ¿ IV C lcp n iC M t C f  t h e  ¿H ~Z.CC.?»*
times. I t  i s  important to recognise, however, that by fa r  the greater 
number refused to admit that there is  any inherent or inescapable c o n flic t  
between science and poetry, o r  that s c ie n t i f ic  progress necessax'ily 
en ta ils  p oetic  d e c lin e ."
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Kant and Spinoza also are evident in the la t t e r 's  iden tica l treatment 
o f  sense* perception , imagination and opinion, and Kant's emphasis 
on the spontaneous unity in experience o f  appearance, imagination and 
apperception; (we should also note the closeness here o f  Spinoza's 
•opinion' and Kant's ' apperception '. ) .  finch hangs here on experience 
wherein f o r  Kant the productive synthesis c f  imagination takes place, 
and on Ivant's assertion that a l l  Jen owl edge too i s  grounded on the 
productive synthesis o f  imagination; as Spinoza sa id , the tx-uth o f 
an idea depends on i t s  agreement with the o b je c t . The fundamental 
(e x is te n t ia l)  element is  appearance which, despite Kent's insistence 
o f  the spontaneity o f  the threefold  synthesis o f  imagination, is  p rior 
tc  i t s  apperception; that 3s, things appear and then become meaningful 
and in t e l l ig ib le .  This synthesis is  governed by the wind through the 
categories o f  understanding, according to  Kant, and is  thus neither 
an appearance to mind alone, as we might construe from l'er.cartes, 
nor to sense alone, as we might sim ila rly  construe from Locke or
Ihime
299.
SECTION I I .
The inconsistencies o f  Kant's theories o f  imagination la rge ly  
stem from h is attempt to provide a lo g ic  o f  th is concept, very ranch 
in  the metaphysical tradition  o f  Paumgarten and W olff, as w ell ns 
try ing to  account fo r  the freedom o f  a creative imagination. Levi 
considers that these twe endeavours lead Kant to "the curious 
extrem ity o f  giving to c rea tiv ity  a purely log ica l status" ("The 
Two Imaginations", p.191) ; Levi al so considers that what, he c e i ls  the 
"phenom enological-existential exegesis" has not improved on Kant's 
theory o f  imagination, ( l )  I  have intimated that Kant's theory ic  
fundamentally an attempt to reconcile  the recurrent assertions o f  
A risto te lia n  and a ssoc ia tion ist  psychology and P latonic metaphysics, 
and that the prominence o f  the concept o f  imagination stems from i t s  
in ev itab le  progression to the centre o f  enlightened aesthetic and 
ph ilosoph ica l/psychologica l in terest, la rge ly  instigated  by Addison 
and Hume. German romantic theory a fte r  Keuit, to which Coleridge was 
h h ir, p la g ia r is t  and in terlocu tor  in England, can be seen as an 
attempt to e f fe c t  a unity o f  imagination and reason, the subjective 
and the universal, ch aracteristic  o f  die Roman tike r  -  a term used 
f i r s t  by Novalis or  F. Schlegel.
For Kant the imagination finds harmony with understanding in the 
beautifu l and with reason in the sublime, the fom er constituting 
the judgments o f  taste  and the la t te r  the manifestations o f  genius.
As with Parke, Kant considers taste to he a property o f  a ll  men, 
mahing beauty a unifying quality  having fo r  Burke a socia l function ; 
the sublime is  a rarer quality , given to  few men, and therefore
( l )  See also p»189 o f  "The Two Imaginations" : " . .th e  c la ss ica l tradition  
trichotom ises 'B eing ' according to the ob jective  correlates o f  the cpistcm ic 
s e r ie s . Thus sensation y ie ld s  ex is te n t ia l, conceptualisation y ie ld s  
essen tia l and fantasy y ie ld s  imaginary being. ’The schema i s  neat, but 
i t  conceals a fatu l ambiguity -  one from which the consequences are 
roa lised  in the continuing p erp lex ities  about the ontologica l status o f 
the realm o f  the imaginary."
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e ffe c t iv e ly  d iv is iv e . The Kantian imagination may be seen as an 
agent both o f  unity and d iv is ion , n paradox owing to the d iscon tin u ities 
o f  h is theory, and considering his influence on subsequent theory o f  
imagination in England i t  would be o f  value to know which o f these 
functions Coleridge favoured. I t  seems l ik e ly  however that even 
he d id n 't  know. The idea o f  the sublime e ffe c t iv e ly  orig in ates with 
Longinus hut in the shorter term Kant evi dently found much to in terest 
him in Burke's "Biquiry" and in Burke's forerunner John B a i l l ie 's  
"Essay on the Sublime" o f  1747. ( l )  Like Burke, Kant speaks in 
tom s o f  magnitude in  re la tion  to the sublime, giving the concept 
a quantitative rather than a qualitative aspect which had i t s  tangible 
and v is ib le  e ffe c ts  in the large canvases o f  a rtis ts  l ik e  John Martin 
and James Ward. Burke's notion o f  the 3ublimc also influenced 
Wordsworth, esp ecia lly  the la t t e r 's  "Guide To The Lakes" and Book I 
o f  "The Prelude". Like Kant’ s, Burke's "sublime" is  notable fo r  not 
being simply pleasurable but may also be mixed with astonishment or 
even terror , a s ig n ifica n t development, as E. Cassirer comments :
"The sign ificance  o f  the doctrine o f  the sublime con sists  in the 
fa c t  that from the dimension o f  art i t  indicates the lim ita tion s  o f  
eudaemonism and overcomes i t s  narrowness." ("The Age o f  the Enlight­
enment", p .329).
The rather scant regard which Burke was given by Coleridge, Blake, 
and most other a r t is ts  o f  the Homan t i c  age, is  p oss ib ly  owed to  h is 
rather lim ited , Lockian view o f imagination which he regards as 
"incapable o f  producing anything absolutely new; i t  can only vary 
the d isposition  o f  those ideas which i t  has received from the senses." 
("Etaquiry", Introduction on Taste, p.l7_). But the importance o f  the 
imagination fo r  Kant cannot be regarded as simply an inheritance from 
liume, fo r  the concept wo3 very much tia  the forefron t o f  German aesthetic
( l )  Sec J,T .B oulton 's Introduction to Burke's "Ihqu iry", p . l i i i .
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speculation in the middle o f  the 18th century follow ing the pub­
lica t io n  o f  "Die Disburse dor Mahlern" — modelled on Addison's 
"Spectator" — by J .J .  Bodmer and J .J . > h e itin g er .(l ) Both these 
writers on aesthetics emphasises what they ca lled  Dichtkra ft , which 
L. Welch transcribes into ling] ish  as "the power o f  prodtictive 
imagination" ("Imagination and human Nature", p;>. 0 8 -9 ). and which 
was based on Addison's ideas on imagination. This concept o f 
Dichtkraft was subsequently studied at some length by the l i t t l e — 
known psychological th eorist J .K . Totens, whose "Pbiiosophische 
Versue.he" s ig n ifica n tly  influenced Kant : "There can hardly be any 
doubt thst Kant borrowed from him the fa c to r  o f  imagination. I t  
is  divided in Tetens as in Kant, into a reproductive and productive 
function which he c a l ls  D ichtkraft. "  ( H.J. de Yleeschauwer, o p .c i t , , 
p. 8 5 ). ( 2 ) .  K'hereas with llume reason lose3  i t s  dominance to imag­
ination , in Germany the early Romantics follow ed Kant (esp ecia lly  
P. Schlegel) in the endeavour to  unify  imagination and reason in the 
pursuit o f  the h ighest qu a lities  o f  a rt; th is  unity c lea r ly  i-e flects  
Kant's theories on the sublime in re la tion  to aesthetic imagination 
and the Ideas o f  Reason. I t  i s  also at the root o f  "the most fundamental 
theory o f  romanticism", romantic irony; (See A.B.I ussky. "T ieck 's 
Romantic Irony", p « 3 ) .
The immediate h e ir3  to Kant's "Critique o f  Judgment" were F ichte, 
Schelling and llegel, and i t  was from Fichte that F. Schlegel took 
the beginnings o f  h is  theory o f  romantic irony. (See l .u 3 sk y ,op .c it .. 1
(1) Roth these w riters were in flu en tia l educators in Switzerland; 
Pestalozzi was a pupil o f  E reitinger. For a discussion o f  the influence 
o f  Addison on them, see M.H.Aorans. "The Mirror and The Lamp", pp-27^ff 8 
also R.Ucllek. on . c i t . , Vol I . who says o f  Bodmer t he adopted the
f o m o n n d e d  A d d i s o n ' «  e-P -Min n-e + ii / «  i  i,n\-  ,  . »  * ■ - -- ------------ ra----------—. . .  »
Abrams, (o p .c i t . .  P .2 T3 ) says that Bodmer and B reitinger influenced 
C oleridge's notion o f  "essem plastic" imagination.
(2) See also L .Weich. o p .c i t . . pp .87-9: and Veil ok. Vol . I I .  p.l6*t 1 
"In Tetens' Pnilosophische Versuche uber die menechliche :.p.tur T l?7 7 ). 
a  book know» to Kant and Coleridge, a d istin ction  is  drawn between 
'Mldende D ich tkraft", which i s  a r t is t ic ,  and Fhantaeie. . . .  "e tc .
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pyi.23—M . In th is context vc should also mention Lessing, underlining 
the importance o f  the drama for  the early  romanti c theori s ts . With 
V olta ire , Lessing was among the f i r s t  to admire Shakespeare arid to 
contrast him sharply with the Stoic attitudes informing the French 
c la ss ica l drama o f Corneille and Hacine. "All Stoicism is  undramatic" 
comments Lessing ( FLaocoon", n. 12 ) ,  and in h is "Hamburg Dramaturgy" 
he says that the "impressions produced by French Tragedy are absolutely 
cold  and feeb le " (rip.224 -5 )« adding how unfavourably French drama 
compares with the Greek. He castj.gateG Corneille fo r  his malevolent 
m isinterpretation o f  A r is to t le 's  "P oetics" which, "follow ed by a ll  
subsequent poets, have fa ile d  to produce anything but the most shallow, 
vapid, and untragical s t u f f ."  ("Hamburg Dramaturgy", p.2GX) .  A 
reverence fo r  Shakespeare, coupled with what Lussky ca lls  "Grecomania", 
were consuming passions o f  the early romantics, and this great admir­
ation fo r  the Greeks informs F. S ch legel's  theory o f  romantic irony, 
which the la t te r  regarded as a unity o f  o b je c t iv ity  (the Greek) and 
in teressanto (the modem), and which Hegel was to  ca ll "the acme o f  
moral e v i l " .  B rie fly , the ob jective  re fers to the attitude the 
a r t is t  should have in re lation  to h is work, the in toreasante to 
h is in d iv idu a lity  ard contemporaneity which the work must inevitably  
manifest s romantic irony was fo r  Friedrich Schlegel that 
o b je c t iv ity  in a romantic work o f l ite r a r y  art which nevertheless shows 
forth  p la in ly  the lite ra ry  creator in a ll  h is a r t is t ic  power, g lory , 
wisdom, and love toward h is  crea tion ."(bussky, o p .c i t . . p .S l )♦
This p o la r ity  between the ob je ctiv e  and the interressante was 
coalesced into a lik e  p o la r ity  o f the transcendence and immanence 
o f  God in the world, echoed by the a r t is t  in h is work, which was 
an a r t ic le  o f  Lutheran orthodoxy into which the Schlegels, lik o  
Kant, harl been bora. This, apparently incompatible, po la rity  bears 
a marked s im ila rity  to the notion o f  the "recon cilia tion  o f  opposites"
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which Coleridge got from Schelling, end which ho thought was the
function o f  im agination .(l) An A.D.Snyder says o f  Coleridge
" . . .  hence the d e fin ition  o f art as the union c f  reneon and
imagination, as the recon cilia tion  o f opposites.
Without a doubt Coleridge had a near in terest in bringing
to an end, or what seemed to him on end, the c o n flic t  between
e
the reason and the im agination." (2 ) .  1
(1 ) I have already found precedents fo r  th is  Promethean notion in 
Cambridge Platonism, but see also E. C assirer, "The Philosophy o f  the 
Enlightenment" p.316 f f .  Abrams, o p . c i t . . p .272. comments on the great 
impact o f  th is  near-blasphemous parallel o f  God and man in the 18th 
century; see also pp.273-;i o f  this work t " . . i n  eccle  stian ti cal L atin , 
creare was the common word to connote the orthodox concept that God made 
the world ’ out o f n o th in g '."
(2 ) See "The C ritica l Principle o f  the R econciliation  o f  Opposites as 
Employed by Coleridge", p .19: also on Coleridge and Schelling see
M. Wamnck. "Imagination" pp«92 f f . See also Abrams on S ch e llin g 's 
"rjinoixaungsKraix" ("productive im agination ') ,  o p . c i t . . p.ziO . ii.v/amock 
thinks Coleridge regarded his "esem plastic" as a translation o f  
"Eindildungskraft" -  but would he have translated a noun by an ad jective?
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Chapter 3 : Cft.ERIir.ii! AND l/ORDSV.'Oim i
section; i
P oster ity  has generally hacn unkind to Coleridge the c r i t i c  and 
aesthetic th eor is t , and not without reason. His numerous borrowings, 
from his German contemporaries ( l ) ,  often  unacknowledged, he seems to 
have admired as much fo r  the sound as fo r  the sense, and his contempor­
ary reputation fo r  erudition and profundity was quickly replaced by one 
fo r  obscurantism and piagiarism (2 ) .  Cut the clearest authors are 
not often  the most in flu en tia l as they leave so l i t t l e  fo r  th eir  
apologists and detractors to expound; disputations on the number o f  
angels able to occupy a pinhead fin d  a modern counterpart in the number 
o f  commentators a few sporadic remarks can engender, and C oleridge's 
comments on imagination are few, cry p tic , and therefore f e r t i le .  They 
have, fo r  e l l  th eir  inconsistency, exercised  a powerful influence on 
B iglisli c r i t ic a l  and aesthetic theory, (3 ) and, pertinently  to the 
present study, on art educational theory. Ilis influence on Herbert 
Head, doyen o f  art education in England, is  openly acknowledged in 
"Education Through Art" — a work which lias had a formative influence 
on the most recent government pamphlet on art education, "Art in 
Schools" (1971)» wherein art education is  prim arily seen as "fosterin g  
the growth o f  imagination" (p .9 3 ). (4 ) K.Wamock's assertion that 
the 'l i n e '  from Kant to Coleridge i s  "re la t iv e ly  stra igh t" (o p .c i t . .  ,
p .72 ). i s  on oversim plification , I  b e liev e , which ignores the e ffe c ts  
o f  S ch lcg e l 's  notion o f  romantic irony and S ch ellin g 'e  o f  the recon­
c i lia t io n  o f  opposing forces ( 5) , which la t te r  Read much approved o f ,
(1) Coleridge v is ited  Germany fo r  nine months during the period Sept.l79S- 
July 1799.
(2) For a contemporary, rather debunking view, see Ha z l i t t 's  essay "Mr. 
Coleridge"; Coleridge was also a favourite  target o f  T.L.Peacock, appearing 
as Mr. Panscope in "Headlong H all", Hr. Flo sky ('A  lov er  o f  shadows'J in 
"Nightmare Abbey", and as Mr. Sk ionar,( 'the dream o f  a shadow'), the "trans­
cendental poet" 01 "urotenet u a stie ."
(3 ) See, e .g . .  Abrams, o p .c i t . .  p.189 : "The h is to r ica l importance o f  Coleridge 
imagination has not been overrated. "A.W.Levi ca lls  T .S .E lio t "that contemp­
orary Coleridgean", ("L iterature, Philosophy and Imagination", p .5 7 ).
¡4) On "Imagination and Education" see ?I. Uamock. "im agination", Part V.5) See Ch.IX o f C oleridge's "Jiiographia L iteraria " fo r  conments on h is in te lle ctu a l association  with Kant, Sckelling , Fichte and 'Behmen*.
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and o f  which Coleridge wrote :
"My own conclusions on tlie nature o f  poetry, in the s t r ic te s t  use o f  
the word, have been in part anticipated in the . . .  d isqu isition  on the 
fancy and imagination, lib at is  poetry? is  so nearly  the came question 
w ith, what is  a poet? that the answer fo r  the one is  irvolved in the 
solu tion  o f  the other. For i t  i s  a d istin ction  resu lting from the 
p o e tic  genius i t s e l f ,  which sustains and m odifies the images, thoughts 
and emotions o f the p o e t 's  own mind. The poet, described in  ideal 
p erfection , brings the whole soul o f  man into a c t iv ity , with the sub­
ordination o f  i t s  fa cu lt ie s  to each other, according to th e ir  re la tive  
worth and d ign ity . He d iffu ses  a tone and s p ir i t  o f  unity that blends 
and (as i t  were) fuses, each in to each, by that synthetic and magical 
power to which we have exclu s ive ly  appointed the name o f imagination.
This power, f i r s t  put in to action  by the w ill and understanding and 
retained under th eir  irrem isoive, though gentle and unnoticed controul 
(la x is  e ffe r tu r  habenis) reveals i t s e l f  in the balance o f  recon cilia tion  
o f  opposite or discordant q u a lit ie s  : o f  sameness, with d ifferen ce ; o f  
the general, with the concrete; the idea, with the image, the individual 
with the representative; the sense o f  novelty and freehneos, with o ld  and 
fam iliar ob je c ts ; a more than usual state o f  emotion, with more than 
usual order; judgment ever awake and steady se lf-p ossess ion , with 
enthusiasm and fee lin g  profound and vehement; . . . "  ("Biographia L itera ria " , 
Ch.XIV. pp. 175—3M l )
Though Coleridge is  here talking o f  poetic  genius what he is  essen tia lly  
dealing with is  very close  to Kant's "productive imagination", with
( l )  For fnrther comment on th is  passage in re la tion  to English crit ic ism  up 
to the present day, see Abrams, o p .c i t . .  pp.118 f f .  See a lso R. W ellck.
o n . c i  . V f t l  . T  . n . ^  • H T  S  T  » T*i . U . . .  1 -  ....... -A--- J.1 _ .
- —- -  ^ * - - —-  -  * - A •••• Uk» VWMO VM11 UJl J
quote the key passage in  C oleridge 's  Biographia L iteraria  describing 
imagination as the balance or recon cilia tion  o f  opposite o r  discordant 
q u a l it ie s ."  Most commentators seem not to he aware o f  C oleridge 's debt 
to Schlegcl here. For a further discussion o f  S ch legel's  romantic irony 
see Wollek. op . c i t . , Vol. II  pp.14.ff.
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evidence o f  the influence o f  other early  German romantics, particu larly  
Schlege' and. Schelling? th is fusing and mediating function o f  imagination 
is  also very sim ilar to S ch ille r ’ s "S p ie ltr ieb " ( l ) .  lie is  saying that 
imagination is  the sovereign power whose ’ gentle and unnoticed’ control 
i s  e ffe c t iv e ly  l ik e  Hume’ s ’ gentle force that commonly prevails* hut 
which is  activated by w ill and understanding in uni fy ing a ll the 
fa cu lt ie s .
The ’ recon cilia tion  o f  opp osites ' is  akin to the S ocratic ideal o f  
seeing the many in the one, as indeed C oleridge's "esem plestic" power 
o f  imagination means, he t e l ls  us, "shaping into one" (see o p .e f t . ,
Ch.X, p ,9 l ) .  Be invented the term "eeemplastic" in order to designate 
a power o f  imagination and to "prevent i t s  being confounded with usual 
import o f  the word imagination", and th is term, which I believe owes 
something to Cambridge Platonism, looks l ik e  an attempt to describe 
the blending, fusing and unifying a c t iv ity  described in  the above 
quotation. There is  a confusion, deliberate or otherwise, between 
the idea o f  a unity o f  the seljf ( i . e .  the " fa cu lt ie s " )  and the unity o f  
a poetic  (or  v isu a l?) work o f  a rt, and though Coleridge makes no overt 
reference to Kant's unity o f  apperception th is  is  a necessary component 
o f  the synthesis o f  the productive imagination, and o f  that imagination 
to which Coleridge is  here addressing h im self. The confusion may be 
deliberate in i t s  im plication that the work o f art in i t s  unity at 
once epitomises and evokes the exaltation  o f  a sense o f  unity in whoever 
experiences that work. In the "usual import" o f the word "imagination" 
Coleridge could well have in mind the trad ition  o f  Addison and i t s  
patently  Lockian or ig in s ; more l ik e ly  s t i l l ,  he means the Humean and 
Hortleyan a ssoc ia tion ist  view, Kant's "reproductive im agination", which
W ord sw orth  v a lu e d  r a t h e r  m ore h i ohl v  t.hau f io le r id ir e . t h e  l e t t e r  r o m e v d in .w  v W # V» «_»
i t  as mechanical and ca llin g  i t  "fancy". Some eleven years a fte r  writing (l)
( l )  See Letter 14 o f  h is "Letters on the Aesthetic Education o f  Man."
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the "Biographia L iteraria" Coleridge wrote in a le t t e r  to Richax'd 
Sharp : "Imagination, or the modifying power in the highest sense 
o f  the word, in which I have ventured to oppose to Fancy, or the 
aggregating power." (15th Jan ., 1804; see In tro . to "Liogranhia 
L itera r ia " , p .x i i .  f tn t « ) . Although the two function« are not 
mutually exclusive the e a r lie r  'shaping into one' i s  rather more 
thorough in  i t s  im plications than 'm odifying ', and i t  i s  quite l ik e ly  
that Coleridge had f e l t  the restra in t o f  Wordsworth in  making th is  
change.
There i s  a further complication to  h is theory o f  imagination 
in  the "Biographia L ite ra r ia " where he su p er fic ia lly  adopts a 
d iv ision  o f  imagination f i r s t  made nearly 100 years previously  t 
"The imagination then I consider as primary, or secondary. The 
primary imagination I held  to he the liv in g  power and prime agent o f 
a l l  human perception, and as a repetition  in the f in i t e  mind o f  the 
eternal act o f  creation in  the in fin ite  I AM. The secondary I 
consider as an echo o f  the former, co -ex istin g  with the conscious 
w i l l ,  yet s t i l l ,  as iden tica l with the primary in the kind o f  i t s  
agency, and d iffe r in g  only in degree, and in the mode o f  i t s  operation . 
I t  d issolves, d iffu ses , d iss ip ates, in  order to recreate ; or where 
th is  process i s  rendered im possible, y et s t i l l  at a l l  events, i t  
struggles to  id ea lise  and to  un ify . I t  is  essen tia lly  v ita l ,  even as 
a l l  ob jects  (as ob jects ) are essen tia lly  fixed  and dead.
Fancy, on the contrary, has no other counters to  play bat 
f i x i t i e s  and defin í te s . The fancy i s  indeed no ather than a mode 
o f  memory emancipated from the order o f  time and space; and blended 
w ith, and modified by that empirical phenomenon o f  the w ill  which we 
express by the word o f  ch o ice . But equally with the ordinary memory 
i t  must receive a ll i t s  m aterials ready made from the law o f  assoc­
ia t io n .” (G p .c it .. Ch.XIII. P.167).
Although these two kinds o f  imagination have the same t i t le s  as
Addison's i t  is  c le e r  that they are quite d iffe re n t; Addison's 
primary imagination e ssen tia lly  re fers  to that which is  immediate 
to eense, and is  passive . His secondary imagination may be an 
echo o f  his primary in  so fa r  as th is "echo" resembles an impression 
or imprint, hut i t  i s  rea lly  a hybrid o f  memory and day-dreaming 
which bears a c loser  resemblance to C oleridge 's  "fancy". For a 
fu lle r  consideration o f  the im plications fo r  c r i t ic a l ,  aesth etic , 
and art educational theory end practice  i t  i3  essential to look 
back to the theories o f Kant as well as to those o f  Wordsworth, 
and to find in each and a ll  a continuation o f  the anomalies which 
have passed into our own times.
There are those who think that C oleridge 's theories o f  imagination
owe th e ir  inception very la rge ly  to Wordsworth, hut inspection reveals
a common ancestry in  Kant; in the case o f  Wordsworth th is  is  no more
evident than in liook XLV o f  "The Prelude" :
" ....Im a g in a tion , which, in truth,
Is but another name fo r  absolute power 
And c lea rest in sigh t, amplitude o f  mind,
And Reason in her most exalted mood." (l l .  1 3 9 ff .)  ( l )
There is  also a Neoplatonic flavour to Wordsworth's statements
about imagination:
"Imagination having been our theme,
So a lso  hath that in te lle ctu a l Love 
For they are each in each, and
cannot stand D ividually ." (L o c .c i t . ,  11 .206 -9 ). (2) 
Wordsworth's emphasis on the moral and d id a ctic  functions o f  the
3 0 8 .
(1) See also the Preface to the poems o f  1813 < "Fancy ia  given to quicken 
and beguile the temporal part o f  our nature. Imagination to in c ite  and 
support the e te rn a l."  ( p.7*>f>)
(2) This 'Neoplatonic flavour' i s  also evident in h is ode "Intimations 
o f  Immortality", e sp ec ia lly  stanza V; i t  i s  in teresting  to compare th is  
work with C oleridge 's  ode "D ejection" as they both mourn the apparent 
lo ss  o f  imaginativo in sp ira tion .
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sublime is  close in s p ir it  to Shaftesbury ( l ) ;  as W. Strang says :
" I t  i s  imagination which enables Wordsworth to feel a presence
that disturbs him 
'with a jo y
Of elevated thoughts; a sense sublime " e tc . ("Imagination
and Fancy", p .7 ) . This imagination, Strarig opines, " is  the creative 
force  o f  a l l  great poetry, the seeing o f  the universal in the p a rticu la r ."  
(b o c .c i t . . ) . Wordsworth1 r. close re lation  o f  reason, in te lle c t  and 
imagination again indicates s im ila rities  with the productive imagin­
ation  o f  Kant (rather than, e .g . ,  the aesthetic imagination o f  the 
"Critique o f  Judgment") and Wordsworth was certa in ly  not the kind o f  
person to enthuse over the purely subjective and emotive aspects o f 
imagination, as subsequent w riters were wont to do. There is  an 
element o f  detachment, mattei>-of-factne8s even, iu the poetry o f  
Wordsworth which, though lapsing into bathos in the lesser  works, 
informs the quality  o f  h is  best poems.
This "creative fo rce " o f  Strong’ s is  the ’ power', tra d ition a lly  
end p ers isten tly  attributed to , or ca lled , "imagination"; th is 
tra d ition , as we see, i s  maintained by Coleridge. I t  passes from him 
v ia  Read into English art educational theory. For Read the imagination 
i s  very much a subjective power ju s t  as in Coleridge i t  i s  essen tia lly  
and l i t e r a l ly  a se lfish  power which m odifies and reshapes ' f o r  me1 
what was o r ig in a lly  and p oten tia lly  a unity ' f o r  a l l ' .  Thus mysterious, 
magical, and in v is ib le  mental power i s  said to be responsible fo r  acts
(1 )  See also M.Warnock. op . c i t . , p.120 on Wordsworth's knowledge o f  Ilumej 
she believes that Wordsworth placed Ifume's connection o f  ideas and fee lin g s  
"a t  the heart o f  the mysterious active power o f  the imagination". See 
o n .  ^ /* • ** . .  n** **
the centuries o ld  tradition  o f  empiricism. In h is  e x p lic it  prose coaments, 
he says that 'imagination is  a subjective term t i t  deals with ob jects  not 
as they are, hut as they appear to the mind o f  the p o e t ',  and hiB extended 
analysis o f  the p oetic  imagination, in  the preface o f  1815, i s  in a thorough 
accord with liig lish  psychology."
i
o f  creation , o f  se lf-s iisertion , which are, i t  should he stressed, 
acts which are described as creative by their loca tion  and th e ir  
product; action and m odification are synonymous. There is  a real 
sense both fo r  Hume and Kant in which to use imagination, to be 
imaginative, i s  to be active , i . e ,  to be a liv e , fo r  imagination 
is  the essential perceptual synthesis o f  the manifold o f  sense and 
the categories o f  understanding; in the Christian existentia lism  
o f  Kierkegaard the 'in f in it is in g ' and perceptual functions o f  
imagination together constitute a moral imperative. This la t te r  
development is  already im p lic it  in eome o f  Wordsworth’ s poetry, 
and in Coleridge the purely aesthetic imagination is  prominent but 
not alone; but th is  aspect o f  imagination has been promoted in i t s  
autonomy by subsequent w riters as though i t  were only active in the 
realm o f  art making mid appreciating. To have an aesthetic imagin­
ation i s  to act in a certain sphere which we designate 'a r t i s t i c ' ,  
and we should be no more surprised and delighted with exceptions 
in th is  sphere than eny other; nor should i t  m ystify us that the 
human mind or imagination should be capable o f  such great prod ig ies 
as a rt manifests seeing that, as Leibniz remarks, the body is  able 
to perform so many astonishing feats — accepting fo r  the moment the 
metaphorical senses o f  "mind" and "body” . Some men have strong 
arms and some, so to  speak, strong imaginations; that the la t te r  are 
more mysterious does not necessarily  make them more meaningful. 
Imagination may w ell be regarded, and perfected , in i t s  autonomy, 
a esth etica lly ; what is  more important i s  i t s  re la tion  — estab lished 
by Kant (and reiterated  by Sartre) -  with the concept o f  freedom.
I t  is  to  th is aspect o f imagination that educationists in general 
should, I  b e liev e , address themselves: i t  i s  too important to be 
l e f t  to a r t is ts  alone.
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Chapter 1 : EXISTENTIALISM & PHENOMENOLOGY.
SECTION I
A1 though I have f u l f i l l e d  the intentions with which I set 
ou t at the beginning o f  th is thesis i t  would be wrong to ignore 
e n tire ly  some o f  the developments in the theory o f  imagination, 
and p articu larly  those which seem to have passed unnoticed by art 
educators, follow ing the romantic era. But i t  would also be 
wrong, I  be lieve , to make an eaay equation o f  'development' with 
•progress' fo r  i t  could well bo argued that ju s t  as A risto tle  
w restled with the problems o f  "imagination" bequeathed to him by 
Plato so posterity  has wrestled with th eir  jo in t  bequest. As I 
began with Plato and A r is to t le , so in a sense (and appropriately)
I  end : fo r  the Phenomenology o f  Husserl, borrowed and extended 
by Sartre, is  founded on a metaphysic which is  ultim ately P latonic, 
end, so far as the theory o f  "imagination" i s  concerned, both o f  
these philosophers con sisten tly  argue against the A ristotelien ism  
and empiricism o f  Brentano. In Phenomenology the term "imagina­
t io n "  almost becomes redundant, being variously  replaced by 
"phenomenon", "appearance" or "presentation” with a d istin ction  
made between the act and the content o f  consciousness such as was 
denied by Brentano (though he la te r  changed h is  mind). But before 
considering the phenomenological "imagination" I wish to 3ay some­
thing about the ex is ten tia l theory o f  imagination in Kierkegaard and, 
f i r s t l y ,  about Hegel.
In the th ird  volume o f  h is  "Encyclodaedia", the "Philosophy 
o f  Mind", we find Ilegel adopting the fam iliar tr ip a rtite  d iv ision  
o f  human consciousness, ca llin g  the components in tu ition , represen­
ta tion , and thought. ( Sec, b ll  s o q .) .  To the second o f  those belongs 
imagination, i t s e l f  subdivided in to : P.Ccollection, which i s  the 
'in vard isa tion ' o f  the in tu ition  as meaningful, i . e .  os posited  as
mine; Bepresentation, having subjective and ob jective  elements, which
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creates 'general represen tation s ', i . e . ,  i deas; and Memory, whereby 
the 'con ten t' o f  in tu ition  is  made a s i r,n . i . e .  i t  i s  o b je c t if ie d , 
externalised , 'im aged', as fo r  instance in language. ( l )  He says 
that the general ideas encompass those images which belong to us 
form ally, leaving "an in fin ite  host o f  images o f  the past" ( Zusatz 
to See.4*53) 'slumbering' w ithin us, any one o f  which may come to 
l i f e  -  to borrow Strawson's phx*ase -  as when, fo r  instance, we 
recognise a face in a crowd. This formal aspect o f imagination 
belongs to H egel's ''reproductive imagination" ("Einbildungskraft") 
wherein images are connected and thus raised to general ideas; Hegel 
i s  careful to emphasise that th is  elevation and association  o f images 
i s  e ffe cted  by active mind and is  not simply a number o f  sim ilar 
images coming into contact with each other. He also describes what 
he ca lls  Phantaste s " . . .  in which in te lligen ce  pos its  i t s  general 
ideas or representations as iden tica l with the particu lar aspect, 
o f  the image end so gives the former a p ic to r ia l  ex istence. This 
sensuous existence has the double form o f  a symbol and a sign, so 
that th is  th ird stage comprises creative imagination (Phantaaic), 
which produces symbols and signs, the la t te r  forming the transition  
to memory." (O p .c it . .  Zusatz to Sec.435)« In the next section  Hegel
adds t "Such is  the creative imagination — symbolic, a lle g o r ic , or 
poetica l imagination -  where the in te lligen ce  gets a de fin ite  
embodiment in  th is  store o f  ideas and informs them with i t s  general 
ton e ." Not surprisingly , given th is in te lle ctu a l view o f  creative 
imagination, H egel's highest form o f  art is  the 'c la s s i c ' -  "the art
( l )  This sign/general idea connection is  arbitrary, says Hegel, and 
must be learned. In the sign , "The in te ll ig e n c e .. . .g ives  proof o f  wider
««V«» 4 MM A M  j  «•. • • • X U . —4 X   _ J.1 . S i  » • 4 • * • • » • 1«-  w - c*. u u M t v ix ^ r  x u  uiio u o e  u x  i u  i>ui bU riio w ueu i v  t i u a t H  uieiil
as designatory (s ig n if ic a t iv e )  rather than sym bolical. "  Here also 
in te llig en ce  " . . .  gives i t s  own original ideas o f  d e fin ite  existence 
from i t s e l f . "  (O p .c it . . Sec. 456).
o f  sublimity — symbolic a rt” as he ca lls  i t  ( g e c .56 1) « H egel's notion 
o f  creative imagination -  and there art grounds fo r  inferring a sim ilar 
one from Coleridge -  is  very sim ilar 'to the ideal im itation suggested 
in A r is to t le 's  "P oetics ' and developed and adopted during the 
Renaissance; th is s im ila rity  is  rein forced in  E egel's "A esthetics" :
" . . .  th is productive a ctiv ity  o f  imagination whereby the a r t is t  takes 
what is  absolutely rational, in i t s e l f  and makes i t  a rt, as h is very own 
creation, by giving i t  external form, is  wliat. is  ca lled  genius, ta len t, 
e t c ."  ("The Idea o f  Aesthetic Beauty", p .2 8 3 ). The transcendental, 
idea lising  imagination common tc Kant,Coleridge, and Hegel seems often  
to induce an art which i s  rather dry, formal aid n eo -c la ss ic , raising 
spectres o f  arid academicism ouch as haunt the a r t is t ic  establishment 
o f  Western Europe.
But th is  somewhat se lective  reading o f  H egel's theory o f  creative 
imagination is  balanced by reference to h is notion o f  imagination as 
functioning in a kind o f  're con c ilia tion  o f  opposites ' way in existence 
and perception : "Productive imagination i s  the centre in which the 
universal and being, one 's own and what is  picked up, internal and 
external, are completely welded into one. The preceding 'sy n th esis ' 
o f  in tu ition , re co lle c t ion , e t c . ,  are u n ifica tion s  o f  the same 
factors, but they are 'syn th eses ', i t  i s  not until creative imagination 
that in te lligen ce  ceases to be the vegue n ine and the universal, and 
becomes on in d ividu ality , a. concrete su b je c t iv ity , in which the s e l f -  
reference i s  defined both to being and u n iv e rsa lity ."  ("Philosophy o f  
Mind", S ec.477). This sense o f  imagination as a continuous synthetic 
a c t iv ity  ia  tantamount to asserting that we l iv e  in imagination, a lb e it  
an imagination guided by in te llig e n t p r in c ip le s . A sim ilar synthesis 
o f  the f in ite  (external) end in fin ite  (un iversa l) places imagination 
on a moral plane as a medium o f  what Kierkegaard c a lls ,  in h is  "Sickness 
Unto Death” , 'in f in i t i s in g '. The power o f  se lf-re feren ce  and s e l f -
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re fle ct ion  make thia ex isten tia l synthesis a  moral task, but a task
which is  newer completed.
To "venture wholly to ha on ese lf1' (o p . c i t . , p.lfr2) is  fo r  
Kierkegaai’d the tine Christian heroism; the s e lf  (o r  's p i r i t ' )  
does not a ctu a lly  ex is t  hut is  a process o f  becoming, o f  " in fin it ie in g "  
as he c a l l s  i t .  In fin ity  can only be gained through despair which, 
says Kierkegaard, " is  related to  the eternal in man" (op . c i t . . EiiSO) 
and to the striv ing fo r  in fin itu d e ; he c a lls  this despair "an anxious 
dread o f  an unknown something" (p .lh 'i) and amongst i t s  forms are 
detexninisn and d ia le c t ic .  There i s ,  we may note, a kind o f  
d ia le c t ic  o f  the f in ite  and in f in ite  which is  the ex isten tia l and 
the crea tive  imagination, but Kierkegaard states that synthesis is  
a re la tion  o f  two fa ctors  (in  th is case) and so is  not a s e l f  :
"The s e l f  i s  a re la tion  which re la tes i t s e l f  to i t s  own s e l f " ,  
and in the aisrelation  which may here occur he again says is  a fern 
o f  despair. Again, in anticipating the charge (perhaps) o f  in fin ite  
regression , he says that this too is  despair : " . . . t h e  s e l f  i s  a 
synthesis o f  which the f in ite  i s  a lim itin g  fa ctor , and the in fin ite  
i s  the expanding fa c to r . In fin itu d e 's  despair is  therefore the 
fa n ta s t ica l, the l im it le s s .” ( p . 1 6 5 ) . So, outside the Christian 
l i f e ,  as Kkcrkegaard understands i t ,  the d issocia tion  o f  despair 
may perta in  to the unlimited, the fa n ta st ica l; or to  the m ateriel, 
the lim ited  and f in i t e :  when fe e lin g , knowledge, o r  w ill become 
fa n ta stic , he says, the s e lf  i s  v o lt i l iz e d  and a man is  carried 
away from him self; when a man lacks in fin itu de  he i s  mean-spirited, 
narrow-minded, and sp ir itu a lly  emasculated, he is  a cipher, a 
p h il is t in e , fo r  he has no imagination. I t  i s  imagination which 
i s  the medium f o r  m o r a l l y  good  (C hristian ). evi e te n + .i «1 i n f i n i t e  e i n g .  
fo r  p o s s ib il i tv  is  the only antidote to despair :
"The fan tastica l is  doubtless most c lo se ly  related to fantasy,
imagination, but imagination in  turn la  re lated  to fe e lin g , knowledge,
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«nd v i l 1. ,  b o  that a person may have a fan tastic fee lin g , or knowledge, 
or w i l l .  Generally speaking imagination i s  the medium in the process 
o f  in f in it is in g ; i t  is  not one facu lty  on a par with others, but i f  
one would so speak, i t  ie  the facu lty  i nstar ominm ( fo r  a l l  facul t ie s ) .  
What fee lin g , knowledge, or w ill  a man has, depends in the la s t  resort 
upon what imagination he has, that is  to say, upon how these things 
arc re fle cte d , i . e .  i t  depends upon imagination. Imagination i s  the 
re fle c t io n  o f  the process o f  in f in itis in g , and hence the elder Fichte quite 
r ig h tly  assumed, even in re lation  to knowledge, that imagination is  the 
orig in  o f  the categories. ïhe s e l f  is  re fle ct io n , and imagination is  
re fle c t io n , i t  i s  the counterfe it presentment o f  the s e l f ,  which is  the 
p o s s ib il ity  o f  the s e l f .  Imagination is  the p o s s ib il ity  o f  a ll r e fle c ­
tion , and the in ten sity  o f  th is  medium is  the p o s s ib il ity  o f  the 
in ten sity  o f  the s e l f . "  ( O p .c it . . pp. 1 6"5- h ) .
The notion o f  imagination as the fa cu lty  instar omnium on which are 
dependent knowledge, fee lin g  and w i l l ,  is  already present in Kant and 
Hegel, tu t i t  i s  s t i l l  a fa cu lty  which acts according to understanding 
or in te llig e n ce ; th is  la t te r  constitutes a v o la t iliza tio n  o f  ihe s e l f  
fo r  Kierkegaard, vhose "imagination" anticipates Brentano's "presenting" 
hut th is  la t te r  i s  without the form er's Christian and moral te leology .
Nor i s  i t  surprising that in th is  near id en tifica tion  o f  s e l f ,  imagin­
ation , and re f le c t io n , there i s  the blueprint fo r  S artre 's  notion o f  
negation as an essential function o f  imagination, though Kierkegaard 
would have regarded Sartre 's conception as a "v o la t il iz a t io n " , and 
h is ex is ten tia l te leo logy  is  quite d iffe ren t from S artre 's  phenomenology 
o f  imagination. Thex*e i s  a very real sense fo r  Kierkegaard, fa r  more 
than fo r  Hegel o r  Kant, that we are <m>irinnMnn. H r ln j ( i f  we see 
morally good) in  a continuous p o s s ib il ity  o f  in fin ity  which fo r  him
i s  the C hristian  l i f e The p o te n tia l fo r  such an e x is te n t ia l
316
imagination pxiots in  b is  philosophical forerunners, and. divested 
o f  i t s  rational guides -  themselves a product o f  a kind o f  fa ith  -  
i t  is  here giver an actual loca tion  and a moral function . This 
function, a manifestation o f  despair, is  reiterated by Schopenhauer 
in h is assertion that i t  i s  only such depressed mental, sta tes that 
ve arc re a lly  o liv e ; fo r  i t  i s  only then that the p o s s ib i l i t y  o f 
improvement activates the individual, a p o s s ib il ity  vh ich  imagination 
o ffe r s  in i t s  mediation to the in fin ite , in i t s  " in f in it is in g " .
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SECTION II
Kierkegaard's " in f in it is in g " does havo i t s  counterpart in  
Brentano' a conception o f  the p e r fe c t ib i l i t y  o f  mental phenomena, 
though Ifusoerl attacked b is  "psychologism" (B asica lly  a denial o f  
the id e a l) -  on good grounds, but, as I  b e lieve , erroneously.
Brentano was certa in ly  c r it ic a l  o f  nay return to P latonic p rin cip les  
such as he found in Meinong's "Gegenstandstlieorie" end H usserl's 
"Phenomenology", h im self favouring a return to true A ristotelian ism . 
There can be no doubt that h is "Psychology from an Empirical Stand­
point" owes much to the "Be Aaima" and, to a le sse r  extent, L e ib n iz 's  
philosophy o f  mind. Brenteno's "psychognosy", as he ca lled  h is 
theory, constitutes a s ig n ifica n t and powerful attack on the myster­
ious and metaphysical fa cu lt ie s  o f  mind such as the creative and 
synthetic imagination.
Despite the valuable attention he gave to the problem o f  d istin ­
guishing between images and ob je cts , Leibniz considered that even i f  
a ll  o f  l i f e  were a dream th is would be o f  l i t t l e  consequence, and 
ca lled  a ll 'in tu it io n s ' "phenomena"; Brentauo's term i s  "presentations" 
but he asserts that on ly  mental phenomena possess real and intentional 
existence. Perception, he says, i s  inner perception to inner con­
sciousness, i t  i s  true and we recognise i t  immediately as such; these 
inner perceptions, in  ( e .g . )  l in g u is t ic  form, are the basis o f  
ob jective  knowledge i  " . . .  Kant simply defined the contrast between 
in tu ition  and concept in  such a way that the 1otter  i s  universal and 
the former individual. But ju s t  the opposite i s  the case. Inner 
perception never reveals to us anything which another person could not 
find exactly  the «eme in  h im se lf."  (lin . c i t . . "Additional Essays".
For Brentano the presentation i s  the nine qua nou o f  a ll 
mental acts, which are characterised by reference to something as 
"o b je c t" ; th is  reference he ca lls  in ten tion a lity  ; "Every mental
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phenomenon i s  characterised by what the Scholastics o f  the Kiddle Ages 
ca lled  the intentional (o r  mental) inexistence o f  an ob ject , and what 
we might c a l l ,  though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, 
d irection  toward an ob je ct  (which i s  not to be understood as meaning 
a th ing), o r  immanent o b je c t iv it y ."  ("P sych o logy .." . P.G8). Given 
th is  generic t i t l e  "presentation” , Brent on o says that in many cases that 
which i s  actual may be non-existent (see "Supplementary Remarks", pp.
291 f f ) . fantasy images d i f fe r  on ly in orig in  end not in content from 
sensation -  which Sartre was to re itera te  and which led  to Husserl1s 
great emphasis on the phenomenological valne o f  " fa n c y " .( l)
As well as presentation, a ll mental acta have, according to 
Brentano, both judgment and fe e lin g ; the unity o f  mental phenomena 
depends on th e ir  being perceived together, (as opposed to Locke’ s 
"simple ideas” ) ;  they are fused in the "o b je c t"  as ho call's jt  and not 
in the a ct . All perceptions are judgments fo r  Brentano, and judgments 
are simple affirm ation or denial; consciousness i s  not "an absolute 
simple r e a lity "  ("P sy ch o log y ..." , p.16*}) but has d is t in c t  parts which 
are organ ica lly  related  l ik e  the parts o f  a coral re e f, a conception 
which appears to owe something to the monadology o f  Leibniz. Brentano 
la te r  revised h is  views in the unity  o f  (inner) perception and jndgrient, '
and came to  believe in the a b i l it y  to "unite o b je c ts " , (2 ) bat in h is 
"Psychology.. "  the b e l ie f  in the id en tity  o f  judgment end perception 
inevitab ly  leads him to assert that a ll  categorical judgment propositions
(1) Husserl comments on the fiv e  o r  s ix - fo ld  embiguity o f  "presentation",
and g ives a l i s t  o f  twelve d iffe re n t meanings; see h is  l o g i c a l  Irv estig a tion s", 
Ch.VI. Investigation  V. S ec.44. p p .6 5 2  f f .
(2 ) See h is  "Supplementary Remarks", o p . c i t . . pp.276 f f . . where he abandons 
the b e l ie f  that presentations have a "fee lin g  tone" and a judgment; a ll 
presentations have a temporal mode, he la te r  adds, and comes to recognise
our a b il ity  to un iteob jecta , g iving an "integral o b je c t"  as he c a lls  i t  (p ,231 ).
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are reducib le  to ex isten tia l propositions (o p . c i t . , p,218) and that 
the compounding o f  elements i s  "merely a l in g u is t ic  expression" (p.220) -  
the ch ie f  aim o f  language being the communication o f  judgm ents.(l) I t  
hardly needs to be emphasised that Brentano's views here constitute a 
radical attack on the o ld  doctrine o f  a metaphysical, synthetic imagin­
ation , imposing the categories o f  understanding and reason on percep­
tion , but there i s  no basis in h is  account fo r  explaining the more 
extreme and individualised  products and examples o f  humanity -  the 
works and men o f  genius, fo r  example.
He does give a few remarks which are suggestive o f  an aesthetic 
theory however. (2 ) The o ld  metaphysical tr ia d  o f  the True, the Good, 
and the Beautiful belong to the d iffe ren t but co-ordinating sides o f  
our mental l i f e  -  Cognition, Appetite, and Feeling -  which relate to 
Brentano's three categories o f  mental phenomena : Presentation, Judgment, 
and Emotion (lo v e /h a te ). Each class o f  mental phenomena has i t s  own
p erfection , he says, which fo r  presentation i f  the beautiful : "This 
p erfection  makes i t s e l f  known in the inner fe e lin g , which, as we saw, 
accompanies every a ct. Inherent in the most p erfect acts in each 
fundamental c la ss  there i s ,  so to  speak a noble pleasure. The highest 
p erfection  o f  the a c t iv ity  o f  presentation l i e s  in the contemplation o f  
the b ea u tifu l, whether th is  is  rein forced by the influence o f  the o b je c t , 
or independent o f  such in flu en ce ."  ( O p .cit. , p .2 6 l) ( 3 ) Given the 
e a r lie r  p r io r ity  o f  presentation in  mental l i f e ,  there is  a clear 123
(1 ) In h is  "Supplementary Re marks" Brentano says he is  strongly against 
"psychologism", the view that knowledge is  n ot generally v e lid  t " . . .  
i t  would have to  be paradoxical, even absurd, to  me, i f  someone denied 
that knowledge is  judgment and that judgment belongs to the domain o f  
psychology." He asserts that anyone sharing onr knowledge mast share 
what f a l l s  within the domain o f  human psychology and only in th is domain
4 «  4 A  . . . . . . .  . m i  j • . . . ! .•• •  ••fcts A M V V C d W A U A C  W  O V t t ' U b i l l l i  IXA 4. V •
(2 ) Unfortunately there i s  no English translation  o f  Brentano's work on 
aesth etics ava ilab le .
(3) C .f .  S artre 's  view that the real is  never beautifu l, only the 
imaginary, in h is  "Psychology o f  Imagination" p.225.
im plication here that beauty (or the beau tifu l) i s  the highest 
achievement and perfection  available to man, but Brentano also 
describes vhat he ca lls  the "Ideals o f  Id ea ls", which is  a unity o f  
h is three classes o f  mental l i f e ,  corresponding to Christian blessedness 
and the Socratic and Platonic v ision  o f  the eidos (as I have ea rlie r  
ca lled  i t ) .  I t  i s  here that the anomalies o f  a Platonic metaphysic 
and an A ristote lian  "psyebognosy" become m anifest, but these anomalies 
are owed to some extent in Urcntano to  h is la te r  change o f  opinion 
against some o f  the views expressed in  h is  "P sy ch o logy ..." ; th is is  
particu larly  so in  relation  to the un ity , o f  mental acts, which he 
or ig in a lly  regarded as a necessity . And given h is  early  b ifurcation  
o f  "outer" and "inner" perception i t  i s  surprising that he never con­
sidered the p o s s ib il ity  o f  a neutral, unitary function out o f  which 
such a bifurcation  could be advanced. But despite H usserl's ob jections 
to Brentano's views there is  no doubt o f  the la t t e r 's  awareness o f  the 
greater quality  or mcaningfulness o f  some forms o f  vhat he ca lled  "inner 
consciousness", but that h is "psychognosy" is  ultim ately e x is te n t ia l. 
without Kierkegaard's Christian m orality , and not essential  (or "e id e t ic " )  
as is  the phenomenology o f  Husserl and Sartre.
This 'e id e t i c ' or essential impetus o f  the 'in ten tion ' i s  con­
s isten tly  maintained by both Husserl and Sartre; as the former says :
"To present something to oneself means . . . .  to achieve a corresponding 
in tu ition  o f  what one merely thought o f  o r  what oue meant but only at 
best very inadequately indeed." ("L ogica l Investigations", Ch.VI. Inv.V, 
Sec.44. p .6 33) . The need to maintain a clear d istin ction  between sense 
and imagination was also f e l t  by the la t e r  Brentano, who sew as he said 
no ju s t if ic a t io n  fo r  making analogies between "ob jects "  ar.d the i>nnt.»n+.» 
o f  consciousness, content having no being : "only that which fa l ls  under 
the concept o f  a thing (Reales) can provide an ob je c t  for  mental reference" 
("On Genuine and 1 fic tit iou s  O bjects", op . c i t . . p .2 9 l) he says, adding that
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"Leibni:: knew th is "  — perhaps having in mind L e ibn iz 's  statement 
that being is  experienced by a d is t in ct  concept, existence by a 
d is t in c t  perception, nusserl, no doubt mindful o f  Brentano' a position  
in the "P sy ch o log y ..." , maintains a pos itive  d istin ction  between the 
presentation and the presented ( l ) }  for  him the mere "having o f  a 
content" is  not an intentional experience nor an "in trospective percept".
0»  the re je c t io n  o f  th is d istin ction  Husserl remarks : "However the 
action o f  presentation is  defined, i t  i s  un iversa lly  seen as a pivotal 
concept, not only fo r  psychology, but also fo r  epistemology and lo g ic ,  
and p a rticu la r ly  fo r  pure lo g i c .  A man who admits th is  and yet bases 
himself on the above re je c t io n , has eo ipso involved him self in con­
fusion . For th is  concept has no part to play in  epistemology and 
pure l o g i c . "  (O p .c it . , p .658) . For lik e  Kant's defending philosophy 
in the face  o f  Hume's notion o f  causality, Husserl is  very concerned 
to defend a metaphysical concept o f  intention .
With Brentano on the one hand and Husserl and Sartre on the other, 
we complete a kind o f  c ir c le ,  given the respective A ristote lian  and 
P laton ic allegiances th eir  theories display; even H usserl's philosophical 
language is  Platonic in flavour : "The Eidos, the pure essence, can be 
exem plified in tu it iv e ly  in the data o f  experience, data o f  perception, 
memory, and so fo rth , but ju s t  as readily  also in  the mere data o f  fancy 
(Phantasie). "  ("Id eas", Ch. 1 . 4^  p » )  . In attempting to grasp
th is essence in i t s  ^primordial" form, Husserl says that we can start 
from in tu it ion s  which are empirical or non-em pirical. v i z . ,  "o f a merely 
imaginative order " ( l o c . c i t . ) .  In adhering to the on tolog ica l essence 
(eidos) ho is  relinquishing Brentano's view o f  consciousness in tb . 
"P sy ch o logy ..."  ( 2) but he also puts great importance on the phenomenological
(1 ) Seo "Ideas", S ec.2. Ch.2. Sec.4t3.P.133 : " I t  is  a fundamental error to 
suppose that perception . . .  fa i ls  to come into contact with the thing i t s e l f . "  
Also p.137 s perception . . .  "presents and apprehends a s e l f  in i t s  bodily  
preserve . . i t  does th is  in accordance with the apprehended ob je c t ’ s own 
meaning, and to suppose that i t  acts otherwise i s  ju s t  to  run counter to i t s  
own sen se ."
(2) On the relationships between the theories o f  nusserl and Brentano, 
p a rticu la r ly  on in ten tion a lity  see M.Saraiva. "L'Imagination Solon Husserl", 
cap. i>i>.27ff., 30 . 53~ e tc . ~
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function  o f  the autonomous "fancy" (Phantasie).sta tin g  that the 
phenomenologyst needs i t s  help in  h is  "research in the region c f  
essence" (O p .c it . . Se c »3. Ch,IV, 111. p„309). So works o f  art, 
the " fr u it s  o f  imagination" excel our own fancy in th eir  c la r ity , 
abundance, and o r ig in a lity , and are therefore o f  great assistance 
to the phenoraenologist in h is 'research*. Exactly hoy Phantasie 
may so a s s is t  is  not completely c lea r , but much depends on what 
Husserl c a l ls  "neutra lity -m odification" -  " the process o f  fancy 
in  general i s  the neutrality -m odification  o f  the 'p o s it in g ' act 
o f  p resen tation ." (h o c . c i t . ) .  This "neutrality-m odification" 
c lo s e ly  resembles C oleridge 's  notion "suspension o f  d is b e lie f"  ( l )  
as a mental a c t , and i s  much lik e  the phenomenological epoche. or 
"bracketing" o f  the world} as Husserl says -  presumably against 
Brenteno — "in  no respect does the mental consciousness play towards 
that o f  which i t  i s  aware the part o f  a 'b e l i e f ' . "  (2 ) .  This neu­
tra lity -m od ifica tion  i s  also an antecedent o f  S artre 's  concept o f 
"nothingness" in  the "Psychology o f  Imagination", and has a sim ilar 
aesthetic function ; Husserl regards aesthetic observations as the 
neu tra lity -m odifica tion  o f  perception : in looking at a p icture , he 
says, "we do not impart to i t " .
S a rtre 's  theory o f  imagination is  based on H usserl's phenomenology. 
He accepts what he c a l ls  H usserl's "radical d istin ction " between 
consciousness and that o f  which we arc conscious, regarding the ob ject 
o f  consciousness as transcendent (rather than "o b je c t iv e ly  immanent" 
asB reitan o maintained); fo r  Sartre : "on image i s  a certain type c f
(D  See "Biographia L ite ra r ia " . Ch.XIII : "That w illin g  suspension o f  
d is b e lie f  fo r  the moment, which constitutes poetic fa ith ."
(a) See Sartre '«  "Imagination, A Psychological C ritique", Cli.IX, p.128 on 
cpor.he; also : "Phenomenology is  a description o f  the structure o f 
tronsccndental consciousness based on in tu ition  o f  the essences o f 
tho.se stru ctu res ."  He asserts that phenomenology draws i t s  knowledge 
o f  eternal truths from f ic t io n .
consciousness. An image i s  on a c t , n ot some th ing : An image is  a
consciousness o f  some th in g ." ("Imagination, A Psychological 
C ritique", p .146). But th is fora o f  consciousness is  sui generis, 
forming no part o f  a larger consciousness as Brentano held, and has 
a negative manifestation which is  somewhat reminiscent o f  Kant's 
apperception, o f  Berkeley's " s p ir it " ,  o f Kierkegaard's " s e l f " :  "The 
ch aracteristic  o f  the intentional ob ject o f  the imaginative con­
sciousness is  that the ob je c t  is  not present and is  posited  as such, 
or that i t  does not ex is t  and i s  posited as n o t  ex istin g , or that 
i t  i s  not posited  at a l l . "  ("Psychology o f Imagination", p .1 3 ). The 
image, as Sartre says, "involves a certain nothingness", i . e . ,  a 
pos itin g  o f  the world as "nothingness” in re la tio n  to images — as 
against the "psychological determinism o f  ( e . g . )  Hume -  "IVoa th is  
i t  follow s c lea r ly  that o i l  creation o f  the imaginary would he 
completely impossible to a consciousness whose nature was p rec ise ly  
to  he ' in-the-m idst—of-th e-w orld ' . "  (O p .c it . ,  Ch.V, p .21 3 ). We must 
be able to escape from the world says Sartre or we could not produce 
the rea l. He does not examine the moral im plications o f  the 
imaginary in h is  two works on imagination; he regards the aesthetic 
as quite separate from the moral and h is concern is  with the foruor.
So, in  looking a t a painted p ortra it , he says we p o s it  the person 
portrayed os not—present hut we feel towards the p ortra it  ju s t  aa 
we would towards the person, in an aesthetic act which, fo r  Sartre, 
i s  magical : " . . .  the relationship  that consciousneos p os its  in the
imaginative attitude between the portra it and i t s  orig in a l i s  nothing 
short o f  m agical." (O p .c it .. p .2 5 ). This mode o f  thought, he 
■aya, a t i l l  p ers ists  among certain prim itive tr ib es , in Mack magic, 
e t c . .  This magical a ct, th is incantation as he elsewhere c e l ls  i t  
( p »1 4 l). produces the ob je c t  in thought w ith a view to taking 
possession o f i t  : ju s t  as the actor, p loying a ro le , i s  'possessed ' 
by the character he plays; th is is  close to -the true A ristote lian  
mimesis and, we may r e c a ll, to the Dionysian enthusiast, the Bacchante,
• filled  with the g o d '.
Bab fo r  Sartre th is i s  not simply an emotive lo s s  o f  s e l f  but 
i s  an act o f  negation; the art-work is  an u nrea lity , and external 
analogue o f  the image e ffe c te d  by a negation o f  the world. Wc 
p o s it  the w orld as a "synthetic t o ta lity " , we "take perspective", 
an act which demands a freedom, to 'go beyond', o f  which being in 
the world i s  a necessary condition . In imagination, as Sartre says,
"the whole o f  consciousness rea lises  i t s  freedom." (p .2 l6 ) .  This 
negation, l ik e  the "forg etfu ln ess" o f  P lotinus, i s  a re je ct ion  o f 
and an escape from the world in to  a freedom which in  i t s  ideal nature 
relinquishes moral and a l l  other re sp on s ib ilit ie s  and attachments — 
lik e  the man in the dnngeon o f  Addison's example. I t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  
to  in terp ret th is negation as anything other than a se lf-in du lgen t 
relaxation, an abandonment, mere phantasising, though such a judgment 
can only be made on the contents o f  thought which, unless externalised , 
are p r iv a te . Being "in -the-m idst-of-the-w orld " i s  a condition  o f 
the body and in positin g  the world as a nothingness the mind is  
emphatically dividing i t s e l f  o f f  from the body, acting autonomously, 
and very probably performing a function which i s  essential to the 
equilibrium  o f  the individual. But, l ik e  Husserl, Sartre seems to 
be more concerned with the metaphysical aspect o f  the image, i t s  
essential o r  e id e tic  nature which, i t  seems to me, remains an un- 
re a lisab le  p o s s ib il i ty  ( l ik e  the concept o f  freedom) which we may or  
may not regard as an ex is ten tia l target. In th is  sense the imagin­
ation re la tes  to the id ea l, which we may regard as ju s t  one o f  i t s  
functions — though perhaps i t s  most p erfect  — and may, as Kierkegaard 
shoved, be a guide to the m orally good l i f e ;  but fo r  Sartre th is  
re la tion  to the ideal i s  autonomous (though not 'n a ively  o n to lo g ica l ' 
in  an em pirical, 'im pression ' sense o f  images) and amoral, and belongs
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CONCLUDING P3MAHKS.
"Art education has been regarded as p articu larly  concerned with 
fostering  the growth o f  the imagination. In art the use o f  the 
imagination extends to acts o f  revealing or  discovering whet was 
already therct hut not n oticed ; also o f  c la r ify in g  relationships 
between what had previously  seemed disparate phenomena or  m ateria ls." 
("A rt in Schools", D .E.S., 1971)•
Art education in England i s  quite r ig id ly  divided into three 
quite separate parts, primary, secondary, and tertia ry , the la tte r  
being la rge ly  vocational (as in teacher training and Colleges o f  
A rt). The a c t iv it ie s  subsumed under these three d iv isions are 
enormously varied , many defying description -  as "a rt" or anything 
e lse  — but however great th is  variety , these a c t iv it ie s  are frequently 
ascribed to "im agination"; th is  fa c t  may he owed to the great breadth 
o f  th is  concept, to the universal approval with which i t  i s  received, 
and often  to the useful obfuscation which i t  engenders. This la t te r  
i s  p articu larly  evident in te rtia ry  education where, in the 'Fine 
A rts ' at le a s t , the notion o f  genius reigns supreme. This notion , 
which as I have shown orig in ates in the P latonic daemon, recurs in 
various forms throughout the h istory  o f  our c iv il is a t io n  t in 
Christian mysticism, the authentic man o f  P lotinus, the magus and 
messiah o f  Renaissance magic, and f in a lly  the Romantic genius. What 
lin k s these conceptions i s  a b e l ie f  in a transcendent realm, the 
P latonic and Phenomenological eidos, the Neoplatonic One, the Christian 
heaven, the Kantian Ideas o f  Reason, to which & few special individuals 
have access by dint o f  insp iration  or  revelation . Because o f  the 
haphazard, unpredictable nature o f  th is  quality  o f  genius i t  i s  
frequently f e l t  that art cannot be taught and consequently there is  
a conspicuous n eg lect o f  technical p ro fic ien cy  at th is lev* ! o f  art 
oducation. In many cases th is  attitude also ex ists  in secondary
education oving to the large number o f  art teachers who have been 
through the non-vocational art co lleg es  and, perhaps oving to poor 
professional training, have not had cause to r e f le c t  on the appro­
priateness o r  otherwise o f  th is  attitude fo r  the secondary school 
ch ild . This 'a r t  cannot be taught' idea i s  deeply ingrained in 
the thinking o f  many educators generally end i s  r e fle c te d  in the 
status, capitation  allowance, and general strength o f  a r t  departments 
in comparison with others within the secondary school. There i s  no 
question that in examination orientated schools -  Grammar schools fo r  
example -  a rt  i s  the le a s t  o f  subjects on the curriculum and the art 
teacher is  ob liged  to accept those pupils who are judged unable to 
deal with the more 'academic' su b jects. I t  i s  part o f  the lo g ic  o f  
th is  syndrome that art i s  also regarded as a therapeutic subject 
which i s  o f  use to academic pupils as a kind o f  relaxation  from 
more demanding tasks in  school. This state o f  a ffa irs  i s  undoubtedly 
changing with advent o f  comprehensive schools, some with departments 
or fa cu lt ie s  o f  design, o r  o f  creative or expressive a r ts , often 
very well-equipped and frequently with an art trained person at 
the hand. But such establishments are not many in number. Rven so, 
th e ir  existence i s  testimony to a strik ing  change in a ttitu des to 
art education in  the secondary school, the part o f  art education 
which i s  said  to be p a rticu la r ly  concerned with foster in g  the growth 
o f  the imagination. But i t  seems to me that there i s  a c o n f l ic t  
between revealing and discovering what i s  already "there" and 
"c la r ify in g  relationsh ips between . . . .  disparate phenomena".
The quotation at the head o f  the foregoing paragraph symptomiscs 
the change o f  d irection  in art education, a change which 1» no h»+.+.»n. 
nor perhaps any worse, then the o ld  genius-expression-therapy syndrome 
i t  replaces and which i t s e l f  might equally woll be said to  be cen tra lly  
concerned with imagination. The subjective view o f  imagination i s  
giving way to the empirical -view. The problem remains whether the
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ei&pirical view meets requirements o f  an educational kind more 
s a t is fa c to r ily  than did  the old  view, for  i t  i s  certain that th is  
la t te r  was and i s  concerned with the ch ild  as a r t is t  rather titan 
as eaucand, with products rather then with the process o f  education 
in a rt ; such a concern may well s u ff ic e  in te rtia ry  education, but 
i t  i s  inadequate fo r  secondary.
Turning to the second great tradition  o f  the theory o f  imagin­
ation , (that which s ta r ts , and to soice extent fin ish es , with 
A r is to t le ) , we fin d  th at the P latonic notion o f  metempsychosis and 
o f  daemonic inspiration  i s  made redundant by the view that the soul 
has no extraneous 't r u e 1 home to which to return since i t s  home i s  
the body. I t  i s  p o in tle ss , as A risto tle  says, to speak o f  soul 
and body as separate. The d ifferen ce  between the P latonic and 
A ristotelian  trad ition s i s  epitomised in the attitudes to dreaming 
which in the Middl e Ages came to he regarded as a medium o f  divine 
revelation  as we see in  Dante, and the 'd iv in e  imagination* as 
Iamblichus ce lled  i t ;  A r is to t le  regards the dream as an autonomous, 
m ind-eclipsing thing t a negative function as M.G.M. Mure describes 
i t  — in terestin gly  enough in  view o f  S artre 's  la te r  theory o f  imagin­
ation . For A risto tle  imagination i s  a kind o f  movement; and as 
Leibniz said, that which moves is  continually created. As Breutano 
la te r  repeated, there i s  fo r  A risto tle  no mental a c t iv ity  without 
a presentation (phantasma)and actual knowledge i s  identica l with 
i t s  o b je c t  t the mind does come to understand i t s e l f  through i t s  
own concepts, but these i t  finds (as i t s e l f )  in  the world and not 
in any 'e id e t i c ' world renunciation. A r is to t le 's  theory o f  the
AAnl M iHvhlflllv ran a n+A/) C - - i c r t i c n  r*_ *
and the body are one but nmy be considered under d ifferen t attribu tes -  
o f  thought and extension resp ective ly ; th is unity  is  expressed 
uacrocoamically in the formula Pena s ire  Xatura. I t  1a on the unity
and id en tity  o f  ideas ( in  the hreudest sense) that truth depends,
asserts Leibniz, and the best te s ts  fo r  the truth o f  'phenomena* 
are agreement with the course o f  one 's  l i f e  and their pred ictive 
accuracy; because o f  th is  unity •fa n cy ', as Spinoza says, can create 
nothing and can t e l l  us nothing fo r  i t  i s  indistinguishable from 
the mind's decision . The actual iden tity  c f  presentation, judgment, 
and a ffe c t io n  which Brentano maintained in h is  "Psychology . . . "  -  
though he la te r  changed h is  mind -  i s  based on A ristotelian  and Leibnizian 
philosophy o f  mind -  i s  a rather more accurate accotait ©f human per­
ception than Hobbes' or Locke's (on which Addison's theory o f  
imagination was based). The "naive ontology" o f  images, as Sartre 
ca lls  i t ,  which i s  the basis o f  the empirical end essoc ia tion ist  
accounts o f  perception end cogn ition , o f  Kant's "reproductive imagin­
ation ", and o f  C oleridge 's "fancy", the 'aggregating power', is  the 
fr u it  o f  on a llian ce  o f  P latonic metaphysics and A ristote lian  ph il­
osophy o f  mind. On th is  account -the imagination is  said to synthesise, 
in a creative a ct, the separate 'im pressions' which i t  receives from 
sense, according to  the mind's structural p r in cip les  (Kant); or 
th is  synthesis i s  a rather passive reception o f  what customarily 
impresses i t s e l f  on the senses (Hume). E ither the mind tends to shape 
the world, or the world tends to  shape the mind.
The idea o f  using the imagination to reveal or d iscover what 
is  "already there” immediately prompts the question t where? hid 
though the en ever might be "in  the world", "in  the mind", o r  "in 
phenomena", the a c t iv it ie s  o f  discovery and c la r ify in g  relationships 
between disparate phenomena or  m aterials do appear to correspond to 
the f i r s t  o f  these answers. This in v ites  on empirical notion o f  
imagination and, as the D.E.S. quotation in d ica tes , a p seu d o -sc ien tific , 
investigatory  approach to art education with the emphasis on obser­
vation and recording; thus mind ia  shaped by tho world. This 
ob jectiv e  interpretation  does overlook the statement that imagination 
grows, but there seems to be a contradiction  between the aggregatiounl
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notion o f  discovery and the b io log ica l one o f  growth. Many 
good art departments in  secondary schools unwittingly follow  the 
precepts o f  A lberti and Leonardo in basing their syllabuses on 
observation o f  the natural world, teaching s k ills  end techniques 
b e tter  to fa c i l i t a t e  the recording and observation o f  the visual 
environment. This proceedure i s  no le s s  ju s t if ia b le  as use o f  
imagination than the notion o f  genius, though i t  i s  no doubt a 
more acceptable secondary school a c t iv ity .
Imagination also belongs to a trad ition  which sees i t s  function 
as a ffectin g  syntheses between what Eant ca lls  the manifold o f  
sense and the categories o f  understanding, in the building and 
employment o f  concepts. But i t  was perhaps inevitable that th is  
synthesis be regarded not as a hidden and mysterious mental process 
but as an a c t iv ity  rea lised  in experience. The idea that perception 
i s  the actual locus o f  imagination, indeed that we l iv e  in imagination, 
i s  already im p lic it  in A r is to t le , Spinoza, and Leibniz, and is  
c le a r ly  stated by Kierkegaard. Even in Coleridge imagination i s  
recognised as having th is  ex isten tia l function , but despite the 
importance o f  Coleridgo as a forerunner o f  art educational and 
aesthetic theory th is  function o f  imagination has not been investigated 
in  these areas. Art i s  too often  apart from l i f e ,  but education can 
never a fford  to  be; these fa cts  are often  overlooked by the unre­
f le c t in g  art educator who i s ,  unfortunately, in a m ajority. The 
a lleged  su periority  o f  art over l i f e ,  i t s  adherence to idea ls, i s  
(again) no more defensible in terms o f  imagination than are the more 
o r  le s s  mundane tasks o f  da ily  l i f e .
The po in t o f  these remarks, and much o f  the point o f  th is 
th es is , i s  that "imagination" i s  a vast and ancient concept which 
has a p lace, o r  at le a s t  a counterpart, in  the often con flictin g  
philosophies o f  mind and art which have been expressed in Vostem 
Europe since the time o f  P lato. I t  i s  essential that any theory
330
which purports to be acted upon, and which turns on, the concept 
o f  imagination, c lea r ly  state which  theory o f  imagination i s  intended. 
Unpredicated or unexplained, "im agination", used as i t  often  is  as 
a p iv ota l concept in art educational theory, can t e l l  us nothing 
o f  the u se r 's  intentions except perhaps that they are based on a 
b lin d  enthusiasm fo r  art education. Lack o f  c la r ity  about the aims 
and in tentions o f  art in the secondary school has bedevilled  art 
education fo r  too long -  the art department which produces a syllabus 
is  a great ra r ity  — consideration is  not even given to the problem 
o f  the appropriateness o f  aims and intentions fo r  a rt  education.
What I  have tr ied  to o f fe r  in th is  ih esis  are the materials fo r  the 
achievement o f  greater c la r ity  in  art educational theory wherever 
the concept o f  imagination i s  involved; o r , a t le a s t , grounds fo r  
dispensing with the tin examined use o f  th is concept.
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